The Spanish Civil War (95 page)

Azcárate paid a final melancholy visit to Lord Halifax to ask Britain to try still to secure some guarantee of moderation by Franco as a condition of recognition.
³
Russia denounced the falsity of ‘the capitalist policy of capitulation before the aggressor’ but took no other action. No act of recognition of Franco was prepared in Washington, but most other countries now followed the lead of Britain and France.

Back in Madrid, the anarchists were holding a meeting. Instructions from their secretary general, Vázquez, in France, to back any effort to end the war were accepted. There was some discussion of the idea that Negrín was contemplating a
coup d’état
within the state. The CNT resolved to resist such an idea, which could lead to a communist dictatorship. The CNT now was, however, little more than a pressure group without clear goals save to oppose the communists.
⁴
In Burgos, a new message was received from Madrid saying that a ‘
junta
of liquidation’ of the war would be set up the next day, and that Besteiro and Colonel Ruiz-Fornells, chief of staff of the Army of Estremadura, would go to any aerodrome that the nationalists specified in order to arrange the surrender. Franco replied that he still would not treat with any civilians. There could only be unconditional surrender, except for the
guarantees already promised to the army officers. He would not treat with Besteiro. One or two officers could come if they desired.
¹
Franco was not going to offer the republic the luxury of an honourable peace; nor did he want those who wished to escape to be able to do so. This delayed Casado’s
coup d’état
for several days.

The following day, 28 February, after the news of the recognition of Franco by Britain and France, Azaña, in Paris, resigned from the presidency of the republic. The permanent committee of the Cortes assembled at La Pérouse, a famous restaurant on the Quai des Grands Augustins, and Martínez Barrio as speaker of the Cortes assumed Azaña’s duties, as provided under the constitution of 1931. But he had no intention of returning to Spain. The civil governor of Madrid, José Gómez Ossorio, meantime, told Casado that he had received orders for his relief. Negrín, however, assured Casado, by telephone, that he had
not
ordered his relief, and summoned him to Elda for a meeting on 2 March, with Matallana. The two officers drove down the 260 miles in the morning. Negrín proposed the reorganization of the general staff. Matallana and Casado would become heads of the ‘general’ and of the ‘central general’ staff respectively. Both officers repeated their arguments against further resistance. Casado, with the communists Modesto and Cordón, were to be named generals, while two officers on Casado’s staff, Muedra and Garijo, were to become respectively sub-secretary of the army and adjutant to Miaja. All these appointments had been agreed at a meeting of the cabinet during the night of 28 February.

Casado and Matallana argued against reorganization. After the meeting, they drove north to Valencia. There they met Miaja, General Menéndez and Colonel Ruiz-Fornells. Casado described to these officers his determination to rebel against the government and to make peace. All promised support, but warned against the communist party. Nevertheless, Casado made a similar approach to Hidalgo de Cisneros, whom he knew to be a communist, the next day at lunch outside Madrid. Presumably he supposed that the air leader’s loyalty to his old friends was greater than that to his new comrades. ‘Only we generals can get Spain out of the war’, said Casado, who, according to Hidalgo de Cisneros, had already given orders for his new insignia as a general
to be placed on his uniform. ‘I give you my word,’ he added, ‘that I can get better terms from Franco than Negrín ever can. I can even assure you that they will respect our ranks.’ Hidalgo asked how this was and Casado said that the British representative in Madrid (presumably Denys Cowan) had arranged everything with Franco. Hidalgo thought that Casado was romancing, but told Casado to go and see Negrín.
¹
Hidalgo de Cisneros told Negrín of this interview. But Negrín did nothing. He faced the new challenge with temporary but fatal passivity.
²

At much the same hour, Admiral Buiza at Cartagena summoned the commanders of the ships and the political commissars. He told them that a
coup d’état
against Negrín was being prepared and that a national council of defence would be formed, representing the armed forces, all trade unions and political parties. No one at the meeting objected, and Buiza concluded that agreement had been achieved. Twenty-four hours later, Paulino Gómez Saez, the socialist minister of the interior, arrived to tell the naval commanders that the government had been told what Buiza had said the previous day, and that it was determined to prevail. In Madrid, Casado continued plotting and received the support of most of the non-communist political colonels, and of the non-communist political parties. He prevented the circulation of the
Diario Oficial
of 3 March, which named the changes in command decided on by Negrín. General Martínez Cabrera (military governor of Madrid), Vicente Girauta (director-general of security) and in particular Angel Pedrero García, chief of the SIM in Madrid, also pledged their support. The SIM’s surprising support for Casado was of great importance. Casado told Cipriano Mera to make ready to take over the central army in his place. A telegram arrived from Negrín summoning Casado to another conference at Elda. Casado telephoned Matallana, who was with Negrín, that he would not go because he feared arrest. Negrín was told that Casado’s health prevented him from making so long a road journey again. Negrín sent his private aeroplane to fetch him. Meanwhile, all the communist leaders who had arrived from France clustered together at Elda, expecting to be given work by Negrín; Cordón was to be secretary general of defence, Jesús Monzón his secretary, Francisco Galán to command the naval base at Cartagena;
and the military governors of the coastal provinces of Valencia, Murcia and Alicante were to be succeeded by Lister, Etelvino Vega and Tagüeña.

The next day, 5 March, saw the culmination of the plots in Madrid. In the morning, the head of Barajas airport informed Casado that Negrín’s Douglas aircraft had landed. Casado gave orders that the pilot should be sent home. At noon, Negrín once more telephoned to Casado. The colonel said that his health made it impossible to leave Madrid. Negrín, brushing this aside, said that he needed Casado immediately, regardless of health. Another aeroplane would arrive at six in the evening to take several cabinet ministers, who were at Madrid, to Elda. Casado, said Negrín, should travel with them. Casado answered that he would ‘arrange matters’ with the ministers.

Negrín’s nomination of ‘Paco’ Galán to command the naval base at Cartagena now fired strange events in that port (some fifty miles away from the government). First, General Bernal, the military governor till then, passively agreed to hand over to Galán.
¹
The officers of the artillery, under Colonel Gerardo Armentía, came out to protest. There was similar indignation in the fleet. Admiral Buiza and Commissar-General Alonso contemplated attacking the city.
²
Next, a Fifth Column of falangists emerged, headed by Colonel Arturo Espá, of the coastal artillery regiment. Supported by mobs wishing to show enthusiasm for the victors of the civil war, they surrounded the artillery barracks. A retired officer living in the city, General Rafael Barrionuevo, proclaimed himself military governor, in Franco’s name. A regiment of marines joined the falangists, and, together, they proceeded to take over the naval radio station. From thence, they sent demands for reinforcements to Cádiz. Colonel Armentía surrendered to the Falange, and shortly afterwards killed himself.

Admiral Buiza then ordered the fleet to sea (including the three remaining largest ships, the cruisers
Miguel de Cervantes, Libertad
and
Méndez Núñez,
and eight destroyers), with Galán’s agreement since he, Galán, sought sanctuary on board the
Libertad,
after having been briefly detained by the chief of staff of the base, Colonel Fernando Oliva. Galán resigned. Negrín appointed the naval under-secretary,
Antonio Ruiz, to succeed him.
¹
The communist ex-minister Jesús Hernández, acting on his own responsibility as commissar-general of the army, dispatched the 4th Division, including a tank unit from the base at Archena, under a communist officer, Colonel Joaquín Rodríguez, who had begun his war career in the Fifth Regiment, to Cartagena. By mid-afternoon, both the falangist and the anti-communist rising had been suppressed. A nationalist warship, the
Castillo de Olite,
which arrived with 3,500 soldiers on board, was sunk when it came to reinforce the falangists.
²
The other nationalist naval vessels were held back in time. But the republican fleet remained at sea, and, indeed, gave itself up to the French, who requested Buiza to surrender in Bizerta. Thus the republic lost its three cruisers, eight destroyers and many small craft.
³

In Valencia, something similar occurred: General Aranguren, the military governor, declined to hand over to Lister and, with General Menéndez of the Levante Army, prepared to resist with force. La Pasionaria and Manuel Delicado, who had been in Murcia, drove up to Elda to report on what had occurred at Cartagena: on their way, they were fortunate to escape arrest by a squad of assault guards acting for the socialist governor of Murcia, Eustasio Cañas, who had given orders for the arrest of communists, in support of Casado.
⁴

