Ultimate Explanations of the Universe (19 page)

Isaac Newton earned his place in history as the creator of modern physics, but he was also a theologian. The number of works he wrote on theology is comparable with the number of his scientific works. He was a deeply committed theologian. This is documented both by his numerous statements on this subject as well as his entire oeuvre, if taken as a whole – all his achievements in physics together with their metaphysical framework. The opinions of a thinker of Newton’s class must be a harmonious synthesis – at least in his own evaluation – of his diverse experiences, even if drawn from very different spheres of achievement and activity. But Newton’s scientific instinct told him to keep his strictly scientific works free of his theological beliefs. Only the trained eye of the historian of science is capable of detecting vestiges of theological inspiration in works of this kind. But if that historian reads Newton’s scientific works in the full context of his philosophical worldview, he will readily discern the components of a synthesis. The foundation of that synthesis was the conviction espoused by the creator of classical mechanics that the world accessible to science was not all there was to the universe. To put it in today’s language, that the rationality proper to scientific method was not identical with rationality in its entirety. Moreover, looking from the perspective of the “higher rationality,” in the world accessible to science one could discern vestiges of components which were inaccessible to science.

A trenchant testimonial of these opinions is lodged in the history of the
Scholium Generale
, which Newton appended to the second edition of his
Principia
. The first edition, which had no exposition on the role of God in the “system of the world” met with severe criticism chiefly from Berkeley and Leibniz. Berkeley’s objection was that Newton’s absolute space was either a divinity, or something infinite and coeval with God, and both of these options were absurd. Leibniz criticised Newton’s concept of general gravitation as a sort of “hidden quality” which God had called into existence with no apparent sufficient reason. Roger Cotes, the editor of the second edition of the
Principia
, wrote to Newton suggesting he might answer these criticisms. That’s when Newton decided to write the
Scholium Generale
, which was to be devoted entirely to the role of God in His “mechanistic philosophy.” As if to justify the presence of such an extensive appendix on God in the
Principia Mathematica
, Newton added the following sentence (but only when the manuscript was going to the printers): “And thus much concerning God; to discourse of whom from the appearance of things does certainly belong to Natural Philosophy.”
¹

Understandably, in Newton’s natural philosophy the place where the connection between his scientific “system of the world” and his vision of God is most apparent is his idea of the creation of the world. Beyond all doubt Newton was far more dependent in his opinions on the tradition out of which he had grown than we generally imagine nowadays. For instance, the roots of his concept of absolute space go back to the Scholastic discussions on the omnipresence of God,
²
while his definitions of absolute space and absolute time are a fairly faithful echo of a statement made by his teacher Isaac Barrow. As we may observe in numerous examples from the history of science, nothing crystallises a scientist’s philosophical opinions as strongly as his own scientific achievements. In Newton’s case, too, we see a subtle mechanism of feedback at work between tradition and his philosophical interpretation of what he had accomplished in science.

Newton inherited his concept of absolute space from tradition, but it is enough to consider only the structure of his
Principia
to realise how important a role this concept plays in his natural philosophy. It comes as no surprise that the idea passed from his natural philosophy into his philosophy of God. In the
Scholium Generale
Newton wrote the following about God: “his duration reaches from Eternity to Eternity; his presence from Infinity to Infinity.” But He “is not Duration or Space,” even though He “constitutes Duration and Space.”
³

In this context it is worthwhile citing a passage which states the absolute nature of space and the absolute nature of simultaneity: “every particle of Space is
always
, and every indivisible moment of Duration is
every where
,” (Newton’s emphasis).

Newton refutes the Scholastic concept of the omnipresence of God, whereby God is present in the world by virtue (
per virtutem
, viz. through His power), not like other bodies, which occupy a certain position in space. According to Newton, God is present in the world not only by virtue, but also in substance (viz. in His essence): “in him are all things contained and moved,” even though “God suffers nothing from the motion of bodies;” and “ bodies find no resistance from the omnipresence of God.” Likewise, Newton departed from the Augustinian concept of eternity as the existence of God beyond time. God’s existence stretched from “minus infinity” to “plus infinity,” or using Newton’s own words, “from Infinity to Infinity.”

Absolute space and absolute time were the indispensable stage on which the world’s physics was performed, but as they were the
sensoria
(organs) of the divine omnipresence and the divine eternity, they had something of the necessity of God in them. Therefore they existed, even if no processes were occurring in them. Newton formulated this clearly enough in his famous “definitions” at the beginning of the
Principia
.
⁴
 Therefore “empty” time and “empty” space existed prior to the beginning of the world. When He created the world, at a particular point in absolute time God called into being bodies endowed with mass, placed them in particular points in absolute space, and gave them their initial velocities. Ever since that moment the laws of motion Newton discovered had been taking the world in the direction determined by them. In other words, the only difference between Newton’s idea of the creation of the world and the solution of Cauchy’s problem for the equations of motion (viz. the setting of initial conditions for these equations) was that the former applied not to a physical sub-system, but to the entire universe and that the “setting” of the initial conditions involved not only the determination of the initial positions and velocities bodies had, but also the calling of those bodies into existence.

