The United Nations Security Council and War:The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945 (147 page)

⁷⁸
See Ian Hurd, ‘Of Words and Wars: The Security Council’s Hard Life Among the Great Powers’,
Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
5, no. 1 (2004), 72; Ian Hurd, ‘The Great Powers and the UN Security Council: The Futile Search for Collective Security in the Charter and on Iraq’, in Harvey Starr (ed.),
Approaches, Levels, and Methods of Analysis in International Politics: Crossing Boundaries
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

⁷⁹
See also Voeten, ‘Political Origins’, 533–41; Thompson, ‘Coercion through IOs’, 26–9. However, on the importance of legitimacy in international relations, see Hurd, ‘Legitimacy and Authority’; Ian Clark,
Legitimacy in International Society
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

⁸⁰
See Richard Price, ‘A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo’,
International Organization
49 (1995), 73–103; Nina Tannenwald, ‘Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo’,
International Security
29 (2005), 5–49.

⁸¹
On debates on Kosovo, see Nico Krisch, ‘Unilateral Enforcement of the Collective Will: Kosovo, Iraq, and the Security Council’,
Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law
3 (1999), 97–8. On public opinion on Iraq 2003, see William Horsley, ‘Polls find Europeans oppose Iraq war’,
BBC News
, 11 Feb. 2003, available at
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2747175.stm
YouGov,
A Possible War in Iraq
, Mar. 2003, available at
www.yougov.com/archives/pdf/dim030101001_1.pdf
Thompson dismisses these facts as indicators of normative beliefs because they were not accompanied by a willingness to participate in the respective wars: Thompson, ‘Coercion through IOs’, 28. This overlooks that recognizing somebody else’s right to act in no ways implies an own obligation to join in the action.

⁸²
See Eichenberg, ‘Victory Has Many Friends,’ 159–61, 175.

⁸³
In a 2004 survey, between 60% and 80% of people polled in European countries said their government needed UN approval before dealing with an international threat. The figures in the US and Russia were 41% and 37% respectively – not very different from those in the other countries polled: in Turkey, Pakistan, Jordan, and Morocco, between 38% and 45% responded favourably. See Pew Research Center, 2004 report, above n. 72, p.146.

⁸⁴
See also Voeten, ‘Political Origins’, 531–3; Hurd, ‘The Great Powers’.

⁸⁵
See generally Gray,
International Law and the Use of Force
, 25–6; and on African positions, Mayall, ‘Humanitarian Intervention’, 121–6. But see also Thomas M. Franck, ‘Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by States’,
American Journal of International Law
64, no. 4 (1970), 809–37.

⁸⁶
On Kosovo, see Krisch, ‘Unilateral Enforcement’, 81–3; on Iraq, Adam Roberts, ‘Law and the Use of Force After Iraq’,
Survival
45, no. 2 (2003), 39–41; Gray,
International Law and the Use of Force
, 273–5.

⁸⁷
On the different possible strategies behind Western action, see Michael Byers, ‘Preemptive Self-defense: Hegemony, Equality and Strategies of Legal Change’,
Journal of Political Philosophy
11 (2003), 171–90.

⁸⁸
UN doc. S/2003/351 of 21 Mar. 2003; see also William H. Taft and Todd F. Buchwald, ‘Preemption, Iraq, and International Law’,
American Journal of International Law
97, no.3 (2003), 557–63.

⁸⁹
On argumentative ‘self-entrapment’ in general, see Risse, ‘“Let’s Argue!”’, 32–3. See also Abbott and Snidal, ‘Why States Act’, 25, on changes in the environment of states brought about by international institutions.

⁹⁰
See Franck, ‘Who Killed Article 2(4)?’, 832–5.

⁹¹
See Gray,
International Law and the Use of Force
, 201–4.

⁹²
See Danesh Sarooshi,
The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security: The Delegation by the UN Security Council of its
Chapter VII
Powers
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), ch. 5, also on the limited precedents of Korea and Southern Rhodesia.

⁹³
See Simon Chesterman,
Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 127–60; Martin Lailach,
Die Bedrohung des Weltfriedens und der internationalen Sicherheit als Aufgabe des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen
(Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1998). On China’s reservations, see Morphet, ‘China’, 161–4.

