Warwick the Kingmaker (62 page)

And lett us say, ‘Good Lorde, ever thy will be doo.73

Hence perhaps the large numbers that turned out for Warwick in 1471. Apart from his own northerners and midlanders, most of whom probably turned out for him, he had only limited support among the nobility and gentry that did not grow. Chastellain reports on Edward’s confidence that ‘great part of the nobles of England, covertly and all the time, held him in favour’.74 It is striking that Sir Henry Stafford, who sought favours from the new regime and was one of its royal family, nevertheless fought against it and that Sir James Harrington and Sir William Parre, two Cumbrians whom Edward had frightened into obedience in 1470, were to join him voluntarily in 1471.75 Whatever their original affiliations, the ruling elite had participated for ten years in Yorkist rule and its favours, which were now to be withdrawn or curtailed. They may have felt a genuine distaste for the domination once again of the Neville faction. Though shipmen, Kentishmen and the London
canaille
apparently appreciated opportunities to pillage foreigners of all kinds, the Calais staplers and London elite enthused neither about a break with Burgundy nor closer commercial ties with France.

The Readeption relied on very few individuals and Warwick at times appeared a one-man band. ‘The king was a subject there and ordered like a crowned calf,’ Chastellain observed, admittedly with virulent exaggeration, but not without justice. ‘And the subject was then the governor and dictator of the realm and did everything! Such government was there in London and not much better in Calais.’76 Warwick dominated parliament and conducted foreign policy. He himself was to fetch Queen Margaret in person in December and late February. He was to command the army against Burgundy. As energetic as ever, in practice he lacked the time. When in Warwickshire in January, it was Clarence who took his place in London.77 Both magnates resumed their former offices, leaving nothing for their new allies.

Warwick was issuing protections and safe conducts as admiral and engaging in piracy and trade from the moment of his return. Having recovered possession of those ships seized by King Edward, he admitted the
Trinity
,
Margaret
,
Christopher
and
Elyne
into his fleet as early as 27 October; the
Katherine Warwick
, which followed on 10 December, unfortunately became a Dutch prize. The earl was paid £2,000 for an army of ships to fetch the queen on 17 December and was recruiting in the Cinque Ports for this on 21 January. Imagine how disastrous it would have been had she and her son been intercepted! The fleet maintained itself by piracy against foreigners of all types. The Bastard of Fauconberg, Warwick’s overall captain, is recorded capturing Portuguese shipping. Such behaviour, whilst popular with the shipmen and helping to finance the fleet itself, was questionable in a government. In particular such depredations may explain why Hansard ships helped convey Edward to England, their nominal enemy, and how he slipped through the English blockade at a time when it was preoccupied by Breton and Hanseatic squadrons seeking reprisals.78

Warwick also reasserted his authority in Calais. Suddenly everyone was again wearing the ragged staff (
le rave-stoc
). He put in extra men by 8 October, increasing the crew (his personal guard) to 500.79

Warwick was appointed justice of the peace in every county. In December and January Montagu, once again warden of the East March, was commissioned to array the North; Clarence, Warwick, Oxford and Scrope of Bolton to array in East Anglia and the East Midlands; and Clarence, Pembroke and Warwick in Wales. How few magnates Warwick thought that he could trust! ‘Never had commissions of array for defence been placed in the hands of so few’.80 He was apparently unwilling to rely on Shrewsbury, Stanley and Devon. Another tactic was to remove suspect notables from their home country: thus Norfolk was removed from East Anglia and leading gentry were summoned then by writs of privy seal, some being incarcerated and bound under sureties.81 This proved a highly effective countermeasure on Edward’s landing; it contrasts with the complete ineffectiveness of Edward’s defences in 1470. Terror and frightfulness also had their place. What holds were barred for the man who eliminated in Worcester his brother-in-law, long-standing patron, friend and ally, feoffee and executor? When Edward landed, relatively few noblemen and gentlemen joined him in the early stages; more were willing to back his claim to his duchy than to the crown. However much the Readeption enjoyed popular support, it had relatively little among the aristocracy. No wonder Warwick hesitated to commit everything to battle! It was better to be sure.

