The World at War (74 page)

MAJOR GENERAL WESTPHAL

I became in the beginning of September 1944 Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander West, Field Marshal von Rundstedt. We had three Army Groups with together eight Armies, but no troops. The kernel of all reports, demands and discussions with General Headquarters was the demand for stronger reinforcements but we didn't get any answer. On 24th October I was ordered to come to Hitler, his headquarters in East Prussia, and he told me and the Chief of the Army Group in the centre that we would get end of November or beginning of December strong reinforcements. He named twenty infantry divisions, ten armoured divisions and a lot of special troops and he promised that we would be supported by the Air Force with about three thousand planes. But we were totally surprised that these were not intended for the defence in the Western Front. Hitler said that the possibility of building up a new front against the Western Allies was nearly a miracle and he had the opinion that miracles didn't repeat themselves. Therefore he had the opinion to attack and this plan for offensive in the Western Front had been developed in every detail in the headquarters.

MAJOR GENERAL DE GUINGAND

In war you can't be strong everywhere and therefore Eisenhower had to decide where he was going to be strong, where he going to be weak and he assessed the situation in the Ardennes sector was extremely difficult country, particularly in winter, snow and ice, trees and forests, and therefore he decided to thin down the Ardennes sector. The German preparations were brilliantly carried out under Hitler's control and it had produced these great armies with very well-equipped tanks, what air power they had available and everything had been prepared for this event. We really didn't have any certain knowledge that there was such a large force had been pulled back ready to conduct an offensive. Very shortly before the Ardennes campaign was launched there was someone in American intelligence who began to suspect that was something was cooking, but the Americans did not take him very seriously, and so it came as a complete surprise.

GENERAL HASSO-ECCARD FREIHERR VON MANTEUFFEL

Commander Fifth Panzer Army

The
Ardennes offensive was Hitler's idea in December 1944, worked out by Chief of Operations Alfred Jodl by order and attraction of Hitler personally. Overall objectives were Antwerp and Brussels and he order two armies, First Panzer and Sixth SS Panzer Army, to break through the Ardennes in a concentrated attack and quick at once to Antwerp. And the cover of these two armies was the responsibility of the Seventh Infantry Army under General Brandeburger. Hitler hoped that with its intention to effect a blow against the coalition and to split three armies, the First American Army, Second British and First Canadian, and to capture them. And he explained to myself in November in headquarters that by 11th or 12th December he hoped a military and political falling, to a collapse of this coalition. He hoped furthermore to change the whole situation on our West Front in Germany's favour because Montgomery could be cut off from the rest of the alliance and especially to cut off their sources of supplies, which were lying and built up cast of the Meuse for the attacking the West Wall and to their drive to the Rhine. After this attack in the Ardennes he had intended other attacks on other sectors of our West Wall. He explained that Antwerp and Brussels were something of a risk and might be beyond the capacity of the forces available and their conditions. Nevertheless he had decided to stake everything on one card because Germany needed the breathing space, a defensive struggle could only postpone the decision and not change the general situation for Germany.

MAJOR GENERAL WARLIMONT

I am astonished that even today, thirty years after the war, you ask me what Hitler's role was, because Hitler was in everything from the beginning, particularly after the disaster at Moscow in 1941. It was he who ordered the offensive to drive to the coast at Antwerp. It was he who demanded, after looking out the first planning preparations, that the left wing had to be enlarged and from the right wing of the offensive had to be opened up a second attack as soon as possible. On this old basis, regardless of every modification of weapons and what else had gone on in the meantime, Hitler ordered the same kind of procedure as in 1940 during the Ardennes offensive. And there was a last moment – there had to be bad weather. Even he was convinced that it would be impossible to perform an offensive of this kind under the pressure of the British and American Air Force.

MAJOR GENERAL WESTPHAL

I think the health of Hitler at that time was not good, he had to bear the consequences of the plot of 20th July and he was the origin of the plan to attack, not the OKW [Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces]. It was a deciding role. When we came back we studied the possibilities to reach Antwerp and we were convinced that this was not possible with these forces, and we reported that this big solution was not possible to carry out. We proposed a little solution in the rear of Aachen, the first German town who had been conquered by the Americans in October. They offered attack from both sides and this was possible with the divisions we had to expect. And we compared with the game of bridge: the plan to conquer Antwerp was like 'grand slam' and the plan to attack both flanks of the American troops was like 'little slam'. Unfortunately Hitler didn't play bridge and we had the possibility to destroy ten to fifteen American divisions, a quarter of all American forces fighting in Europe, but a few days later came the answer, 'This operation is unalterable in every detail.' But we didn't resign, we sent a new proposal basing on the situation near Aachen; it was declined again. Then we had the opportunity to speak with Jodl, the Chief of Operations Staff of Hitler. He had the same opinion like we but he was too weak to persuade Hitler. Then I asked Rundstedt to go personally to Hitler because Hitler had respect for his personality, but he refused. He said he had often spoken with Hitler without any success. Hitler used monologues for one or two hours about theme and there was no solution to get. Finally on 2nd December we did meet Hitler in Berlin, in the Reichschancellery. Field Marshal Walther Model, the commander of the Fifth Panzer Army, the SS leader Sepp Dietrich and me tried a fourth time to persuade Hitler for this reasonable, only possible plan, but without any success.

MAJOR GENERAL DE GUINGAND

The final objective Hitler had in mind was the capture of the port of Antwerp, which would cut off our supplies. There was a subsidiary objective, which was to drive a wedge between the Allied forces and produce the situation where he might be able to negotiate peace with the Allies and not have to submit to unconditional surrender. He didn't achieve them and I don't think he had a chance of achieving them. He was frightfully lucky that he had the very bad weather conditions which he wanted, there was fog and blizzards, and when the attack opened they made a very deep penetration and they reached the Meuse and never crossed, and there was nothing actually between the Meuse and Brussels, our main headquarters.

