The Transfer Agreement (47 page)

Nonetheless, on the day of the London march, British labor provided a pivotal display of solidarity. The National Joint Council, comprised of the Tades Union Congress, the Labour party, and the Parliamentary Labour party, circulated a binding boycott manifesto to its members. Citing a long list of prohibited German merchandise, the directive asked workers to announce to "shopkeepers and others when purchasing goods or services that they will not buy from the country whose government has so outraged the conscience of the world." The manifesto closed with this assurance:
Against an awakened and sensitive public opinion no tyranny can stand."
⁴

British labor's logic was sound, but it became difficult to mobilize Britain when protest and boycott were incongruously disowned by Jewish leaders themselves. Christian perceptions could not penetrate the complex Jewish fears of becoming highly visible or triggering dormant British anti-Semitism. They saw only unfathomable inaction.

On July
19,
traditional Anglo-Jewish leaders reached a turning point. For decades, the stalwarts of the Board of Deputies and the Anglo-Jewish Association had remained steadfastly anti- and non-Zionist. But since the German Zionist mission to Britain at the behest of Goering in March, Anglo-Jewish leaders slowly came to see Zionism as the answer to German Jewry's dilemma. The Zionist solution gained momentum after the July
13
meeting at Wilhelmstrasse, when Werner Senator went to London to join high-ranking Zionist officials to lobby for transfer.
⁵

On July
19
at
5:00 P.M.,
the Joint Foreign Committee held its decisive session. Neville Laski devoted much of the meeting to a clause-by-clause review and modification of the seven-point compromise memorandum of July 14. Laski then explained that the list of new members would be much shorter than originally suggested. It would include Melchett and his boycott colleague Maj. J. L. Nathan, but no others from the boycott community. And while the original list did name leading Anglo-Zionists, the final list would upgrade Zionist representation to include the movement's most influential voices. Chaim Weizmann was one of those discussed. Ultimately, the list of twelve additional names to be inducted included Zionist Organization president Nahum Sokolow, former Palestine attorney general Norman Bentwich, Palestine academic Philip Hartog, Zionist investor Sir Robert Waley-Cohen, and the non-Zionist president of the Jewish Agency (oversight) Council Osmond d' Avigdor-Goldsmid.
⁶

Laski then read a classified briefing based on an interview with Gen. Jan Christian Smuts, deputy prime minister of South Africa. Smuts, formerly of the British Imperial War Cabinet, was, together with Chaim Weizmann, mainly responsible for the Balfour Declaration. Although not Jewish, Smuts was one of Zionism's most important supporters. On condition that the press not be informed, Laski revealed that Smuts was "optimistic as to the future of the Jews in Germany."
Optimistic
was a word thus far unheard in the lexicon of the Hitler crisis. Laski mentioned some important developments in Germany, adding Smuts' personal advice: "Take the long view of the situation," do not allow "discretion to be overridden by sentiment," and remain strongly opposed to an organized boycott. The JFC members were impressed by the briefing and decided that Smuts' news could be read in secret at the next Board of Deputies meeting—just before the boycott vote.
⁷

Laski finally read a letter from Nahum Goldmann inviting the JFC to attend Stephen Wise's. World Jewish Congress gathering in Geneva in early September.
⁸
This was Wise's coordinated global boycott. Laski and the JFC decided to defer acceptance of Goldmann's invitation, thus increasing the ambiguities about Anglo-Jewish cosponsorship of an international boycott Jewish conference.
⁹

It
was all very confusing. On July
12,
Lord Melchett's eight-point take-over memorandum called for an international conference to convene in October. Presumably, this was to be the rescheduled World Jewish Economic Conference. Heightened pressure then focused on Lord Melchett to abandon any conference with ad hoc boycott leaders and instead work within the system. On July
14,
Neville Laski engineered a rescission of Melchett's July
12
coup, and Melchett's eight-point memorandum was replaced by a new seven-point proposal, which still mentioned an October conference. But presumably, the reference was now to Wise's World Jewish Congress. Wise even wrote back to New York, "It represents a great triumph for the democratic and nationalistic Jewish ideals. For the first time, these London gentlemen have been forced to ... sit down and publicly confer with representatives of the Jewry of the world—something they have never done before."
¹⁰

