The Triple Agent (34 page)
Authors: Joby Warrick
1.
first big score as a spy: Details of Balawi’s video attachment and the reaction within the CIA were described in interviews with three current intelligence officials who participated in meetings to discuss the finding, and one former U.S. intelligence official who reviewed internal memos and notes about the events.
2.
a top aide to bin Laden: For more on Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, see Craig Whitlock and Munir Ladaa, “Al-Qaeda’s New Leadership,”
Washington Post
online special, accessed Jan. 7, 2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/world/specials/terror/rahman.html
.
3.
“You have lifted our heads”: bin Zeid’s reaction to Balawi’s apparent success as a spy, as described in Balawi’s Dec. 26, 2009, videotaped interview, op. cit.
4.
serve up graphically detailed descriptions of the damage: Descriptions of Balawi’s assistance to CIA targeters in the fall of 2009 were provided in author interviews with three U.S. and two Jordanian intelligence officials.
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code-named Agent Hero: For an official account of the double agent Colonel Penkovsky’s espionage achievements during the Cold War and his eventual execution in Russia at the hands of the KGB, see his official CIA profile at
https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2010-featured-story-archive/colonel-penkovsky.html
.
6.
Indonesian terrorist ring known as Jemaah Islamiyah: For a detailed description of the terrorist group, see the profile “Jemaah Islamiyah” at
HistoryCommons.com
, at
http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=jemmah_islamiyah
.
7.
“I have to be there for Ali”: Darren LaBonte’s comments, biographical information, and friendship with bin Zeid described in author interviews
with two CIA colleagues as well as with members of the bin Zeid and LaBonte families.
1.
The Jordanian had made direct contact with the deputy commander of al-Qaeda: Details of Balawi’s e-mails about his reported interaction with Zawahiri, as well as the internal reaction to his messages, were described in author interviews with U.S. intelligence officials who participated in meetings convened to discuss the e-mails, and one former U.S. intelligence official who reviewed internal memos and notes about the events.
2.
“we have a chance to go after Zawahiri”: CIA director Leon Panetta’s words, as recalled in author interviews with two intelligence officials and one administration official who attended the meeting.
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the al-Qaeda version of a mad scientist: See Lawrence Wright,
The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006).
4.
“To kill Americans and their allies”: Ibid.
5.
an alleged 2003 plot to attack New York City’s subway system: See Ron Suskind,
The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America’s Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006).
6.
Zawahiri was known to have visited the same province: For a description of the failed assassination attempt on Zawahiri, see analysis by Bill Roggio, “Zawahiri, and al-Qaeda’s Future Plans,”
Long War Journal
, Jan. 15, 2006, as posted by
http://threatswatch.org/analysis/2006/01/zawahiri-and-alqaedas-future-p/
.
7.
“Bush, do you know where I am?”: Andrew Buncombe, “Zawahiri Taunts Bush in New Videotape,”
Independent
, Jan. 31, 2006.
8.
a series of options for a meeting with Balawi were weighed: The CIA’s internal debate over the meeting with Balawi was described in author interviews with three CIA officers who participated.
9.
“government was crying out for information”: Interview with the author.
10.
Balawi became increasingly insistent: Negotiations with Balawi over the details of his meeting with the CIA and bin Zeid recounted in author interviews with two Jordanian and three U.S. intelligence officials.
11.
“We need to go slow on this case”: LaBonte’s words and his bosses’ response, as described in interviews with two CIA officials briefed on the exchange.
12.
“But it’s my case”: The Jordanian intelligence agency’s effort to replace bin Zeid as the case officer for Balawi was confirmed by CIA director Leon Panetta in a press briefing on Oct. 19, 2010. Additional details about the internal discussions and events preceding bin Zeid’s departure for Afghanistan were described in author interviews with two Jordanian and two U.S. intelligence officials, as well as with bin Zeid’s and LaBonte’s families.
1.
She would join them via Skype: Details of Matthews’s experiences during Christmas week were provided in author interviews with two CIA colleagues and two family members.
