The Road to Berlin (96 page)

Marshal Koniev’s 1st Ukrainian Front was assigned Breslau as its primary objective. The main attack would be launched from the Sandomierz bridgehead with five field armies, two tank armies and four independent tank and mechanized corps in the direction of Radomsko; in ten to eleven days Koniev’s forces were to reach a line running from Radom–Czestochowa–Miechow, after which the offensive would be developed in the direction of Breslau. The break-out from the bridgehead would be made on a narrow twenty-mile front by three armies,
supported by six artillery divisions; two field armies would be held in the second echelon, one of them supported by a tank corps to be used for an attack on Szydlowiec, outflanking German units in Ostrowiec from the west and co-operating with troops of the 1st Belorussian Front in the capture of Radom, the second army to be employed along the axis of the main attack. The tank armies would be committed once the enemy defences had been shattered along the line of the main thrust. To the south Petrov’s 4th Ukrainian Front was ordered to prepare Moskalenko’s 38th Army for joint operations with the 60th Army of Koniev’s 1st Ukrainian Front in order to capture Cracow.

With Poznan and Breslau pinpointed as their major objectives, Zhukov and Koniev set about preparing their own operational–tactical variants. Marshal Zhukov decided on three breakthrough sectors—from the Magnuszew and Pulawy bridgeheads, and from Jablonna to the north of Warsaw. In conformity with the
Stavka
directive, Zhukov planned his main attack from Magnuszew bridgehead with three field armies (5th Shock, 8th Guards and 61st Armies) committed to breaking through the German defences on a narrow ten-mile sector and driving in the direction of Kutno–Poznan; right-flank units of 61st Army would outflank Warsaw from the west and south, while the 3rd Shock Army—a second-echelon formation—would also attack in the direction of Poznan. The two tank armies—Katukov’s 1st Guards and Bogdanov’s 2nd Guards—plus 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps were to be introduced into the gaps torn in the German defences; 2nd Guards Tank Army and 2nd Cavalry Corps would move into the gap on the third day in 5th Shock Army’s zone and drive on Sochaczew with the aim of cutting escape routes from Warsaw. Katukov’s 1st Guards Tank Army would be committed in Chuikov’s 8th Guards Army zone of operations, to push on in the direction first of Lodz and then Poznan. The secondary attack from the Pulawy bridgehead would be launched by 69th and 33rd Armies supported by two tank corps, and aimed first in the general direction of Radom and then on Lodz; left-flank units of 33rd Army would co-operate with 1st Ukrainian Front forces in reducing the Kielce–Radom group of German forces. The attack on Warsaw would be mounted by Perkhorovich’s 47th Army operating to the north of the Polish capital, while the 1st Polish Army would be introduced on the fourth day of the operation and co-operate with 47th, 61st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies in clearing the city.

Marshal Koniev decided on one massive blow from the Sandomierz bridgehead aimed along the Radom–Breslau axis. The breakthrough sector was some twenty miles wide and here Koniev intended to use 13th, 52nd and 5th Guards Armies, together with elements of 3rd Guards and 60th Armies, all reinforced with three tank corps (25th, 31st and 4th Guards). The second echelon consisted of two field armies, the 21st and 59th, the first destined to be used for an attack on Radom, the second for operations in the direction of Cracow. With over 3,000 tanks at his disposal, Koniev planned to commit Lelyushenko’s 4th Tank Army on 13th Army’s sector to drive in a north-westerly direction, cut the escape route
of the enemy’s Kielce–Radom group and then link up with 1st Belorussian Front in the area of Lodz; Rybalko’s 3rd Guards Tank Army would attack in 52nd Army’s sector, strike on to Radom and frustrate any attempts by enemy forces to take up defensive positions on the rivers Nida and Pilica. Right-flank formations (6th and 3rd Guards Armies) would attack in the direction of Szydlowiec, while the left-flank armies (60th and 59th) were to advance along the Vistula and co-operate with the 38th Army of 4th Ukrainian Front in an attack on Cracow.

The offensive operations to which Rokossovskii and Chernyakhovskii were committed—the conquest of East Prussia and the elimination of German forces in that region—involved a co-ordinated attack from the east and the south on the defensive bastion formed by the Masurian lakes. This offensive intention inevitably recalled the days of August 1914 and the Imperial Russian Army, when Rennenkampf and Samsonov attempted the invasion and conquest of East Prussia in a simultaneous drive from the east and the south; Hindenburg and Ludendorff had rallied a shaken German defence, turned on Samsonov moving from the south and defeated him, while Rennenkampf stood by inexplicably inactive, though he had already approached the outer defences of Königsberg. Rennenkampf had marched through Insterburg, Samsonov through Allenstein; though the Russian threat was finally deflected, here was a lesson the German military did not easily forget. In addition to securing the ‘Insterburg gap’ and the ‘Allenstein gap’, the German army made provision for a defensive system deeper within East Prussia. In 1945 Rokossovskii took up the role of Samsonov and once again much depended on the speed of his advance; Chernyakhovskii for his part was faced with smashing his way through the fortifications of the ‘Insterburg gap’.