MAJOR GENERAL J LAWTON COLLINS

Commander US VII Corps

The German offensive in the Ardennes was really their last gasp and Hitler was directly responsible for it. He had ordered a rather grandiose plan which was going to end the war from the German point of view and it was designed to break through this very broken country in the Ardennes, through which the Germans had gone before, so they knew the area well. They were going to break through where the American defences were very light, cross the Meuse river and then head for the port of Antwerp, which was our base port. If it had succeeded then the British and American forces would have been separated and the main base port for the whole northern half of the armies would have been lost and the war would have come to an end. Actually it was too grandiose a scheme, the German officers knew that it couldn't work, but they were forced under the system to do their best.

GENERAL MANTEUFFEL

We have reliable data about the strength of the enemies and we were informed that the forces to the other side of the hill were relatively weak. Reports of our front-line troops confirmed this data as a quick way through of our forces because they would not be expecting a German attack here and at this time. I went to the front-line troops disguised as a colonel of infantry and was there for thirty-three hours. The Americans one hour after darkness went to the villages to their rooms, or to their girls, but there were no cover between their positions during the night. And it was this manner I proposed to Hitler, so I formed strong troops and we went up, I think five o'clock in the morning, we slipped through the positions of the Americans.

MAJOR GENERAL STRONG

Some of the American divisions that were holding the area were new and not all that well trained. We knew that the Germans had a reserve army, that they were preparing for some sort of operation. It could have done several things and one of them was to come through the Ardennes. People who went up behind the American lines found a good deal of confusion. I don't think that confusion lasted very long – the attack took place on the Saturday morning and General Eisenhower made his plan for dealing with the attack on the Tuesday morning at Verdun and from then on I think he had the whole situation completely under control.

PRIVATE JOHN LOVELESS

US serviceman in the Ardennes

When we went from England, across France and through Belgium, I think most of us felt that we were just gradually going to get into the action. That was reinforced by the fact that we were going over what they called the Blue Road rather than the Red Road. The Red Road was to take the troops into the areas where the fighting was more pronounced and the Blue Road was into a more or less quiet area, which was simply preparatory to getting to the front line. So we were somewhat hopeful and cheered by the fact that we were going over the Blue Road, but of course it didn't make any difference because of the German offensive.

PRIVATE HENRY BROTH

US serviceman captured in the Ardennes

We really didn't know that we were going to be captured until we were broken down into smaller units by the Germans and they surrounded us and sort of backed our particular group up on to a hill. Then we realised that we had to surrender or that was it. The lieutenant went down and made arrangements with the German officer in charge and came back and told us we had one hour to dismantle and destroy our weapons, or dig holes and bury whatever we wanted to bury, and be ready to come off that hill within one hour.

SS COLONEL WILHELM OSTERHOLZ

Battalion Commander Sixth SS Panzer Army in the Battle of the Bulge

As a simple soldier you see more of everything on the road, you have to think there are more divisions than there really are. Therefore we had the feeling that this build-up of force might enable us to reach the final objective, which was Antwerp. And the weather was foggy, and the American and British air superiority didn't matter in that kind of weather. And in addition to that we had for support a whole artillery corps, we never knew such type of artillery support, and therefore we believed we would be successful. It was almost the same area where we had attacked when war against France was waged, and we knew that area and you know that soldiers are a little bit superstitious and everybody believed that we could repeat that rapid advance we had in 1940.

MAJOR GENERAL COLLINS

There were two key points from the American point of view, one was at
St Vith and the other was at
Bastogne. St Vith was what prevented the rapid movement of the Germans in the north half of the Bulge and Bastogne was what delayed Model and much of the German Army in the southern half. We held St Vith for quite a while and finally Monty ordered the withdrawal of the American forces in order to shorten the lines on our north side. Whether they could have held out longer or not will be a debatable question. Fortunately, we were able to hold at Bastogne and a very gallant fight was fought there by my good friend Brigadier General Tony McAuliffe. This plus the splendid fighting that was done by the small units of these two untried American divisions in small-unit actions. They delayed the German advance to the point where we could build up first-class troops on the north side of the Bulge and Patton was able to come up the south and we were finally able to close the gap.

MAJOR GENERAL STRONG

Intelligence knew that the Germans had managed to recover their position and were building up a reserve army which they could use for operations – somewhere, for something. When I told Eisenhower about this he said, 'Will you go and see [General Omar] Bradley and tell him exactly what you think.' I went up twice and Bradley said, 'Yes, I'm aware of this and if Germans do what you're suggesting then I think we can defeat them.' We agreed that the Germans hadn't got enough resources to carry out a full-scale strategic offensive and it would be necessary for them to capture supplies if they were going to be at all successful. Bradley had, in the area of the offensive, moved dumps of petrol, oil and so on, so the Germans couldn't get at them. When the Ardennes offensive took place the weather was extremely bad, there was no air reconnaissance and one had no information of the latest movement on the German front, and when they did attack they attacked with almost twice as many divisions as we estimated they would do. It penetrated right through Bradley's army, separated the north from the south and I got extremely worried the Germans might get so far towards Meuse that it would be impossible for Bradley to control the northern flank. When Eisenhower's plan was being carried out, which was to close on both sides of the penetration and cut it off, it seemed to me and to the others that the northern flank should be under one man and there was only one man who was suitable, Montgomery. When the Germans were defeated there was a press conference held by Montgomery in which, not intentionally but by various remarks, he gave the impression that he'd saved the Americans completely.