A History of Korea (60 page)

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY ISSUE AND INTERNAL PROBLEMS

The nineteenth century, marked by both internal uprisings and external threats, continues to stand as a troubling historical fulcrum in Korea’s transition to the modern era. In this regard, the period is taken simply as the prelude to “the end,” that is, the loss of national sovereignty and other calamities of the early twentieth century. The shadow cast by the nineteenth century on Korea’s modern experience is so long and dark that attempts have arisen recently to suggest that, given the flourishing of culture and statecraft in the eighteenth century (
Chapter 11
), the nineteenth century was more of an anomaly. Both of these perspectives situate the nineteenth
century in longer, and presumably more significant, historical developments—that of the late Chos
n era that preceded it, and of the modern era that succeeded it. While such a long-term historical approach is always edifying, it is equally important to take the nineteenth century on its own terms and show how it represented a distinctive period in Korean history.

Many factors contributed to the major events that racked the nineteenth century, but we must look first to politics. Here, an event took place—conveniently, for arranging historical eras, at least—at the very beginning: the death of King Ch
ngjo in 1800. As discussed in
Chapter 11
, King Ch
ngjo has come to embody in the historical annals all that was hopeful and healthy in the Chos
n dynasty, and his sudden death while still in his forties represented the end of the comprehensive reform movement that he had been leading. He was followed on the throne, coincidentally, by a succession of four kings too young to exert authority on their own when they began their reigns. Not so coincidentally, throughout the nineteenth century the court came under the corrupting influence of royal family members, especially those of the queen. The network of corruption extended all the way to local administration, and this constituted a fundamental cause behind the eruptions of rebellious violence—the largest in the Chos
n dynasty until that time—in northern Korea in 1811 and southern Korea in 1862.

The Hong Ky
ngnae Rebellion of 1811–12 is striking for its many similarities to the Myoch’
ng Rebellion of 1135–6 (
Chapter 5
): a charismatic malcontent, convinced by divination of Pyongyang’s rightful place as the center of Korean civilization and, seething at the discrimination against the northwestern region of the country, leads a devastating uprising to overthrow the reigning dynasty. On both occasions, the central government’s forces eventually crushed the rebels after a long siege, but the negative reverberations in P’y
ngan province, and indeed throughout the country, would last for decades. The lingering bitterness following the Hong Ky
ngnae Rebellion, however, would prove especially consequential because, unlike the Myoch’
ng Rebellion, the uprising was instigated by rampant corruption by local government
authorities. Indeed, the venality came at a particularly acute time—amidst near-famine conditions. And this largely explains how, under the banner of regional solidarity, the rebel leaders could mobilize so many people from different socioeconomic and status backgrounds to join the cause.

While the court undertook a thorough investigation of the rebellion, it could do little to overturn the most entrenched cause, which was not the famine nor even regional discrimination, but rather local corruption. For misconduct by local officials was rooted in the chain of graft emanating from the central court itself, chronically headed by a weak king and beset by factional strife. Hence, smaller-scale uprisings continued, and it was almost inevitable that another major peasants’ revolt would erupt. Half a century later it did, striking this time the southern provinces. In early 1862 residents around the southern coastal city of Chinju, fed up with the extortionate local military commander, rose up to kill local officials and take command of government offices around the area. The central government hurriedly dispatched Pak Kyusu to investigate the uprising and mollify the local populace. This did little to stop the spread of the revolts throughout the southern provinces—and indeed all the way to some counties in the north as well. Eventually Pak came to recommend several systemic reforms in the taxation system as a way to address the grievances of the populace. His recommendations, however, were swallowed up by the festering dysfunction of the central government.