⁹⁴
On the legal aspects, see Frowein and Krisch, ‘Introduction to
Chapter VII
’.

⁹⁵
See Abbott and Snidal, ‘Why States Act’, 16–23; Woods, ‘US and International Financial Institutions’, 93–5; Thompson, ‘Coercion through IOs’. On international law, see Krisch, ‘International Law in Times of Hegemony’.

⁹⁶
On such readjustment in the Security Council, see Hurd, ‘Security Council Reform’; also Prantl, ‘Informal Groups of States’.

^*
The author would like to thank Amy Scott, Chris Waters, and Sir Michael Wood for invaluable comments on earlier drafts of this chapter.

¹
GA Res. 1000 (ES-I) of 5 Nov. 1956.

²
The difference arises from the question whether one considers the 1951 referral of the war in Korea from the Security Council to the General Assembly as a use of the Uniting for Peace procedure. The issue is discussed in more detail below.

³
GA Res. 377 (V) of 3 Nov. 1950.

⁴
GA Res. ES-10/17 of 27 Jan. 2007.

⁵
ICISS,
The Responsibility to Protect
(Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), xii.

⁶
SC Res. 83 of 27 June 1950; and SC Res. 84 of 7 July 1950.

⁷
See William Stueck’s discussion of this issue in
Chapter 11
.

⁸
The USSR vetoed two draft resolutions on 6 and 12 Sep. 1950 (UN docs. S/1653 and S/1752), which among other things called on states to desist from supporting North Korea.

⁹
See Dean Acheson,
Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department
(London: Hamish Hamilton, 1970), 449–50.

¹⁰
Charter of the United Nations, Art.12(1).

¹¹
Acheson,
Present at the Creation
, 450. The British government was originally sceptical about the American proposals, favouring instead a ‘more subtle’ approach to get around the veto problem. In discussions with US diplomats, the FCO suggested to amend the rules of procedure of the General Assembly to allow in the event of a crisis for the convening of the Assembly within 24 hours on request of any member state supported by the majority of members. ‘Friendly’ Security Council members could prevent the crisis from reaching the Council’s agenda. British diplomats admitted, however, that they might face problems in mobilizing the necessary international support quickly enough in the event of a crisis. See
Telegram from the Ambassador in the UK (Douglas) to the Secretary of State
, London, 16 Aug. 1950, FRUS 1950, Vol. II, 320.

¹²
GA Res. 377 (V).

¹³
GA Res. 377 (V).

¹⁴
Charter of the United Nations, Art. 10: ‘The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.’

¹⁵
Michael Matheson,
Council Unbound: The Growth of UN Decision Making on Conflict and Postconflict Issues after the Cold War
(Washington, DC: USIP, 2006), 104.

¹⁶
Keith S. Petersen, ‘The Uses of the Uniting for Peace Resolution since 1950’,
International Organization
13, no.2 (Spring 1959), 219.

¹⁷
GA Res. 111 (II) of 13 Nov. 1947.

¹⁸
GA Res. 39 (I) of 12 Dec. 1946.

¹⁹
GA Res. 109 (II) of 21 Oct. 1947, and GA Res. 181 (II) of 29 Nov. 1947. See also Dimitris Bourantonis and Konstantinos Magliveras, ‘Anglo-American Differences over the UN during the Cold War: The Uniting for Peace Resolution’,
Contemporary British History
16, no.2 (2002), 62.

²⁰
Bourantonis and Magliveras, ‘Anglo-American Differences over the UN during the Cold War’.

²¹
UN doc. S/1894 of 30 Nov. 1950.

²²
UN doc. A/1618 of 4 Dec. 1950. In this telegram, the representatives of Cuba, Ecuador, France, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States request the inclusion of the item ‘Intervention of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China in Korea’ in the agenda of the General Assembly session.

²³
Sidney D. Bailey and Sam Daws,
Procedure of the Security Council
, 3rd edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 225–6.

²⁴
Petersen, ‘The Uses of the Uniting for Peace Resolution’, 224.

²⁵
GA Res. 498 (V) of 1 Feb. 1951.

²⁶
For a more detailed discussion, see Petersen, ‘The Uses of the Uniting for Peace Resolution’, 220–3.

