Authors: Timothy H. Parsons
Tags: #Oxford University Press, #9780195304312, #Inc
French offi cials only trusted “old Frenchmen.” This discrimination
invariably alienated and disillusioned potential allies. Consequently,
the preeminent notables in the conquered territories withdrew from
civic life to avoid being drawn into the imperial administration on
unfavorably subordinate terms.
Napoleon’s problems recruiting and retaining local allies would
have been quite familiar in earlier empires. The Romans, Umayyads,
conquistadors, and nabobs all tried to implement their own versions
of
ralliement
. Napoleon, however, broke new ground in the scope of
his ambitiously systematized amalgamist agenda. While he sought
to rally the most useful and prominent European social classes to
his cause, in the long term his goal was to create a cohort of “new
Frenchmen” to bridge the gap with his subjects. Theoretically, they
would be loyal to the Napoleonic regime because they shared its goals
256 THE RULE OF EMPIRES
and core values while retaining suffi cient ties to their home cultures
to be useful imperial intermediaries. The vast majority of conquered
Europeans would remain subordinate subjects, but these assimilated
elites would enjoy a measure of privilege and equality on par with
that of romanized Britons under the later Roman Empire. Where it
took centuries for romanization to run its course in Britain, Napoleon
gambled that he could create a viable European continental empire in
a single generation by reviving and updating Roman assimilationist
policies.
The legacy of Bourbon absolutism and revolutionary centralization gave Napoleon the means and inspiration to attempt such an
audacious feat of imperial social engineering. Banking on the malleability of youth, French administrators established special schools
to draw the children of the aristocratic and notable classes into the
new order. Always on the lookout out for promising recruits, they
kept careful track of prominent families and maintained extensive
fi les on their wealth, talents, loyalties, and reputations. No amount of
gossip was too trivial, and police offi cials recorded the religion, dowries, physical appearance, and morals of unmarried young women
of means. For those who passed muster, receptions, balls, salons, and
tours of Paris highlighted the aesthetic rewards of imperial service,
while the army and the
auditoriat
offered the prospect of status, rapid
advancement, and, in the case of the military, glory. Napoleon even
turned Freemasonry, which the Convention and Directory distrusted
and condemned, into an amalgamist instrument. Bringing the various
French rites under central state authority, Napoleon used Masonic
lodges, particularly those tied to French army regiments, to co-opt
the young Germans and Italians who joined the Napoleonic forces.
These amalgamist strategies achieved a small measure of success.
Napoleon had roughly 150 foreign generals, and a little more than
10 percent of all prefects were “new Frenchmen.”22
Amalgame
was
most appealing to the small strata of urban and professional classes
best equipped to take advantage of the stability and opportunities in
the new continental empire. Young Italian, German, and Belgian notables could fi t themselves into Napoleonic society because they shared
the values of the French Enlightenment and revolution and had not
yet committed themselves to an exclusive national identity. Napoleon
claimed to be above the ancien régime’s anti-Semitic prejudices, but he
did not accord Jews equality before the law. Instead, French Jews had to
Napoleonic
Italy 257
serve a ten-year probationary term to demonstrate that they had given
up their “superstitious” ways before qualifying as real Frenchmen.
Eastern Europeans were even harder to assimilate. Coming from
more agrarian feudal societies, they were largely a mystery to French
administrators. Napoleon therefore overreached himself in trying
to impose
amalgame
on the Illyrian Provinces. When Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, and other Balkan communities refused to accept the
Code Napoleon or attend French
lycées
, French offi cials concluded
that they were too primitive and superstitious to ever become new
Frenchmen.
Despite these French rationalizations,
ralliement
and
amalgame
failed because they offered no signifi cant protection from the real
burdens of imperial subjecthood. Austrian and Prussian elites and
commoners alike had to pay tens of millions of francs into French
coffers as penalties for their rulers’ defi ance of Napoleon’s imperial
agenda. In 1807, the
départements réunis
and satellite kingdoms surrendered a total of 359 million francs in tribute, which constituted half
of France’s annual national income. The weight of this unprecedented
extractive regime took an equally heavy toll on both Napoleon’s enemies and allies. The Kingdom of Holland had to take out a loan of forty
million fl orins to meet its obligations to the emperor, and roughly
two-thirds of the Kingdom of Naples’ budget went to pay for the cost
of its French garrison. Similarly, the Kingdom of Westphalia’s yearly
tribute obligations and mandatory military spending outstripped its
annual revenues by more than six million francs.23 The resulting fi scal insolvency ensured that the satellite kingdoms would never be
even remotely autonomous.
The continental system, which embargoed British goods in the
aftermath of the French navy’s demise at Trafalgar, had an equally
extractive dimension. Hoping to strangle Britain’s emerging industrial economy, Napoleon turned the empire into a common but protected market for French industry and commerce. Under a blatant
“France fi rst” policy, discriminatory internal tariffs privileged French
manufactures over those of rivals in the satellite kingdoms. As a
result, Swiss, German, and Austrian producers lost access to key markets in northern Italy, Belgium, and the Rhineland that had become
part of metropolitan France as annexed
départements réunis
. Even
worse, the Royal Navy’s retaliatory blockade closed off overseas
markets, thereby swamping the continent with unsold excess goods.
258 THE RULE OF EMPIRES
This overproduction drove down prices and forced bankers to tighten
credit and raise interest rates. Unemployment rose as small fi rms and
large manufacturers alike went out of business. French merchants
also openly violated the blockade when it suited them. They resold
captured goods at a premium and even saved the British from a bad
harvest in 1810 by selling them wheat.
