The Whale Has Wings Vol 1 - Rebirth (3 page)

The TBR requirement it was pointed out could be filled by the private venture Swordfish, which would be available in service from 1935. Concerns were raised over its rather old-fashioned design, but its performance was similar to other planes in service with other navies, and
it was expected that a more powerful version of the engine would give some improvements in performance. The conclusion was to go for an initial production order, while looking at a better plane as a replacement in a few years time. While the Swordfish would have a less powerful engine than that intended for use in the other two aircraft, it was felt that such an aircraft was the most likely one to find use outside of the highest threat areas, and so a later TBR aircraft could replace the Swordfish and allow it to be deployed to lower threat areas.

As no dive bomber was available, a specification was put out to tender. The two selections for development were the Blackburn Skua and a navalised version of the Hawker Henly being designed for the RAF. The Admiralty were a
bit concerned by the non-radial engine of the Henly, but at present there wasn't a radial equivalent. This lack was noted for further action, and Hawker were asked to look at the possibility of replacing the Merlin with a radial engine if this could be done with minimal performance loss.

The Henley was expected to fly in late 1936, and be available to the FAA in 1937. The Skua was also expected to fly in 1936, with delivery in early 1937. The FAA would have preferred earlier development and delivery times, but Hawker in particular were busy with RAF orders.

Finally the difficult choices were over the type of fighter. Previously the RAF had argued that two men were needed to operate any homing beacon and navigate the plane at sea. The USN, on the other hand, seemed to have no big problems doing this with one man (although they did have a superior radio system), and it was obvious that a one man fighter would have a better performance that a two man plane. There was considerable argument that the 'best' performance wasn't necessary, in that land based planes wouldn't have fighter protection, but in the end this lost out to the fact that if they did indeed have modern land based fighters in attendance then things would go poorly for the RN planes, and just because the RAF couldn't do something that didn't mean the RN couldn't. Especially since the USN demonstratably could. Suggestions that the choice was made partially to put one in the eye of the RAF were studiously denied. There was still the problem of the workload on a single man for navigation on long raids (escorting the carriers own strike), but it was hoped progress could be made on this during the development of the plane. If the problem proved too difficult, the single-pilot fighter would be retained for fleet defence and either a version of the divebomber converted to fighter use, or a second crewman added to the fighter.

Since this would be the first specialised fighter for the FAA, the aircraft under development for foreign navies were investigated to allow a specification to be written to exceed them. Aircraft from Japan, Germany, Italy and the USA were considered; while the USA was not considered to be an enemy, the fact
that they were one of the only three navies to run carriers did make them useful for comparison. The committee was quite surprised, when the reports came back , that the initial response of the British aircraft industry was that they could do considerably better, even without any development of new systems and engines. It was pointed out that the planes due in service with the USN and IJN in the timeframe were the Grumman F3F, a biplane fighter with a reasonable performance by biplane standards, but weak armament and protection, and the IJN planes would be the Mitsubishi A5M, a monoplane fighter with a higher speed (although still only around 235kt) and again a weak armament. It was therefore suggested that they requirement should try and meet the one currently being looked at for the RAF, which was a monoplane of at least 300kt speed with a heavy armament of 8 .303 guns or an equivalent. A number of British manufacturers claimed they could come close to this even with the current radial engines, and if a higher powered engine could be developed then they could exceed this.

Consideration was given to pressing for development of a more powerful engine, and as a result some discussions were held with the Bristol company, the main supplier of radial
aircraft engines in the country. There was some surprise at the Admiralty that the company didn't see any need for more powerful engines than those in their current inventory, since the FAA could clearly see advantages in an engine in the 1200-1500hp range for a fighter and for a better dive bomber and TBR aircraft. Informal discussions with Roy Fedden at Bristol led to the interesting possibility of developing what he was calling the Hercules engine with a version available for test flights in 1935. This would allow it to be used for a fighter developed for acceptance in late 1936, which was the FAA's preferred timescale. Such an engine could also be used to drive a dive bomber capable of delivering a 1,000lb bomb (or a 500lb bomb at longer ranges). This was a weight of bomb that would allow the FAA to sink or seriously damage any ship short of a battleship, and indeed only modern battleships would be safe against it. Fedden also pointed out (without wanting to be quoted, of course), that considerable pressure might have to be applied to the Bristol board to persuade them to develop the engine. The Admiralty, fresh from its victory over the RAF, so no reason why they couldn't persuade an engine company to do as requested - especially if they were funding the engine. As a result a contract to get the Hercules available for flight testing in mid-1935 was placed with Bristol (the initial contacts had been resisted by the Bristol board - well known for its reluctance to try what they saw as unnecessary advances - however after the Admiralty had leant hard on the Bristol board of directors, mentioning getting the engine developed by Napier, or even in the USA, they had been persuaded), and the proposed performance made available to the aircraft companies.

A pair of fighter designs were chosen for development; the Gloster G.38 and the Bristol type 153. Both were specified to fly in early 1936 so as to be in production at the beginning of 1937 in time for operational use before the new carrier completed.
The initial designs had been for lightweight land based planes, but the naval requirements meant they would have to be heavier and more robust. The power of the Hercules engine would compensate for that. The armament posed problems, as there was still ongoing argument both in the RN and the RAF as to the best choice of weapon. It was found that the RAF was going for 8 .303 machine guns. While this was considered a good armament, there were issues as to the size and destructive power of the bullet against bombers. In the end it was decided to develop two prototype aircraft with different wings, one carrying eight .303 as the RAF designs, and one with four .5 inch as an alternative. A final decision could then be made later when the expected opposition could be better evaluated. The chosen aircraft was expected to show a performance of over 300kt, and allow a heavy armament as well as the longer range required by a naval aircraft.

