A History of China (71 page)

Sun’s ideas and program also derived from the West but were vague and difficult to identify. His so-called Three People’s Principles of nationalism, democracy, and people’s livelihood were ill defined because his views consisted of a mélange of his unsystematic reading in Western sources. People’s livelihood could refer to either socialism or a kind of people’s capitalism. Nationalism could be anti-Manchu beliefs or a modern form of nationalism for the Chinese. The unclear definitions may actually have worked in his favor because a variety of different peoples or groups, who represented different policies, could join his movement. A lack of a more focused ideology proved to be a boon because he had no rigid criteria for membership in his Tongmenghui (or Revolutionary Alliance), the movement he founded in Japan in 1905. Travel outside China impeded efforts to organize a tightly knit political party or a military force that could offer him the leverage he needed to deal with commanders and warlords throughout China. Indeed, he did not turn out to be a skilled administrator or an adept military leader, which prevented him from assuming power over any sizable domain in China.

When he returned to China (by early 1912), Sun had no choice other than to negotiate with Yuan Shikai, the dominant military figure in north China. Sun agreed to resign as provisional president and to support Yuan as president if he abided by the provisional constitution, permitted political parties, and sanctioned an election for the Chinese parliament. By the time of the election in January of 1913, the Tongmenghui had become the loosely organized Guomindang (or Nationalist Party), a political party. Despite its newness, the Guomindang won the largest number of seats in the parliament, and Sun’s young protégé Song Jiaoren (1882–1913), the leader of the party, was poised to become the premier and to limit the president’s power. However, Yuan could not tolerate the threat of the erosion of his presidential power. This prompted several of his underlings to assassinate Song, although Yuan himself escaped official guilt for involvement in the plot. Without Song in opposition, Yuan compelled the parliament to name him president for five years. When the parliament proved to be a nuisance late in 1913, the Yuan abolished it. Sun, fearing for his life, fled to Japan.

Yuan set about shredding his commitment to Sun, gradually assuming an imperial role and ultimately weakening himself and China, thereby making the country vulnerable to foreign incursions and demands. He had grand visions of restoring China’s dynastic structure, with himself as the new emperor, and, after alleged calls (instigated by his underlings and allies) to take the throne, he agreed to become emperor as of January 1, 1916. However, there was little support for reestablishment of the imperial system, leading many commanders in various provinces to detach themselves from the central government. Provincial warlords had gained power before 1916, but the pace of such challenges to the Beijing government accelerated after Yuan’s attempt at imperial restoration.

At the same time, Yuan faced another quandary. In 1915, capitalizing on the great powers’ involvement in the First World War and the attendant focus on Europe, Japan sent the so-called Twenty-One Demands to the Chinese government. The most controversial of these demands was Chinese recognition of Japan’s dominance over Shandong province, a dominance it achieved by expelling Germany, which had maintained a concession there since the 1890s. Germany was using nearly all its resources for the First World War and could not afford to defend its preeminent position in Shandong. Japan also sought and received greater economic concessions in Fujian, Inner Mongolia, and Manchuria and leverage over important iron and steel companies, thus assuring itself of access to these resources. With no countervailing force from any other foreign power, Yuan had to acquiesce to nearly all the demands, which further alienated the population. His death in 1916 ended his aspirations but also ushered in a chaotic period, with a decline in central governmental authority and an increase in warlord power. It turned out that, the greater the distance from Beijing, the greater the opportunity for warlords to establish autonomous regions.

