The Third World War (10 page)

Difficulty was experienced by the new Soviet fleet commander in establishing satisfactory relationships with the various political regimes and armed force commands in the Middle East. Hitherto the Soviet presence had been based upon political agreements drafted by the Soviet Foreign Office and covering in great detail the respective commitments of the contracting parties. Deviation from ie pied de la lettre was strongly discouraged. Everything had to be referred to Moscow.

When events began to move fast the weakness of this situation became manifest. Proclamation by the new United Arab Republic of the Red Sea as a war zone, and the closure of the Straits of Bab el Mandeb, for example, found a number of Soviet warships, naval auxiliaries and merchant ships in situations, sometimes at sea and sometimes in harbour, requiring diplomatic intervention with the national authorities. All that Flag Officer Soviet Middle East Forces (
FOSMEF
) could do was report to Moscow and await guidance. From the naval point of view his authority was similarly circumscribed. Soviet naval and air units in the Middle East ‘belonged’ to one or other of the main fleets—the Northern, the Black Sea, or the Pacific, In suddenly transferring to
FOSMEF
the ‘operational control’ of a number of surface warships, submarines and aircraft, far away from their main bases, the Soviet naval high command introduced a number of command inter-relationship problems, the resolution of which did not come easily to a commander and staff not bred to the use of initiative in matters of administration.

Even in the operational field
FOSMEF
found himself somewhat isolated. He had been briefed about the Middle Eastern situation before leaving Moscow, but there had been no time to explain to him precisely what was going on in Southern Africa. He knew, of course, that Soviet advisers. Soviet weapons and equipment, and Soviet bases were contributing to the military strength of the Confederation of Africa South People’s Army (
CASPA
). But who, precisely, was in command of all these Soviet activities and forces? What was the directive upon which Soviet actions were to be based? In desperation the Flag Officer decided to send a senior staff officer to find out what was going on. The officer, travelling in plain clothes and using civil airlines, arrived eventually in Beira, where he contacted a member of the Soviet Military Mission. But, alas, events had move too fast. The Soviet Navy, having started off on the wrong foot, and then made a good recovery, had nevertheless failed to retain the control of events which effective implementation of Moscow’s subtle and complex political operations called for.

As evidence built up, and could no longer be disregarded, that a state of hostilities might at any moment exist between the United States of America and the Soviet Union, contingency plans on both sides were brought out and dusted off. The difficulty for the Americans was that in addition to losing an intelligence ship they had lost the initiative. The Russians, on the other hand, though clumsy in execution, knew exactly what they were trying to do. Moreover, at this juncture, although they were deeply involved both politically and militarily in the Middle East and in Southern Africa, two additional factors favoured the Russians. First, the satellite status of their allies in the Warsaw Pact, while a prime cause of the growing dissatisfaction which had done so much to bring about the present Soviet pressure on the Americans, had always had the advantage of giving them firm control over all the Pact armed forces, their deployment and operation. Not so with the Americans. Although continually justified to the American people as being indispensable to the national security of the United States, the military alliances of which she was a member, and in particular
NATO
, had equally been justified by the governments of their other members to their peoples as being indispensable to their national security; hence decision-making had to be shared.

The Americans, therefore, unlike the Russians, would have to consult with their allies about any military action. But this was not all. Unless the Russians chose deliberately to attack within the
NATO
area, they could be reasonably certain that
NATO
would take no action to come to America’s assistance.

This inherent weakness in the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty deserves explanation. When the Treaty was signed on 4 April 1949, the Soviet Union was not a major naval power. She had begun to establish a strong force of submarines based upon the Kola Inlet, where they would have ice-free access to the North Atlantic. But the seas and oceans of the world were not to be treated as extensions of sovereign territory. All that was needed was to include attacks upon the ships and aircraft of a member of the Alliance as cause for acting in collective defence, as with an attack across a land frontier. But surely, it was thought, there must be some geographical limit at sea. Clearly, the waters adjacent to the eastern seaboard of the United States had to be included. As to ocean limits, it was suggested that the boundary be placed at the maximum distance to which submarines operating from the Kola Inlet were likely to proceed on patrol. The Tropic of Cancer was chosen as the limit.

