The Twilight War: The Secret History of America's Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran (102 page)

61.
Admiral James Lyons, USN (Ret.), interview with author, November 6, 2006.

62.
NSC memorandum,”Iran/Afghanistan,” March 20, 1980, p. 5.

C
HAPTER 2
A N
EW
G
RAND
S
TRATEGY

1.
Hamilton Jordan memorandum for President Carter, January 22, 1980.

2.
Jimmy Carter,
White House Diary
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010), January 23, 1980, pp. 394–95.

3.
Current Documents
, U.S. Department of State, 1983, p. 157; Jimmy Carter, “The State of the Union,” January 23, 1980, Carter,
Public Papers
, p. 197.

4.
See also “America Likes Its New Foreign Policy—Or Does It?”
Economist
, February 23, 1980, p. 45.

5.
“Carter Takes Charge,”
Time
, February 4, 1980, p. 12. On the night of his State of the Union speech, see Jimmy Carter, Presidential Daily Diary, entry for January 23, 1980,
www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/diary/1980/
; William Odom comments, “Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski with Madeleine Albright, Leslie Denend, William Odom,” February 18, 1982, Miller Center, University of Virginia, Carter Presidential Project, p. 52.

6.
President Jimmy Carter Presidential Directive/NSC-18, “U.S. National Strategy,” August 24, 1977, pp. 4–5.

7.
Following a crisis in the Congo in December 1963, McNamara expanded the responsibilities of the Tampa-based command to include planning and executing of operations in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. The U.S. military divides the globe up into large geographical commands, called unified commands, with responsibility for all U.S. forces regardless of service within their area. Strike Command, however, did not have a specific geographical area, but was given the mission of “providing a general reserve of combat-ready forces to reinforce other unified or specified commands. After considerable debate, the secretary of defense decided to expand the mission of STRICOM. On December 1, 1963, the new command’s boundaries included the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. Jay E. Hines, “From Desert One to Southern Watch: The Evolution of U.S. Central Command,”
Joint Force Quarterly
, Spring 2000, p. 43; Lawrence R. Benson and Jay Hines,
The United States Military in North Africa and Southwest Asia Since World War II
(CENTCOM History Office, January 1988), p. 30; General George Crist, “CENTCOM: The Bastard Command,” unpublished, 1989, p. 5.

8.
As with the debate over STRICOM two years earlier, the chairman and army and air force chiefs of staff advocated having STRICOM assume the mission for controlling operations in Africa and the Middle East, deploying the U.S.-based forces in the event of a contingency. The navy and marine corps dissented. They wanted command responsibilities to remain the same, with Atlantic Command responsible for Africa and CINCNELM the Middle East. Not surprisingly, both of these were navy-dominated commands.

9.
In a handy compromise, the Pentagon divided the Middle East between two four-star American commands: the army-dominated European Command and the navy-controlled Pacific Command, with the former having responsibility for the Middle East landmass while the latter covered Pakistan, the Indian Ocean, and the Gulf of Oman. Crist, “Bastard Command,” p. 7; letter from Dr. John Partin, U.S. Special Operations Command to General George Crist, “Rapid Deployment Forces and Joint Command Arrangements for the Near East,” October 11, 1989, p. 1. Dr. Partin had served as the Readiness Command historian in the early 1980s.

10.
On July 27, 1978, the National Security Council looked to address the growing crisis in Afghanistan by strengthening CENTO, of which Pakistan was a member. This included a $5 million investment by the United States in new communications equipment. The overthrow of the shah and the end of CENTO killed the idea before it came to fruition.

11.
When pressed, Jones suggested to Brown that they could deploy for a short time two carriers or a marine brigade. Report by the J-5 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), “U.S. Military Response to Minor Contingencies in the Persian Gulf,” October 5, 1978, pp. 1–10.

12.
Harold Brown, interview with author, August 25, 2008.

13.
Brzezinski memorandum to President Carter, December 2, 1978, NSC Weekly Report No. 81, Jimmy Carter Library, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Weekly Reports, Box 41, Weekly Reports 71–81 Folder.

14.
Lieutenant General William Odom, USA (Ret.), interview with author, August 28, 2007.

15.
Tim Weiner, “Robert Komer, 78, Figure in Vietnam, Dies,”
New York Times
, April 12, 2000. Komer agreed with Brzezinski: “The Carter administration was very slow to awaken to the realities of the strategic vacuum in the Gulf.” Robert Komer Oral History, Office of the Secretary of Defense History Office, March 25, 1981, p. 102.

16.
Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, “U.S. Strategy and Defense Policy for the Middle East and the Persian Gulf,” May 10, 1979, p. 1, Appendix A, pp. 1, 6, 13, 22; also mentioned in an earlier internal memorandum of the Joint Chiefs, “Review of U.S. Strategy Related to the Middle East and Persian Gulf,” January 31, 1979, pp. 1–3.

17.
General David Jones memorandum for Secretary Harold Brown, “Potential Joint/Combined Exercises in the Persian Gulf,” June 18, 1979, pp. 1–2; CINCEUR message to Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Potential Exercises in Persian Gulf” (0111507Z), September 1979, pp. 1–3; Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, “U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East/Persian Gulf Region,” November 23, 1979, Annex B, pp. 1–5, Annex C, pp. 1–2.

18.
Only the chief of naval operations, Admiral Thomas Hayward—more proactive about the Middle East than most of his navy brethren—recommended anything substantive. He proposed forming a new Fifth Fleet for the Middle East and suggested that a carrier battle group be maintained on a permanent basis off the Iranian coast. Brown pressed the military to begin planning for the possible deployment of U.S. combat troops to the Persian Gulf. Brzezinski,
Power and Principle
, pp. 182–90.

