Authors: James S Robbins
The Real Custer (13 page)
C
uster took command of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, made up of four Michigan regiments.
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Captain James H. Kidd of the 6th Michigan Cavalry first saw George on June 30, 1863, and the general made quite an impression. “An officer superbly mounted who sat his charger as if to the manor born,” Kidd wrote. “Tall, lithe, active, muscular, straight as an Indian and as quick in his movements, he had the fair complexion of a school girl.” Custer wore a black velvet jacket, trimmed in gold lace and fronted by a double row of brass buttons over a blue navy shirt, and “a necktie of brilliant crimson was tied in a graceful knot at the throat, the lower ends falling carelessly in front.” His wide-brimmed black hat with a gold cord “was worn turned down on one side, giving him a rakish air. His golden hair fell in graceful luxuriance nearly or quite to his shoulders, and his upper lip was garnished with a blonde moustache. A sword and belt, gilt spurs and top
boots completed his unique outfit.”
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Lieutenant Colonel Theodore Lyman, one of Meade's aides, said, “This officer is one of the funniest-looking beings you ever saw, and looks like a circus rider gone mad! . . . His aspect, though highly amusing, is also pleasing, as he has a very merry blue eye, and a devil-may-care style.”
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Custer explained, “I want my men to recognize me on any part of the field.”
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If any of Custer's men had doubts about the bravery of their brigade's eccentric-looking leader, they were dispelled later that day when Custer led a charge through the streets of Hanover, Pennsylvania, against rebel cavalry under the command of Jeb Stuart.
After several pitched cavalry battles in Virginia weeks earlier, among them Brandy Station and Aldie, Stuart moved the Confederate cavalry south, appearing to retreat back toward rebel lines on the Rappahannock. But this was a feint; Stuart swung around Manassas Junction and moved back north, crossing the Potomac at Rowser's Ford between Leesburg and Washington, D.C., on June 28.
First creating panic by moving toward the Federal capital, Stuart drove north into Maryland, raiding Union supply trains and skirmishing with Pleasonton's cavalry. His advance was slowed, however, by the 125 captured wagonloads of supplies he had in tow, and his route made it impossible to maintain contact with the right edge of the main body of the Army of Northern Virginia. Stuart was unable to provide General Lee with the necessary screening troops and intelligence regarding Union movements. Bereft of his “eyes and ears,” Lee moved north, seeking to avoid a decisive engagement but uncertain where his enemy was maneuvering, and in what numbers. As Confederate General Henry Heth later said, “The failure to crush the Federal army in Pennsylvania in 1863, in the opinion of almost all the officers of the Army of Northern Virginia, can be expressed in five words
âthe absence of our cavalry.
”
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On July 1, Heth stumbled into combat against Union General John Buford's 1st Cavalry Division at Gettysburg, and Lee consolidated his
scattered forces. The next day, Kilpatrick's division was ordered to probe the Confederate flank on the eastern reaches of Gettysburg and perhaps find a way to disrupt Lee's lines of communication through the Cashtown Gap. Stuart had reached Gettysburg earlier that same day, having ridden as far north as Carlisle looking for the Army of Northern Virginia. Having word of the Union movement, Stuart ordered Wade Hampton's brigade to intercept and block the Federals along the Hunterstown road.
Union cavalry reached Hunterstown that afternoon. A brisk charge through the town by the 18th Pennsylvania Cavalry put to flight a small rebel holding force. Outside Hunterstown, Farnsworth's brigade deployed to the right on the road to Cashtown. Custer took the left, which led toward Gettysburg and Hampton's main body.
Spotting the enemy cavalry, Custer briefly surveyed their defenses and planned his attack. The 6th Michigan regiment was in the lead. Captain Henry E. Thompson of Company A prepared to charge up the road, with two companies dismounted in an adjacent wheat field to provide support should the assault force fail. Battery M, commanded by Custer's friend and now brevet Captain Alexander Pennington, was deployed to the rear.
When the attack force had readied, Custer rode to the front and took his place beside Captain Thompson. He was conspicuous in his black velvet jacket and gold-trimmed trousers, “the gilt stripes of a brigadier-general on his arm,” Henry C. Meyer recalled. “He wore a man-o-war's man's shirt with the wide collar out on his shoulders, on each point of which was worked a silver star indicating his rank of brigadier-general. The neck was open, just as a man-o'-war's man has his, and he wore a sailor's tie.”
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Company A faced superior forces in a good defensive posture, but this did not deter Custer. He sounded the charge and led the men thundering down the road toward the Confederates.
“The charge was most gallantly made,” Hampton later wrote. But the attack was doomed. The Rebels opened up as the Union cavalry
closed. The Federals pressed on, passing the first line of dismounted Confederates and taking heavy fire in the flanks. Captain Thompson was felled, severely wounded.