A number of arrangements had been made over the years to mitigate the unfortunate consequences to
NATO
of the Tropic of Cancer boundary. Chief amongst these was the pooling of Allied naval intelligence. This clearly could not be limited to the North Atlantic Treaty area. After all, wherever in the world the maritime trade of the member nations was to be found, most of it would sooner or later have to pass into the North Atlantic. How could measures for its protection there be co-ordinated without full knowledge of sailing times and routes? And how could the most economical use of shipping be organized, for the support of peoples and a war effort, unless a worldwide view of the available resources could be taken?
NATO
plans provided, therefore, that a Naval Control of Shipping Organization should be set up, and also a Planning Board for Ocean Shipping. It was through the members of these groups, acting informally as individuals and in conjunction with the worldwide shipping community, that an appropriate response began to be evolved to the Soviet Navy’s activities in the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf.

It was the British Ambassador in Washington who first communicated to the President of the United States the urgent plea of shipowners not to over-react to Soviet naval provocation. It was pointed out that the Iranians would be bound, in exercising’control of shipping in the Gulf, to ensure that the movement of oil cargoes to countries other than the United States would continue. The Japanese, for example, remained almost totally dependent upon Middle Eastern oil. Provided the oil was not cut off at source—and Iran would not connive at this—all was not lost. By switching the destinations of many cargoes already on the high seas and by relying on buffer stocks and alternative sources of supply, the United States should, it was argued, attempt to ‘ride the storm’. The important thing was to determine, if possible, the political objectives which the Soviet Union hoped to achieve by bringing naval pressure to bear on the USA’s Middle Eastern oil supplies, and to consider its best counters.

The Soviet naval attacks and the Iranian response had the effect of alerting NATO—already apprehensive of the consequences of disturbances in Poland and tension in Yugoslavia—to the possibility of a direct connection between events in Europe and those in the Middle East. Indeed, the
NATO
Military Committee, in reporting upon the blowing up of an oil well in the North Sea shortly after Soviet ships had been in the vicinity, on 3 January 1985, drew attention to it. That the Russians had denied responsibility and had suggested that the incident provided ‘good reason for Western Europe to keep out of present troubles’ was significant.

The fact that the oil well happened to be British had an effect which may not have been foreseen by the Kremlin. The action taken immediately by Britain had the tacit approval of the Political Sub-Committee of the North Atlantic Council, meeting in emergency session. This was to announce the setting up of a Northern Seas Environmental Control Agency (
NORSECA
) by agreement between the North Sea countries concerned, with an executive situated at Pitreavie, the Maritime HQ of the RN Flag Officer, Scotland and Northern Ireland, and his
RAF
colleague. Already known, and well practised, as an Air-Sea Rescue Co-ordination Centre, and accustomed •to conducting operations in concert with both civil and armed forces authorities around the North Sea, the Pitreavie HQ was able to put into effect quickly and smoothly the plans for
NORSECA
, which had been maturing for some years-The initial phase required the establishment of standard shipping routes through the North Sea, adherence to which would be mandatory if the right of uninterrupted passage through the area was to be enjoyed. The routes led clear of oil and gas installations, and moving fishing zones were also declared, using the standard medium of Notices to Mariners.

The implementation of this scheme, a possibility for some years, was facilitated by a major change in the
NATO
command structure which had been put into effect in 1983 (see Appendix 3). It had long been recognized that the command structure, particularly as it affected the naval and air forces in the Atlantic, North Sea and English Channel, had ceased to correspond to strategic and operational realities. It was indeed questionable whether it ever had.