While the continental system encouraged some import substitution to replace British and overseas products, it ultimately forced the
rest of Europe to subsidize metropolitan France’s standard of living.
The development of more sophisticated fi nancial instruments allowed
Napoleon to dispense with some of the cruder extractive tactics of his
imperial predecessors, but there was no mistaking the reality that
his fi scal policies were simply an updated form of imperial plunder.
Special agents drew up statistical assessments of the wealth of newly
conquered territories, and prefects toured their departments annually to gather demographic and economic data for the purposes of
conscription and tax collection.
Administrators, generals, speculators, and concessionaires also
leveraged their privileged position to reap the personal benefi ts of
empire. Just as military victories in India gave the nabobs the means
to exploit Bengali rulers and
ryots
alike, the French scrambled to
make their fortunes in the
départements réunis
and satellite kingdoms. They bought up the Catholic Church’s nationalized lands at
reduced prices and made off with its moveable treasures and works
of art. Typically, the imperial administration also became a lucrative
source of jobs, contracts, and patronage. Profi t-seeking Frenchmen
exposed the inherent corruption of empire by selling conscription
exemptions, taking bribes to ignore smuggling, speculating in currency, and extorting gifts from local notables. This sort of graft was
hardly unusual in early nineteenth-century Europe, but the power of
empire gave venial Frenchmen the means to seek fortunes without
fear of sanction or retribution from the local authorities.
Napoleon personally disapproved of this kind of corruption, but
he also had no qualms about exploiting the opportunities of empire.
Ignoring the protests of his German and Polish allies, he seized great
swaths of Church and feudal land in the Kingdom of Westphalia and
the Duchy of Warsaw to create estates for his new imperial nobility,
who consisted primarily of Bonaparte family members and French
generals. The common Poles and Germans who actually lived on these
Napoleonic
Italy 259
donations
essentially acquired new feudal masters. These new French
estates generated tens of millions of francs a year, most of which
their absentee holders remitted to metropolitan France. Napoleon
personally claimed a share of these spoils for his own use through a
special fund known as the
domaine extraordinaire
. Although Polish
and German peasants bore the heaviest burden of this exploitation,
French revenue demands effectively hamstrung Napoleon’s eastern puppet rulers. In addition to losing a signifi cant portion of their
annual budgets, the necessity of using authoritarian measures to generate the surplus required to meet French tribute demands cost them
what little legitimacy they had with their subjects.
While this constituted a fairly conventional form of imperial
extraction, the French also placed new burdens on their subjects
by demanding military service as well as labor and tribute. Protonationalism justifi ed mass conscription in metropolitan France, but
Napoleon’s insistence that the “modernizing” reforms of his empire
placed a similar obligation on conquered populations rang hollow. Yet
the Confederation of the Rhine, Switzerland, and the kingdoms of
Italy and Westphalia actually supplied more conscripts than metropolitan France. To a degree this refl ected the limited successes of
ral-
liement
and
amalgame
in convincing local notables to serve in and
recruit for the French army. Napoleon’s willingness to promote his
offi cers on the basis of merit rather than birth helps to explain how
more than one hundred Westphalians won the Legion d’Honneur.24
However, the rulers of the satellite kingdoms also put their weight
into conscription in the hope of gaining a greater degree of autonomy
from their French overseers.
Roughly one million Italians, Germans, Belgians, Dutchmen,
Poles, and other nationalities served Napoleon as conscripted soldiers. Estimates vary, but anywhere from one quarter to one half
of the men in the Grande Armée that invaded Russia in 1812 were
not French. French conscription policies thus constituted a new and
highly oppressive form of imperial exploitation. The eighty thousand
soldiers Napoleon took from the Rhineland amounted to 60 percent
of all eligible men in 1813. Less than half of these troops returned
home.25
These worsening conditions in the imperial forces eventually
inspired the same kind of local resistance to conscription that broke
out in the French Vendée. As in France, Napoleon’s unending appetite
260 THE RULE OF EMPIRES
for soldiers drove imperial offi cials and their allies to intervene ever
more deeply into local affairs. The result was widespread draft evasion
and anticonscription riots. Banditry also became more common as
draft dodgers and deserters joined the outlaw gangs that had long
resisted the ancien régime’s attempts to extend their reach into the
remote hinterlands. Resistance to conscription also often blended into
local opposition to economic liberalization, land privatization, and the
abolition of collective rights.
Napoleon was barely aware of these realities and treated this
and every other form of dissent as unacceptable threats. The police
imposed summary punishment without trial, and special criminal
courts suspended regular legal codes to deal with captured rebels and
bandits. The French success in improving law and order won over
some notables, but these brutal tactics gave the great majority of
Napoleon’s rural subjects little opportunity to embrace
ralliement
.
Seeing through the hypocrisy of Napoleonic propaganda, common
peoples boycotted French sponsored festivals and ignored orders to
celebrate the emperor’s military victories. Others wore ribbons in the
colors of deposed ancien régime rulers or refused to attend imperial
Church services.
Napoleon’s secular agenda and attempts to impose state control
on the clergy were particularly divisive, and the Catholic Church
emerged as one of his most entrenched and determined opponents
after his accord with the Pope collapsed. The failure of the concordat was costly. The clergy were far more infl uential at the local level