Washington's Revolution: The Making of America's First Leader (9 page)

On this last score he need not have worried. Both General Forbes and Colonel Henry Bouquet, Forbes’s second-in-command, had knowledge of him and entered the American arena with favorable impressions of who he was and what he had done. Forbes gave his first assessment in a tone of regret, in March 1758, having heard that Washington had resigned his commission—he was “extremely sorry,” he wrote in a letter to John Blair, as “Washington has the Character of a good and knowing Officer” in the western counties. Bouquet seems to have entertained a similar opinion, but he soon ran up against Washington’s firm advocacy for the use of Braddock’s Road in the attack on Fort Duquesne. How to approach the fort soon became the center of severe disagreements between Washington and the British command. When Bouquet first
learned of Washington’s argument in favor of the old Braddock’s Road, he resorted to a style that bordered on flattery: Washington’s ideas, he wrote, “were generous dispositions for the Service.” Washington, he continued, “was above all the Influences of Prejudices, and prepared to go where Reason and Judgement Shall direct.” The two men met and discussed their differences. Washington probably recognized what lay behind Bouquet’s oil, and in any case held firm. Bouquet’s judgment, like Forbes’s, was that a route from Raystown, Pennsylvania, about thirty miles north of Braddock’s route, offered the better course to Duquesne. It was shorter and direct, and did not present as many obstructions—impassable mountains and swollen rivers—but indeed ran through land more easily traversed and offered more forage for the army’s horses. Washington discovered a variety of flaws in these arguments and insisted that such a road would have to be cut throughout its rugged terrain. Braddock’s Road, by contrast, had already been carved out through mountains and valleys. Few trees along it, presumably, would have to be cut down, and the crossing of rivers would be easier, because they had been identified before. The knowledge was available, and the entire process of getting at the French would be eased if the old way were followed.
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The most powerful argument Washington had was that the season was late—these discussions took place in late July and early August—and cutting a road across Pennsylvania could not be completed before winter set in. The only route that would lead to Fort Duquesne for an attack in 1758 was the old Braddock’s Road. Forbes listened, read Washington’s frantic letters, and investigated on his own. Both he and Bouquet soon came to the conclusion that Washington was wrong and that a new road could be built before winter shut down operations. Washington received the bad news in early August and reacted with overwrought declarations that “all is lost,” sometimes expanded to “All is lost, by Heavens!” This theme of loss preoccupied him for at least four months and filled his letters to two Virginia governors, the Speaker of the House of Burgesses, and assorted friends in and out of the regiment. He presented a quieter, less extravagant version of the idea to General Forbes and Colonel Bouquet, but their rank and position shielded them from his anger and despair. Inevitably they learned of the depth of Washington’s opposition, and both concluded that his unrestrained anger had gone too far. By the middle of September,
Forbes had heard enough and summoned Washington and William Byrd, the colonel of the 2nd Virginia Regiment, to inform them that he found their conduct unseemly.

I told them plainly that, whatever they thought, yet I did aver that, in our prosecuting the present road, we had proceeded from the best intelligence that could be got for the good and convenience of the army, without any views to oblige any one province or another; and added that those two gentlemen were the only people that I had met with who had showed their weakness in their attachment to the province they belong to, by declaring so publicly in favour of one road without their knowing anything of the other, having never heard from any Pennsylvania person one word about the road.
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Forbes did not hesitate to comment on his own reasons for choosing to approve building a new road. His choice, also Henry Bouquet’s, came out of his devotion to “the good of the service … at heart, not valuing the provincial interest, jealousys, or suspicions.” There were certainly a good many provincial suspicions at play in the controversy over the location of the road. They were at the center of Washington’s explanation to Virginians as to how Braddock’s Road—a Virginia road—had failed to become the road to Fort Duquesne. Washington convinced himself that merchants and others had exacted an unhealthy influence that backed the road through Pennsylvania. Forbes detected non-military influences, too, but he found them in Virginia, not Pennsylvania.
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Washington always denied that political interests to Virginia had shaped his preferences. His recommendation, made over and over again, was for military purposes; nothing else had entered his thought. After a lot of argument that noted the superiority of Braddock’s Road over the projected new one—fewer mountainous obstacles, more easily crossed rivers, abundant forage for horses pulling supply wagons—he settled on the timing of the operation. Cutting a new road from Raystown in Pennsylvania, he insisted, could not be completed before the snow, ice, and cold set in, making a campaign impossible in 1758. Even using the old Braddock’s Road, mounting an attack would be impossible. Delay of a year would destroy the support of the Cherokees, he maintained, and of other friendly Indians as well. The Cherokees would go home to South Carolina, and the others would scatter
throughout the Ohio Country. And there was also the threat that they would attach themselves to the French. As for the French, a delay of a year might enable them to build up their forces and perhaps organize a campaign of strength themselves.
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Early on in the argument, Washington had pledged himself to the “law” that required him to obey his orders, even though his pledge did not rest on agreement with the strategy Forbes had devised. Thus, the campaign to take Fort Duquesne began in fighting, but not the sort anyone relished. During the months it took to settle on a road to the West, George Washington took defeat badly, but he meant what he said about following orders.

