The Super Summary of World History (65 page)

The Battle of the Atlantic, and the entire war, completely depended on another factor: industrial production.

Industrial Production

(Entire
war)
1939
to
1945

Most students of war like concentrating on battles won and lost, great personalities dominating the era, or the machines of war; however, the available resources properly committed to numerous battles habitually decide wars between great powers. As such, the ability
to
harness
and
properly
direct
these
resources
is vital to the outcome of war. The nations marshaling their resources most effectively, turning those resources into what is most necessary for success, and then efficiently delivering the end product, all but assures ultimate victory. Resources include more than weapons, because properly trained men, new methods of war, and new methods of production are critical to victory. This study of stuff is termed
logistics
.

During the war, Hitler made many errors (to say the least), but perhaps his most important blunder was not ordering total war production prior to 1943 (or prior to 1939 for that matter). Haunted by WWI’s citizen depravations the Fuehrer wanted Germans to enjoy some consumer goods, and he hoped the war would be short. Another major error was stopping development of weapons systems (aircraft for example) taking longer than a year to move to production. Both of these decisions were directly responsible for Germany’s destruction by 1945. If Hitler had made the opposite decisions and allowed continued research on all weapons systems, and went to full production by 1940, then the delivery of jet aircraft, new tanks, new submarines, and a lot more would have taken place years sooner than actually delivered. For example, if Germany had developed and produced in quantity the ME-262 jet aircraft eighteen months sooner, the Allies may have lost air superiority over Europe thus delaying the D-Day invasion (I know . . . a
lot
of very big ifs).

The Allies went to total war production immediately. In the United States the huge supply of idle machinery from the Depression went back into use, out of work men got work, and a host of other economic changes took place after 1941. The Great Depression was no more, and all that pent-up potential exploded in a torrent of production and innovation stunning the Allies of the United States as well as its enemies. It took more than idle production availability to cause this industrial flood of supplies and equipment. The organization of industry, the ability to control
quality
as well as turn out large
quantities
of materials, and the ability to develop new methods of war and new methods of war production were as necessary as the machines and men of war. Immediately after Pearl Harbor
General
George
Marshal
reorganized the war department to reflect the new realities and methods of war. Even considering this change on the eve of war would chill most leaders, much less after the war had started and things were going badly. The same reorganization was happening in American industry. This was one of the secrets of success for the United States in WWII. The Americans were willing to reorganize, reshuffle, and reinvent almost everything if it would better serve the war effort. Flexibility of this nature allowed innovation on a grand scale. Often the innovation was stunning. For illustration, reflect on the Kaiser Company’s construction of transport ships in weeks using prefabrication methods rather than months by normal shipyard methods.
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The US Armed Forces ensured their fighting men received excellent weapons. The Americans quickly designed, tested, and put into production new aircraft that easily out performed aircraft developed before 1940. The M-1 semiautomatic rifle, designed just before the war, was rushed into production, and in months all the soldiers, airmen, and marines of the United States carried this excellent rifle. The M-1 displays the skill of the United States in focusing its efforts on where they would do the most good. The United States and the British developed new methods of anti-submarine warfare, crushing the Nazi’s undersea threat by May of 1943. In the Pacific War, the US Marines militarized a civilian amphibious tracked vehicle (LVT—landing vehicle tracked), for scaling coral reefs. First used at Tarawa, it saved the invasion. Large landings, such as D-Day, required large transports, but the Allies went further developing huge transports capable of unloading directly onto enemy beaches. This was the
LST
(landing ship tank). This one craft made large amphibious assault less complicated and more successful. It was one of hundreds of Allied innovations focusing on the best use of available resources.

Coupling new industrial innovations with new methods of war greatly facilitated crushing the Axis. As an example, the US Navy invented the “
seatrain
” concept. With seatrain the US Pacific Fleet resupplied at sea eliminating steaming back to port for supplies and refueling. This idea, and the construction of cargo ships and oilers to realize the concept, allowed the US Fleet to strike suddenly anywhere in the Pacific. Admiral Nimitz rapidly crossed Pacific, stunning the Japanese Navy and ruining its capacity to adapt. It was a major reason for Japan’s defeat by 1945. This again displays the Allied aptitude for focusing resources on ideas yielding remarkable results once implemented.

The Axis failed miserably in the realms of production and focusing the use of resources. In Germany the prime cause was Hitler. His poor decisions in military and industrial matters doomed his nation. One decision was right. He appointed
Albert
Speer
as armaments minister in 1942. Speer displayed outstanding organizational genius. Under his oversight, the Third Reich increased armament production during the height of Allied bomber offensives against its industries. Over thirty months (1942 to 1944) he increased production fourfold. Speer receives little credit for his feat, possibly because his genius prolonged the war; yet, there is no denying he accomplished miracles of production.

For instance, Speer joined, for the first time in the Reich, minds in German universities with the need for faster construction of better submarines. Germany soon developed a superior submarine drive system that pushed the submarine’s underwater speeds beyond their surface speeds.
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Speer adopted new prefabrication construction methods, significantly decreasing submarine construction time. It all came too late for the Reich. Allied bombing destroyed the new submarines in dry dock. If such submarines had been put to sea one year earlier, the Battle of the Atlantic could have gotten extremely dangerous for the Allies.

Germany brought its war experience to the industrial front on a few occasions. Panther tank development, although flawed, came from hard experience fighting the Soviet T-34 (the best tank of the war). An entirely new weaponry concept, the assault rifle, flowed from exceptional German field research. Their original German assault weapon, Sturmgewehr 44, became the prototype for the famous Russian AK-47.
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The Sturmgewehr was arguably the best rifle of the war. Once more, the German idea failed to influence the war, but it exhibited German talent in conceiving an idea from combat experience then bringing it to fruition even as its industrial base was being devastated. The Sherman tank shows the Allies occasionally failed at marrying combat experience with equipment.
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Somehow, the news that the Sherman was outclassed by German tanks in 1944 failed to reach Allied decision makers in Washington.

Hitler simultaneously maintained numerous overlapping projects, some of them outrageous, thereby squandering valuable resources of every nature. Hitler should have ordered production one very good but easy-to-construct and maintain tank, rather than several excellent but hard-to-build tanks. Germany needed to focus their limited resources on practical projects that could be in the field in a reasonable time. Case in point, the ME 262 jet fighter. Hitler demanded a combination fighter and bomber, thereby delaying production and squandering resources. To really impact the war an early unleashing of the ME 262 in quantity was necessary. Hitler also expended a tidal wave of human effort and hard-to-get materials on vengeance weapons such as the V-1 and V-2 rockets. The V-1 was a simple piece of equipment, easy to produce, modest in cost, and effective in reaching London. Increasing its effectiveness only required a little more effort on improving the guidance system and speed. Hitler instead opted to expend valuable resources on the V-2. Directing these men and materials to speed production of the ME 262 would have increased their impact exponentially.

One set of wasted Nazi resources is difficult to discuss. Hitler ordered the destruction of the Jews, Gypsies, Slavs, Poles, mentally retarded, mentally ill, the old, the sick, the infirm, and more under the “
final
solution
” for his Jewish problem. Millions went to the Nazi industrial killing centers. In purely economic terms this was a massive waste of resources. The use of the trains and trucks to transport these millions of victims misdirected vital transportation units to tasks unrelated to winning the war. In addition, troops were guarding the camps, workers constructing and then maintaining the facilities, and resources were also expended destroying evidence of the evil acts. Many of the murdered were loyal Germans who would have fought for their country. The thousands of men used in this killing effort were sorely needed to fight or work in factories. Some of the murdered were experts in vital fields or highly trained workers, impossible to replace. On the Eastern Front, groups of SS troops (Einsatzgruppen) roamed about killing Slavs by the hundreds of thousands, thereby misusing those resources and turning the entire population against Germany. Recognizing that the minds directing this industrialized murder were twisted, I know I am attempting logic where no logic can apply. Still, we must recognize the massive expenditure and wastage of resources extensively degraded the Nazi war effort. It also proved the true depths of evil confronted by the Western Democracies. The death camps forever answered the question, why did we fight?

Italy’s industrial base was unprepared for war because of outdated methods and machinery. Italian industry had no capacity to produce the quantity of military equipment needed, and it struggled with changes to new manufacturing methods. Thus, Italian troops fought with outdated and difficult to fix equipment. In the North African campaign photos of Italian tanks often show sandbags piled all over them. This was necessary because Allied projectiles easily penetrated the armor. Men saddled with outdated poor quality weapons are seldom highly motivated warriors.

Japan adopted modern industrial methods of design and production before 1910; thus, Japan began the war with excellent weapons of their type. The Japanese “long lance” torpedo (twenty-one inch, oxygen propelled) was the war’s best, and Zero fighters excelled in 1941 (note these are naval developments). A few powerful families (the zaibatsu), following Japanese military directions, operated the Japanese industrial base; however, the Imperial Army was slow to innovate. During the war, Japan failed to develop new weapons or new methods of production. The
Kamikaze
concept
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grew out of desperation to make do with out-of-date aircraft that were good for nothing except ramming American ships. Why the Japanese failed to develop newer aircraft, rifles, machine guns, and tanks is difficult to understand. Japan’s industrial giants had two or more years to design and deploy newer weapons before the US bombing campaign became a factor.

The Japanese built excellent ships throughout the war. What the Japanese needed to do was build sufficient
merchant
shipping
to supply their war needs. All of their important raw materials and much of their food came from the south by ship. When American subs began sinking large numbers of cargo vessels Japanese shipbuilders failed to replace the losses. Prewar Japanese planning ignored protection for merchant shipping. For the first six months of the war, because of defective American torpedoes, little damage was done to Japan’s merchant marine; however, after correcting the malfunctions, US submarines extensively damaged the Japan’s cargo fleet. As this disaster unfolded Japan’s leaders ignored the problem. They delayed using the convoy system, failed to develop adequate anti-submarine warfare methods, and did not commit enough ships to protect their vital merchant fleet.

We should note here that industrial and military cooperation between the Axis partners was nil. If Japanese plans for the Long Lance torpedo had made it to Germany before the war the course of the conflict could have changed dramatically. If Japan had adopted German anti-shipping submarine warfare methods the Pacific War would have grown much harder for the Allies.

England’s industry performed well, especially its aircraft industry. England produced the Lancaster, one of the best bombers of WWII, as well as many other superb aircraft. The LST, conceived and designed in England, was built in the United States, showing the knack of the two allies to work closely together toward common goals. The P-51 Mustang was an aircraft that both the United States and England contributed to designing and constructing. Cooperation among allies at this level within the industrial base is phenomenal, and a key reason the Allies won the war. English industry turned out enough freighters, rifles, aircraft, and the like to keep them in the war. The US could, and did, produce these items in such superabundance it became a war-winning factor all by itself.