The Whale Has Wings Vol 1 - Rebirth (13 page)

The Royal Navy h
ad practiced carrier groups of two ships since 1930, and even three carriers at times (although until recently lack of numbers had made getting three carriers together for training very difficult). They were quite confident they could coordinate a three-carrier strike, especially since it would be a night attack and there would be time to arrange the attack carefully. It was realised that setting up such a large attack, at night with the threat of U-boats to consider, was not a small task, however it was likely they would only get one chance to surprise the enemy, and it was necessary to take a few risks to make this a decisive blow. A simultaneous strike on two targets had been considered, but there were problems with hitting both at once (navigational issues alone meant that one would be alerted), and it was decided that a decisive strike against one target would be more practical. There were also issues with coordinating the number of carriers for a two-target strike, this would mean five fleet carriers, and no-one had tried using that many together before .

The actual timing was mainly set by the availability of the carriers and the moon. In order to aid in the attack, a 3/4 or better moon was considered necessary, and a waning moon best (since
its late rising would help hide the attack force before launching). The final date was set after the destruction of the Graf Spee, which allowed some of the carriers dispersed for hunting to be recalled, thus allowing the striking force to finalise its intensive training. It also allowed for carriers with the home fleet in case of damage or loss of part of the striking force. The force was to consist of a heavy surface force as well as the carrier group, in order to protect the carriers in case of detection on the way to the target, and to help them get home again. The date was set for the 31st December, with an additional hope that the defenders might be more surprised by an attack on this date.

Com
mand of the force was given to Rear-Admiral Lyster, flying his flag in HMS Illustrious; not only was he an expert in carrier operations, but the original plan (against the Italians), had been designed and perfected under him. Finally, the Home Fleet would be out in the northern part of the North Sea, apparently in a sweep of the area. Partly in the hope that if it was spotted it would distract the enemy, and second as a backup in case something went very wrong with the operation.

The attack force was expected to come under
enemy air attack, at least on the morning after the raid. It therefore included two AA cruisers, as well as the eight carrier escort destroyers of the 8th Destroyer Flotilla. Since the attack would take place at night, and no effective German fighter opposition was expected, the carrier fighters were retained for use against the expected attack - it was expected that they would have to fight their way clear on the day following the attack.

It had originally been hoped that the attack could be combined with a follow-up raid by the RAF (one navy navigator was heard to say that
surely even the RAF couldn't fail to find a target after the FAA had left it burning...), but after two earlier raids by Wellington bombers, with heavy losses, the RAF declared that a daylight raid was too dangerous. They were persuaded to do reconnaissance flights by the new stripped-down version of the Spitfire for three weeks before the raid. This was to determine exactly what there was to target, and hopefully get the Germans lulled into ignoring the regular recon flights.

Fleet Order of Battle for Operation Chastise

1st Carrier grou
p; HMS Formidable, HMS Illustrious, HMS Courageous

Total airgroups 78
Swordfish TBR, 48 Cormorant Divebombers, 48 Goshawk Fighters

1st Battlecruiser squadron ; HMS Hood, HMS Renown, HMS Repulse

6th and 8th Destroyer flotillas (16 ships)

The attack would be in the form of two separate strikes, as it was not possible to get all the aircraft off in one go. This also avoided some of the problems of having a very large number of aircraft trying first to form up in the dark, and then attack. The plan was for the second strike to arrive shortly after the first one had finished its attack

The first strike would consist of 18 Swordfish (Formidable) 12 Cormorants (Formidable) 12 Swordfish (Illustrious) 18 Cormorants (Victorious) 12 Swordfish (Courageous)

A total of
42 Swordfish and 30 Cormorants, plus six Swordfish carrying flares to illuminate the targets.

The s
econd strike would be 12 Swordfish (Formidable) 6 Cormorants (Formidable) 18 Swordfish (Illustrious) 12 Cormorants (Courageous)

A total of 30 Swordfish
and 18 Cormorants, plus four Swordfish carrying flares

Home Fleet covering force
(in the northern part of the North Sea);

2nd carrier group;
HMS Colossus, HMS Vengeance

2nd Battle Squadron; HMS Rodney, HMS Ramillies

12th Cruiser squadron; Effingham, Emerald, Cardiff, Dunedin

7th Destroyer squadron (9 ships)

In addition six submarines had been sent to cover the waters the attack force would be returning through

Target - Wilhelmshaven

There were actually three parts to the
Chastise operation - getting into position to launch the strikes, the strikes themselves, and getting safely away afterwards.

In order to get into striking range of Wilhelmshaven, about 150 miles, it was considered best to approach from the north. This avoided coming in from the west over the Frisian islands off the coast, and the planners did not know if there were any warning systems set up on them. Coming in from the north in theory meant going in through a declared British minefield, but this was by no means complete, and they had carefully left a wide area mine-free to come in through.

The biggest problem was avoiding detecting during the approach. Weather conditions were normally favourable at this time of year (i.e. cloudy), and they would be keeping a CAP in the air to, hopefully, shoot down any reconnaissance plane that came close enough to identify just what they were. To aid in this, the cruiser force was split from the main body on the approach down through the North Sea, in a position that would make them spotted first. The idea was then to shoot down the spotting plane, probably after it had identified a few cruisers or destroyers, at the best stopping them sending a sighting report, at the worst miss-identifying them.

