Third Reich Victorious (30 page)

Conner, Albert Z., and Poirer, Robert G.,
Red Army Order of Battle in the Great Patriotic War
(Presidio, Novato, 1985).

Deringil, Selim,
Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989).

Erickson, John,
The Road to Stalingrad
(Westview, Boulder, 1984).

Grechko, Andrei A.,
Battle for the Caucasus
(Progress, Moscow, 1971).

Gwyer, J.M.A., and Butler, J.R.M.,
Grand Strategy
(HMSO, London, 1964).

Hinsley, F. H.,
British Intelligence in the Second World War
(HMSO, London, 1981).

Howard, Michael,
Strategic Deception
(HMSO, London, 1990).

Joslen, H. F.,
Orders of Battle of the Second World War
(HMSO, London, 1960).

Kershaw, Ian,
Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis
(Penguin, London, 2000).

Kolinsky, Martin,
Britain’s War in the Middle East
(Macmillan, London, 1999).

Krecker, Lothar,
Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg
(Kloster-mann, Frankfurt, 1964).

Lucas, James,
Hitler’s Mountain Troops
(Arms & Armour, London, 1992).

Motter, T.H. Vail,
United States Army in World War II, The War in the Middle East, The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia
(Department of the Army, Washington DC, 1952).

Moyzisch, L. C.,
Operation Cicero
(Coward-McCann, New York, 1950).

Oender, Zehra,
Die türkische Aussenpolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg
(Olden-bourg, Munich, 1977).

Papen, Franz von,
Memoirs
(André Deutsch, London, 1953).

Playfair, I.S.O.,
The Mediterranean and the Middle East
(HMSO, London, 1960).

Sandhu, Gurcharn Singh,
The Indian Armour
(Vision, New Delhi, 1987).

Schramm, Percy E., ed.,
Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommando der Wehrmacht
(Bernard & Graefe, Munich, 1982).

Schultz, Friedrich,
Reverses on the Southern Wing
(US Army War College, Carlisle, 1983).

Shtemenko, S. M.,
The Soviet General Staff at War 1941-1945
(Progress, Moscow, 1985).

Tarnstrom, Ronald,
Balkan Battles
(Trogen, Lindsborg, 1998).

Tieke, Wilhelm,
The Caucasus and the Oil
(Fedorowicz, Winnipeg, 1995).

US Army, European Command Historical Division, “Decisions Affecting the Campaign in Russia (1941/1942),” MS #C-067b.

Weber, Frank G.,
The Evasive Neutral
(University of Missouri Press, Columbia, 1979).

Weinberg, Gerhard,
A World at Arms
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994).

Ziemke, Earl F. and Bauer, Magna E.,
Moscow to Stalingrad: Decision in the East
(US Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC, 1987).

1
. Statistics drawn from Ziemke & Bauer
Moscow to Stalingrad
, 283-95.

2
. Actual quote cited in Kershaw,
Hitler 1936-1945
, 506.

3
. Actual quotes taken from “Decisions Affecting the Campaign in Russia (1941/1942),” US Army, European Command Historical Division, MS #C-067b; and Ziemke & Bauer, 296. Both are from Halder, but the second actually dates to November 1941, before the great defeats of the winter.

4
. Actual quotes from May and March 1942, cited in Kershaw, 513-14.

5
. Hitler on August 5, 1942, quoted in Boog,
et al., Der Globale Krieg
, vol. VI of
Das deutsche Reich und der zweite Weltkrieg
, 117.

6
. Actual Jodl assessment quoted in Krecker,
Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg
, 225. The Bulgarian Army was seen as keeping Turkey in check.

7
. An actual incident from early 1941 recorded by the Sicherheitsdienst officer in the Ankara embassy, in Moyzisch,
Operation Cicero
, 7-9.

8
. On Papen’s recommendation, Hitler did write a letter to Inönü in February 1941, and the Germans hosted General Erden on a tour of the Eastern Front in November of that year.

9
. Quotes paraphrased from Weber,
The Evasive Neutral
, 146, citing exchanges between the German Foreign Ministry and von Papen in May 1942.

10
. Fall Gertrud was actually the German contingency plan for military occupation of Turkey, Schramm,
Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommando der Wehrmacht
, vol. III, 1349-50.

11
. Actual quote cited in Oender,
Die türkische Aussenpolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg
, 150.

12
. Hitler quote from November 23, 1940, in Deringil,
Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War
, 112.

13
. Von Papen quote from May 13, 1941, in
ibid.
, 117.

14
. The quote refers to Inönü’s attitude toward the briefing he received from Erden after the latter’s tour of the Eastern Front in 1941. Cited in
ibid.
, 131.

15
. Papen,
Memoirs
, 479.

16
. Actual quotes from Turkish officers in Deringil, 38-39. Thanks to David Ryan for invaluable assistance with order of battle data, and to Rudi Garcia for concept review. Thanks also to Kate Flaherty, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives, for her prompt and courteous help with the photos.

17
. The second quote is actually from a historian, the first is from a British air attaché’s report in 1937. Both in
ibid.
, 33-35.