²⁷
SC Res. 119 of 31 Oct. 1956.

²⁸
SC Res. 120 of 4 Nov. 1956.

²⁹
SC Res. 129 of 7 Aug. 1958.

³⁰
SC Res. 157 of 17 Sep. 1960.

³¹
Yearbook of the United Nations
, 1960, 59–64.

³²
GA Res. 1474 of 20 Sep. 1960.

³³
SC Res. 303 of 6 Dec. 1971. The USSR had previously vetoed two draft resolutions (UN. Doc. S/10416 of 4 Dec. 1971, and UN doc. S/10423 of 5 Dec. 1971).

³⁴
SC Res. 462 of 9 Jan. 1980.

³⁵
SC Res. 500 of 28 Jan. 1982.

³⁶
GA Res. 377 (V), para. 1: Such emergency special session shall be called if requested by the Security Council on the vote of any seven members, or by a majority of the Members of the United Nations.

³⁷
UN doc. A/6717 of 13 June 1967.

³⁸
The Council called for a ceasefire in SC Res. 233 of 6 June 1967, SC Res. 234 of 7 June 1967, and in SC Res. 236 of 11 June 1967.

³⁹
See
Yearbook of the United Nations
, 1967, 209. Each individual part of the draft resolution was rejected by the General Assembly in separate votes, and consequently the Assembly never voted on the whole resolution. See also Andrew Boyd,
Fifteen Men on a Powder Keg: A History of the UN Security Council
(London: Methuen, 1971), 215–17.

⁴⁰
UN doc. S/13911 of 28 Apr. 1980.

⁴¹
GA Res. ES-7/4 of 28 Apr. 1982.

⁴²
Art. 4 of the Charter of the United Nations states that UN membership ‘is open to all… peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter’. By denying that Israel is ‘peace-loving’, GA Res. ES-7/4 seems to suggest that Israel does not fulfil the criteria for UN membership. For a critical discussion of this emergency special session, see also Yehuda Z. Blum, ‘The Seventh Emergency Special Session of the UN General Assembly: An Exercise in Procedural Abuse’,
American Journal of International Law
80, no. 3 (1986), 587–600.

⁴³
UN doc. S/14459 of 27 Apr. 1981; UN doc. S/14460/Rev.1 of 29 Apr. 1981; and UN doc. S/14461 of 27 Apr. 1981.

⁴⁴
GA Res. ES-8/2 of 14 Sep. 1981.

⁴⁵
UN doc. S/1997/199 of 7 Mar. 1997; and UN doc. S/1997/241 of 21 Mar. 1997.

⁴⁶
Indeed, the two draft resolutions vetoed by the US did not make any reference to threats to international peace and security.

⁴⁷
GA Res. ES-10/14 of 8 Dec. 2003.

⁴⁸
International Court of Justice,
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
, 9 July 2004.

⁴⁹
GA Res. 3379 (XXX), of 10 Nov. 1975.

⁵⁰
See also Bruce Jones’s discussion of Israeli perceptions of the UN in
Chapter 13
.

⁵¹
While the resolutions mostly addressed the situation in the occupied Palestinian territories, which certainly has implications for international peace and security, none of the resolutions explicitly referred to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or to aggression, which are the instances under which the Uniting for Peace resolution calls on the General Assembly to meet for an emergency special session. Several of the resolutions call for an end of Israeli settlement activities and expropriation of land. See for example UN doc. S/1995/394 of 17 May 1995; and UN doc. S/1997/199 of 7 Mar. 1997.

⁵²
UN doc. S/1994/1358 of 2 Dec. 1994; and UN doc. S/2002/712 of 30 June 2002.

⁵³
In 1994, a UN peacekeeping mission, UNPROFOR, which was authorized by the Security Council, was deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1994 alone, the Security Council passed eleven resolutions on Bosnia and Herzegovina and UNPROFOR. Eight years later, the pattern was repeated. The US vetoed a draft resolution on Bosnia on 30 June 2002 because of the issue of immunity for its peacekeepers from prosecution by the International Criminal Court, and voted in favour of a resolution extending the mandate of the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina two weeks later, after it gained immunity for its soldiers. See SC Res. 1422 of 12 July 2002, and SC Res. 1423 of 12 July 2002.