War Stories II (57 page)

Before dawn on 23 October, Toyoda's battle plan was coming to fruition. Kurita's First Attack Force, which sortied from Brunei, Borneo, was steaming parallel to Palawan Island toward the American invasion beaches. Nishimura's SF-1, which left the same anchorage, was taking a more easterly route toward Leyte. Meanwhile, Shima's battleships and cruisers were racing at flank speed south from Japan and Okinawa.

 

Admiral Takeo Kurita

At Leyte, the Americans, busy offloading supplies for MacArthur's troops, were blissfully unaware of the pending battle. Then, at 0630 on 23 October, two American submarines, the USS
Darter
and USS
Dace
, observed Kurita's First Attack Force racing north off the west coast of Palawan Island. The
Darter
was able to torpedo the
Atago
, which sank twenty minutes later. The
Dace
torpedoed the
Maya
, causing it to sink just moments after the
Atago
. The
Dace
also seriously damaged the
Takao
, but somehow she was able to withdraw and make her way back to Brunei for repairs. After his flagship sank, the destroyer
Kishinami
rescued Admiral Kurita, who transferred his flag to the
Yamato
and continued on course
toward the now-alerted Americans at Leyte. Despite his losses, Kurita made it clear that he expected all remaining ships from his First Attack Force to press on to the San Bernardino Straits.

By dawn on the morning of 24 October, American recon planes, ignorant of Shima's onrushing fleet, were searching without success for Kurita's First Attack Force and Ozawa's carriers.

At about 0800, U.S. Navy scout planes located Kurita's battleships in the Sibuyan Sea, heading for the San Bernardino Strait. The ever-aggressive Halsey wasted no time ordering his 3rd Fleet carriers—now designated as Task Force 38—to launch an air strike. Admiral Frederick Sherman was the first to respond, launching his carrier planes off the USS
Princeton
to engage Kurita's battleships in the Sibuyan Sea. Meanwhile, his ships and carrier aircraft fended off Japanese bombers from Clark and Nichols Fields. The American carriers and their escorts threw up a furious anti-aircraft barrage. It wasn't enough.

At 0935, a single shore-based “Judy,” launched from Clark Field, managed to penetrate the Hellcats and anti-aircraft fire and drop one bomb on the flight deck of the
Princeton
. The bomb started fires that raged out of control, causing a huge explosion in the carrier's torpedo storage deck. This explosion also damaged the cruiser
Birmingham
, which had come alongside to help fight fires and transfer wounded.
Princeton
went to the bottom less than an hour later.

Meanwhile, Navy carrier pilots from Bogan's, Davidson's, and Halsey's carriers were taking their revenge. Navy dive-bombers and torpedo planes put nineteen holes in the battleship
Musashi
, eventually sending her down—carrying more than 1,000 Japanese sailors to the bottom with her.
With all of his battleships damaged by at least one bomb or torpedo hit, Kuirita broke away and headed west to get out of range of the American planes.

Halsey's 3rd Fleet aircraft had launched some 260 sorties against the Japanese ships, losing only eighteen planes that day, though casualties aboard the
Princeton
and
Birmingham
were heavy. Briefed by his pilots, Halsey believed that the entire Japanese fleet had suffered heavy casualties, and that Kurita was withdrawing to Brunei.

Meanwhile, still hoping to get Halsey's attention, Ozawa's decoy force had launched all its planes to the south during the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea to attack the 3rd Fleet, leaving no aircraft to cover the Northern Force carriers. Ozawa desperately wanted the decoy plan to work. Unless he could draw Halsey's ships north, Kurita's First Attack Force would be unable to get through the San Bernardino Strait in sufficient time to engage the Japanese Southern Force before it could wreak havoc on Leyte.

Ozawa's decoy mission was a disaster for his pilots. Before the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea, Ozawa had 116 aircraft. By late afternoon of 24 October, when one of Halsey's scout planes finally spotted black smoke spewing intentionally from Ozawa's carriers, he had just twenty-nine remaining.