The future after these planes was considered to be a longer term issue, especially as it was known that land-based air was currently in the throes of defining a new generation of higher-performance aircraft. It was complicated by the fact that the preferred engine type for naval planes was the radial engine, whereas the RAF seemed to be looking to a new generation of high performance inline engines produced by Rolls-Royce, although this hadn't been definitely decided yet. It was decided to form a committee to look into the future needs of the FAA in terms of equipment and planes, which would liaise with its equivalent in the RAF. While the relationship between the FAA and the RAF was rather strained at a high level, the lower ranking members actually doing most of the work got along much better, as long as everything could be kept off the record. Something the British officers were quite skilled at, fortunately.

Chapter 3

By the beginning of 1934 the Royal Navy had made considerable progress of the planning for the new-look FAA.

The first and most important business was the laying down of the Ark Royal. The new, purpose built carrier had been waited for so long that in some quarters it was almost mythical. Longer term actions were mainly to do with the support and infrastructure of the FAA, which were seen as quite inadequate in view of the expansion in both size and capability expected in the next few years.

What was needed to be done was fairly obvious, although there was, as expected, some dragging of feet among the battleship Admirals. However the new independence and coming equipment gained for the FAA had given those closely concerned with it a sense of optimism that managed to at least find ways aro
und the more restrictive practices being proposed.

The most necessary
requirement was for more pilots and observers, and in particular senior pilots. In the past, a small number of naval pilots had been supplemented by RAF pilots, but this was not going to last for long. Accordingly arrangements were made to allow a considerable expansion of the RN pilot training program. Since the increased importance of naval aviation that was coming made it clear more prominence would need to be given to more senior air-aware staff, it was also felt that a better career path for pilots would be necessary. Unfortunately many of the officers who would have made admirable senior officers of this type were now serving in the RAF, having left the RN in 1918; however while it would take time, the process could at least be started. A number of the more flexible senior officers had expressed interest in learning much more about naval aviation and the detailed possibilities it offered, and arrangements were made to develop and include an air staff officer role into the staff of the senior admirals.

There was also a considerable exchange of information at lower levels with the USN. While the senior officers in the USN often had issues with the RN, it had been found that aviators liked to talk shop, and getting a few drinks into a US pilot on a hospitality visit was a very good way of comparing tactics and training. As a result some things that the RAF had apparently found 'too difficult', such as over-water navigation and
large fast strikes were put back onto the training syllabus.

While the new aircraft were looked forward to with considerable anticipation, they
wouldn't be ready for some years, so the main aims of the FAA were deemed to be training to increase the pool of skilled pilots (and supporting engineering staff and crews), and examining and testing concepts and tactics that would be possible once the new planes arrived. They would also look at the defensive problem posed by aircraft with the capabilities of those being designed - after all, once the RN deployed planes like those, foreign powers were certain to try and match or exceed them, and it was unclear that the current defensive measure for the fleet could cope with them.

On the construction side, the current effort was finishing the design of the Ark Royal so as not to delay her start. It was still hoped to persuade the treasury that the continuing building of carriers by the Americans and the Japanese meant that more should be ordered, but in the meantime
initial development work shifted to the concept of the Trade Protection carrier, or light carrier as it came to be known.

There were of course issues with the allowed displacement under the London Naval trea
ty. This allowed the RN 135,000 tons of carriers. The existing carriers could be discarded at any time (they were deemed to be experimental), but they still couldn't build all they wanted to. This was a continuing problem due to the global commitments of the navy. The current design was hoped to come in at around 24,000 tons. Building 5 of these would allow one additional, smaller carrier in the range 12,000 tons - 15 ,000 tons, or building 4 would allow 3 smaller carriers (once the existing ones had been scrapped). The current proposal was for a minimum of 4 fleet carriers; this allowed one to be deployed in each main area (Home, Med and the Far East), while allowing for one to be unavailable due to maintenance and refit. If a fifth fleet was built, this allowed a second to be sent to whichever area was under the most threat. The final smaller carrier would normally be used for training, but it would also be available either for deployment or to relieve a fleet carrier in a lower threat area. It was hoped that something more suitable could be arranged when the talks came up for renewal.

The idea of a smaller carrier for use on the trade routes and to cover commerce raiders had been considered for many years, but with not enough aircraft coming from the RAF to fill the existing carriers, it had always fallen victim to ships considered to be needed more urgently
. There wasn't, after all, much point to a trade protection carrier without planes.

Such a vessel would be ideal for supporting a hunting group looking for a commerce raider, as its aircraft could cover a far greater area than the cruisers usually assigned to that task. It would also be an ideal support for high value convoys in dangerous waters, and suited to task force support which did not merit the use of a fleet carrier. It was intended such a ship would be of similar cost to a cruiser, and as such could be risked in areas when a fleet carrier would be
considered too valuable.

Given that the displacement of the fleet carrier was around 25,000
tons, the first studies of the CVL were around half this. As the vessel was expected to be used and risked as a cruiser, it was important that cost be kept to a minimum, and corners could be cut in a way that wasn't considered sensible for the fleet carrier. The capacity was to be around 25 planes. A number of studies and proposals were investigated, and these slowly consolidated around a proposed ship.