18
. Actual quote in Schultz,
Reverses on the Southern Wing
, 145. The German corps was actually organized as indicated under General de Angelis.

19
. Quotes are actual. Hitler quote in Lucas,
Hitler’s Mountain Troops
, 133. Actual assessment of the British Chiefs of Staff, March 1940 in Deringil., 94.

20
. Quotes from Hinsley,
British Intelligence in the Second World War
, vol. III, 83-103.

21
. Though little known, the Allied units mentioned here and later actually served in the Middle East, Iraq, and Iran during the second half of 1942, though often at reduced strength. Of the British forces, only the XXII Corps and “Northern Iraq Force” are invented. The Soviet 71st, 72nd, and 73rd Armies are invented, but represent likely command arrangements in the face of an invasion. The Transcaucasus Front and 12th Army were real, but had been disestablished by October 1942; they are retained here for command and control purposes. The Soviet 53rd Army was in Central Asia.

22
. Quotes from actual reports in
Border Troops in the Great Patriotic War
, 450ff.

23
. First quote is actual, cited in Schramm, vol. II, p. 617. Second quote is fictional.

24
. Actual Stalin quote on September 12, 1942, cited in Erickson,
The Road to Stalingrad
, 189.

25
. The planning for an American armored division and for a major U.S. air presence in the Middle East or Persia/Iraq are actual.

John D. Burtt

“It is better to have known enemies than a forced ally.”

—Napoleon

The huge meeting room was silent as the assembled generals watched Khozyin (“the Boss”) warily as he paced the floor, cigarette smoke exploding from his lips accentuating his dangerous anger. The news they had delivered was bad, and Josef Vissarianovich Stalin was not known to “enjoy” bad messages. Their summer attacks against the fascists had been hideously expensive in terms of men and tanks; and worse, the offensives had gained little.

“What of our allies?” Stalin demanded suddenly, with biting sarcasm.

“The same,” Marshal Georgi Zhukov replied. “No appreciable movement.”

“They are waiting for us to destroy the fascists and ourselves,” Stalin snapped, throwing the reports on the table. “No longer,” he sighed, accepting the unthinkable. The abhorrence he felt at discussing an armistice with the fascists was only slightly less nauseating than the disgust he felt at the Western Allies for forcing it on him.

In late 1942, Allied and Soviet offensives shattered the fragile stalemate that existed between the European belligerents. In North Africa, the British 8th Army attacked Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel’s Deutsches Afrika Korps (DAK) at El Alamein. After two weeks of intense combat, the supply-starved and outnumbered Axis forces were forced into retreat. To make matters worse, Allied troops landed to the west in Algeria and Morocco on November 8, 1942, threatening to trap Rommel between converging forces. Then on the Eastern Front in mid-November, Soviet spearheads broke through the flank forces on either side of the German 6th Army as it struggled in the morass of Stalingrad. Within days the army was cut off and surrounded.

Hitler reacted as he always had in other crises, demanding that his forces hold at all costs. Rommel was able to get his particular hold order rescinded quickly, but the delay trapped three good Italian divisions. Hitler ordered German troops to Tunisia to hold a bridgehead open between the converging Allied forces.

As his troops retreated, Rommel flew to Germany to meet with his Führer; he intended to demand adequate supplies or a complete withdrawal from Africa. However, his timing was poor. Caught in the middle of the 6th Army’s developing crisis, Hitler had little time for Rommel and less patience. He categorically refused to consider a withdrawal from Africa and demanded Rommel return to his troops and stop the 8th Army. The field marshal left the meeting a very discouraged man.

The new year brought a drastically changed situation, particularly in the east. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein’s Winter Storm operation to relieve the 6th Army had failed. A second Soviet offensive had broken open the front. Hitler had to reconsider his earlier decision. The men he’d impulsively ordered to Tunisia would have made a significant difference on the Eastern Front.

The Italians now posed Hitler’s largest problem. Their 8th Army in Russia had been virtually destroyed in December by the Soviet offensive.
¹
The defeat at El Alamein and the subsequent retreat added to the continual tale of combat disasters suffered by his Axis partner. Pulling out of Tunisia now would undoubtedly cause Mussolini’s and Italy’s utter collapse. Such an event would leave his southern flank wide open to the Western Allies. A compromise was needed to buy time.

In Tunisia, Rommel’s DAK finally came to rest in the Mareth Line, a set of prewar French fortifications built, ironically, to defend Tunisia against the Italians. Montgomery’s 8th Army stopped in Tripoli, to reopen the destroyed port arid regroup for their next assault. The United States, Free French, and British forces of the 1st Army, under British Lt. Gen. Sir Kenneth Anderson, were pushing into Tunisia from Algeria. The German reinforcements had been organized in January into the 5th Panzer Army under Gen. Oberst Hans-Jürgen von Arnim. His forces included the 10th Panzer Division. New orders came for both German commanders from Hitler—do what they could to delay the Allies, then begin pulling their veteran troops out.