What Stalin Knew (8 page)

have to ask for the right to fight our common foe?’’

Although the conference was scheduled to resume on Monday, Au-

gust 21, this was the last of any serious discussions. Voroshilov looked at

Ponomarev with a bitter smile and said, ‘ We’re pretty bad diplomats.’’

Ponomarev ended his description of the event with this observation, which

remains to this day the Soviet version of what happened: ‘‘The Soviet dele-

gation did everything for the success of the negotiations. However, the

efforts of the representatives of England and France came to this: under

cover of these Moscow negotiations concluding a perfidious deal with Fas-

cist Germany and compelling her to move against the east. For the sake of

this, they would have gone for any deal with the Fascists.’’6

The French attempted over the weekend to persuade the Poles to agree

to the passage of Soviet troops in the event of a German invasion. They

failed. The talks did resume on August 21 but they soon adjourned as it

appeared that Voroshilov was well aware of the futile French approach to

the Poles. The same day, however, Stalin, having received assurance from

Hitler that there would be a secret protocol to the nonaggression pact that

would likely grant him the concessions he had sought in Poland, the Bal-

tic, Finland, and Romania, wrote to him agreeing to the pact and express-

ing willingness to receive Foreign Minister Ribbentrop on August 23 in

Moscow.

The weekend of August 18–20 had been a busy one for Stalin. He had

decided to negotiate a nonaggression pact with Hitler and give up on the

Anglo-French military talks. He had never expected much from them any-

way, and the inferior quality of the representatives and the limitations of

their military resources convinced him he had been right. Besides, he

probably knew that some elements in the British government, working

through Chamberlain’s confidante, Sir Horace Wilson, were still trying to

double-cross the Poles and make a deal with Hitler.7 What were Stalin’s

24

PROSKUROV SETS STALIN STRAIGHT

thoughts over that fateful weekend? Were they confined to expectations

that he would recover those portions of Belorussia and Ukraine that had

been under Polish rule, gain German acquiescence in obtaining Bessara-

bia from Romania, and get Hitler’s agreement on Soviet primacy in the

Baltic States? Or did he revert to long-held Leninist views that the capital-

ists/imperialists would ultimately exhaust themselves in wars, thus paving

the way for revolutionary socialism in the industrialized countries? Ac-

cording to Churchill, the decision to enter into the nonaggression pact

with Germany was made at a Politburo meeting on Saturday, August 19,

1939. In addition to the Politburo, the leaders of the Comintern were also

present. In late 1994, a Russian translation of a French version of the

speech that Stalin purportedly made at the August 19 meeting was pub-

lished in Moscow.8

Here is an English translation of that Russian text:

The question of war or peace has entered a critical phase for us. If we

conclude a treaty of mutual assistance with France and Great Brit-

ain, Germany will give up on Poland and begin to find a ‘‘modus

vivendi’’ with the Western powers. War will be prevented but in the

future events can become dangerous for the USSR. If we accept the

proposal of Germany to sign a nonaggression pact with her, she will,

of course, attack Poland and the intervention of France and England

in the war will become inevitable. Western Europe will be exposed to

serious unrest and disorders. Under these conditions we will have

many chances to remain on the sidelines in the conflict and we can

hope for an advantageous entry into the war.

The experience of the last twenty years shows that in peacetime

it is impossible to have a communist movement in Europe strong

enough to permit a Bolshevik party to seize power. The dictatorship

of that party will become possible only as the result of a major war.

We will make our choice and it is clear. We must accept the German

proposal and politely send the Anglo-French mission back. The first

advantage we can derive from this is the destruction of Poland up to

the approaches to Warsaw, including Ukrainian Galicia.

Germany will grant us complete freedom of action in the Baltic

countries and will not object to the return of Bessarabia to the USSR.

She is ready to concede to us a zone of influence in Romania, Bul-

garia, and Hungary. There remains an open question tied to Yugo-

slavia. . . . At the same time we must foresee the consequences that

may arise from the defeat, as well as the victory, of Germany. In the

case of her defeat, the Sovietization of Germany becomes inevitable

and a communist government will be created. We must not forget

PROSKUROV SETS STALIN STRAIGHT

25

that the Sovietization of Germany will be in great danger if it results

from the defeat of Germany in a short war. England and France will

still be sufficiently strong to capture Berlin and destroy Soviet Ger-

many. And we will be in no condition to come to the aid of our

Bolshevik comrades in Germany.

Thus, our task consists of ensuring that Germany can carry on

the war as long as possible in order that a tired and exhausted En-

gland and France will not be in any condition to defeat a Sovietized

Germany. Adhering to a position of neutrality and awaiting its hour,

the USSR will provide assistance to present-day Germany, furnish-

ing her with raw materials and food products. It goes without saying,

of course, that our aid cannot exceed a certain level in order that we

not harm our economy and weaken the might of our army.

At the same time we must carry out an active communist propa-

ganda campaign, particularly in the Anglo-French bloc and prin-

cipally in France. We must be prepared for a situation whereby in

that country in wartime, the party will be forced to give up legal

activities and go underground. We know that such work will demand

many sacrifices, but our French comrades will not question this. In

the first place, their tasks will be the disintegration and demoraliza-

tion of the army and police. If this preparatory work is carried out

satisfactorily, the security of Soviet Germany will be assured and this

will make possible the Sovietization of France.

