A Durable Peace (64 page)

The fighters and bearers of arms in the battle of liberation are the nucleus of the Popular Army, which will be the protecting
arm of the Palestinian Arab people.

This organization shall have a flag, oath and anthem, all of which will be determined in accordance with a special system.

To this Covenant is attached a law known as the Fundamental Law of the Palestine Liberation Organization, in which is determined
the manner of the organization’s formation, its committees, institutions, the special
functions of every one of them and all the requisite duties associated with them in accordance with the Covenant.

This Covenant cannot be amended except by a two-thirds majority of all the members of the National Council of the Palestine
Liberation Organization in a special session called for this purpose.

The Security Council,

Expressing
its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing
the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every
State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further
that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance
with Article 2 of the Charter,

1.
Affirms
that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which
should include the application of both the following principles:

(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial
integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized
boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2.
Affirms further
the necessity

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures
including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3.
Requests
the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts
with the states concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement
in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4.
Requests
the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon
as possible.

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 19 June 1967, subject as above, which requested the views of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, without regard to political factors, on the minimum territory in addition to that held on 4 June 1967, Israel might
be justified in retaining in order to permit a more effective defense against possible conventional Arab attack and terrorist
raids.

2. From a strictly military point of view Israel would require the retention of some captured Arab territory in order to provide
militarily defensible borders. Determination of territory to be retained should be based on accepted tactical principles such
as control of commanding terrain, use of natural obstacles, elimination of enemy-held salients, and provision of defense in-depth
for important facilities and installations. More detailed discussions of the key border areas mentioned in the reference are
contained in the Appendix hereto. In summary, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding these areas are as follows:

A
. T
HE
J
ORDANIAN
W
EST
B
ANK

Control of the prominent high ground running north-south through them middle of West Jordan generally east of the main north-south
highway
along the axis Jenin-Nablus-Bira-Jerusalem and then southwest to a junction with the Dead Sea at the Wadi el Daraja would
provide Israel with a militarily defensible border. The envisioned defensive line would run just east of Jerusalem; however,
provision could be made for internationalization of the city without significant detriment to Israel’s defensive posture.

B
. S
YRIAN
T
ERRITORY
C
ONTIGUOUS TO
I
SRAEL
.

Israel is particularly sensitive to the prevalence of terrorist raids and border incidents in this area. The presently occupied
territory, the high ground running generally north-south on a line with Qnaitra about 15 miles inside the Syrian border, would
give Israel control of the terrain which Syria has used effectively in harassing the border area.

C
. T
HE
J
ERUSALEM
-L
ATRUN
A
REA

See subparagraph 2A above.

D
. T
HE
G
AZA
S
TRIP

By occupying the Gaza Strip, Israel would trade approximately 45 miles of hostile border for eight. Configured as it is, the
strip serves as a salient for introduction of Arab subversion and terrorism, and its retention would be to Israel’s military
advantage.

E
. T
HE
N
EGEV
-S
INAI
B
ORDER

Except for retention of the demilitarized zone around Al Awja and some territory for the protection of the port of Eilat,
discussed below, continued occupation of the Sinai would present Israel with problems outweighing any military gains.

F
. T
HE
N
EGEV
-J
ORDAN
-A
QABA
-S
TRAIT
OF
T
IRAN
A
REA

Israel’s objectives here would be innocent passage through the Gulf of Aqaba and protection of its port at Eilat. Israel could
occupy Sharm ash-Shaykh with considerable inconvenience but could rely on some form of internationalization to secure free
access to the gulf. Failing this, Israel would require key terrain in the Sinai to protect its use of the Strait of Tiran.
Eilat, situated at the apex of Israel’s narrow southern tip, is vulnerable to direct ground action from Egyptian territory.
Israel would lessen the threat by retention of a portion of the Sinai Peninsula south and east of the Wadi el Gerafithen
east to an intersection with the Gulf of Aqaba at approximately 29° 20’ north latitude.