2.
the most important ops plan of her life: Matthews’s plan and the various reactions to it were described in author interviews with two senior U.S. intelligence officials, three CIA colleagues, and two former Special Forces officers with personal knowledge of the events.
3.
no formal counterintelligence review for Balawi: The CIA’s internal review, as described by Panetta on Oct. 19, 2010, confirmed deficiencies in the agency’s counterintelligence review of the case. Additional insights provided in author interviews with two senior intelligence officials.
4.
they had found Balawi’s behavior suspicious: Author interview with Pickering, op. cit. at Langley, Virginia.
5.
everything seemed wrong: LaBonte’s and bin Zeid’s concerns about the Balawi case were described in author interviews with two CIA colleagues and family members with whom they discussed their feelings in the final days of December.
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“Sometimes it’s your job to say something”: Dec. 21, 2009, e-mail from Jeremy Wise to former navy colleague, provided to author.
7.
Stay far away from this:
Roberson’s words, as recalled by Khost colleague and recounted in author interview with the Khost colleague.
8.
“Pray for me”: Hanson’s words as recalled in author interview with family member.
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very different from the vests he usually made: For the initial account of the making of Balawi’s suicide vest, see Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, “Inside Al Qaeda: Nine Years After 9/11, Osama bin Laden’s Network Remains a Shadowy, Little-Understood Enemy,”
Newsweek
, Sept. 13, 2010. Additional details provided in interview with Pakistani Taliban official.
2.
police discovered that they could often distinguish the dead bomber: For a fuller understanding of the forensics of suicide bombing investigations, see Almogy et al., “Suicide Bombing Attacks: Update and Modifications to the Protocol,”
Annals of Surgery
, vol. 239, no. 3 (March 2004).
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outlandish theories about how the CIA’s missiles found their targets: Specifics provided in interviews with two Taliban associates and a Pakistani law enforcement official.
4.
Balawi’s days started at 5:30
A.M.:
Details about Balawi’s training camp experiences, including his leg injury, as well as al-Qaeda’s internal debate over his trustworthiness, were provided in interviews with two Pakistani Taliban officials.
5.
If you do not march forth, Allah will punish you with a painful torment: For an example of al-Masri’s rhetoric, see his “Message to the People of Pakistan,” on March 26, 2009. English translation provided by
www.nefafoundation.org
.
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Some in the group had been interrogated in U.S. detention camps: Conclusion reached by CIA investigators of the Khost attack, as described in author interviews with two participants in the review.
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“All praise is due to God, the bait fell in the right spot”: Balawi’s words in his Dec. 26, 2009, videotaped interview. English translation provided by SITE Intelligence Group.
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Among the dead was Abdullah Said al-Libi: For more on this attack, see Bill Roggio, “Al Qaeda Shadow Army Commander Thought Killed in Dec. 17 Strike,”
Long War Journal
, Jan. 8, 2010,
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/01/al_qaeda_shadow_army_2.php#ixzz1AMkm70vc
.
9.
“what is going on in the head of a martyr”: Balawi’s words in essay titled “The Last Writing of Abu Dujana al-Khorasani,” released Feb. 26, 2010, by al-Qaeda’s online magazine
Vanguards of Khorasan
. English translation courtesy of SITE Intelligence Group.
10.
“We will get you, CIA team”: Balawi’s words in English in a videotaped
suicide message posted on Feb. 28, 2010, by al-Qaeda media arm, as-Sahab. Video provided courtesy of Ben Venzke and IntelCenter,
http://www.intelcenter.com/
.
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There was a weightier matter: Dane Paresi’s views about the Balawi case and life at Khost were described in author interviews with two of his Khost colleagues, a family member, and a third person, a former military comrade with whom he spoke in December 2009.
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he finally arrived at Ghulam Khan: Details of Balawi’s transit through Pakistan to Khost were provided in interviews with three current and one former U.S. intelligence official.
3.
“wants to go on a martyrdom-seeking mission”: Hakimullah Mehsud’s and Balawi’s statements in a joint video appearance first broadcast on Jan. 9, 2010, on al-Jazeera television. English transcript provided courtesy of SITE Intelligence Group.
