The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (22 page)

In March 2004, the CIA took custody of an Afghan national who had sought employment at a U.S. military base because he had the same name (Gul Rahman) as an individual believed to be targeting U.S. military forces in Afghanistan.
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During the period in which the Afghan was detained, the CIA obtained signals intelligence of their true target communicating with his associates. DNA results later showed conclusively that the Afghan in custody was not the target. Nonetheless, the CIA held the detainee in solitary confinement for approximately a month before he was released with a nominal payment.
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In the spring of 2004, after two detainees were transferred to CIA custody, CIA interrogators proposed, and CIA Headquarters approved, using the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques on one of the two detainees because it might cause the detainee to provide information that could identify inconsistencies in the other detainee’s story.
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After both detainees had spent approximately 24 hours shackled in the standing sleep deprivation position, CIA Headquarters confirmed that the detainees were former CIA sources.
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The two detainees had tried to contact the CIA on multiple occasions prior to their detention to inform the CIA of their activities and provide intelligence. The messages they had sent to the CIA █████ █████████████ were not translated until after the detainees were subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
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During this same period in early 2004, CIA interrogators interrogated Adnan al-Libi, a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. CIA Headquarters did not approve the use of the CIA’s enhanced techniques against al-Libi, but indicated that interrogators could use “standard” interrogation techniques, which included up to 48 hours of sleep deprivation.
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CIA interrogators subsequently reported subjecting Adnan al-Libi to sleep deprivation sessions of 46.5 hours, 24 hours, and 48 hours, with a combined three hours of sleep between sessions.
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Beginning in late April 2004, a number of media outlets published photographs of detainee abuse at the Department of Defense-run Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. The media reports caused members of the Committee and individuals in the executive branch to focus on detainee issues. On May 12, 2004, the Committee held a lengthy hearing on detainee issues with Department of Defense and CIA witnesses. The CIA used the Abu Ghraib abuses as a contrasting reference point for its detention and interrogation activities. In a response to a question from a Committee member, CIA Deputy Director McLaughlin said, “we are not authorized in [the CIA program] to do anything like what you have seen in those photographs.”
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In response, a member of the Committee said, “I understand,” and expressed the understanding, consistent with past CIA briefings to the Committee, that the “norm” of CIA’s interrogations was “transparent law enforcement procedures [that] had developed to such a high level . . . that you could get pretty much what you wanted.” The CIA did not correct the Committee member’s misunderstanding that CIA interrogation techniques were similar to techniques used by U.S. law enforcement.
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7. The CIA Suspends the Use of its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, Resumes Use of the Techniques on an Individual Basis; Interrogations are Based on Fabricated, Single Source Information