For the realization of these plans it is necessary that the war

last as long as possible, and it is in this direction that we must con-

centrate all the forces that we possess in Western Europe and the

Balkans.

Let us now examine a second possibility, the victory of Germany.

Some hold to the opinion that this would pose a serious danger for

us. There is a grain of truth in this view, but it would be a mistake to

believe that this danger is as close and great as many imagine it. If

Germany is victorious, it will emerge from the war too exhausted to

begin an armed conflict with the USSR for at least ten years.

Her main concern will be to maintain control over defeated

France and England with the intention of preventing their rehabili-

tation. On the other hand, a victorious Germany will have enormous

territories at her disposal and for many years she will be busy ‘‘ex-

ploiting them’’ and establishing German regimes there. It is obvious

that Germany will be too busy in other areas to turn against us. And

there is still another thing that will serve our security. In a defeated

France the French Communist Party will always be very strong. A

communist revolution will inevitably take place, and we can use this

situation to come to the aid of France and make her our ally. Later all

nations having come under the ‘‘protection’’ of a victorious Germany

26

PROSKUROV SETS STALIN STRAIGHT

will become our allies. We will have a broad field of action for the

development of a world revolution.

Comrades! It is in the interests of the USSR, motherland of the

workers, that a war break out between the Reich and the capitalist

Anglo-French bloc. One must do everything to ensure that the war

lasts as long as possible in order to exhaust both sides. It is pre-

cisely for this reason that we must agree to the pact proposed by

Germany and work for the goal of having the war, once declared, last

for the longest possible time. We must strengthen propaganda ac-

tivity in the warring countries in order to be ready for the time when

the war ends.

Sometime after August 19, the French news agency Havas, published

excerpts from the speech. On November 30, 1939, the official party news-

paper,
Pravda,
printed a letter from Stalin on the Havas release:

The editor of
Pravda
has put the following question to Comrade

Stalin: What is Comrade Stalin’s reaction to the message issued by

the Havas agency on ‘‘Stalin’s speech’’ allegedly made by him in the

Politburo on August 19, at which ideas were supposedly advanced to

the effect that ‘‘the war must be continued for as long as is needed to

exhaust the belligerent countries’’?

Comrade Stalin has sent the following answer:

This report issued by the Havas agency, like many more of its

messages, is nonsense. I, of course, cannot know in precisely which

nightclub these lies were fabricated. But no matter how many lies

the gentlemen of the Havas news agency tell, they cannot deny that:

a. it was not Germany that attacked France and Britain but

France and Britain that attacked Germany, thereby taking on them-

selves responsibility for the present war;

b. after hostilities began, Germany made peace proposals to

France and Britain, while the Soviet Union openly supported these

German peace proposals, for it considered and continues to con-

sider that only as early as possible an end to the war can bring

relief . . . to the condition of all countries and all peoples.

c. the ruling circles in Britain and France rejected out of hand

both the German peace proposals and the Soviet Union’s efforts to

end the war as quickly as possible. Such are the facts. What can the

nightclub politicians of the Havas agency provide to counter these

facts? J. Stalin9

How Havas obtained the text of this speech is not known, but the most

likely avenue would have been elements of the French Communist Party

unwilling to accept the Soviet-Nazi rapprochement and seeking a way to

PROSKUROV SETS STALIN STRAIGHT

27

embarrass Stalin. They would have had access to a French translation

of the speech since translations were the normal order of business for

the Executive Committee of the Communist International. It could be

claimed, of course, that the speech was a fabrication. Stalin’s reaction in

Pravda
suggests the Havas release deeply irritated him; the article omits

the word
Poland
entirely. As for German ‘‘peace proposals’’ supported by

the Soviet Union, Stalin’s concern in the first several days of September

was not peace but the speed of the Wehrmacht’s advance, the collapse of

Polish resistance, and whether the Red Army could occupy its promised

slice of Polish territory in Belorussia and Ukraine before the Germans took

it over.

The principal issue arising from the language of the apparent Au-

gust 19, 1939, speech is not how Havas got it but whether it reflected

Stalin’s innermost thoughts on ‘‘the question of war or peace.’’ I believe it

does and my belief is buttressed by the comments Stalin made on Septem-

ber 7, 1939, in the presence of Georgy Dimitrov, Molotov, and Andrei A.

Zhdanov and recorded by Dimitrov in his diary. They parallel the state-

ments contained in the August 19 speech. Consider this: ‘‘A war is on

between two groups of capitalist countries . . . for the redivision of the

world, for the domination of the world. We see nothing wrong in their

having a good fight and weakening each other. It would be fine if at the

hands of Germany the position of the richest capitalist countries (espe-

cially England) were shaken.’’ Or this: ‘‘The position of Communists in

power is different from the position of Communists in the opposition. We

are the masters in our own house. Communists . . . in the opposition are in

the opposition; there the bourgeoisie is master. We can maneuver, pit one

side against the other to set them fighting with each other as fiercely as

possible.’’ In the remainder of his comments Stalin laid out the reasons for

abandoning the Popular Front, explained why he decided not to continue

negotiations with the French and English, and outlined the slogans to

guide the working class in their fight against ‘‘the bosses of capitalist

countries . . . waging war for their own imperialist interests.’’ In September