According to Newton God the Creator behaved like a mathematician and His work followed mathematical principles.

It is widely held that as soon as He created the universe and entrusted it to the laws of mechanics, the Newtonian God ceased to be interested in it. The laws of mechanics were sufficiently precise to govern the world on their own. This is a later idea; Newton himself was far from such an opinion. Indeed, for him the laws of mechanics were sufficient to secure a defined course for the world, but they were entirely dependent on the will of God. Not only could He have created any laws of nature He liked, but He could also intervene in their operation or suspend them completely according to His will. In the
Scholium
Generale
Newton stressed that God was the Lord, Ruler, and Pantocrator of the universe. God ruled the universe not as one rules one’s own body (pantheistic tendencies were appearing already), but as a Sovereign Prince. But God was not an abstract principle, entirely external with respect to the universe. He was a personal and rational being; yet it should be remembered that His eternity and omnipresence constituted absolute time and absolute space – the arena in which the laws of nature operated. In this sense the universe existed in God.

Newton belongs to the voluntaristic tradition in English theology. Moreover, he reinforced that tradition very considerably. Thanks to his enormous scientific authority his numerous greater and lesser epigones would continue that tradition, especially as, apart from his theological reasoning, Newton himself invoked arguments associated with his scientific achievements. He was of the opinion that every so often God intervened in His “system of the world.” This happened, for instance, when comets visiting the Solar System caused too great a perturbation in its previously synchronised motions and there was a need to administer new initial conditions.
⁶
Soon the search for this kind of “gap” in current scientific theories became fashionable. It came to be held that the chief task of natural theology was to explain such “gaps” by the direct intervention of God. Today this trend is referred to as physico-theology, and is considered to have been based on both a theological error and a methodological error. Leibniz pointed out the theological error when he wrote that the Newtonian God had not been provident enough to have created a perfect work which required no amendments.
⁷
The methodological error soon came to light once the progress made in science gradually started to fill in the gaps in hitherto current theories, and the “God hypothesis” was no longer necessary. Today physico-theology and “resorting to God to fill in gaps” is censured (by theologians as well), but we must remember that at the time it was perhaps a more or less inevitable outcome of the first phase of progress in science, and of the over-enthusiastic reaction to the avalanche of successes accumulating at such a rate that it was hard to imagine that the avalanche did not conceal many still unexplained areas.

As regards the opinions of Newton himself the situation was even more subtle and connected with his idea of creation. Note that the gaps in our knowledge need not be located in the middle of the history of the universe (e.g. corrections to the movement of the planets); they may lie at the beginning, where they are harder to spot. The Newtonian creation concept itself has the nature of a gap in our knowledge: for the equations of motion require the “setting” of initial conditions in order to govern the world. But since Newton’s theory is not capable of setting the required initial conditions, the task is assigned to the Creator.
⁸
At least Newton was consistent: once he decided to introduce the “God hypothesis” to his cosmological vision, on subsequent occasions (in corrections), he was less hesitant to do so, while his voluntaristic theology made him more confident.

It would be hard to overrate Newton’s impact on later developments in science. This fact is so obvious that we may consider it generally known. But he also exerted an enormous influence on the development of theology, both in the textbooks as well as of the popular kind. Today few people are aware of this fact. The tremendous prestige of classical physics meant that soon a vision of the world based on it became the prevalent view, and certain aspects of Newton’s personal opinions were inseparably associated with it. Post-Tridentine catechisms adopted this view, tacitly and perhaps not fully aware of doing so, in their formulas. For anyone relying on such catechisms for their religious instruction it was well-nigh obvious that whenever we spoke of the creation of the world, what we meant was that at a certain time in His eternal and unending existence God called the world into being and ruled it according to His will. The course of the world in accordance with the laws of nature was the natural sphere; while the actions of God transcending those laws were the supernatural sphere. The average believer envisages even God’s hearing of his prayers as a divine “adjustment” to what was to occur.

Such views became so ubiquitous that even those who, in increasing numbers, rejected and contested them on the grounds of atheism, argued against the Post-Newtonian version of popular theology rather than against the interpretations proposed by the Grand Masters of traditional theology. The anti-religious slogans of the French Enlightenment and thereafter of Positivism went hand in hand with a continuous lowering of standards in theology.