As Edward IV had found, the best way to secure a regime was not by defeating invaders or intercepting them at sea, but by denying them any refuge from which to launch attacks through treaties with neighbouring countries. Edward’s obvious ally was his brother-in-law Charles the Bold, with whom he had taken refuge. Charles, however, wanted peace. His credence for Philippe de Commines on 8 October was to declare his love of England, illustrated by his marriage to Margaret of York, his desire for continuing trade, and his pleasure at the restoration of King Henry VI, since he himself was of Lancastrian descent. Four days later he protested to the English chancellor and council at reinforcements to Calais, which were unwarranted on security grounds and which he hoped were not for use against him in time of truce. He had no part in the quarrels of England, but merely wanted friendship, he wrote in his own hand and sealed with his oath of St George. Charles declined to meet Edward until December and never
publicly
committed himself to his return.82 Charles was alarmed, of course, that French support for the invasion was directed against himself, as Louis certainly intended. The treaty of Angers had provided for a thirty-year Anglo–French truce and probably also a formal alliance.83 Commines found that Louis had banned trade with Burgundy on 8 October. On 28 November Louis concluded a treaty with the young Prince Edward committing himself to war with Duke Charles until Burgundy was conquered, neither side being entitled to make peace without the other.84

This was the main objective of the mission Louis despatched to England with instructions dated 13 November. The five ambassadors were headed by Louis de Harcourt, Bishop of Bayeux, Tanguy de Chastel, and William Monypenny. They were to congratulate Henry VI on his restoration and to stress his debt to Warwick, in whom Louis had the greatest confidence: it was clearly in
his
interest that Warwick was in control! They were to point out the services the French had rendered to him and Louis’s willingness to abide by the terms of Angers. Their real business was to conclude an aggressive alliance against Burgundy in which neither side was to make peace until it was conquered. They might treat about the partition of Charles’s territories, offering Warwick himself Holland and Zeeland, and about expenses. Louis would attack the duchy and county of Burgundy. They were to offer a choice of strategies for the English army and to fix the day when fighting would commence. Delay was to be prevented, but they were to agree whatever Warwick wanted. They also sought details of Burgundian negotiations in breach of the treaty of Peronne, for it was on that basis on 6 December that Louis and the princes of the blood released themselves from the terms of the treaty. War was declared on 4 January 1471. The ambassadors had to negotiate not only with Warwick, but also the English parliament, which would have to vote taxation for the war. They had a formal audience with King Henry on 19 December 1470.85

Although there was disquiet among the mercantile community, which Louis did his unsuccessful best to disarm, Monypenny reported favourable progress on 19 January 1471. Negotiations were almost complete on 6 February. Harcourt assured Louis that there would be no peace between England and King Edward and that a ten-year truce and unbreakable alliance against Burgundy had been agreed as he required. From other sources we know that negotiations for a permanent Anglo-French peace were approved. Today, the bishop wrote, Warwick has sent orders to Calais to start fighting on the agreed strategy: evidently the earl preferred to campaign separately. The fleet would put to sea by the stipulated day. A further 2,000–3,000 men would be despatched as reinforcements in 10–12 days and a further army of 8,000–10,000 would follow under Warwick’s own command as soon as possible. ‘Sire I promise you,’ Warwick added in his own hand in a French postscript, that everything in this letter will be performed, ‘for it is all that I desire.’ A week later he wrote again, wishing Louis victory, and assuring him that the garrison of Calais had actually started fighting, advancing to Gravelines. ‘As soon as I possibly can, I will come to you to serve you against this accursed Burgundian without any default, please God, to whom I pray to grant you all that your heart desires’.86
Accursed
was what Louis thought and wanted to hear; but Warwick’s own disagreement and dislike for Charles, as for Rivers and Worcester before him, was also now extreme. Warwick was personally in control of foreign policy and was fulfilling personal undertakings to King Louis. To Louis his value was precisely that he acknowledged such obligations and carried them through, however herculean. The formal appointment of English ambassadors on 13 February was followed on the 16th by the conclusion of the truce and arrangement of a future conference on a final peace.87

