The Road to Berlin (148 page)

OKH
/GenStdH. ‘Chefs. Ungarn 21.3–6.4.44’; also ‘Ungarn–Chefs. v. 29.3–2.4.44’. Defense of Hungary east of river Tisa, mobilization of Hungarian troops for defence. (Operations-Abteilung materials.) T-78/R333, 6290844–1120.

OKH
/GenStdH: Op. Abt. II, Chefsache: policies, operation in Bulgaria, Soviet–Bulgarian relations 2.43–5.44. T-78/R333, 6290413–480.

FH0
. Teil A.
Zusammenstellung … Beurteilungen der Feindlage (1942–44):
important, detailed reports on Soviet strength/deployment (as Anlage Nr 1 to report 19.12.43), graphs and statistics, Soviet rifle and armoured strength (15.1.44), Report No. 103/44 on Soviet operational intentions dated 10.2.44 (10 pp.), intelligence data on Soviet intentions dated 4.3.44, Gehlen appreciation of overall operational and strategic situation 30.3.44. T-78/R466, 6446070–6135.

Soviet materials

IVMV
, 8, pp. 133–7, Soviet operations, Western theatre, Soviet plan to drive on to Vitebsk, 13 January 1st Baltic Front offensive, failure to outflank Vitebsk from south-east, combined operation of 1st Baltic and Western Fronts, deep outflanking of Vitebsk and threat to Third
Panzer
Army: operations of 1st Baltic, Western and 1st Belorussian Fronts not wholly successful (these Fronts received only 19 per cent of field reinforcements, 4.2 per cent of tanks and
SP
guns), State Defence Committee (GKO) commission of enquiry into failure, blamed poor command and co-ordination.

Grylev, A.N.,
Za Dneprom
, pp. 110–17, situation in western Ukraine, beginning March 1944. Also
Dnepr. Karpaty …
, pp. 123–30.

Grylev, A.N.,
Za Dneprom
, pp. 117–51, Proskurov–Chernovtsy operation (4.3–17.4.44). Also
Dnepr. Karpaty …
, pp. 130–60.

Grylev, A.N.,
Za Dneprom
, pp. 151–66, Uman operation (2nd Ukrainian Front).

Grylev, A.N.,
Za Dneprom
, pp. 166–75, Bereznegotavo–Snigerevka operation (3rd Ukrainian Front: 6–18.3.44). Also
Dnepr. Karpaty …
, pp. 178–87.

Grylev, A.N.,
Za Dneprom
, pp. 175–82, Odessa operation (28.3–14.4.44). Also
Dnepr. Karpaty …
, pp. 187–200.

Grylev, A.N.,
Dnepr. Karpaty Krym
, pp. 219–42, planning of assault on
Crimea
(4th Ukrainian Front), breakthrough to Sevastopol.

Israelyan, V.L.,
Diplomaticheskaya istoriya VOV
, ch. IV(2), ‘ “Mirnyi” zondazh satellitov gitlerovskoi Germanii vesnoi 1944 goda’, pp. 198–205, satellite peace-feelers, spring 1944.

Svetlishin, Colonel N., ‘O nekotorykh osobennostyakh zimnei kampanii 1944 goda’,
VIZ
, 1969 (2), pp. 15–30, operational characteristics of Soviet winter offensive 1944 (see table, p. 29).

Yakubovskii, I., ‘Na proskurovsko-chernovitskom naprevlenii’,
VIZ
, 1969 (4), pp. 18–29, 1st Ukrainian Front operations, Proskurov offensive, March 1944.

Zakharov, Marshal SU M.V., ‘Umanskaya nastupatel’naya operatsiya 2-vo ukrainskovo fronta’,
VIZ
, 1962 (4), pp. 12–32, Uman offensive operations, March 1944, 2nd Ukrainian Front.

Strategic appreciations, Soviet and German pp.
182
–
190

GMDs

FHO. Beurteilung im Grossen …
, General Gehlen’s appreciation
Nr 112/44 30.3.1944
(12 pp.), also letter of transmittal to Generalquartiermeister Wagner adjuring great secrecy, restricted circulation. T-78/R497, 6485544–556.

Note:
FHO report 1428/44
(dated 3.5.44), version of
conference held by Stalin
between 24.3 and 30.3 (44) to review operational plans, two variants with Stalin adopting Plan No. 2—to open access to the Balkans, also to push German forces back to the line of the San–Vistula; German reserves would be heavily strained due to the Anglo–American threat in the west and the dangers posed by a Polish rising (hence the Soviet command discounted the threat of a German counterblow from Galicia to the Dnieper and into the Soviet flank). T-78/R498, 6485829–832.

FHO
(IIc),
Führerstellenbesetzung der Roten Armee
(1943–1944): alphabetic listing of senior Soviet commanders (down to lieutenant-colonel), positions held, identification of Soviet formations with commanders, commanders’ fronts, armies, corps, divisions, brigades (also chiefs of staff). T-78/R463, 6442178–3155.

FHO
(IIc),
Unterlagen für grosse Kräftegegenüberstellung
. Compilations of comparative Soviet–German strength, autumn 43 to summer 44. T-78/R463, 6441975–2002.

Soviet materials

IVOVSS
, 4, pt 2, pp. 123–8, Soviet strategic planning, 12 April GKO investigation of W Front, 17–19 April Stalin orders turn to defensive all fronts (except 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts), outline of main operational plan.

Zhukov, G.K.,
Vospominaniya …
, vol. 2, pp. 237–42, summons to Moscow, April 22, discussion with Stalin on summer/autumn campaign plans, correctness of decision to give priority to attack Army Group Centre (Belorussia), Stalin announces that ‘Second Front’ will come in June, Zhukov emphasizes importance of ‘enemy group in Belorussia’, Stalin suggests opening with 1st Ukrainian Front offensive to achieve deeper envelopment of Army Group Centre (and draw off German reserves), Antonov argues better to begin in the north and then attack in Belorussia, some two to three days later Stalin agrees to this (also
Memoirs
, pp. 515–20).

5 BREAKING THE BACK OF THE
WEHRMACHT:
APRIL–AUGUST 1944

For Operation
Bagration
, the Red Army offensive directed against Army Group Centre, I have relied on much Soviet memoir material, hence the repeated reference to
Voennoistoricheskii Zhurnal (VIZ)
and also the collection edited by Professor A.M. Samsonov,
Osvobozhdenie Belorussii
(Moscow: Nauka, 2nd edn 1974, 799 pp.), supplemented by my own notes taken in exchanges with Soviet commanders. Note also two collections from
GMD
which span several operations: (i) marked maps, updated daily,
OKH
‘Kriegsgeschichtliche Abteilung’, T-78/R136; (ii)
OKH
‘Allgemeines Heeresamt. Abwicklungsstab’, after-action reports from survivors of destroyed German divisions, T-78/R139,
passim
.

The recovery of the Crimea, Stavka planning pp.
191
–
199

Allen, W.E.D. and Muratoff, Paul,
The Russian Campaigns of 1944–45
, ch. III, ‘Reconquest of the Crimea’, pp. 69–86, particularly the storming of the Sapun Heights with its descent into the valley where the Light Brigade charged in 1854 (pp. 84–5).

Deane, John R.,
The Strange Alliance
(London: John Murray 1947), ch. IX, ‘Coordinating the European Land Battle’, ‘Bodyguard’ deception plan, visit of Colonel J.H. Beran and Lt.-Col. W.H. Baumer to Moscow, January 1944, meetings with Col.-Gen. F.F. Kuznetsov (Soviet General Staff).

Hillgruber, A.,
Die Räumung der Krim 1944
(Berlin and Frankfurt: E.S. Mittler 1959).

Philippi, Alfred and Heim, Ferdinand,
Der Feldzug gegen Sowjetrussland
, pt 2, ‘Die Katastrophe auf der Krim’, pp. 242–5.

Seaton, Albert,
The Russo–German War
, ch. 25, Soviet recovery of the Crimea, ‘the final in the succession of German defeats in the Ukraine … probably the greatest’, pp. 427–31; ch. 26, planning and preparation for
Bagration
, pp. 432–7.

Werth, Alexander,
Russia at War
, pt 7, ch. IV, ‘Hitler’s Crimean Catastrophe’, pp. 827–40.

Soviet materials

Badanin, Colonel B., ‘Na perepravakh cherez Sivash’,
VIZ
, 1964 (4), pp. 32–8 (engineer support, Sivash crossings).

Biryuzov, S.S.,
Surovye gody
, pt 1, pp. 254–82, planning and execution of Crimea attack, fall of Sevastopol. (As well as being very informative, this is an extremely well-written account.)

Domnikov, V.M.,
V nastuplenii Gvardiya
, 2nd Guards Army operations, Perekop and storming of Sevastopol—‘Daesh Krym!’, pp. 186–214.

Grylev, A.N.,
Dnepr Karpaty Krym
, ch. 4, recovery of the Crimea, operational planning and preparation, pp. 219–27; breaching German defences and advance on Sevastopol, pp. 227–42; storming of Sevastopol, pp. 242–53. (Extremely detailed operational narrative.)

Koltunov, G. and Isaev, S., ‘Krymskaya operatsiya v tsifrakh’,
VIZ
, 1974 (5), pp. 35–41. (Tabulations of Soviet strength/Crimea operations; includes air strength, also partisan formations.)

Korotkov, I.S. and Koltunov, G.A.,
Osvobozhdenie Kryma
(Moscow: Voenizdat 1959). See Soviet offensive, 51st Army (Sivash), 2nd Guards Army (Perekop), pursuit in northern Crimea, pp. 29–64; storming of Sevastopol, pp. 65–82.

Koshevoi, Marshal SU P., ‘Na Sivashe’,
VIZ
, 1976 (3), pp. 57–65. (P. Koshevoi commanded 63rd Rifle Corps assigned to Kreizer’s 51st Army; here, on planning Sivash crossings, also Tolbukhin’s planning for Sivash. Perekop attack on broad front.)

Kreizer, General Ya., ‘Sivash–Sevastopol’,
VIZ
, 1969 (5), pp. 75–92. (General Kreizer’s 51st Army operations.)

Kuznetsov, P.G.,
Marshal Tolbukhin
. See ‘V Krymu’, on Tolbukhin’s planning/Crimean operation, 51st Army and 2nd Guards Army attack plans, summary of operations, pp. 117–34.

Luchinskii, General A., ‘V boyakh pod Sevastopolem’,
VIZ
, 1964 (5), pp. 17–30. (Independent Coastal Army operations, Crimea.)

Shavrov, General I., ‘19-a tankovyi korpus v boyakh za Krym’,
VIZ
, 1974 (4), pp. 62–72. (Operations 19th Tank Corps, Crimea.)

Shtemenko, S.M., ‘Pered udarom v Belorussi’,
VIZ
, 1965 (9), pp. 44–59. (Unlike his ‘memoirs’, this account by Shtemenko supplies a close narrative with documentary support on the first phase of planning for
Bagration.)
Hitherto, operations in Belorussia had not attained the desired results, resulting in extensive analysis of previous failures by the Soviet command; Marshal S.K. Timoshenko confirmed that 1st and 2nd Baltic Fronts could not themselves mount the main blow, General Staff analysis of total situation on the Soviet–German front, recommendation for a provisional turn to the defensive
(Stavka
directive No. 202947, 7 May), submission of plans by Front commanders,
GKO
decision to split the Western Front, importance of operational deception
(operativnaya maskirovka)
, GS operations completed draft planning by 14 May, aim to destroy bulk of Army Group Centre (importance of blows at the flanks), 22–23 May review of General Staff operational plans, offensive fixed for 15–20 June (provisional), 3rd Belorussian plans submitted, planning also for Leningrad and 1st Ukrainian Front offensive operations.

Vaneyev, G., ‘Deistviya Chernomorskovo flota na kommunikatsiyakh protivnika v Krymskoi operatsii’,
VIZ
, 1974 (5), pp. 28–34. (Black Sea Fleet operations, Crimea.)

Vasilevskii, A.M., ‘Osvobozhdenie Kryma ot nemetsko-fashistskikh zakhvatchikov v 1944 godu’,
VIZ
, 1971 (5), pp. 71–85 and (6), pp. 57–73. In contrast to Vasilevskii’s memoirs proper
(Delo vsei zhizni)
, these two accounts of the Crimean operation are filled out with a great deal of operational documentation and details of reporting to Stalin and the
Stavka;
in particular,
VIZ
, 1971 (6), p. 57,
Stavka
directive to Black Sea Fleet (11 April), Vasilevskii to Stalin 12 April (pp. 58–9),
Stavka
orders for Independent Coastal Army 16 April, re-assignment of Yeremenko (p. 61), Vasilevskii to Stalin 18 April (p. 64), Vasilevskii to Stalin 23 April (p. 65) Stalin’s insistence on
rapid operations
, Tolbukhin’s operational directives 29 April (pp. 66–7), Vasilevskii’s written report to Stalin 5 May (p. 68), and report on storming of Sevastopol (pp. 69–70).