In May 2004, the OLC, then led by Assistant Attorney General Jack Goldsmith, informed the CIA’s Office of General Counsel that it had never formally opined on whether the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques in the CIA’s program was consistent with U.S. constitutional standards.
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Goldsmith also raised concerns about divergences between the CIA’s proposed enhanced interrogation techniques, as described in the August 1, 2002, memorandum, and their actual application, as described in the CIA Inspector General’s Special Review.
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In late May 2004, DCI Tenet suspended the use of the CIA’s “enhanced” and “standard” interrogation techniques, pending updated approvals from the OLC.
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On June 4, 2004, DCI Tenet issued a formal memorandum suspending the use of the CIA’s interrogation techniques, pending policy and legal review.
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The same day, the CIA sought reaffirmation of the program from the National Security Council.
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National Security Advisor Rice responded, noting that the “next logical step is for the Attorney General to complete the relevant legal analysis now in preparation.”
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On June █, 2004, a foreign government captured Janat Gul, an individual believed, based on reporting from a CIA source, to have information about al-Qa’ida plans to attack the United States prior to the 2004 presidential election.
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In October 2004, the CIA source who provided the information on the “pre-election” threat and implicated Gul and others admitted to fabricating the information. However, as early as March 2004, CIA officials internally expressed doubts about the validity of the CIA source’s information.
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On July 2, 2004, the CIA met with National Security Advisor Rice, other National Security Council officials, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, as well as the attorney general and the deputy attorney general, to seek authorization to use the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, specifically on Janat Gul.
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The CIA represented that CIA “interrogations have saved American lives,” that more than half of the CIA detainees would not cooperate until they were interrogated using the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques,
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and that “unless CIA interrogators can use a full range of enhanced interrogation methods, it is unlikely that CIA will be able to obtain current threat information from Gul in a timely manner.”
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Janat Gul was not yet in CIA custody.
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On July 6, 2004, National Security Advisor Rice sent a memorandum to DCI Tenet stating that the CIA was “permitted to use previously approved enhanced interrogation methods for Janat Gul, with the exception of the waterboard.” Rice offered “to assist [the CIA] in obtaining additional guidance from the Attorney General and NSC Principals on an expedited basis” and noted the CIA’s agreement to provide additional information about the waterboard technique in order for the Department of Justice to assess its legality. Rice’s memorandum further documented that the CIA had informed her that “Gul likely has information about preelection terrorist attacks against the United States as a result of Gul’s close ties to individuals involved in these alleged plots.
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In a meeting on July 20, 2004, National Security Council principals, including the vice president, provided their authorization for the CIA to use its enhanced interrogation techniques—again, with the exception of the waterboard—on Janat Gul. They also directed the Department of Justice to prepare a legal opinion on whether the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques were consistent with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
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On July 22, 2004, Attorney General John Ashcroft sent a letter to Acting DCI John McLaughlin stating that nine interrogation techniques (those addressed in the August 1, 2002, memorandum, with the exception of the waterboard) did not violate the U.S. Constitution or any statute or U.S. treaty obligations, in the context of the interrogation of Janat Gul.
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For the remainder of 2004, the CIA used its enhanced interrogation techniques on three detainees—Janat Gul, Sharif al-Masri, and Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani—with individualized approval from the Department of Justice.
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After being rendered to CIA custody on July ██, 2004, Janat Gul was subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, including continuous sleep deprivation, facial holds, attention grasps, facial slaps, stress positions, and walling,
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until he experienced auditory and visual hallucinations.
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According to a cable, Janat Gul was “not oriented to time or place” and told CIA officers that he saw “his wife and children in the mirror and had heard their voices in the white noise.”
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The questioning of Janat Gul continued, although the CIA ceased using the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques for several days. According to a CIA cable, “[Gul] asked to die, or just be killed.”
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After continued interrogation sessions with Gul, on August 19, 2004, CIA detention site personnel wrote that the interrogation “team does not believe [Gul] is withholding imminent threat information.
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On August 21, 2004, a cable from CIA Headquarters stated that Janat Gul “is believed” to possess threat information, and that the “use of enhanced techniques is appropriate in order to obtain that information.”
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On that day, August 21, 2004, CIA interrogators resumed using the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against Gul.
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Gul continued not to provide any reporting on the pre-election threat described by the CIA source.
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On August 25, 2004, CIA interrogators sent a cable to CIA Headquarters stating that Janat Gul “may not possess all that [the CIA] believes him to know.”
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The interrogators added that “many issues linking [Gul] to al-Qaida are derived from single source reporting” (the CIA source).
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Nonetheless, CIA interrogators continued to question Gul on the pre-election threat. According to an August 26, 2004, cable, after a 47-hour session of standing sleep deprivation, Janat Gul was returned to his cell, allowed to remove his diaper, given a towel and a meal, and permitted to sleep.
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In October 2004, the CIA conducted a ███████ of the CIA source who had identified Gul as having knowledge of attack planning for the pre-election threat. ███████████████████, the CIA source admitted to fabricating the information.
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Gul was subsequently transferred to a foreign government. On ████████████████████████████ informed the CIA that Janat Gul had been released.
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Janat Gul never provided the threat information the CIA originally told the National Security Council that Gul possessed. Nor did the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against Gul produce the “immediate threat information that could save American lives,” which had been the basis for the CIA to seek authorization to use the techniques. As described elsewhere in this summary, the CIA’s justification for employing its enhanced interrogation techniques on Janat Gul—the first detainee to be subjected to the techniques following the May 2004 suspension—changed over time. After having initially cited Gul’s knowledge of the pre-election threat, as reported by the CIA’s source, the CIA began representing that its enhanced interrogation techniques were required for Gul to deny the existence of the threat, thereby disproving the credibility of the CIA source.
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On August 11, 2004, in the midst of the interrogation of Janat Gul using the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, CIA attorney ██████████████ wrote a letter to Acting Assistant Attorney General Dan Levin with “brief biographies” of four individuals whom the CIA hoped to detain. Given the requirement at the time that the CLA seek individual approval from the Department of Justice before using the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against a detainee, the CIA letter states, “[w]e are providing these preliminary biographies in preparation for a future request for a legal opinion on their subsequent interrogation in CIA control.” Two of the individuals—Abu Faraj al-Libi and Hamza Rabi’a—had not yet been captured, and thus the “biographies” made no reference to their interrogations or the need to use the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. The third individual, Abu Talha al-Pakistani, was in foreign government custody. His debriefings by a foreign government, ██████████████, were described in the letter as “only moderately effective” because Abu Talha was “distracting [those questioning him] with noncritical information that is truthful, but is not related to operational planning.” The fourth individual, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, was also in foreign government custody and being debriefed by foreign government officials █████████████. According to the letter, Ghailani’s foreign government debriefings were “ineffective” because Ghailani had “denied knowledge of current threats.” The letter described reporting on the pre-election threat—much of which came from the CIA source—in the context of all four individuals.
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Ahmed Ghailani and Abu Faraj al-Libi were eventually rendered to CIA custody and subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.

On September ██, 2004, after the CIA had initiated a counterintelligence review of the CIA source who had reported on the pre-election threat, but prior to the CIA source’s ██████, the CIA took custody of Sharif al-Masri, whom the CIA source had reported would also have information about the threat.
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Intelligence provided by Sharif al-Masri while he was in foreign government custody resulted in the dissemination of more than 30 CIA intelligence reports.
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After entering CIA custody, Sharif al-Masri expressed his intent to cooperate with the CIA, indicating that he was frightened of interrogations because he had been tortured while being interrogated in ████████████.
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The CIA nonetheless sought approval to use the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against al-Masri because of his failure to provide information on the pre-election threat.
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After approximately a week of interrogating al-Masri using the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, including sleep deprivation that coincided with auditory hallucinations, CIA interrogators reported that al-Masri had been “motivated to participate” at the time of his arrival.
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Despite al-Masri’s repeated descriptions of torture in ████, the CIA transferred al-Masri to that government’s custody after approximately three months of CIA detention.
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