The orders were rather slow in coming. Forbes did not summon Washington and the Virginia Regiment to Raystown until September 21, perhaps thinking that beginning the construction of the road to the West should be left to officers better disposed toward the campaign. Even after reporting with his troops, Washington was given to evaluating what lay ahead with bleakness and pessimism, writing to Francis Fauquier, the newly appointed governor of Virginia, that “our affairs in general appear with a greater gloom than ever.” On September 25, he wrote, “I see no probability of opening the Road this Campaign.”
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He could not see the probability of opening the road “this Campaign,” but he attempted to make it happen. He had artificers with the regiment and some equipment to use in preparing the way. He also commanded a significant part of Forbes’s army. Throughout the march, the army was divided into three brigades, with Washington commanding one, made up principally of Virginians; Bouquet leading another; and Colonel Archibald Montgomery the third. Washington had the most experience in wilderness operations of the three colonels, and at times Forbes directed him to lead the way. His general orders, when he was operating almost alone, reveal a commander who gave attention not just to general purposes but also to important details. On the march up to Loyalhanna, near the crest of Chestnut Ridge, he was especially concerned about tools needed in opening the road, and ordered that those in use should be given to sentries, then delivered to a Captain Fields for safekeeping. If any officer received tools—axes
are mentioned in orderly books—he was to see that they were returned to Fields at night. Weapons were not ignored in Washington’s orders; rain fell daily in mid-November, a danger to the condition of both firearms and gunpowder. Such matters demanded careful supervision in all eighteenth-century armies—and in Washington’s brigade they always received scrutiny.
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The march to Loyalhanna from Rayston consumed most of October. The move up gave Washington opportunity to assess the quality of the new road, which was, he wrote Governor Fauquier from Loyalhanna at the end of October, “undescribably bad.” It was raining at this time, and the movement of men, wagons, and horses undoubtedly helped turn the soil into mud. About a week later, he told Bouquet that the campaign should be ended there.
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On November 12, some two hundred of the French and their Indian allies attempted a raid on the animals of the British at Loyalhanna. Forbes reported to James Abercromby that he sent five hundred men out to thwart this group. A skirmish followed, which Washington did not write about for almost thirty years; his report then described a small-scale encounter in which a second British force, led by himself, exchanged fire with the first, sent out by Forbes. Each of the two had mistaken the other for the enemy, a mistake that cost them forty dead or missing. The sources from which an account can be constructed are not altogether reliable; Forbes’s letter did not mention Washington’s part, though others say that upon realizing friends were shooting friends, he interposed himself in the middle of the gunfire and with his sword knocked upward the muskets of men he could reach. The existing evidence is not strong enough to establish the truth of this report; Washington’s part in it remains largely unknown.
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In the firefight, three of the enemy were captured and questioned; they testified that Fort Duquesne was lightly garrisoned and short of provisions. The fort appeared ripe for the taking.

The day before the capture of the three enemy soldiers, General Forbes, who had just arrived at Loyalhanna, held a meeting of his principal officers—eight colonels in all. The question posed by Forbes was quite simply what should be done now, given what was known of the enemy’s forces at Fort Duquesne and considering the strength and provisions of his command. Washington’s opinion had been given to
Colonel Bouquet the week before, and he probably repeated its substance at this meeting. In talking to Bouquet—and writing him almost immediately after the conversation on November 6—Washington had argued for caution: British provisions were not ample, and a march to Fort Duquesne would draw them down. Should a battle be fought in the woods and should the British then put the French to “Rout[,] what do we gain by it?” If the enemy were defeated in such an engagement, he asked, could the British be certain that the French would give up the fort? He did not offer a prediction then; but the tone of his attitude was that Forbes’s army was in no shape for a gamble to risk all. What the eight colonels thought of this formulation, if in fact he gave it in their meeting, is not absolutely clear. But they voted as if they heard it, or perhaps for other reasons they shared his skepticism, voting against a full-scale march to Fort Duquesne.
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Then the skirmish of November 12 occurred and the French prisoners reported on the weakness of the fort. That news was enough for Forbes, who the next day ordered his army to take itself to Fort Duquesne. The next two weeks banished doubts about the enterprise, and Washington, along with his colleagues, plunged into action. The three brigades moved as fast as they could, with Washington playing a full part. For several days his brigade took the lead, Bouquet and Montgomery following; but for much of the time he led his men in the middle of the march, which, by necessity, saw the brigades slightly separated from one another. Washington’s brigade guarded the light artillery, deep within the column—tents and the heavier guns had been left behind. The three brigades took turns cutting the road toward the fort, an uncertain task if for no other reason than that no one seemed certain of how near, or far away, Fort Duquesne was. At the beginning of the march, predictions of how far they would have to slog their way were optimistic. When it became clear that Fort Duquesne was not just over the next hill or ridge or stream, realism set in.

On November 25, they reached Fort Duquesne almost without opposition—the enemy had fled and had burned the fort before leaving. No doubt some of the army, both officers and men, felt let down at not getting a fight, but the feeling gave way almost immediately to relief and happiness. Forbes, a generous and thoughtful commander, sent Washington off to Williamsburg and Governor Fauquier with a
report of the army’s success. In late December, Washington arrived home, with more than this news on his mind. He would resign his commission in a few days, and on January 6, 1759, he married Martha Dandridge Custis.

The war had served as George Washington’s tutor, and it drove his development as a soldier and a commander of soldiers. When he accepted the commission as the head of the Virginia Regiment, he had some awareness of what he was taking on. “Some awareness,” but not all, of what lay ahead. The chief problems that were to affect his life for the next three years began to take shape long before he took command. They lay in Williamsburg, the Ohio Valley, and the militia of Virginia.

Williamsburg—the governor and the legislature—was close enough to present problems, almost daily. The governor whom Washington had to deal with for most of the period was Robert Dinwiddie, a man of ability but unsteady in judgment. Dinwiddie meant well, as is often said of troublesome men, but he meddled in matters he could not know much about; and had he known more, his judgment might not have led to the right decision. Moreover, the governor was faced with a legislature in which one house, the Burgesses, took a dim view of his use of executive power. The House of Burgesses did what it pleased and often found much that was not pleasing in what the governor recommended.