Then Samuel Untermyer's Amsterdam conference founded the World Jewish Economic Federation, whose inaugural convention would still be held in London in October under Lord Melchett. Now, on July
19,
a new world gathering in London was being discussed for October, this one sponsored by Zionist and Anglo-Jewish leaders to focus on "relief' and fund-raising to the exclusion of boycott.
¹¹

So many rival suggestions for a world Jewish gathering were vying for recognition by July
19
that nobody was sure which idea was under discussion at any given time. Laski's move to defer a decision to accept Goldmann's invitation to Wise's World Jewish Congress only prolonged the confusion. The longer such confusion existed, the less likely anyone
except
the Deputies could properly organize a conference—which is why Untermyer suddenly called his Amsterdam conference. Similarly, Stephen Wise decided he could no longer wait for the Deputies to co-convene the World Jewish Congress. So Wise and other Congress advocates scheduled something called the Second World Jewish Conference for early September in Geneva, which would finally construct a worldwide anti-Hitler boycott—with or without the Anglo-J ewish establishment.

Melchett was trying to walk a line between his own grass-roots support and the establishment Joint Foreign Committee of which he was now a member. So after the boycotters in Amsterdam proclaimed him chairman of the World Jewish Economic Federation, Melchett felt compelled to issue press statements denying his involvement and counseling against any "officially proclaimed" boycott. Yet at the same time, his own boycott journal,
The Jewish Economic Forum,
assured boycotters that the long-awaited anti-Nazi "conference" would indeed convene in October in London. To pacify conservative Jewish leaders, however, it would be called a
general
conference, not an
economic
conference. But Melchett promised that the preliminary work in Amsterdam would be a major focus. The
Forum
stressed that whether the boycott was proclaimed or unproclaimed, official or unofficial, was not as important as ensuring that the boycott was indeed
organized.
¹²

However, Melchett's equivocation soon gave way to indecision. Perhaps the boycott was not a good idea. Melchett was an ardent Zionist. Like the others in the JFC, he had heard Laski foreshadow a great development for German Jews. Was it better to continue the struggle to topple the Hitler government—a prospect that seemed more difficult as each day passed, a prospect that carried the certainty of bloody reprisals, but a prospect that made the Jews the sole force willing to organize the war against Nazism internationally? Or was it the heartbreaking duty of Jewish leaders to renounce the fight in advance, struggling instead to save who could be saved, convert the anguish of Nazi Germany into the future of Jewish Palestine, and thus solve such tragedies forever more? Melchett was unsure. Others in Anglo-Jewish leadership were unsure. The decision would be made on July
23,
at the Deputies' final meeting of the season, when the JFC's pro-Zionist shift and the boycott would both come up for debate and a vote.

The Board of Deputies was a representative Jewish body. But a core of longtime elected members, including Neville Laski, were able to control the votes in part because of chronic roll-call absenteeism.
¹³
However, for the July
23
final session,
185
Deputies packed the auditorium. Many would support the Laski line. But many were determined to vote the boycott through.

