The President's Call: Executive Leadership From FDR to George Bush (71 page)

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Authors: Judith E. Michaels

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A careerist added that "Nixon was the first to advance women, Carter moved it on, but Reagan set it backhe claimed Schedule C secretaries in his count of women appointees. George Bush is pushing it up again, but it's still behind where it was, we're still in the dip from the Reagan years."
Conclusion
It seems obvious that, aside from the differences discussed above, the Bush PASs were a fairly homogeneous lot, both in their demographics and in their qualifications, so much so that a "typical PAS" could be described: the standard-issue PAS was a middle-aged, married, well-educated white male from Washington, D.C.
Questions of on-the-job competence continue to provide a political thicket for political theorists and others. While the
Prune Book
systematically analyzes qualifications for some jobs, there is no such handbook for the majority of positions. This is a responsibility the Presidential Personnel Office (PPO) should undertake at its earliest opportunity. The PPO is also the unit that should address federal budget and personnel management training for its PASs.
In general, it is clear that more pressure should be placed on the PPO to make qualifications at least as important a criterion as connections in political hiring.
10
As most PASs have relatively little power in hiring their subordinates, this pressure has to come from the top of the administration, as well as from the Senate.
PAS turnover continues to be a serious issue for any administration. While Ronald Reagan seemed oblivious to its importance, Jimmy Carter, George Bush, and some senators during the latter's term made it clear to nominees that they expected them to sign on for the full term. This trend is healthy and should be continued by future presidents and in the Senate confirmation process.
What many judged the excessive and intrusive nature of the FBI investigation should be reevaluated. It is not crucial to the health of the Republic that the FBI know every single address, membership, contribution, prescription drug, etc., going back over the entire life of a potential nominee. In most cases there should be a limitation of no more than fifteen years on the number of years back into a nominee's personal life that the FBI and the Senate dig. It is also not necessary for the Senate to make public all of its knowledge about a candidate and, certainly, to that end leaks should be firmly plugged.
There should be some significant streamlining of paperwork in the nomination process so that the same information is not demanded in dif-
 
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ferent formats on different forms from the White House and the Senate, as it is now. It seems reasonable that staff cooperation could produce a basic questionnaire to which both sides could append their own questions.
Delay in nominations seems to rest with the White House more than with the Senate. While the growth in political jobs and increasingly tight ethics requirements since the Watergate era have been, to a large degree, responsible for this, the White House has been increasingly slow in choosing candidates and inordinately sluggish in the simple act of transmitting nomination papers to the Senate. This should be addressed and remedied in the PPO, supported by increased presidential attention.
While past excesses discourage any suggestion that ethics laws be loosened at this time, it appears that the financial disclosure laws and conflict of interest requirements are in need of revision to the extent that they keep otherwise qualified candidates from public political service. Likewise, postservice job restrictions should be analyzed to ensure that, in a frenzied public display of political morality, they do not excessively hinder recruitment or shorten tenure by encouraging early departure.
Bush maintained Reagan's antiregulatory stance, appointing likeminded people to the IRCs and agencies and strengthening the vice president's Council on Competitiveness, which, on its own authority, could overrule agency regulations of any sort if it deemed them harmful to capitalism or the market. He also extended Reagan's litmus test on abortion, most publicly in his appointments to the federal bench and the Supreme Court, but later in his term to many of his other PAS appointments, as well. This political criterion clearly limited the president's options.
George Bush appears to have at least cracked the conventional wisdom that posits political appointees as hacks, unqualified, agenda-driven ideologues who are more concerned with their own advancement than with the efficient and effective administration of their agency. However, because he stood so long in the shadow of Ronald Reagan and because so many of the key players were the same over both administrations, it is difficult to assess the width or depth of that crack. Nevertheless, the twelve years the Republicans held the White House meant that very often, even if appointees moved, they moved within government, not out of it, or if they did move out, they did not go very far and returned relatively quickly. Indeed, the fact that as many as 50 percent of the Bush people originally served Reagan's administration indicated that they received on-the-job training and so, often being their own predecessors, were more prepared and qualified by the time they served in Bush's. Although their experience in managing budgets and personnel was very limited, perhaps,
 