Initially, at least, the fighting was small-scale, with only two of the garrison of Gravelines reported dead on 13 February and all fighting being confined to the immediate locality. Led by Sir John Benstead, forays were made against Marquise, Wymel, Harlow and Wissant (whose inhabitants sheltered in the church), and there was considerable expenditure on munitions. Money was being raised at Coventry for recruitment of a field army on 22 February.88 Far from distracting attention from domestic problems, an aggressive war was likely to be a financial strain which the government could not sustain89 and would remove from England those on whom the new regime most relied. Might it not be as unpopular as Edward’s alternative? We cannot know how far the promises of manpower were honoured; Commines’s estimate of 4,000 men is an exaggeration; Warwick himself was not able to cross and on 11 April, quite improperly, Louis agreed a truce with Burgundy.90 An Anglo-French war against Burgundy compelled Charles from self-interest secretly to back Edward, which perhaps he always intended, in the hope at the least of diverting English attention and at the most of dislodging the new regime. This was on a much smaller scale than Louis’ the previous year, but with as complete success. Whatever commitments Warwick and Margaret had given to Louis at Angers, it was contrary to English interests to fulfil them before their regime was secure. Nor was it in Louis’s interests. Haste lost him everything. Whilst Warwick had long favoured an alliance with France rather than Burgundy, his sense of obligation and service to Louis and his hostility to Duke Charles now led him seriously astray. This war was therefore a major factor in his fall.

Although a mistaken foreign policy impelled Charles to assist in Edward’s return and though the Readeption regime was itself divided, it does not follow at all that a counter-revolution was bound to succeed. Edward returned with only three ships and 1,000 men,91 far less than the invaders of the previous year, and initially was ill-received. His was ultimately to be the victory of a better general with smaller forces over superior but divided enemies. Whatever the end result, the threat that he posed assisted Duke Charles by dislocating the Readeption government, which virtually ceased operating in March, and preventing English intervention abroad.

Successfully if inadvertently evading Warwick’s fleet, Edward landed at Cromer, close to the Scales estate of Middleton, but was deterred by Oxford’s defensive countermeasures and disembarked instead on 14 March at Ravenspur on the Yorkshire side of the Humber, where Montagu was in command. Warwick’s Richmondshire retinue had proved too strong for the Percy Earl of Northumberland the previous August. There was no spontaneous outburst of support or hostility for the Readeption. That he landed in Percy country, having previously corresponded with Northumberland, meant in practice that the earl was able to restrain his Lancastrian-inclined followers rather than provide direct help. Fortunately Edward appeared willing to compromise. He would settle for the duchy of York, to which his title was unquestionable, rather than the crown. That ruse was popular. It secured him admission to York and recruits even from those who did not want him as king. It even impressed his enemies, so that Montagu at Pontefract could not persuade his men to attack and permitted Edward to pass by. Having evaded Montagu’s northern forces, the king proceeded southwards, recruiting all the time, and arrived on 29 March at Coventry.92

Warwick himself was at Warwick by 25 March, when he informed his retainer Henry Vernon of Edward’s landing with a force of Flemings, Easterlings and Danes not exceeding 2,000 and of his inability to recruit from the country. Vernon was summoned to Coventry with as many men as he could make ‘as my verray singuler trust is in you and I mowe doo thing to youre wele and worship herafter’. Though it did not work in this case, he remembered the personal touch in his postscript: ‘Henry, I praye you fayle not now as ever I may do for you.’93 It was therefore at Coventry that Warwick assembled his army, which may well have been swollen by those recruited for war against Burgundy, and he was still there on Edward’s arrival. Basing himself at the earl’s own town of Warwick, Edward offered battle on three consecutive days. Warwick, however, remained within the city walls.

Therein lay Warwick’s undoing. He was not a coward as Edward supposedly thought,94 but he was too cautious to be a successful field commander. If he was never in the position of 1470 where victory was assured, he was never to be so strongly placed again. Edward was unwilling to attack the earl in his preferred defensive position and Warwick refused to fight on equal terms. This was not stalemate, for it conceded to Edward the initiative both morally and militarily. The army that was available to Warwick, comprising only his northern and midland supporters, was nevertheless larger than Edward’s. Was it not better to fight while he had that advantage than wait for reinforcements that might be countered by those of the king? But Warwick hoped to place the battle beyond doubt. He waited to be joined by Exeter, Beaumont and Oxford, whom Edward had out-pointed but not defeated at Newark. He was waiting also for Clarence, whose letters of encouragement reported his approach from the south-west. Once united, Warwick hoped to attack the king with their combined forces; ironically the duke defected to the king. Delay was to Warwick’s advantage; though the king encamped at the earl’s town of Warwick, presumably being excluded from the castle, his shortage of victuals meant that he could not remain. A manly man in chivalric parlance rather than devil-may-care, Warwick could live with the cheap aspersions of Yorkist propaganda. War was too important to leave to chance. If he was not sure to win, like Wellington, he would not fight. Challenged to battle again on 5 April, he again declined.95