After dispensing with questions of kosher slaughter, honorary mentions of academic achievements, and congratulations on the seventieth birthday of one of the Deputies, the topic finally turned to Germany.
¹⁴
Laski began by assuring the Deputies that the many delays were misleading. During previous days, JFC members had been busy working with Jewish organizations throughout the world to alleviate the plight of German Jewry, including initiating "constructive" assistance. "Constructive" in Jewish relief parlance meant the rebuilding of Palestine. Laski acknowledged that for the first time he would attend the Zionist Congress and that this should be interpreted as a major change in the Deputies' longtime antagonism for Jewish nationalism.
¹⁵

Laski then alluded to enormous efforts under way to liquidate German Jewish assets. He declared emotionally that he yielded to no man in his sincerity or the sincerity of his colleagues. Laski readily acknowledged that others at the gathering, especially those who supported boycott, did not see "eye to eye" with him, but he would not challenge their sincerity either. The audience applauded.
¹⁶

But the Deputies had still heard no persuasive reason to abandon the boycott. Deputy Joseph Wimborne objected that too much of the Jewish public had been "in the dark" about negotiations with Germany. Whatever it was that Jewish leadership was doing, it was not helping Germany's Jews. Mr. Wimborne demanded "more information" and "brass tacks." Laski answered that certain matters were still secret and could not be divulged in public. Deputy Percy Cohen spoke up, agreeing that the Jews had been fighting on "too narrow a front" and that it was time to broaden the offensive
¹⁷
Boycott was the obvious alternative.

Deputy Michael Levy then urged Laski and his colleagues to heed the warning of British Jews who had just three days earlier staged a spectacle of protest through London. The people, declared Mr. Levy, "want to be led." But unless the board took that lead, "the masses would lead themselves."
¹⁸

Laski saw the mood. So he invoked his privilege as president and declared that the boycott debate would now go into secret session to explain certain developments that could not be uttered in public. There could be no outside observers, no reporters, no minutes. All the Deputies participating would be sworn to secrecy as well. Laski promised that after his statements, the Deputies would understand the secrecy.
¹⁹

Presented with such drama, the Deputies reluctantly agreed. With all outsiders barred, the stenographer's pen capped, and the doors closed, Laski read from the document given to him by General Smuts. In this moment of decision, with the Deputies torn between the instinct to fight and the inclination to allow their leaders to engage in quiet diplomacy, Smuts' secret document would have to make the final, compelling case against boycott.
²⁰

After reading the document, Laski delivered an impassioned hourlong speech explaining why it was now absolutely necessary to forgo the boycott against Germany. When he concluded, Laski felt certain he had swayed the Deputies, even those adamantly pro-boycott. Again using his authority as president, he limited other speakers to five minutes each, saying that it was "a poor case that could not be stated in that time." Only one or two pro-boycott Deputies were permitted to speak.
²¹

Many had come to demand that their leaders organize a boycott fight against all odds for persecuted German Jewry. They saw this as their duty to God and man. But they had heard the hard facts of Jewry's endangered position. And although their organizations officially rejected Zionism, as individuals they believed in the destiny of Jewish people to finally find redemption and peace on the soil of their forefathers. Torn between the anger in their veins and the vision in their hearts, one by one they cast their votes to battle or to build.

The vote:
27
to boycott,
110
against. Two hours after it had begun, the secret session was adjourned.
²²
No boycott.

In July
1933,
influential Anglo-Jewish leaders committed themselves to the Zionist solution of the German Jewish crisis. In so doing, they would help bring to sudden fruition the dream of Jewish nationhood. Unlike previous Jewish emergencies, this time Palestine would come first. When the next persecution descended upon a Jewish people, Israel would be there to receive them.

That noble goal was also desired by Jews advocating combat with the Reich. But they believed the better answer was boycott. For them, Wise's Second World Jewish Conference would indeed be the last chance to organize. And Wise wanted it that way. He was counting on his ability to achieve a dramatic eleventh-hour breakthrough, producing the unified economic death blow needed to end Hitlerism.

But plans were even then afoot to undermine Wise's culminating efforts. Just after the Deputies' final July
23
vote, Nahum Goldmann, the main Congress organizer, arrived back in Geneva and promptly wrote a short letter about a fund-raising question to his friend Mr. Sam Cohen, who had by then reached London. At the end of the letter was this addendum: "Stephen Wise is presently in Paris and will arrive here [Geneva] Thursday evening."
²³