19.
The Joint Chiefs opposed the deployment in 1978, viewing Saudi motivations with suspicion. The deployment of these aircraft became complicated when Spain denied them landing rights on their flight from the United States to Saudi Arabia.

20.
Brown interview.

21.
Joint Chiefs of Staff message, “U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East/Persian Gulf Region” (071725Z), July 1979, p. 2; General David Jones memorandum for Secretary Harold Brown, “Potential Joint/Combined Exercises in the Persian Gulf,” June 18, 1979, pp. 1–2; CINCEUR message to Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Potential Exercises in Persian Gulf” (0111507Z), September 1979, pp. 1–3; Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, “U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East/Persian Gulf Region,” November 23, 1979, Annex B, pp. 1–5, Annex C, pp. 1–2.

22.
Joint Chiefs of Staff message, “Middle East Exercises,” September 7, 1979, pp. 1–2; Harold Brown memorandum for General David Jones, “Potential Joint/Combined Exercises in the Persian Gulf/Northwest Indian Ocean,” May 25, 1979, p. 2.

23.
A May 29, 1979, CIA report influenced the thinking of the national security adviser. “The departure of the Shah was a windfall for the Soviets,” the CIA report stated. “While they have not benefited directly, the new regime’s inherent weakness and its withdrawal from a regional security role have created power vacuums both with Iran and the area generally that they would like to exploit.” Brzezinski latched onto this assessment and rejected Vance’s views. CIA Intelligence Assessment, “Changes in the Middle East: Moscow’s Perceptions and Options,” May 29, 1979, p. iii; Olav Njolstad, “Shifting Priorities: The Persian Gulf in U.S. Strategic Planning in the Carter Years,”
Cold War History
4:3 (2004), p. 30.

24.
Harold Brown memorandum for President Jimmy Carter, “U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East/Persian Gulf,” July 11, 1979, pp. 1–3.

25.
On November 15, 1979, General Jones relayed to the secretary of defense a rough force list that would be available to the new rapid force, from which forces could be tailored for various contingencies. This included three carrier battle groups, one corps-sized marine amphibious force, eight air force squadrons, and three army divisions (4th, 101st, and 82nd), including the elite XVIII Airborne Corps from Fort Bragg, the 194th Armored Brigade, and two battalions of Army Rangers. All told, 170,000 men were on tap for potential deployment under the rapid deployment force.

26.
The four airfields were Masirah, Seeb, Thumrait, and Kasab. “Logistics Concept in Support of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF),” United States Readiness Command, J-4, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force J-4, April 15, 1981, pp. A5–A6.

27.
Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, “U.S. Access to Facilities in the Middle East/Persian Gulf Region,” March 14, 1980, p. 1; Robert Komer memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, “Rear-Staging Areas in Egypt,” March 7, 1980, pp. 1–3.

28.
David Isenberg, “The Rapid Deployment Force: The Few, the Futile, the Expendable,” Policy Analysis No. 44, CATO Institute, November 8, 1984, p. 9,
www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa044.html
, accessed September 20, 2002. The ambassador to Jordan, a career Foreign Service officer named Nicholas Veliotes, secretly concluded an arrangement with the Jordanian king to establish a Jordanian counterpart to the U.S. rapid deployment force that could augment the American effort in the event of a war with the Soviets. The two countries conducted low-level military exercises and Jordan offered use of its bases as marshaling areas for the rapid deployment force. Ambassador Nicholas Veliotes, Foreign Affairs Oral History Program, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, January 29, 1990.

29.
Brzezinski memorandum to President Jimmy Carter, July 31, 1979.

30.
Harold Brown memorandum to General David Jones, November 10, 1979. Brzezinski’s military aide William Odom later wrote that Carter contemplated just ordering its creation and dictating the command structure, but in the end the president let the Pentagon sort it out.

31.
Secretary of Defense memorandum to Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 22, 1979.

32.
General Paul X. Kelley, interview with author, May 13, 2009.

33.
Two names—Army General Paul Gorman and P. X. Kelley—had been forwarded to Jones as possible commanders of the rapid deployment force. Gorman was well respected in the Pentagon and had the strong backing of the army chief of staff, Edward Meyer. But W. Graham Clayton, Jr., former secretary of the navy and now Brown’s deputy, knew Kelley and liked the marines, and when Gorman’s name came before Clayton, he suggested Kelley as an alternative choice. American Embassy Kabul message to Secretary of State, “Meeting with Soviet Diplomat,” June 25, 1979, p. 3.

34.
Robert H. Barrow memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Rapid Deployment Forces,” December 14, 1979, pp. 1–2, Personal Papers of General Robert H. Barrow, U.S. Marine Corps Archives, Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA.

35.
Bright Star was an annual exercise until 1985, when, due to its size and the number of forces involved, the decision was made to hold it every two years.

36.
The main Soviet attacks would come from the Transcaucasus and Turkistan toward Tehran along four main axes with a supporting attack from Turkistan and Afghanistan along the eastern Iranian axis to seize Mashhad and Zahedan.

37.
The first was submitted for the Joint Chiefs’ review on July, 31, 1980; it was modified over the coming year and resubmitted on February 13, 1981.

38.
RDJTF OPLAN 1001-81, February 15, 1981, Annex C, pp. C1–C13.

39.
The first plan was labeled 1001 but quickly three variants (1002, 1003, 1004) emerged, based upon the conditions that precipitated the invasion and if it coincided with a general war in Europe. COMRDJTF message to Joint Chiefs of Staff, “OPLAN 1001-81” (170350Z), June 1981, p. 1; CINCRED message to Joint Chiefs of Staff, “COMRDJTF OPLAN 1001-81” (132306Z), February 1981, p. 2.

40.
The forces allocated to the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force in 1981 included: