The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (38 page)

The identification and arrest of Iyman Faris is one of the eight most frequently cited examples provided by the CIA as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. Over a period of years, CIA documents prepared for and provided to senior policymakers, intelligence officials, and the Department of Justice represent the identification, capture, and/or arrest of Iyman Faris as an example of how “[k]ey intelligence collected from HVD interrogations
after
applying interrogation techniques” had “enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots” and “capture additional terrorists.”
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The CIA further represented that the intelligence acquired from the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques was “otherwise unavailable” and “saved lives.”
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For example, in a July 2003 CIA briefing for White House officials on the CIA interrogation program, the CIA represented that “[m]ajor threats were countered and attacks averted,” and that “[t]ermination of this [CIA] program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive.” The CIA further represented that “the use of the [CIA’s enhanced interrogation] techniques has produced significant results” and “saved lives.”
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Under the heading, “RESULTS: MAJOR THREAT INFO,” a briefing slides states:

“KSM: Al-Qa’ida Chief of Operations . . . -
Identification of Iyman Faris
”
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Similarly, on February 27, 2004, DDO James Pavitt responded to the CIA Inspector General’s draft Special Review and included a representation related to Iyman Faris. Pavitt stated that the Inspector General’s Special Review should have come to the “conclusion that our efforts have thwarted attacks and saved lives,” and that “EITs (including the water board) have been indispensable to our successes.”
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Pavitt provided materials to the OIG that stated:

“Specifically, as a result of the lawful use of EITs, KSM identified a truck driver who is now serving time in the United States for his support to al-Qa’ida.”
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The final CIA Inspector General Special Review, “Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program,” published in May 2004, states:

“Khalid Shaykh Muhammad’s information also
led to the investigation and prosecution Iyman Faris
, the truck driver arrested in early 2003 in Ohio.
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This passage in the CIA Inspector General Special Review was declassified and publicly released on August 24, 2009.
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Likewise, information prepared by the CIA for CIA Director Leon Panetta in February 2009 on the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques states that the “CIA assesses . . . the techniques were effective in producing foreign intelligence,” and that “most, if not all, of the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by other means.” The document provides examples of “some of the key captures, disrupted plots, and intelligence gained from HVDs interrogated,” including the ‘‘
arrest
of Iyman Faris.”
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In March 2009, the CIA provided a three-page document to the chairman of the Committee stating, “CIA assesses that most, if not all, of the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by any other means,” before listing “Iyman Faris” as one of the “key captures” resulting from the CIA interrogation program.
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The CIA provided similar inaccurate representations regarding the identification and capture of Iyman Faris in nine of the 20 documents and briefings provided to policymakers and the Department of Justice between July 2003 and March 2009.
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A review of CIA operational cables and other records found that the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program and the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques played no role in the identification and capture of Iyman Faris.
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CIA records indicate that Iyman Faris was known to the U.S. Intelligence Community prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001. On March ██, 2001, the FBI opened an international terrorism investigation targeting Iyman Faris.
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According to CIA records, the “predication of the [FBI] Faris investigation was information provided by [foreign] authorities that [revealed] Faris’ telephone number had been called by Islamic extremists operating in France, Belgium, Turkey and Canada,” including “millennium bomber” Ahmad Ressam.
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Ressam, currently serving a 65-year U.S. prison term, was arrested on December 14, 1999, en route to Los Angeles International Airport with explosives in the trunk of his car. According to CIA records, as “a result of a post 9/11 lead,” the FBI interviewed Iyman Faris shortly after the attacks of September 11, 2001.
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On November ██, 2001, the FBI closed its investigation of Iyman Faris for unknown reasons.
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On March 5, 2003, Majid Khan was taken into Pakistani custody.
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That same day, FISA coverage of Majid Khan’s residence in Maryland indicated that Majid Khan’s
█████████████
made a suspicious phone call to an individual at a residence associated with Iyman Faris.
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The call included discussion of Majid Khan’s possible arrest and potential FBI surveillance of
████████
, who asked the individual in Ohio if he had been approached and questioned.
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███████
warned the Ohio-based individual not to contact anyone using his phone.
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That same day,
████████
informed FBI special agents that the other party to the intercepted conversation was Iyman Faris.
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By March 6, 2003, the FBI had officially reopened its international terrorism investigation of Iyman Faris.
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While U.S. law enforcement investigations of Iyman Faris moved forward, Majid Khan, in foreign government custody, was being questioned by foreign government interrogators. According to CIA records, the interrogators were using rapport-building techniques, confronting Khan with inconsistencies in his story and obtaining information on Majid Khan’s al-Qa’ida connections.
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On March 11, 2003, Majid Khan identified a photo of Iyman Faris.
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Majid Khan stated that he knew Faris as “Abdul Raof,” and claimed Faris was a 35-year-old truck driver of Pakistani origin who was a “business partner of his father.”
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In addition to describing business deals Iyman Faris was involved in with Khan’s family, Majid Khan stated that Faris spoke Urdu and excellent English and had a “colorful personality.”
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The next day, while still in foreign government custody, Majid Khan stated that Iyman Faris was “an Islamic extremist.”
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According to CIA cables, on March 14, 2003, Majid Khan provided “more damning information” on Iyman Faris, specifically that Faris was a “mujahudden during the Afghan/Soviet period” and was a close associate of his uncle, Maqsood Khan. Maqsood was a known al-Qa’ida associate whom Majid Khan had already admitted was in contact with senior al-Qa’ida members. Majid Khan told foreign government interrogators that it was Maqsood who provided the money for Majid Khan’s al-Qa’ida-related travels.
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Majid Khan further stated that “after the KSM arrest became public knowledge,” Iyman Faris contacted Majid Khan’s family and requested the family pass a message to Maqsood Khan regarding the status of KSM.
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This information on Iyman Faris was acquired prior to—and independently of—any reporting from the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program.
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On March 10, 2003, in response to a requirements cable from CIA Headquarters reporting that al-Qa’ida was targeting U.S. suspension bridges,
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KSM stated that any such plans were “theoretical” and only “on paper.” He also stated that no one was currently pursuing such a plot.
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KSM repeated this assertion on March 16, 2003,
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noting that, while UBL officially endorsed attacks against suspension bridges in the United States, he “had no planned targets in the US which were pending attack and that after 9/11 the US had become too hard a target.”
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On neither occasion did KSM reference Iyman Faris.