The
Stavka
directive to Rokossovskii stipulated an initial offensive operation designed to destroy enemy forces in the Przasnysz–Mlawa area and, after ten to eleven days of operations, a drive in a north-westerly direction to the Neidenburg–Myszynec line and thence to Marienburg and the Baltic. The main attack would be launched from the Rozan bridgehead on the Narew with four field armies, one tank army and one tank corps, with the breakthrough sector fixed at some twelve to fourteen miles where three armies and three artillery breakthrough divisions would be committed, giving a density of some 220 guns and heavy mortars to each kilometre of front. A second attack with two field armies and one tank corps would be launched from the Serotsk bridgehead in the direction of Belsk, while one army and one tank or mechanized corps was to be used for joint operations with the 1st Belorussian Front in eliminating German forces in Warsaw. Rokossovskii’s formations would outflank Modlin from the west and prevent the Germans falling back on the Vistula.

Rokossovski accordingly planned to use three armies—3rd, 48th and 2nd Shock Armies—striking from the Rozan bridgehead along the Mlawa–Marienburg axis. To widen the breach 3rd Army would make its main attack in the direction of Allenstein, with a secondary thrust in a northerly direction. 2nd Shock Army
would use part of its forces to outflank Pulutsk from the west and co-operate with 65th Army (attacking from the Serotsk bridgehead) in eliminating the ‘Pulutsk group’. Volskii’s 5th Guards Tank Army would be introduced in the gap made by 48th Army and drive through Mlawa in a north-westerly direction. The main attack would thus be launched from the left wing of 2nd Belorussian Front, with four field armies and one tank army assigned to this primary assault, advancing in two echelons. Two field armies—the 50th on a broad front from along the Augustov canal from Augustov to Lomza, and the 3rd in closer formation north of Rozan—were deployed to provide protection against possible German counter-attacks from the north, 49th Army being assigned to the second echelon of this force.

Chernyakhovskii’s 3rd Belorussian Front received
Stavka
instructions which specified the destruction of the ‘Tilsit–Insterburg group’ of German forces as its initial objective and, after ten to eleven days of operation, the seizure of the Nemonien–Darkehmen–Goldap line. Thereafter 3rd Belorussian would develop its attack along the river Pregel in the direction of Königsberg, with the main attack force operating on the southern bank of the river. The main assault would be launched with four field armies and two tank corps from the area to the north of Gumbinnen in the direction of Wehlau. Faced by extensive German defences, manned and ready and waiting, Chernyakhovskii had no choice but to grind his way forward step by step. He proposed to destroy the Tilsit forces at the outset and reach the Tilsit–Insterburg line; then the Insterburg group would have to be reduced and eliminated, followed by an advance in the direction of Wehlau–Königsberg. Three field armies—39th, 5th and 28th—would make the initial breakthrough north of Gumbinnen; Galitskii’s 11th Guards Army would operate in the second echelon, following 5th and 28th Armies, and on the fifth day of the offensive 11th Guards would join action with 1st Tank Corps on the line of the river Inster, make a sudden thrust on Wehlau and use part of its force to co-operate with 28th Army in the capture of Insterburg. Chernyakhovskii envisaged one deep and massive thrust in the direction of Königsberg, reducing the Ilmenhorst and Heilsberg fortified regions and finally storming the fortress city of Königsberg. In the process German forces at Tilsit and Insterburg would be encircled and destroyed. The task was formidable indeed, taxing all the skill and tenacity of the brilliant Chernyakhovskii: the accomplishment of it was all too soon to cost him his life.

The Soviet build-up for the offensive on all four fronts proceeded apace during the late autumn and early winter. An enormous effort went into repairing the shattered railway networks running eastwards from the Vistula; the rail bridge over the Vistula at Sandomierz, destroyed by German shellfire, was also fully repaired and thus facilitated a more rapid movement of supplies to the western bank. More than 1,200 train loads served to fill out the supply dumps on the 1st Belorussian Front and virtually the same number served Koniev. Red Army lorries shifted more than 920,000 tons of supplies to Zhukov’s Front command
and over 100,000 reinforcements. In order to keep this stream of transport flowing, 22,000 trucks were overhauled and put into service with 1st Belorussian Front. The attack from the Vistula bridgeheads inevitably presented difficult problems. Zhukov’s Magnuszew bridgehead was relatively constricted, being no more than fifteen miles long and seven deep, served by inadequate dirt roads: here Zhukov concentrated 400,000 men and 1,700 tanks and
SP
guns. Over the question of the supply of ammunition and fuel, nerves frayed and tempers snapped. Commanders, such as General Chuikov of 8th Guards Army, were incensed at the notion of Front ‘rear services’ (logistics) under Antipenko dumping their supplies with the forward assault formations and then leaving them to it, putting an immense strain on individual army rear services to maintain the flow of supplies. Fuel for 2,500 aircraft, 4,000 tanks and
SP
guns, 7,000 lorries and 3,000 heavy tractors proved to be a vastly difficult problem, and even food supplies—never the highest priority—could not be entirely ignored; the Front required a daily supply of 25,000 tons, including 1,150 tons of bread and 220 tons of meat, 1,500 tons of vegetables and 44 tons of sugar. Difficulties with meat supply already demanded a second meatless day for the Front armies.