3. It is emphasized that the above conclusions, in accordance with your terms of reference are based solely on military considerations
from the Israeli point of view.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff

signed Earle G. Wheeler

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. T
HE
J
ORDANIAN
W
EST
B
ANK

a. Threat.
The Jordan-Israeli border is 330 miles in length extending from the Gulf of Aqaba northward to the Dead Sea, thence following
the armistice demarcation lines and the Jordan River northward to the Yarmuk River, thence along the Yarmuk River to the Syrian
frontier. This border area has traditionally been lightly held by military forces and defenses consisted mainly of small, widely separated
outposts and patrols and, therefore, afforded an area where launching of saboteurs and terrorists into Israel was relatively
easy. During the period January 1965 to February 1967, a total of 53 incidents of sabotage and mining activity took place
along this border. These activities resulted in three killed, 35 wounded, and damage to houses, roads, bridges, railroads,
and water and electric power installations in Israel. Instances of exchange of small arms fire occurred quite frequently.
The majority of these events took place from the Mount Hebron and Arabah areas where the Jordanian authorities did not take
sufficient measures to protect against line crosses and saboteurs. The high ground running north-south through the middle
of West Jordan overlooks Israel’s narrow midsection and offers a route for a thrust to the sea which would split the country
in two parts.

b. Requirement.
A boundary along the commanding terrain overlooking the Jordan River from the west could provide a shorter defense line. However,
as a minimum, Israel would need a defense line generally along the axis Bardala-Tubas-Nablus-Bira-Jerusalem and then to the
northern part of the Dead Sea. This line would widen the narrow portion of Israel and provide additional terrain for the defense
of Tel Aviv. It would provide additional buffer for the air base at Beersheba. In addition, this line would give a portion
of the foothills to Israel and avoid interdiction by artillery in the Israeli villages in the lowlands. This line would also
provide a shorter defense line than the border of 4 June 1967 and would reduce the Jordanian salient into Israel. It also
provides adequate lines of communication for lateral movement.

2. S
YRIAN
T
ERRITORY
C
ONTIGUOUS
TO
I
SRAEL

a. Threat.
The border between Syria and Israel extends approximately 43 miles. It extends from a point on the Lebanese-Syrian border
east to the vicinity of Baniyas, south to Lake Tiberias, then south along the eastern shore of the lake to the Syrian-Jordanian
border. During the period January 1965 to February 1967, a total of 28 sabotage and terrorist actsoccurred along this border.
In addition, there were numerous shellings of villages from the high ground overlooking the area southeast of Lake Tiberias.
Casualties were seven killed and 18 wounded. Control of the dominant terrain affords Syria a military route of approach into
northern Israel; however, the greatest threat in this sector is from terrorism and sabotage.

b. Requirement.
Israel must hold the commanding terrain east of the boundary of 4 June 1967 which overlooks the Galilee area. To provide a
defense in-depth, Israel would need a strip about 15 miles wide extending from the border of Lebanon to the border of Jordan.
This line would provide protection for the Israeli villages on the east bank of Lake Tiberias but would make defending forces
east of the lake vulnerable to a severing thrust from Jordan to the southern tip of the lake. The Israelis would probably
decide to accept this risk. As a side effect, this line would give the Israelis control of approximately 25 miles of the Trans-Arabian
Pipeline.

3. T
HE
J
ERUSALEM
-L
ATRUN
A
REA

a. Threat.
These areas have been the scene of intermittent trouble over the years as both Jordanians and Israelis have been illegally
cultivating lands in the area between the lines. Only one serious incident occurred in this area during the period January
1965 to February 1967.

b. Requirement.
To defend the Jerusalem area would require that the boundary of Israel be positioned to the east of the city to provide for
the organization of an adequate defensive position. On the other hand, if Jerusalem were to be internationalized under the
United Nations, a boundary established west of the city could be defended in accordance with the concept in paragraph 1, above.