There was also the possibility of being detected by a submarine leaving for or returning from a patrol, but again they would have Swordfish in the air, which would hopefully keep any submarines safely down and unable to transmit. The 'run-in' from the North Sea into the area north of Wilhelmshaven would, thanks to the time of yea
r, only have daylight for some eight hours, and as it was likely that any planes would prefer not to land at night, the detection window was quite small. The worst that could happen was that they would have to retreat without attempting the raid.

Getting away after would be the more difficult task. It was expected, if things went to plan, that they would be able to start the withdrawal at around 0500. The first job was to head north/north west in order to get out of range of the short ranged German fighters. Without
having to handle these, the defending Goshawks would have a much easier time protecting the fleet from bombers. There was also the submarine threat, but they expected to be sailing at 25kt and this was considered a small risk - a submarine would have to be in an attacking position by pure luck.

As it was, the run-in to the attack position went perfectly.
The weather was with them - the day of the 30th and 31st were cloudy, with the cloud breaking up late on the evening of the 31st. Of course, the choice of these dates were quite deliberate, and were intended to reduce the chance of alertness on the part of the defenders. The only worry was that if the cloud continued to break up, they would have clear weather on the first for the enemy planes to spot them, but by then the damage would have been done and they were confident of their ability to fight their way out. The sea state was moderate (although it would have required a full-blown North Sea gale to prevent the FAA from launching once they had got that far!), and once night fell the crews started to prepare the planes for the raid.

Normally it was not practice to keep armed and fuelled planes in the hangers, indeed normal procedure was for the fuel lines to be drained when not actively in use, but in this case the need to get a large number of aircraft off , followed by a second strike, in a very short time had made them decide to take the chance. As it was night and they were in the middle of the fleet, it was considered a more than acceptable risk. In fact some planes had to be armed on the flight deck - in order to manage the attack, a number of Swordfish, picked from other squadrons for the skill of their navigators, were to lead the strikes and then illuminate with flares for the attacks to go in, and there wasn't room for all the planes in the hangers. Everything was prepared by 2200, and all they had to do then was worry and hope noting detected them at the last minute.

At 2330 there was a final briefing for the aircrew, giving them the latest weather data and probably positions of the targets inside the harbour. The first Swordfish would take off at 0045, with the first strike expected to arrive on target at 0230. The raid expected to move down the coast of neutral Denmark, which conveniently had no idea what a blackout was, then cut southwest to hit the port with minimal chance of warning. It also allowed them to fly lower, with less chance of detection. As it was the experimental Freya radar only picked them up when they were close (it was mainly set up to detect aircraft coming from the west, not the north-east, and by the time they had got themselves sorted out the attack had almost arrived. Ironically the two earlier failed RAF raids helped - the defenders made the assumption that this was another medium-high level raid by Wellingtons, which led to more confusion and an inefficient response. No-one had ever considered a mass night raid by carrier planes possible, let alone likely, as it was well known that the harbour was too shallow for torpedoes, and naval planes couldn't carry the weight of bombs necessary to make an inaccurate high level attack sensible. Indeed while the speed at which the local defences got the 88mm guns into action was impressive under the circumstances, they, and the searchlights, were all looking in the wrong direction. By the time they realised their mistake it was too late.

The job of the first flights of attacking planes was to illuminate the harbour with their flares. Since it was intended to make a short, sharp attack these planes were slightly ahead of the main strike force, who had orders not to attack until the harbour was well illuminated, in order to drop as many flares as possible in a short time. Very soon indeed the harbour, and the planes targets, were well lit by the flares and the gibbous moon. In addition to giving the attackers a clear view of their intended victims, it also hindered the German light AA, who were straining to see what was going on past the brilliant spots of the flares. The port did, of course, have considerable AA, plus searchlights, and the area even had an experimental Freya radar, but the night-time AA defence in 1939 was not what it would come to be in the next few years.

Once the flares were dropping, the following planes fell into their strike formations and determined the best line of approach to their targets. It was helped by the r
ecent photographs from an RAF Spitfire; it seemed that the ships they were looking for were still moored as they had been a couple of days ago.

The first to make their attacks were the torpedo planes. They weren't too worried by the AA (although it was quite heavy - a real 'Brocks benefit' as it was later described),
due to the very low altitude of their approach; their main concern being to manage their approach runs to avoid any torpedo nets protecting their target. The first victim was the pocket battleship the Admiral Scheer (sister to the recently despatched Graf Spee). She was the target of 12 Swordfish from HMS Illustrious, lying at anchor fitfully backlit by the parachute flares. Even though a considerable degree of surprise had been attained, her crew had manned her AA guns, although they were obviously having a problem finding the attackers as they bore in at 50 feet.

Given the Sheer's helpless and immobile situation, the flights had split up, 6 planes attacking from each beam. In theory she was a helpless sitting duck, but of course the need to avoid the nets, and the rather impressive AA display made it ra
ther more different. The first six planes, attacking from the port side, only achieved mediocre results, one hit out of six. This impacted the vessel about amidships, with a spectacular plume of water, and breached her hull, sending water flooding into the forward engine compartment.

The planes attacking from starboard and led by Lt-Cmr Edmonde (the raid leader) had more luck (they l
ater insisted it was mere skill). The ships AA had obviously been distracted by the attack from port, and as a result they were not spotted until the first drops. This time 3 of the aerial torpedoes hit -one forward, and 2 more further astern. All three breached the hull, and the flooding went from worrying to serious. One of the torpedoes also caused the second engine room to flood, and the ship lost power, a situation which hardly helped to reduce the amount of water entering. The Scheer took on an increasingly growing list to one side, while the crew tried frantically to get power restored to work the pumps.