Marshal Koniev was a little more fortunate with his bridgehead dispositions. The Sandomierz bridgehead on the western bank of the Vistula stretched for some forty-five miles and was almost forty miles deep, which facilitated the concentration of large forces. To persuade the German command that his front would mount a major offensive from the left flank, Koniev made no secret of the preparations going forward on the eastern bank of the Vistula or of massing near Sandomierz, largely concentrated amidst Kurochkin’s 60th Army and designed to suggest that the main Soviet thrust would be in the direction of Cracow. An impressive force of 400 wooden tanks and dummy
SP
guns, plus 1,000 dummy guns—all served by a network of newly built roads for this ‘important’ sector—served some notice that a major attack could be expected on the left flank of Koniev’s front. On the bridgehead itself more than 1,160 command posts were set up, 11,000 gun and mortar emplacements made ready, and more than 2,000 kilometres of motorroad repaired or built from scratch to give each division and tank brigade two roads in order to avoid traffic jams. Red Army engineers laid no less than thirty bridges over the Vistula and put three heavy-duty ferries into service. Half the ammunition available to the front was concentrated in forward dumps in the Sandomierz bridgehead on the eve of the offensive in order to cope uninterruptedly with the heavy demand the initial barrage would make.

The preliminary German dispositions caused Marshal Koniev unconcealed satisfaction. The German command, not unnaturally, concentrated substantial reserves facing the Sandomierz bridgehead—two
Panzer
and two motorized divisions, drawn closely into the tactical defensive zone. Koniev’s Front artillery plan was designed to neutralize the whole of the enemy’s tactical defensive zone and his operational reserves all to a depth of some ten miles. In addition, it seemed that Army Group A had taken the bait about an attack to be developed
from the left flank of his front, to the east of the Wisloka and on the south side of the Vistula. On Zhukov’s front, German infantry divisions held fortified positions in front of the Magnuszew and Pulawy bridgeheads, with other units garrisoning Ostrowiec. Col.-Gen. Harpe was also holding a mobile reserve of two German divisions at the Skarzisko road junction, a ‘fire-brigade’ force able to move on any threatened sector, be it Radom, Kielce or up against the Sandomierz bridgehead. The key to the battle for Malopolska eventually proved to be Kielce, but the German command discovered that far too late in the day.

During the first week of January 1945 events in the western European theatre impinged directly on the Soviet preparations to attack in the east. Amidst a tense and sordid wrangle over the Polish question, with Stalin wringing his hands that he had not succeeded in persuading Churchill of the ‘correctness of the Soviet Government’s stand’, the British Prime Minister on 6 January 1945 sounded out the Soviet leader on the prospects of a Soviet attack in the east to ease the burden in the west, where Allied armies were being beaten bloody by the German offensive launched from the Ardennes. ‘I shall be grateful if you can tell me whether we can count on a major Russian offensive on the Vistula front, or elsewhere …’; Stalin was only too pleased to reply on 7 January that preparations would go ahead ‘at a rapid rate’ and
‘regardless of weather’
for launching the Soviet offensive not later than the second half of January. Twenty-four hours later Marshal Koniev received a radio-telephone call from General Antonov, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, who informed him that in view of the ‘difficult position’ of the Allies due to the Ardennes offensive the Soviet attack would now begin as soon as possible: 1st Ukrainian Front would accordingly attack on 12 January, not the 20th as previously understood. This order emanated from Stalin himself. Koniev agreed at once, though he realized almost immediately that due to the prevailing as well as anticipated weather conditions his offensive would have to rely on artillery alone, with Soviet aircraft grounded. Somewhat inexplicable (and still unexplained) is the instruction to Zhukov to open his attack on 14 January, but judging from the adjustments in the timing of other offensive operations it would appear that some kind of synchronization was being attempted. Koniev would attack first with 1st Ukrainian, Chernyakhovskii on the following day, 13 January, with 3rd Belorussian, followed in turn by Zhukov with 1st Belorussian and Rokossovskii with 2nd Belorussian on 14 January. And while Stalin could make the grand gesture to his Allies by advancing the date of the Soviet offensive, this accelerated pace also had the advantage of setting Soviet armies on the move before the German command could bring substantial reserves to bear in the east. The prevailing weather promised poor flying conditions, but at least the cold would facilitate the ground movement and offer firm going for some days.