Sweden, Soviet Russia, Poland and East Germany, as individual states whose shipping and fishing vessels were regular users of the North Sea, were invited to be represented, if they wished, on the
NORSECA
Council, in addition to the littoral states. Meanwhile, the British naval C-in-C arranged with his
RAF
colleague (C-in-C Strike Command) for armed surveillance of the Soviet group which appeared to be responsible for blowing up the North Sea oil well.

Elsewhere events had been moving at an equally dramatic tempo.

31 December 1984. Riots take place in East Berlin, with West Berliners standing on vantage points near the Wall, under full TV cover, cheering the rioters on. The riots are put down by Soviet troops, taking over almost at once from the East German police, much more firmly and bloodily than those in Poland the month before.

It must be observed here that television coverage, which was to play a very important part in the events described in this book, was in these incidents of such significance as to deserve fuller treatment.

All television news coverage in advanced countries is undertaken by lightweight electronic cameras, capable of recording their images on 25 mm videotape, or of having their material beamed live from the scene. On 31 December
ENG
(electronic newsgathering) cameras from many countries were in position at many places along the Berlin Wall, and were able to secure—and to send out live throughout the world—shots of the rioting.

One sequence was, however, secured from within East Berlin itself. An American documentary unit happened to be working on a programme on the German Democratic Republic. The director, who had won acclaim at the time of the Vietnam War for his strongly anti-war attitude, had been given considerable latitude to move about Berlin by the East German authorities. By chance he was on his way, with his camera crew, to interview an East German trade union leader when rioters began to threaten the trade union headquarters. His camera crew, their electronic equipment readily available, had secured some particularly vivid pictures, many of them in close up, before the police became aware of their presence. When two plain clothes officers intervened to stop their recording, the East German driver of the car in which they had been travelling shouted
Give me the tape’, grabbed the roll of recordings, and disappeared into the crowd. The cameraman, his recordist and the documentary director were immediately arrested, but the next day the film, smuggled across the Wall by dissidents, appeared on West Berlin screens. The pictures on it made plain, beyond any possibility of argument, that the rioters were not the usual run of urban malcontents but men of responsibility and discipline. The film also contained some ugly shots of East German police firing deliberately into the crowd, and pursuing and savagely beating the rioters.

The American crew and the director were charged with having instigated the riots, and, for good measure, with being responsible for the death of two policemen. The fact that the director had a high reputation as a left-wing sympathizer added to the irony of the situation, but did nothing to help his case.

The Federal Republic makes no move. There is now some strain between Western Europe and the United States. The stoppage of the flow of oil from the Middle East and hindrance to shipping in the Mediterranean is beginning to hit the
EEC
, which claims that its own interests in the dispute are not being considered. The Community asserts a right to import oil from Iran and to complete freedom of movement for the shipping of its members and insists that it must be a party to the coming summit discussions.

3 January 1985. The President of Mexico is assassinated.

9 January. The German Democratic Republic now announces the arrest of the American TV crew. They will be tried on a capital charge of instigating the riots and murdering two policemen in East Berlin on 31 December.

10-18 January. The US declares that it must have more naval forces in the Gulf in order to stabilize the situation there. A US task force is despatched to Bandar Abbas.

19 January. Egypt invites the Soviet Union to take control of the Suez Canal. The US Sixth Fleet effectively closes the northern exit.

20 January. The Inauguration Day message to President Thompson from Soviet President Vorotnikov is hailed by a frightened world as astonishingly placatory, and presaging a new detente. President Vorotnikov says;

a The Egyptian government has today asked the Soviet Union to take control of the Suez Canal. The Soviet government has said it would wish to do this only in co-operation with US observers on the spot, because the sole Soviet object will be to enforce the mutual standstill agreed with President Carter after his Christmas Day messages. Both the Soviet Union and the Americans may feel, in theirdifferent ways, that the other side has broken that standstill in the past three weeks. ‘But from the beginning of your presidency I beg that we should work together on these difficult issues.