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at least, George Bush did not leave the "wisdom" about PASs as conventional as he found it.
While interviewees were of divided opinion as to which president's (Bush's or Reagan's) PASs were more competent, it was clear that George Bush's sense of team spirit mobilized his appointees in loyalty, if not in unity of vision. However, opinion was undeniably united regarding the unhappy combination of youth and inexperience in a PAS in any administration.
A word may be spoken regarding the potential end of "the age of macho" in Washington. With the advent of a nondefensive president who is not afraid to have equal partners in his spouse, the first lady, Hillary Rodham Clinton, and his vice president, Al Gore, there is, perhaps, hope that the new consciousness slowly dawning in the White House will filter down through the administration. Bill Clinton made a promise to create an administration that "looks like America," in terms of gender, ethnic, and geographic representation. He made a good start in that direction. It is therefore unlikely that the next cohort of PASs will be as easily typified as was George Bush's.
The following chapter analyzes the Bush PASs in light of various intrabureaucratic issues, with particular attention to relations among the various levels of federal employees, job satisfaction, and stress.
 
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8
Intrabureaucratic Issues: "Here, Ruining People Is Considered Sport"
Because PASs relate to numerous types of federal employees in man
y
agencies in their federal service, they have to be flexible enough and experienced enough to tolerate a system that does not respond to a command-control style. They have to know whom to consult and when, and whose judgment to trust. They also have to walk a fine line of politics, knowing who their boss is and who their customer is at any given time, because they relate not only to the White House that appointed them but also to the Congress, the press, and the public that all hold them accountable. Additionally, they have to know their own values and what gives them satisfaction in their work and how to maximize it, as well as what causes them stress and how to minimize it.
PASs carry primary responsibility for the functioning of their agency. As the political overlords in the system they have to manage organizations of varying sizes and complexities, providing policy direction while administering political and career staff of equally varying sizes and complexities. Because some PASs may be the only political appointee in their agency or they may not have any Senior Executive Service (SES) subordinates, it is difficult to generalize about PASs as a group in discussing intrabureaucratic issues. However, some conclusions can be drawn from the results of the Bush PAS Survey; they are explored in the following sections dealing with intrabureaucratic issuespolitical-career relations, political-political relations, job satisfaction, and stress.
 
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PASs Evaluate the SES: The System and Its Careerists
PASs were asked to rate SES members, both career and political, on their political responsiveness and competence. While PASs rated career SESs (CSESs) somewhat lower on responsiveness (reflecting perhaps real or imagined resistance to the Reagan-Bush agenda), they rated their competence higher than that of the political, noncareer SESs (NSESs).
Some respondents expressed frustration with the protections of the civil service system. A few wrote critical, even hostile, marginal comments in the survey about those protections and the roadblocks to change they believed these protections presented in their agency. This belief was echoed by many of the PASs who were interviewed. Though they strongly supported it in theory, they felt that the protections of the civil service system too often obstructed attempts at good management. Said one PAS: ''The worst stuff is the personnel systemit protects individuals at the expense of the efficiency of the operation. One's abilities to deal with the anomalies are much more limited than in even the most unionized company. There should be audits but there should be more emphasis on efficient management, especially regarding personnel, not to put impediments in the way of it."
Another unwittingly expressed the paradox of the situation: "On balance the careerists are pretty good. They have a remarkable level of competence considering the level of protection they have. But they should have protection. I don't believe politicians should 'clean house.' On the other hand, they should be able to get rid of the bad ones."
Others had disparaging words for the SES system and its safety for careerists, calling it a "homestead provision" that insulated workers or a "closed society" too difficult for outsiders to enter. Said one, "Certain people [CSESs] are knighted and unless they stub their toe they're going to be there foreverand it takes an
awful lot
to stub your toe. They're golden for the rest of their career."
The Senior Executive Association's executive director, Carol Bonosaro, rebutted the politicians' complaint that it was nearly impossible to dispatch a CSES:
I'm stunned that people don't use the tools they have to get the performance they wantit's a mystery to me. In fact, it's very easy to get rid of careerists. Set performance standards of things to be accomplished. Either they do it or they gorate them once as unsatisfactory, that's all it takes. I'm astonished that PASs do not exercise this option because CSESs basically have no rights, (except prohibited personnel practices).

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