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His aide Lieutenant Stephen H. Ballard had his horse shot from beneath him and was taken prisoner. Custer's horse took a bullet in the head and fell, throwing him. Rebel troops rushed to capture or kill the general as he regained his footing. Private Norval Churchill rode to the rescue, shooting a Confederate who was closing on Custer before hoisting the general onto his horse and dashing back up the road.
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Company A pulled back, with twenty-five wounded, leaving two dead.
Hampton's men counterattacked as the Michiganders withdrew, but they met heavy fire from Union skirmishers and artillery and were repulsed. An artillery duel then commenced that lasted a few hours. The fight died down, and the contending forces held their positions as night fell. Around midnight, Kilpatrick's division was ordered to retire south to the area around Two Taverns on the Baltimore Pike.
Custer's brigade arrived four hours later. They had been on the move and fighting continuously since June 29 and needed some rest. The men bedded down to the sound of cannon fire coming from the direction of Culp's Hill, about five miles northwest. It was “rather serious music to be lulled to sleep by,” Major Luther S. Trowbridge remarked to his friend Major Noah Ferry, both of the 5th Michigan.
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But after only three hours' rest, Custer and his men were readying again for action. Kilpatrick's division had been ordered to the southern end of the battlefield to strike at the Confederate right flank. Merritt's and Farnsworth's brigades moved out, and Custer was preparing to as well, when fate intervened.
That morning, General Gregg was in a position about five miles east of Gettysburg. General Pleasonton ordered Gregg to pull in closer to the right flank of the army dug in at Culp's Hill, which was then under attack and had seen bitter fighting. But Gregg hesitated, sensing that it was more important he hold the area to his front. He also knew that the part
of his command on hand, a single brigade under the command of Colonel John B. McIntosh, would be insufficient to take on the full force of Stuart's cavalry should they attempt an end-run around the Union position.
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Gregg's other brigade, commanded by his cousin Colonel J. Irvin Gregg, was further back on the Baltimore Pike. Gregg needed support, and Custer was available. On Gregg's order, Custer turned the Michigan Brigade north.
Gregg's instincts were good; Stuart was plotting another of his daring flanking maneuvers. He planned to sweep into the Union rear between the Hanover Road and the Baltimore Pike, creating confusion, raiding supply trains and encampments, disrupting Meade's stream of reinforcements, and supporting the massive infantry assault on the Union center that was about to be launched by General George Pickett. At mid-day, Stuart began moving south to the attack, and Gregg, more by design than chance, stood directly in his path.
Stuart paused on Cress Ridge, overlooking the Union lines. The ground between them, near the Rummel and Trostle farms, was not ideal for a cavalry engagement. There were trees to either side of the fields, which were crossed by stone and wood fences. Stuart's mobility would be limited, but he had the advantage of numbers. He ordered the Louisiana Guard Artillery battery to fire a round in each of the four directions of the compass, perhaps to flush out any other Union troops in the area, or to signal the Confederate main body that he was commencing the critical phase of his movement.
Pennington's battery answered Stuart's artillery, and the battle commenced. Dismounted rebel skirmishers from Ferguson's and Chambliss's brigades advanced across the fields against a similar line of men from the 5th and 6th Michigan regiments. The firepower edge of the Spencer rifles carried by the Michiganders stalled the initial Confederate movement. “Our boys held their fire until the rebs got within less than twenty rods, then they opened on them,” Captain Harris recalled. “After the first
volley the rebel officers called out, âNow for them before they can reload.' But our boys did not have to stop to reload their Spencers, but gave them a second, third, and a fourth volley. Many a reb fell, either dead or wounded; the rest were unable to stand the rain of lead and the most of them got back faster than they came. . . . One tall, lean, lank Johnny, after he came in, asked to see our guns, saying: âYou'ns load in the morning and fire all day.'”
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“A stubborn and spirited contest ensued,” Kidd recalled. “The opposing batteries filled the air with shot and shrieking shell. Amazing marksmanship was shown by Pennington's battery, and such accurate artillery firing was never seen on any other field. Alger's men, with their eight-shotted carbines, forced their adversaries slowly but surely back, the gray line fighting well, and superior in numbers, but unable to withstand the storm of bullets.”
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As the scene developed on Rummel Farm, word came from General Pleasonton affirming Gregg's decision not to withdraw, and saying he should meet the enemy where he stood. But Pleasonton also ordered Gregg to release Custer to join Kilpatrick's planned attack on the Confederate right. Again Gregg stalled. He knew a major engagement was developing, and he had a report from General Oliver O. Howard of XI Corps that “heavy clouds of dust were seen rising above the trees on his right,” indicating Gregg was facing the bulk of Stuart's cavalry. He sent word back that he required written orders to release Custer, and until he received them, the Michigan Brigade would stay where it was. Gregg noted that Custer, “fully satisfied of the intended attack, was well pleased to remain with his brigade.”
