The Secret Sentry (70 page)

45. Confidential interviews.

46. For importance of the Fifty-fifth Brigade, see Ali A. Jalali, “Afghanistan: The Anatomy of an Ongoing Conflict,”
Parameters
, vol. 31, no. 1 (Spring 2001): p. 89; “Pentagon Sets Sights on Tal-iban’s Elite Brigade 55,” AFP, October 15, 2001; Rory
McCarthy, Helen Carter, and Richard Norton-Taylor, “The Elite Force Who Are Ready to Die,”
U.K. Guardian
, October 27, 2001; Daniel Eisenberg, “Secrets of Brigade 055,”
Time
, October 29, 2001; Romesh Ratnesar, “Into the Fray,”
Time
, October 29, 2001.

47. Confidential interview.

48.
Unclassified Documents from Marine Task Force 58’s Operations in Afghanistan: Forming: 27 October
to 5 November 2001
, February 2002, http://www.strategypage.com/articles/ tf58/forming.asp.

49. “ ‘No More Retreat,’ Taleban Troops Told,” BBC, November 13, 2001, /world/south_asia/1654256.stm.; William Branigin, “Afghan
Rebels Seize Control of Kabul,”
Washington Post
, November 14, 2001; Jonathan Steele, “Stand and Fight, Fleeing Taliban Told,”
U.K. Guardian
, November 14, 2001.

50. Vernon Loeb and Bradley Graham, “Special Forces Block Traffic in Search for bin Laden,”
Washington
Post
, November 15, 2001.

51. Confidential interviews. See also “Omar ‘Disappears’ as Taliban Surrender Ends,” Reuters, December 7, 2001.

52. For SIGINT teams searching for bin Laden, see confidential interviews with former military intelligence officers; Michael
Smith,
Killer Elite: The Inside Story of America’s Most Secret Special
Operations Team
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2006), pp. 224–25.

53. Open source discussion of the mission and functions of Grey Fox can be found in Peter Beaumont, “ ‘Grey Fox’ Closes in
on Prize Scalp: Saddam,”
U.K. Observer
, June 22, 2003; Rowan Scarborough, “Agencies United to Find Bin Laden,”
Washington Times
, March 15, 2004. For mentions of the U.S. Army Security Coordination Detachment, see Defense Department, Under Secretary
of Defense for Personnel and Readiness,
Defense Manpower Requirements Report
for Fiscal Year 2006
, July 2005, p. 65; “USATST Recruiting Effort,”
Fort Huachuca Scout
, September 19, 2002, p. 6.

54. Philip Smucker, “How bin Laden Got Away,”
Christian Science Monitor
, March 4, 2002.

55. U.S. Special Operations Command,
U.S. Special Operations Command History: 1987–2007
(MacDill Air Force Base, FL: USSOCOM History Office, 2007), p. 94.

56. Charles H. Briscoe, Richard L. Kiper, James A. Schroeder, and Kalev I. Sepp,
U.S. Army Special
Operations in Afghanistan
(Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 2006), p. 213; U.S. Special Operations Command,
Special Operations Command History
, p. 93.

57. Briscoe, Kiper, Schroeder, and Sepp,
Army Special Operations
, pp. 214–15. The mission of the Green Beret SIGINT team from confidential interview.

58. Michael R. Gordon and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Force May Search Tora Bora for bin Laden,”
New
York Times
, December 19, 2001.

59. Confidential interviews. See also Rory McCarthy, “Radio Picks Up Voice of bin Laden,”
U.K.
Observer
, December 16, 2001.

60. Barton Gellman and Thomas E. Ricks, “U.S. Concludes Bin Laden Escaped at Tora Bora Fight,”
Washington Post
, April 17, 2002.

61. U.S. Special Operations Command,
Special Operations Command History
, p. 98. See also Peter Bergen, “War of Error: How Osama bin Laden Beat George W. Bush,”
New Republic
, October 22, 2007.

62. Patrick Healy and Farah Stockman, “Taliban Flee Kandahar,”
Boston Globe
, December 8, 2001.

63. Armando J. Ramirez,
From Bosnia to Baghdad: The Evolution of US Army Special Forces from
1995–2004
(Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2004), p. 65.

64. Tony Karon, “Why the Bad Guys Get Away in Afghanistan,”
Time
, January 8, 2002.

65. Confidential interviews. See also James Risen and Dexter Filkins, “Qaeda Fighters Said to Return to Afghanistan,”
New York Times
, September 10, 2002; Evan Thomas, “The Ongoing Hunt for Osama bin Laden,”
Newsweek
, September 3, 2007.

66. Steve Vogel, “Rumsfeld Doubts Bin Laden Escaped,”
Washington Post
, January 17, 2002.

67. Mark Mazzetti, “On the Ground: How Special Ops Forces Are Hunting al Qaeda,”
U.S. News &
World Report
, February 17, 2002.

68. Bergen, “War of Error.”

13: A Mountain out of a Molehill

1. Bradley Graham, “Unfinished Business in Proxy War,”
Washington Post
, January 6, 2002; Tony Karon, “Why the Bad Guys Get Away in Afghanistan,”
Time
, January 8, 2002; Rory McCarthy, “Fighters Who Slipped Through the Net,”
U.K. Guardian
, February 13, 2002; William R. Hawkins, “What Not to Learn from Afghanistan,”
Parameters
, vol. 32, no. 2 (Summer 2002): p. 30.

2. Confidential interviews with NSA and U.S. military intelligence officials; Battalion Landing Team 3/6, 26th Marine Expeditionary
Unit,
Command Chronology for Period 1 July 2001–28 February
2002
, sec. 2, March 1, 2002, p. 16, Marine Corps Historical Center, Quantico, VA. For confirmation by Defense Department officials
that the U.S. military was continuing to detect Taliban usage of satellite telephones, see also Jim Garamone, “Central Command
Can Call More Troops If Needed,” American Forces Press Ser vice, January 25, 2002. For resumption of Taliban attacks in southern
Afghanistan, see “Afghan Fighters Seal Border Crossing,” Associated Press, January 11, 2002; Richard Lacayo, “The Deadly Hunt,”
Time
, January 14, 2002; Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Says Tribal Leaders Balk at Aiding Search for Taliban,”
New York Times
, January 17, 2002; Tim McGirk, “Where Danger Lurks,”
Time
, January 27, 2002; Philip Smucker, “After Tora Bora, US Hunts Alone,”
Christian Science Monitor
, January 28, 2002.

3. Barton Gellman and Dafna Linzer, “Afghanistan, Iraq: Two Wars Collide,”
Washington Post
, October 22, 2004. For withdrawal of the 513th Military Intelligence Brigade and its SIGINT units, see John F. Berry, “The
513th Military Intelligence Brigade in Support of Operation Enduring Freedom,”
Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin
, April–June 2002; Spc. Leslie Pearson, “Longtime Reservist Recalls Two-Year Activation,”
Mirage
, vol. 1, 4th Quarter ed. (2003): p. 17; “513th Military Intelligence Brigade,”
Mirage
, vol. 1, 4th Quarter ed. (2003): p. 20; confidential interviews.

4. Sean Naylor,
Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda
(New York: Berkley Books, 2005), pp. 41–42.

5. Naylor,
Not a Good Day
, p. 75; Rowan Scarborough, “Military Officers Criticize Rush to Use Ground Troops,”
Washington Times
, March 7, 2002; Richard T. Cooper, Geoffrey Mohan, and Rone Tempest, “Fierce Fight in Afghan Valley Tests U.S. Soldiers and
Strategy,”
Los Angeles Times
, March 24, 2002; confidential interview.

6. The best single description of Operation Anaconda and its aftermath can be found in Naylor,
Not a Good Day
.

7. Bruce D. MacLachlan, Lt. Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
Operational Art in the Counter-Terror War
in Afghanistan
(Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2002), p. 17; Stephen Biddle,
Afghanistan and
the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy
(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2002), pp. 20, 31; oral history,
Interview with Major Jason Warner
, third interview, August 21, 2007, p. 8, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

8. Accounts of Operation Anaconda differ markedly as to whether the operation was a success or a failure. For a generally
rosy assessment see Dr. Richard Kugler,
Operation Anaconda in Af-
ghanistan: A Case Study of Adaptation in Battle
(Washington, DC: National Defense University, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 2007). Critical assessments
of U.S. military per for mance during Operation Anaconda can be found in Naylor,
Not a Good Day
; Bradley J. Armstrong,
Rebuilding Afghanistan: Counterinsurgency and Reconstruction in Operation Enduring
Freedom
(Monterey, CA: U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, 2003), p. 7; Lt. Commander Todd Marzano, USN,
Criticisms Associated with Operation Anaconda: Can Long-Distance Leadership Be
Effective?
(Newport, RI: Naval War College, October 23, 2006); Scarborough, “Military Officers Criticize Rush”; Elaine Grossman, “Was
Operation Anaconda Ill-Fated from the Start? Army Analyst Blames Afghan Battle Failings on Bad Command Set-up,”
Inside the Pentagon
, July 29, 2004, p. 1; Elaine Grossman, “Anaconda: Object Lesson in Poor Planning or Triumph of Improvisation?,”
Inside the Pentagon
, August 12, 2004, p. 1.

9. “Prepared Statement of General Tommy R. Franks, Commander, U.S. Central Command Before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee,”
July 31, 2002, p. 6; General Tommy Franks (USA, Ret.),
American Soldier
(New York: Regan Books, 2004), p. 379.