Halsey jumped at the bait. He ordered his 3rd Fleet to give chase—with the goal of launching a dawn attack on the Japanese flattops. That's when things began to unravel for the Americans.

As he sped north, Halsey thought that the 7th Fleet transports and their escorts at Leyte faced no serious threats because he'd accepted the exaggerated reports of his returning pilots that Kurita's force had been compelled to retire and head back to Brunei. This faulty information led
him to presume that Kinkaid no longer needed the 3rd Fleet's covering force. The hard-charging “Bull” was wrong.

Kurita had turned toward Brunei, but then he reversed course and headed back east toward the San Bernardino Straits. At 2000 on 24 October, as he sped northward, Halsey was heading away, just as Ozawa and Kurita intended.

Halsey radioed Admirals Nimitz and Kinkaid with the message: “I AM PROCEEDING NORTH WITH THREE TASK GROUPS TO ATTACK ENEMY CARRIER FORCE AT DAWN.”

Earlier that day, Halsey had sent a message indicating that he was going to create a new task force group by pulling ships from the other groups. This new force, to be called Task Force 34, was to consist of four battleships, six cruisers, and fourteen destroyers. Halsey had said that it would be used “to engage the enemy decisively at long ranges.”

Admirals Nimitz and Kinkaid had each received Halsey's earlier radio message, but neither had any idea that creating Task Force 34 meant Halsey was not going to provide a covering force for the 7th Fleet's amphibious force, which still had 110,000 troops and 250,000 tons of ammunition, fuel, rations, and other supplies still to be put ashore.

When Nimitz and Kinkaid received Halsey's message at 2000 about heading north with three groups, they each assumed that he would use Task Force 34 to guard the San Bernardino Strait against Kurita's return and would be taking his only three carrier task groups to engage Ozawa's fleet.

As long as the 7th Fleet commanders were able to provide cover from their own ships in the south, and there was no interference from Kurita's Center Force or Ozawa's Northern Force, there was no need to worry. They
could handle the Southern Force, and no one replied, questioning Halsey's order.

For his part, Halsey believed his intentions were clear. He said, “I am proceeding north,” and had earlier reported that he would be with Task Force 34. No one questioned the fact that he was going north, nor did they think to inquire who was left to guard the San Bernardino Strait.

When the news came that afternoon about Kurita's losses and apparent withdrawal, Halsey changed his mind about creating Task Force 34. He reasoned that with Kurita so weakened and in retreat, Kinkaid could handle any other problems the Japanese navy might pose. So Halsey steamed north, to engage Ozawa, leaving no U.S. force to guard the San Bernardino Strait or provide cover for Kinkaid's 7th Fleet.

On the night of 24 October, believing that Halsey's Task Force 34 was guarding the San Bernardino Strait and the northern waters, Kinkaid concentrated on the south. He assigned Rear Admiral Jesse Oldendorf to “plug up” the Surigao Strait between Dinagat Island (taken by the 6th Ranger Battalion almost a week earlier) and the southern tip of Leyte Island. It would be the logical sea entrance for an attack by the Japanese Southern Force.

Kinkaid relied on more than logic, however. He'd received reports earlier in the day that the Southern Force had been sighted in the Sulu Sea—due west and opposite the invasion's landing beaches. By having Oldendorf cover the southern entrance to the Surigao Strait, and with Task Force 34 supposedly covering the waters north of the landing site, the U.S. invasion of Leyte could continue until completed without interference by the Japanese. All Kinkaid had to do was keep the Japanese Southern Force from getting through. Kinkaid and Oldendorf both reasoned that Task Force 34 would surely take care of Kurita's Center Force if and when it returned.

At 1900 hours on 24 October, Nishimura was already at the southern end of Surigao Strait and sailing north toward the American transports. At 2230, one of Oldendorf's thirty-nine torpedo boats sighted Nishimura's force in the strait and radioed its presence to Oldendorf and Kinkaid.