The northwest province of Xinjiang illustrates the potential for ­dismemberment of the country. Conquered by the Qing in the middle of the eighteenth century and riveted by rebellion throughout the nineteenth century, Xinjiang had, in any case, loose connections with China. The Qing had ruled a mostly non-Chinese population composed of pastoralists and oasis-dwellers who engaged in subsistence farming. Although the vast majority of the people were Turkic and Muslim, a Chinese warlord named Yang Zengxin (1867–1928) took power in the aftermath of the 1911 revolution. A tough-minded, oppressive, and shrewd leader, he had the advantage of a well-organized military force. He combined ruthless suppression of the local, non-Chinese inhabitants with some relief measures and protection from exploitative Chinese merchants. His forces dealt harshly with both Chinese dissidents (including secret societies who sought greater autonomy) and Turkic governors who demanded independence. He devised agreements with some non-Chinese governors, but in some cases duped and murdered recalcitrant chieftains. One of his successful tactics was to generate conflicts among them and thus prevent them from ­allying with each other. Within a few years, he had enforced a certain stability in Xinjiang, although tensions remained beneath the surface and would, on occasion, flare up into violence. In dealing with these domestic problems, Yang paid lip service to Yuan Shikai’s leadership and to the later rule of a hobbled central government after Yuan’s death, but, in fact, he was virtually independent and devised his own policies.

Tensions along the Russian border also plagued Yang. Tsarist Russia’s ­control over central Asia, the region bordering Xinjiang, had weakened considerably with its entrance into the First World War. Its own general dete­rioration led to poor performance in the early stages of the war. Deaths, demoralization, and desertions devastated the Russian forces, compelling the government to draft its central Asian, mostly Muslim subjects, into the armed forces in 1915 – a policy that it had tried to avert because it knew that it would antagonize these less-than-loyal groups. Many central Asians perceived the war as a European problem and saw no great benefit in them becoming involved. Moreover, their economic conditions had become ever more parlous. In the nineteenth century, the tsarist court had forced them to substitute cotton for grain cultivation, making them dependent on other parts of Russia for some of their food. The onset of the war created food shortages for central Asia, as the country’s western regions retained, and did not export, their grain. Thus, ­turbulence erupted in central Asia because of limited food supplies and resistance to recruitment into the tsarist army. The Russian Revolution of 1917 exacerbated the instability and violence, forcing Yang to pay attention to his western and northern borders with Russia.

Yang feared that the violence in Russia and central Asia would spill over into Xinjiang. The struggle between the Bolshevik communists and the White Russian forces (the anticommunists, who were the main anti-Bolshevik group) often took place in Siberia and central Asia, where the anticommunist groups found a hospitable environment. This civil war was waged relentlessly from at least 1918 to 1921, with the Whites often using central Asia as a base. As the Bolsheviks defeated one after another of the White groups, some soldiers sought sanctuary in Xinjiang. Yang faced a dilemma. Should he assist the Whites or should he seek to establish good relations with the Bolsheviks? He eventually chose to deal with the Bolsheviks, and in 1920 signed an agreement calling for the repatriation of the White Russians, for proper commercial relations, and for an exchange of diplomats. Yang did not ally with the Muslim central Asian opponents of the USSR (the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which came into being in 1922 as a consequence of the Russian Revolution). Instead, in 1924, he signed a treaty permitting the USSR to establish five ­consulates in Xinjiang and allowing for his own government to open the same number in central Asia. As a result, trade between Xinjiang and the USSR increased at a faster rate than the Chinese central government’s commerce with Xinjiang. The most revealing aspect of these developments is that Yang had the right to negotiate with foreign states without seeking the central ­government’s approval. His power typified that of many provincial warlords.

Yan Xishan (1883–1960) represented still another warlord of this era. A native of Shanxi who commanded a large military force, Yan took power in the province right after the 1911 revolution. Yuan Shikai’s government had scarcely any influence over Shanxi, and after Yuan’s death Yan supported one or another of the succeeding military men who controlled the government in Beijing – but without relinquishing authority over his own province. He survived, and in fact flourished, during the almost constant changes in the central government from 1916 to 1927. In 1928, when Chiang Kai-shek’s military campaign united at least China’s east coast, Yan at first collaborated with the new leader, who ­happened to be Sun Yat-sen’s brother-in-law. However, Chiang and Yan soon came into conflict, and only eventually established a fragile peace because of the Japanese and communist threats in the 1930s. The so-called alliance with Chiang granted Yan autonomy over Shanxi; he used this free hand to ingratiate himself with the population via a policy of economic modernization. He promoted industry (especially mining), built roads and a railway line, fostered agronomy, and instituted social reforms, including establishment of public schools and greater emphasis on women’s rights. After the Second World War, his efforts were insufficient to halt the Chinese communists’ inexorable rise to power. In late 1949, recognizing the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek’s armies, he fled to Taiwan.

