The Super Summary of World History (73 page)

Both navies began to understand that controlling the Slot was vital to winning the island contest. As a result, a number of naval battles took place around the Solomon Islands deciding the fate of the marines and army troops on Guadalcanal every bit as much as the ground fighting. Some of the sea battles were: the Battle of Savo Island, Battle of the Eastern Solomon’s, Battle of Cape Esperance, Naval Battles of Guadalcanal, the Battle of Tassafaronga, and the Battle of Santa Cruz Islands. In these exchanges both navies suffered high losses. More than once the US Navy was down to one operational carrier (the
Enterprise
once, and the
Hornet
once). In this naval war of attrition Japan could only lose. American production and training capability were coming on line and with it a massive outpouring of new and better equipment with torrents of well-trained men to accompany that equipment. Japan boasted an excellent navy at the war’s beginning, the equal of any in the world with its high training standards, fine ships, and aircraft. With this kind of force there is a need to strike swiftly and withdraw. In a war of attrition, the side with the largest army (or navy) and the best production ability wins.

While Japan’s generals were planning another large offensive to throw the Americans off Guadalcanal, the Japanese merchant marine reported they lacked the shipping to support an attack. Japan needed all its transport capability to keep shipping war materials to the home islands; thus, no transports could be spared for Guadalcanal. Japan decided to leave the island. The Japanese evacuation of Guadalcanal was a perfect operation. The Americans discovered the retreat after an unopposed offensive found a few starving, sick, and abandoned Japanese troops.

Midpoint
in
the
Second
World
War
Europe:
Key
Decisions

July
1942 - June
1944

By mid-1942, important milestones approached the warring parties. In the East, Russia held on at enormous cost, saving Moscow, but the Germans retained the initiative. In the West, France was conquered, but England fought on while Spain stayed out.
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In the Atlantic, German submarines won some significant victories, but Allied losses remained low enough to sustain the war effort. On the Pacific front, Japan swept all before it until the Coral Sea and Midway where she suffered strategic defeats.

Each warring power now faced a few
critical
decisions:

1)    The Allies knew they must
stay
on
the
offensive
and keep the Axis on their heels. In war conferences between the British and Americans prior to December 1941, they agreed Germany must be defeated first. The Allies continually held conferences during the war to decide what course of action was best for all concerned. This kept the Allies on the same page allowing a coordinated response to disorderly events. Good planning was a hallmark of the Allied powers
.

2)    Japan’s Pacific defeats made the decisions for them. Japan’s reverses put it on the defensive. She was smarter than Hitler in this respect because Japan at least recognized the changing situation. The empire could attempt to make headway against China, but even this would be difficult. Japan decided to defend its gains with fierce efforts aimed at causing her antagonists unacceptable losses. In retrospect, this was an appropriate decision because Japan was overextended and probably should have made this decision sooner.

3)    The best German generals knew they had lost the war. However, Hitler demanded offensives in the East with the aim of destroying the USSR. This was another bad
foundational
decision
by the Fuehrer. Germany’s best move was to adopt the strategic defensive, retreat to better lines of defense, and use its still ample mobile reserves to demolish Soviet advances.
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The Germans would hope to bleed the Soviets until they decided to quit, and then attack in the west. However, Hitler demanded new offensive victories. This decision was opposed by the German general staff, and held extraordinary risks.

Axis
(mis)
Management

Both Germany and Japan conquered huge resource-rich areas with large numbers of people that, if used correctly, would add immeasurably to their industrial and military power. If Hitler had convinced people in the conquered areas of Russia and Eastern Europe to work and fight for him millions of additional men would be available to supplement his industrial and armed forces. If the Japanese had worked at creating a true cooperative effort within their conquered territories they too might have enjoyed additional war making potential. Fortunately for the Allies, the Axis utterly squandered these potential assets.

By
mismanagement
on
a
scale
beyond
comprehension
Japan and Germany turned conquered peoples against them, failing to obtain a good return on the raw materials and physical assets they captured. The Axis planned for wars of conquest, but they failed to effectively plan for the well-organized use of their conquered resources during the war. They assumed that once these assets were seized they would simply do what they wanted with them (including the people). To their consternation people resisted murderous oppression and raw materials failed to simply up and move themselves to factories in the homeland. The skilled workers who knew how to extract the raw materials often ran away to avoid the oppressors. Those staying were enslaved, so they worked slow and made many “mistakes.”

A key element in this lack of resource management was failing to convince conquered peoples to join the fight against the Allies (especially the Russians). There were exceptions, but as a rule, people “liberated” by the Japanese and Germans found them harsh taskmasters. As a result, they came to resent their Axis overseers and refused to serve as their soldiers. Compare this result to the communist Chinese who recruited the central government’s own people to fight for them in China’s civil war. Had the Axis consistently convinced even a small percentage to join their camp a lot could have changed. This failure by the Axis to show proper concern for people falling under their sway was
central
to
their
loss
of
WWII
. It seems no single decision drove this course of action. This was just collective stupidity on an extraordinary scale.