On March 15, 2003, deputy chief of ALEC Station, ████ ██████, who was reading the intelligence from the foreign government interrogations of Majid Khan, requested a photograph of Majid Khan and additional information to use with KSM.
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In response, CIA Headquarters sent the detention site photographs of Majid Khan’s family and associates, including Iyman Faris.
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On March 17, 2003, eleven days after the FBI officially reopened its investigation of Iyman Faris, KSM was shown photographs of both Iyman Faris and Majid Khan.
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According to CIA cables, KSM was also asked detailed questions based on email communications, which a cable stated served as “an effective means to convey to [KSM] the impression that the USG already possessed considerable information and that the information would be used to check the accuracy of his statements.”
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In this context, KSM identified the photograph of Iyman Faris as a “truck driver” and a relative of Majid Khan. KSM claimed that he could not remember the truck driver’s name. KSM described the “truck driver” as a “colorful character who liked to drink and have girlfriends and was very interested in business.
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The next day, March 18, 2003, KSM stated that in February 2002 he tasked the “truck driver” to procure specialized machine tools that would be useful to al-Qa’ida to loosen the nuts and bolts of suspension bridges in the United States. According to KSM, in March 2002, the “truck driver” asked Mansour Khan [son of Maqsood Khan]
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to inform KSM that he (the “truck driver”) could not find such tools. KSM stated that he made no further requests of the “truck driver.”
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According to a CIA cable, on the evening of March 20, 2003, the FBI informed the CIA that “Ohio police had been following [Iyman] Faris for ‘some time,’ and had stopped him and questioned him about his relationship to Shoukat Ali Khan [Majid Khan’s father] of Baltimore.”
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According to a CIA officer, “[w]hen the FBI approached Faris he talked voluntarily.”
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Records indicate that Faris “initially claimed to know Shoukat All Khan though the gas station business” and agreed to take a polygraph examination. According to FBI records, prior to the polygraph, Faris admitted to being associated with KSM and provided details on his relationships with al-Qa’ida members in Pakistan.
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Specifically, Iyman Faris told FBI and Ohio police that he had met KSM twice and had been “tasked with procuring items.” Faris detailed how KSM had a plan “to cut the suspension cables on the Brooklyn Bridge to cause its collapse using gas cutters.
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Faris maintained that he “thought that the task to take down the bridge was impossible”
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and did not take further action.
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Over several weeks Iyman Faris continued to voluntarily cooperate with law enforcement officials and engaged in efforts to assist in the capture of Maqsood Khan.
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Faris provided additional details on his activities related to the Khan family, KSM, his meeting with UBL, and two extremists in the United States who had discussed wanting “to kill Americans in a Columbus area shopping mall with a Kalashnikov automatic rifle.”
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On April 22, 2003, “Faris had accepted a plea agreement”
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and continued to cooperate, including by sending email messages to al-Qa’ida members in Pakistan for the purposes of intelligence collection.
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On May 1, 2003, Faris was transported from Quantico, Virginia, where he was voluntarily residing and working with the FBI, to a federal court in Alexandria, Virginia, where he pled guilty to material support to terrorism charges.
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He was subsequently sentenced to 20 years in prison.
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On April 3, 2003, the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT) assessed that the use of tools to loosen the bolts of suspension bridges were “methods that appear to be unrealistic.”
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6. The Identification, Capture, and Arrest of Sajid Badat

summary
: The CIA represented that its enhanced interrogation techniques were effective and produced critical, otherwise unavailable intelligence, which thwarted plots and saved lives. Over a period of years, the CIA provided the identification, discovery, capture, and arrest of Sajid Badat as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. These representations were inaccurate. U.K. domestic investigative efforts, reporting from foreign intelligence services, international law enforcement efforts, and U.S. military reporting resulted in the identification and arrest of Sajid Badat.

further details
: Sajid Badat
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was selected by al-Qa’ida leaders, including Abu Hafs al-Masri and Sayf al-’Adl, to carry out an attack against a Western airliner with Richard Reid using a shoe bomb explosive device in December 2001.
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Sajid Badat returned to the United Kingdom in late 2001 and sent a message to his al-Qa’ida handler, Ammar al-Baluchi, stating that he was withdrawing from the operation.
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On December 22, 2001, Richard Reid attempted to detonate a shoe bomb on a flight from Paris, France, to Miami, Florida. The plane was diverted to Boston, Massachusetts, and Reid was taken into custody.
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