There were many other such examples. Warlords, some of whom had been Yuan Shikai’s underlings or commanders, gained control over numerous areas in China. Criminals or bandits who had significant forces took power in some regions and generated fear and instability. Some of these figures, such as Yan Xishan and, to a lesser extent, Yang Zengxin, advocated and implemented policies emphasizing social reforms and economic modernization. But many were simply rapacious and contributed to poverty and oppression, as well as to a weakened Chinese state. Foreign governments took advantage of this disunity to back one or another of the warlords, creating even greater havoc. Japan, increasingly concerned with Shandong, Manchuria, and Inner Mongolia, ­supported its own candidates among the warlords or simply precipitated disruptions upon which the warlords could capitalize. The USSR meddled in Xinjiang, and by the late 1920s had virtually supplanted China as the main external force. It also helped to detach Mongolia from China’s control and facilitated its efforts to become an independent country. Britain, the USA, and, to a lesser extent, France, in part due to investments and stakes in trade with China, also became involved in the country’s tempestuous politics in the first and second decades of the twentieth century. In these chaotic circumstances, foreign involvement and alliances were destabilizing. Different foreign states had differing economic and political interests and exerted their authority over a weak and decentralized China for their own benefit, contributing to continued misery but also to stirrings of nationalism.

Decentralization offered greater power to local officials and landlords. Some in the old gentry class profited from the lack of an effective central government. Virtually without restrictions, these landlords had flexibility to enforce their own will in local areas. Alliance with local officials, who either derived from the elite class or were readily corruptible, permitted landlords to evade taxation and to dominate their regions’ peasants and workers. Chinese who believed themselves to be exploited had no agency to which they could appeal. They became increasingly frustrated with government, which did not appear to be protecting the weak and the powerless.

At the same time, nationalism, which, on occasion, developed into antiforeign demonstrations or boycotts, spread. Some Chinese blamed foreigners, together with social divisions and inequality in the country, for China’s ­predicament. They became increasingly alienated and suspicious of foreign intentions. The USA was somewhat excepted because it had not demanded a specific Chinese territory as a concession. It sought free trade rather than a monopoly of the territories’ economic activity. Chinese intellectuals were captivated by President Woodrow Wilson, who had, after all, been an ­academic. Via his Fourteen Points (proclaimed at the outset of the USA’s entrance into the First World War), Wilson championed the principle of national self-determination, which meant that colonies could opt to regain their independence. Some Chinese intellectuals assumed that Wilson would therefore support their nationalist aspirations and would assist in persuading foreign states to abandon their virtual occupation of Chinese territories.

They were to be disappointed when the Western powers that met at Versailles at the conclusion of the First World War acquiesced to Japan’s claim to Germany’s concession in Shandong province and to Japanese occupation of the region. Many Chinese intellectuals believed that the West had undermined its commitment to China. The pledge of national self-determination had not been honored. Instead, Chinese territory had been turned over to a country that had traditionally borrowed much from China, including Confucianism, Buddhism, and even much of its written language – a land that the Chinese considered a younger brother who learned from China.

On May 4, 1919, several thousand students organized a demonstration to protest the Japanese occupation of Shandong. Followed and restricted by the police, the students originally marched around Tiananmen (The Gate of Heavenly Peace) in Beijing, but scuffles soon broke out. Students damaged the house of a prominent Chinese official, violence erupted, and one student was killed during the fighting that ensued. Much of the Chinese population was appalled at the violence and the loss of life. For a country that had been governed by scholar-officials and where education was so highly valued, the death of a student was shocking. Many lost faith in the Western democracies and began to search for political and social alternatives.