Hitler
Attacks
in
the
East

1942

(
 . . .
or
What’s
in
a
name?)

In the summer of 1942 Hitler began operations to capture large amounts of land and resources south of Moscow. In this region there were ample supplies of
oil
, grain, and raw materials that could help the Nazi war machine. The attack’s direction surprised the Soviets and initially allowed the Germans to make good ground. Note that Stalingrad was NOT originally a major target of the advance.

As the German offensive wore on the front expanded. It was like going up a funnel rather than down; thus, German units became widely separated. Non-German units began to move into the line to fill the voids left by the expansion of the front. German units were superior to Italian, Romanian, and other friendly Axis forces in the quality of their equipment and training. Even in static defense non-German units could not repel a strong Soviet attack. As the Germans moved into
Stalingrad
the Soviets began reinforcing the city. If the Germans had moved swiftly the city would have fallen early, but hesitation resulted in disaster. As at Leningrad, the failure to take Stalingrad in a timely manner had dire unforeseen consequences
.
At Leningrad the result was a long siege where the Soviets retained the city. At Stalingrad the results were crippling German losses of men and material.

Figure 61 German Summer Offensive 1942

Before the battle at Stalingrad began the German general staff recommended bypassing the city, but Hitler thought he must conquer the city named after his archenemy. In making this irrational decision, Hitler condemned his forces to the type of battle every German general wanted to avoid. The entire point of the German Blitzkrieg was maneuver, that is, avoid the WWI style clash of attrition. Fighting in Stalingrad was committing the German Army to the wrong type of fight. Moreover, Hitler ordered his Sixth Army into a head-on clash against a Soviet army
outnumbering
his troops and fighting on
smashed
city
terrain
ideal
for
defense
. Worse, the Soviets were receiving ample supplies and reinforcements. Worse yet, on the flanks of Stalingrad non-German units were in place because of a lack of Nazi units, and these flanking forces were not positioned for in-depth defense. The German line was therefore very weak at vital points on the flanks of the city.
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After a colossal struggle the Sixth Army reached the Volga (the river running on the eastern side of Stalingrad) leaving only a few Soviet pockets of resistance. At Stalingrad it was said even the rats fled the city, only men remained.
Homo
sapiens
alone could inflict or withstand such slaughter. The battle’s descriptions are unbelievable. During the horror of the fight inside the city, Soviet General Zhukov was assembling forces outside the city on the German flanks. After months of building up, he was ready to spring his great trap. It was winter, and the freezing conditions impeded movement by the mixed Axis forces; conversely, these same conditions were ideal for the Soviet counterstrike designed to break through positions held by non-German troops and encircle the German Sixth Army in Stalingrad.

It was November of 1942 when massive Soviet attacks surprised and scattered Romanian units guarding Stalingrad’s flanks. A shallow Soviet double envelopment surrounded von Paulus’ army in the city. General von Manstein, leading a counterattack by the redoubtable Forth Panzer Army, tried to reach the trapped men but fell a few miles short. Von Manstein ordered Von Paulus to attack toward him to complete the breakout. Von Paulus refused saying it was impossible; however, the trapped general previously radioed Hitler requesting permission to break out,
but
Hitler
refused
(There’s a surprise). Hitler’s “not one step backward” order condemned the German Sixth Army and the foolishly loyal von Paulus to a sub-zero deathtrap.

After withstanding weeks of Soviet bombardment, little food, dwindling ammunition, and no heat Von Paulus surrendered his army in January of 1943. Over
330,000
German soldiers were killed or captured in the pocket, and probably a year’s worth of production from German factories vanished. Total losses for the Wehrmacht in the fight for Stalingrad were approximately
750,000
. This was a grave defeat for the Wehrmacht and Germany, and they never recovered. Remember, the USSR suffered worse defeats in 1941 and not only survived but also regrouped, launching large counterattacks before Moscow. The fact that this defeat could finish Germany shows how thin their prospects of victory were in June of 1941. Stalingrad, with its constant attrition of German forces followed by the death of an entire German Army, wrecked all chances for success. The Soviets were on the offensive and receiving massive amounts of supplies from the USA and the United Kingdom. After Stalingrad, the power-hungry Stalin would strike until he possessed Hitler’s head and Germany’s homeland.

Hitler fought on, ordering one more offensive (limited—at Kursk), but the war in the East was impossibly lost. As usual, Adolf Hitler continued issuing “stand fast” orders only to witness his men’s extinction in the thunder and fire of massive Soviet mechanized assaults. Operation Bagration’s annihilation of Army Group Center
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in June of 1944, blew open the door to Germany by virtually eradicating the Wehrmacht’s ability to defend the fatherland. Hitler’s unmitigated incompetence lost Germany’s best troops in the snow and mud of the USSR. He was next.