In Madrid, six ministers of Negrín’s cabinet—Giner, Velao, Paulino Gómez, Segundo Blanco, Moix and González Peña—were lunching in the central government building. They were joined for coffee by Casado, who later said that each minister privately expressed to him his despair at Negrín’s policy. Casado explained that he had no intention of accompanying them to Elda. Giner, who had been minister of communications throughout the war, telephoned to Negrín to suggest a postponement of the cabinet. Negrín answered so fiercely that the ministers set off immediately, though without Casado. At seven o’clock, Negrín telephoned Casado yet again, ordering his presence. Casado replied that he would come if the situation were no worse.
Half an hour later, Casado moved his headquarters to the treasury, an easily defended eighteenth-century building of distinction in the Calle Alcalá, near the Puerta del Sol. There he met Besteiro. The anarchist 70th Brigade under Bernabé López, from Mera’s Army Corps, established itself around the building. Casado allowed himself to be named president of the new national council, after Besteiro had declined (he did agree to act as foreign secretary). Casado later gave way to Miaja who, through fatigue, gloom, realism and opportunism, was shortly persuaded to join the plotters. Casado then took upon himself the portfolio of defence. The other members of the council were Wenceslao Carrillo, the socialist ex-director general of security under Largo Caballero; González Marín and Eduardo Val, of the CNT; Antonio Pérez, of the UGT, and Miguel San Andrés and José del Río, both republicans.
¹
None were well known except for Besteiro. These men, nevertheless, took respectively the portfolios of the interior, finance, communications, labour, justice and education. Sánchez Requena, a member of Pestaña’s unsuccessful syndicalist party, was secretary. This
junta
broadcast a manifesto at midnight on 5–6 March:

Spanish workers, people of anti-fascist Spain! The time has come when we must proclaim to the four winds the truth of our present situation. As revolutionaries, as proletarians, as Spaniards, as anti-fascists, we cannot endure any longer the imprudence and the absence of forethought of Dr Negrín’s government. We cannot permit that, while the people struggle, a few privileged persons should continue their life abroad. We address all workers, anti-fascists and Spaniards! Constitutionally, the government of Dr Negrín is without lawful basis. In practice also, it lacks both confidence and good sense. We have come to show the way which may avoid disaster: we who oppose the policy of resistance give our assurance that not one of those who ought to remain in Spain shall leave till all who wish to leave have done so.

The plotters were on shaky ground: Negrín’s government was legally constituted. As events were to show, too, Negrín’s policy had logic behind it, and the council were unable to fulfil the promise in the last sentence.

Besteiro, Casado and Mera spoke. The first demanded the support of the legitimate power of the republic which, he added, was now nothing more than ‘the power of the army’: strange echo of the sort of speech that might have been made by Franco in 1936.
¹
Casado concentrated on an appeal to all in the trenches, on both sides. ‘We all want a country free of foreign domination. We shall not cease fighting till you assure us of the independence of Spain,’ he added, for Franco’s benefit, ‘but if you offer us peace, you will find our Spanish hearts generous.’
²

Negrín was presiding over a cabinet meeting at Elda. Matallana was with him. It was he who answered a telephone call from Casado. ‘Tell him I have revolted,’ Casado said. Negrín took the telephone: ‘What is going on in Madrid, General?’
³
‘I have revolted,’ answered Casado. ‘Against whom? Against me?’ ‘Yes, against you.’ Negrín told him that he had acted insanely. Casado answered that he was no general, but a plain colonel, who had done his duty as ‘an officer and as a Spaniard’.
⁴
The telephone rang often that night between Elda and Madrid; Negrín tried to find someone to arrest Casado. But no one would.

Next day, Casado arranged that Miaja should take over as president of the national council. He told General Menéndez to tell Negrín that, unless Matallana, under arrest at Elda, were released within three hours, he would shoot the entire cabinet. Matallana was released—though not before he had (falsely) declared himself at Negrín’s disposal in respect of the revolt at Cartagena. Meantime, Casado appointed the anarchist Melchor Rodríguez, famous as a humane director of prisons, to be mayor of Madrid, ordered the red stars to be stripped from the uniforms of the army, and suppressed all the recent
promotions. But Maija became lieutenant-general, a rank abolished by Azaña in 1931.