4.
“These are the hired dogs”: Balawi’s words in his Dec. 26, 2009, video, op. cit.
5.
“Are you going to perform jihad and get yourself killed”: Balawi offers insight into his anxieties over his mission in his essay “The Last Writing of Abu Dujana al-Khorasani,” op. cit.
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witnesses to the explosion: The immediate aftermath of the explosion and the initial efforts to save the wounded were described in author interviews with three U.S. intelligence officials privy to after-action reports.
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Alley was nearing the end of his shift: Author interview with Dr. Josh Alley. For more on Alley’s recollections of the day, see his blog at
http://www.joshalley.com/node/158
.
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Hayden happened to be in Langley: Accounts of the reaction to the Khost bombing at Langley were described in author interviews with three +intelligence officials and one administration official present at the time.
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grim task of locating wives and parents: The circumstances surrounding notification of the CIA and Jordanian families were described in author interviews with family members.
1.
“A successful epic”: Al-Masri’s reaction to the bombing in a statement posted on jihadist Web sites on Jan. 6, 2010; English translation courtesy of SITE Intelligence Group.
2.
“We claim the responsibility for the attack”: Tom Cohen, “Taliban Factions Compete for Credit in CIA Bombing Deaths,” CNN online, Jan. 3, 2010.
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“Our fidaeen have penetrated the terrorist America”: Hakimullah Mehsud’s words in a videotaped statement recorded April 4, 2010; English translation courtesy of
Long War Journal
,
http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2010/05/full_text_of_hakeemullah_video.php
.
4.
CIA’s senior managers gathered in the director’s office: Account of CIA meeting related in author interviews with two agency officials present at the meeting.
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CIA Predator carried out the first retaliatory strike: Details of the missile strikes in late December and January were provided in author interviews with two senior agency officials who participated in meetings in which the strikes were discussed.
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“Hakimullah feared dead”: “Hakimullah Feared Dead in SWA Drone Attack,”
OnePakistan
online, Jan. 15, 2010,
http://www.onepakist.an.com/news/top-stories/29848-hakimullah-feared-dead-in-swa-drone-attack.html
.
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the human dimensions of the disaster became fully clear: The events at Dover were described in author interviews with two CIA officials and four family members present at the time.
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a series of private services: Private memorials described in author interviews with family members who participated.
9.
“they went to another country to defend our country”: Remarks by President Obama and Leon Panetta at Feb. 5, 2010, memorial service, as recorded by CIA and posted on the agency’s Web site at
https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/press-release-2010/president-and-cia-director-speak-at-memorial-service.html
.
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proper burial for Elizabeth Hanson: Details of the service provided in author interviews with two CIA officials and a family member present for the burial on May 21, 2010.
2.
they had located an al-Qaeda operative: CIA effort to target al-Masri described in author interviews with two senior agency officials privy to the details.
3.
pair of longtime Washington hands: Author interviews with Thomas Pickering and Charles E. Allen.
4.
the major preoccupation was the good health and safety of the man: Author interview with Thomas Pickering.
5.
“The most important failure was one of imagination”: 9/11 Commission report, op. cit.
1.
Bin Laden set up housekeeping: Details of Osama bin Laden’s hiding place, as well as the May 1, 2011, Navy SEAL raid that led to his death, were compiled from official White House and Defense Department statements and from interviews with two Obama administration officials briefed on the events.
2.
“We think we’ve found a path forward”: Details of CIA discussions and activities during the six-year search for bin Laden’s courier were described in interviews with two current and two former intelligence officials with direct knowledge of the events.
3.
“When you put it all together”: Leon Panetta interview with Jim Lehrer on PBS
NewsHour
, broadcast May 3, 2011.
4.
“Once those teams went into the compound”: Author interview with Panetta, May 3, 2011, and ibid.
5.
“we have rid the world of the most infamous terrorist of our time”: May 2, 2011, e-mail from Leon Panetta to CIA staff, provided to author.
