Zionism: The Real Enemy of the Jews, Volume 1 (47 page)

Nearly two decades after the events, when he was recognised by all who were seriously well-informed about Arab politics as the most shrewd and wise Arab leader of modern times, it was King Feisal himself who gave me, in private conversation, retrospective insight into the way his mind had been working in 1947. (The private conversation came about because of the question I asked him off-the-record after an hour-long filmed interview, his first ever with a foreign TV correspondent, and in which he said nothing newsworthy. After my camera crew had withdrawn, I dared to ask him why he spoke in riddles. Through an interpreter he replied: “You must understand how difficult and delicate my position is. If I say the wrong thing, or even the right thing in the wrong way, the Middle East could go up in flames.”) Apart from Feisal’s truly regal bearing and his courtesy, and his splendid semitic nose, the thing I most remember about him is his bloodshot, piercing eyes and the way they undressed you to your soul. If you lied to Feisal he knew, whoever you were, that you were lying. (Which is probably why Kissinger was never comfortable in Feisal’s presence).

As his kingdom’s foreign minister Feisal foresaw the catastrophe that would happen if the Arabs could not find a way to contain Zionism. He knew the Zionists had no intention of being satisfied with what had been allotted to them in the partition plan and that the name of the game was preventing Zionist expansionism. The only way of doing so was by accepting a self-governing Jewish entity within a unitary Palestine. If the Arabs compromised to that extent, they would enjoy the goodwill of the Western world—the U.S. especially, and that would make it more difficult, and hopefully impossible, for the Jewish entity, once established, to seek to take more Arab land by force. It would not be easy to persuade the Palestinians to agree to give up some of their land in the name of political expediency, but Saudi Arabia’s escalating oil wealth would enable it to sweeten that most bitter of pills. And, anyway, the alternative was too terrible to think about. If the Arabs found themselves confined in the rejectionist corner, they would have to fight a war they could not win, and thereafter they would be at the mercy of an expansionist Zionist state, supported no doubt by an America at the mercy of the Zionist lobby.

The other factor pushing Feisal in the direction of some sort of accommodation with Zionism was his fear of the Soviet Union (he was at one with his father on this), and thus the strategic need to have the U.S. as its superpower ally and protector. Feisal’s nightmare was the scope communism would have for penetrating the region and making mischief in it if failure to resolve the Palestine problem led to unending conflict between the Arabs and the Jews.

In the real world (and as the Palestinians would come to understand) those with grievances, nationalist movements as well as states, had to have one of the two superpowers on their side if their grievances were to be addressed. That being so, and if there was an unending state of war between the Arabs and Zionism supported right or wrong by the U.S., a war the Arabs could not win, there would come a point when Arab radicals would seek the support of the Soviet Union, as a counter-balance to American support for Zionism. The radicals would get Soviet support and that would have two predictable consequences.

The first was that a flirtation by Arab radicals with the Soviet Union would divide the Arab world, leading to the creation of a pro-American camp on the one hand, which by definition would consist of the traditional and conservative regimes led by Saudi Arabia; and, on the other hand, a radical camp that would be, more out of need than choice, apparently pro-Soviet and apparently anti-American. Soviet backed Arab radicalism would pose a threat to the stability and perhaps even the very existence of the traditional and conservative Arab regimes upon whom, actually, the U.S. and the West as a whole would be relying for oil to fuel economic growth.

The madness as Feisal saw it was that American support for Zionism right or wrong would create the situation that would pose the biggest potential threat to the continuing flow of the oil the West so desperately needed at the cheapest possible price.

The other consequence of allowing the Soviet Union to have influence in the Arab world would be the creation of a situation that would enable Zionism’s entity in Palestine to demand the unquestioning support of all the Western powers on the basis that it, the Zionist entity, was the only secure bastion of anti-communism in the region.

In Feisal’s analysis the absolute priority was doing whatever had to be done to prevent the Soviet Union winning friends and influence in the Middle East. If that required the Arabs to make some sort of accommodation with Zionism in order to enjoy the support of America, so be it—provided the U.S would oblige the Zionists to accept a self-governing Jewish entity in Palestine on terms Feisal could sell to his fellow Arabs.

When he expressed his willingness to meet with Secretary of State Marshall to try to hammer out a compromise based on both the majority and the minority recommendations of the Special Committee, Feisal was entertaining the view that he could make common cause with those at Executive level in the Truman administration who were developing U.S policy for containing the Soviet Union.

He also believed he had a strong negotiating card in his hand. It was no secret that the partition resolution would not get the support it needed in the General Assembly. Because the injustice it represented was so obvious, so outrageous, there was no way that two thirds of the member states were going to vote for it.

Feisal’s intention was to say to Marshall something like the following: “When the partition resolution fails to achieve the necessary majority in the General Assembly vote, we’re all going to have a problem with Zionism; but it’s the U.S. that will have the biggest problem because of Zionism’s influence on American politics. I can and will help you defuse this crisis, but you must help me by requiring the Zionists to accept a self-governing Jewish entity on terms I can sell to my Arab brothers.”

The meeting Feisal wanted with Marshall did not take place. Secretary of State Marshall was a seriously good man with unquestionable integrity, but he knew that Zionism would not consider any compromise Feisal was likely to propose. There was no point in him meeting with the Saudi prince to convey that message.

In cabinet, Marshall’s own view echoed that of Defence Secretary Forrestal. It was that partition in the face of Arab antagonism would create serious trouble in the region after Britain’s withdrawal; and that the only beneficiary of it, apart from Zionism, would be the Soviet Union. In fact Marshall and Forrestal shared Feisal’s analysis.