10. Confidential interviews with U.S. Army officers involved in the operation. See also Paul Haven, “Top General in Afghanistan
Says al-Qaida and Taliban Forces Are Trying to Regroup in East,” Associated Press, March 20, 2002; Anthony Lloyd, “Marines
Start Sub-Zero Hunt for al-Qaeda,”
U.K. Times
, April 17, 2002; Rick Scavetta, “Military Interrogators in Afghanistan Use Detective Work in Mental Chess Game,”
Stars and Stripes
, April 30, 2002.

11. Confidential interviews.

12. Ibid.

13. Karl Vick and Kamran Khan, “Raid Netted Top Al Qaeda Leader,”
Washington Post
, April 2, 2002; Aftab Ahmad, “Osama in Faisalabad?,”
The Nation
(Lahore ed.), April 8, 2002, FBIS-NEW-2002-0408; Ijaz Hashmat, “US Intercepted Satellite Phone Message That Led to Raid in
Faisalabad,”
Khabrain
, April 9, 2002, FBIS-NES-2002-0409.

14. Jonathan Fowler, “Al-Zarqawi Used Swiss Cell Phone,” Associated Press, November 25, 2004.

15. Rory McCarthy and Julian Borger, “Secret Arrest of Leading al-Qaida Fugitive,”
U.K. Guardian
, September 4, 2002.

16. Jason Burke, “Brutal Gun Battle That Crushed 9/11 Terrorists,”
U.K. Observer
, September 15, 2002; Nick Fielding, “Phone Call Gave Away Al Qaida Hideout,”
U.K. Sunday Times
, September 15, 2001; Rory McCarthy, “Investigators Question Key September 11 Suspect,”
U.K. Guardian
, September 16, 2002; Nick Fielding, “War on Terror: Knocking on Al-Qaeda’s Door,”
U.K. Sunday
Times
, September 22, 2002.

17. Confidential interview. See also James Risen and Eric Lichtblau, “Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts,”
New York Times
, December 16, 2005.

18. For killing of al-Harethi, see “U.S. Kills al-Qaeda Suspects in Yemen,” Associated Press, November 5, 2002. For Hayden-Rumsfeld
interchange, see Dana Priest and Ann Scott Tyson, “Bin Laden Trail ‘Stone Cold,’ ”
Washington Post
, September 10, 2006.

19. Colum Lynch, “US Used UN to Spy on Iraq, Aides Say,”
Boston Globe
, January 6, 1999; Barton Gellman, “Annan Suspicious of UNSCOM Probe,”
Washington Post
, January 6, 1999; Bruce W. Nelan, “Bugging Saddam,”
Time
, January 18, 1999; Seymour M. Hersh, “Saddam’s Best Friend,”
New Yorker
, April 5, 1999, pp. 32, 35; David Wise, “Fall Guy,”
Washingtonian
, July 1999, pp. 42–43.

20. Charles Duelfer, Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence,
Comprehensive Report of
the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraqi WMD
, vol. 1, chap. 2, September 30, 2004, pp. 108–09, CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, Document No. 0001156395, http://www.foia.cia.gov;
Bill Gertz, “China Fortifying Iraq’s Air-Defense System,”
Washington Times
, February 20, 2001.

21. Charles Aldinger, “Western Warplanes Hit Iraqi Defenses,” Reuters, August 8, 2001.

22. Mohammed Hayder Sadeq and Sabah al-Anbaki, “Cell Phone Service Is Spotty, But Reception Is Great,”
USA Today
, March 3, 2005; Yaroslav Trofimov and Sarmad Ali, “Iraq’s Cellphone Battle,”
Wall Street Journal
, July 21, 2005.

23. Kevin M. Woods et al.,
Iraqi Perspectives Project: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam
Hussein’s Senior Leadership
(Norfolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command, 2006), p. 129.

24. Confidential interviews.

25. Joe Trento, “Pakistan & Iran’s Scary Alliance,” National Security News Service, August 15, 2003, http://www.storiesthatmatter.org/index.php?option’com_content&task’view&
id’48&Itemid’29.

26. “Sanction Busting,”
Newsweek
, December 31, 1990, p. 4. See also Director of Central Intelligence,
Annual Report on Intelligence Community Activities
, August 22, 1997, http:// www.cia.gov.

27. Bill Gertz, “French Connection Armed Saddam,”
Washington Times
, September 8, 2004.

28. Bill Gertz,
Betrayal
(Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 1999), p. 283.

29. Memorandum,
Intelligence and Analysis on Iraq: Issues for the Intelligence Community
, July 29, 2004, p. 5, CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, Document No. 0001245667, http://www.foia.cia.gov.; Commission on
the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction,
Report to the President of the United States
(Washington, DC: GPO, March 31, 2005), p. 15. Woodward quote from Bob Woodward,
Plan of Attack
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), p. 217.

30. Rowan Scarborough, “U.S. Rushed Post-Saddam Planning,”
Washington Times
, September 3, 2003.