The top-secret position paper that most informed the official State Department view of the strategic significance of the Arab Middle East was the one Loy Henderson had written in September 1947. It contained the following:

The resources and geographical position of the Arab Countries are of such a character that those countries are necessarily factors of importance in the international economic field. Arab friendship is essential if we are to have their co-operation in carrying out some of our vital economic programs. During the next few years we are planning to draw heavily on the resources of the area, not only for our use, but for the reconstruction of Europe. Furthermore, we are intending to make important use of the communications facilities in the area.
¹³

Henderson also noted that the partition plan proposals “ignore such principles as self-determination and majority rule.”

Because he was the prime target of Zionism’s campaign of vilification against the State Department, Henderson, when he forwarded that position paper to Marshall, attached a note to it. The note said that despite the views expressed in the position paper, “the staff in my office is endeavouring loyally to carry out the decision (the majority partition report)... and will continue to execute the decision in a manner which will minimise as far as possible the damage to our relations and interests in the Near Middle East” (in the event of the partition plan being approved by the General Assembly).
¹⁴

Two months later, five days before the vote on the partition plan, Henderson wrote another top-secret advice paper for consideration by his masters. It said: “By our Palestine policy we are not only forfeiting the friendship of the Arab world, we are incurring long-term Arab hostility towards us. What is important is that the Arabs are losing confidence in the integrity of the United States and the sincerity of our many pronouncements that our foreign policies are based on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.”

I think there can be no doubt that
if the Zionists had not had the Nazi holocaust card to play, the views of the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defence, and the various intelligence agencies, would have prevailed
. The American strategic interest—including the need to prevent the Soviet Union winning friends and influence in the Middle East—would have been put first and the partition of Palestine would not have been a runner. If Marshall had been free to act as he thought best, he would have welcomed a meeting of minds with Feisal and, probably, the two of them would have solved the Palestine problem in a way that would have served the best real interests of all concerned. Except those of the Zionists and the Soviet Union.

Feisal’s initial assessment of the strength of opposition to the partition resolution was correct. In response to Zionist pressure on the Truman administration, the critical vote on the resolution was postponed twice because the required two-thirds majority was not there.

After the second postponement Zionist leaders decided to do whatever had to be done to secure the necessary two-thirds majority. They were desperate in the extreme. Without the appearance of legitimacy a UN resolution on partition (if approved) would give Zionism, it would be impossible for the Jewish state to import the heavy weapons and military hardware needed to guarantee victory in the coming war with the Arabs. It was, in short, Zionism’s moment of truth. If it could bend the UN to its will, a Jewish state would be created and, after its birth, the size of it would be determined on the battlefield. But without a birth certificate of sorts from the UN, the whole Zionist enterprise was doomed. Or very well could be.

As Lilienthal revealed, “Operation Partition”, the Zionist strategy to secure the necessary two-thirds majority in the General Assembly, was masterminded by David Niles, Zionism’s top man in the White House. His two main associates for the task—fellow conspirators is a fair description— were New York’s Judge Joseph Proskauer and the Washington economist, Robert Nathan. All three were men with great prestige and enormous influence who could cause almost any door to be opened, but Niles, because of his position and his role in the White House, was himself the master key.

The trio’s mission, with the assistance of other immensely powerful Zionists and a political hit-squad of their supporters in the U.S. Senate, was to persuade a number of target governments to change their voting intention from ‘No’ to ‘Yes’ or, failing that, to abstain.

In every communication they had with representatives of the target governments, including in some cases heads of state, the trio took great care to stress that they were speaking as “mere private citizens”. They were not speaking for the Truman administration. They said. And that was true. But those on the receiving end of their messages could not be blamed for believing the opposite. Everybody who needed to know did know that Niles was one of Truman’s right-hand men, and that when the President himself was not personally involved, Niles was effectively running the White House show on Palestine. Was it likely that Niles would be applying pressure without at least the unofficial and deniable blessing of the President? Not likely, those subjected to pressure thought. But they were wrong. Niles in particular was demonstrating that most unique of all Jewish qualities—
chutzpah
.

This Yiddish word has no exact translation in English. It is usually said to mean effrontery but there is more to it. The full meaning of chutzpah has to be extracted from all the things effrontery can mean including temerity (rashness, unreasonable contempt for danger), audacity, nerve, cheek, gall, impudence, brazenness, impertinence and insolence. By and large
chutzpah
is, in my opinion, an admirable quality; and I think Jews possess it, uniquely, because of their unique experience of history. The role played by
chutzpah
in first the creation of Israel, and then its expansion, is impossible to exaggerate. One might say that
chutzpah
is the single word that best sums up the whole Zionist enterprise.

After two postponements the critical vote on the partition resolution was scheduled for 29 November. Despite their bullying and their blackmail, Niles and his fellow conspirators could not be completely confident about the outcome until the votes were actually cast in the General Assembly.

As it happened on the day there were 33 votes for the partition resolution—including those cast by the United States and the Soviet Union, 13 against and 10 abstentions. The necessary two-thirds majority was achieved. Just about.

Britain was one of the 10 member states which abstained. It was unwilling to vote for a resolution that did not command the support of both the Jews and the Arabs of Palestine.

But what was the story behind the story? How did the Zionists and their unquestioning supporters in the U.S. Senate turn a General Assembly majority ‘No’ into a majority ‘Yes’?

In
Memoirs
published long after the events President Truman himself was quite frank about Zionist coercion. He wrote: