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After 2004 the relationships between the governor and the members of the legislature also declined. Blagojevich shunned Springfield and most legislators. He refused to live in the governor's mansion, preferring to commute by state plane from Chicago to Springfield. On session days the governor was frequently absent. When the legislature was not in session, he seldom went to Springfield. He became disengaged from the legislative process and had little interest in policy details or even policy subjects. He was “a big-picture guy,” Frank Watson recalled. Blagojevich seemed to have no interest in governance. Watson became exasperated when the governor walked out of meetings several times. After one particular meeting, when the waiting press asked what they had been discussing, the frustrated Watson replied that the governor had discussed whether the Chicago Cubs or the St. Louis Cardinals had the best third baseman in past decades. But on occasion, Watson said, Blagojevich could be an “engaging guy.” He would have “heart-to-heart talks” with the senate Republican leader concerning personal matters: Blagojevich's disagreements with his father-in-law, Chicago alderman Dick
Mell, or matters involving the governor's wife, Patty. The governor's staff, surprisingly, informed Watson that Blagojevich was just trying to win him over in an attempt to get him to support Jones and oppose Madigan. Although Watson was aware of the governor's motives, he found the governor's behavior intriguing and, he admitted, “somewhat captivating.”
24

The Speaker tolerated Blagojevich as a Democratic member of the house and as a congressman, but the relationship was never amicable. Outside of being the son-in-law of a powerful Chicago alderman, Blagojevich, as the saying in Springfield goes, brought nothing to the table. He took little interest in legislation, his attention span was short, and he had no time for the details of governance. His relationship with the Speaker had steadily deteriorated since he had taken the office of governor. The two men could not have been more different. Blagojevich was a master at political gamesmanship, a tinseled circus ringmaster, driven by his ambitions and the desire for personal gain. He was obsessed with his appearance and spent an extravagant amount on expensive clothing. To him, politics was personal combat and public office merely a stepping-stone to the next higher office. “He was beyond egotistical,” Clayton Harris recalled; “he was egocentric.”
25
He traveled with a large entourage and a state police escort, and he governed by crisis, confrontation, and threats.
26
Some legislators who had worked with Blagojevich described him as bizarre; others characterized him as reckless and mean.
27

Blagojevich alienated Michael Madigan, who, by contrast, was private, reserved, and thoughtful. He possessed a sense of history and, colleagues report, a respect for the legislative process. Madigan was unpretentious in both mannerisms and style. He lived modestly, preferred a small circle of confidants, and seldom mingled with legislators and lobbyists. He frequented a few familiar restaurants, ate restrictively, and traveled without an entourage or an escort. Michael Madigan could appear remote, and for many, he remains an enigma. But Madigan personified the leadership and trench values honed in the Chicago wards during the 1950s and 1960s. His leadership style was reminiscent of that of a ward committeeman. The ward committeeman was a powerful position in the city's Democratic machine, and to preserve political power, he remained inaccessible and skeptical. One had to keep the barons at bay. A strong work ethic, pragmatism, modesty, and loyalty were attributes ascribed to the culture of second-generation ethnics who populated Chicago's working-class neighborhoods at midcentury. Madigan's personal ethics and style paralleled those values.

Chapter 2
Cause for Impeachment

O
n the morning of December 9 David Ellis, chief counsel to the Speaker of the Illinois house of representatives, was at his Springfield home with his children when he received a call from his sister-in-law in Iowa. “Turn on the TV,” she told him. “What channel?” he asked. “Any channel,” she replied. Ellis saw the reports of the arrest of Rod Blagojevich and called the house Democrats' chief of staff, Tim Mapes, and later spoke with the house Speaker. They discussed their options, and for the rest of the day a flurry of calls were made among house and senate Democratic leaders and their staffs. The arrest of Rod Blagojevich was an embarrassment to Illinois Democrats; they had tolerated his misconduct, but after the arrest everyone agreed that Blagojevich had to leave office. Ellis and his staff had been accumulating evidence of malfeasance by the governor for months. But the question remained whether he would resign. Madigan told Ellis that they were going to give Blagojevich six days to resign before starting a house impeachment investigation. Ellis asked Madigan if he
should get ready for an impeachment investigation, and Madigan replied in a restrained tone, “That's a good idea.” Madigan's instruction began what seemed like a stream of unending days and nights for the meticulous attorney, who authored fiction novels in his spare time. He had six days to develop causality and prepare evidence for impeaching the governor.
1

There was little doubt once the investigation proceedings began that Rod Blagojevich would be impeached. The governor had few friends among house Democrats, and though the house Republican leader Tom Cross, from west suburban Plainfield, had a personal relationship with Blagojevich, the Republicans would hardly support the governor. The Illinois Constitution states the need “to determine the existence of cause for impeachment.”
2
Solid charges were required for the senate to remove Blagojevich from office. Legislators also weighed the possible repercussions of ousting a governor who remained popular in some sections of the state and excelled at public relations. Partisan politics complicated the situation. The governor was a Democrat, Speaker Madigan was chairman of the Illinois Democratic Party, and attempting to display party unity, both Madigan and Jones had served as official co-chairmen of Blagojevich's reelection campaign two years earlier.

But the governor's mismanagement and the corrupt practices of his advisors and staff members during his first term had become well known. Several aides and associates had been indicted and some convicted. A steady torrent of negative newspaper coverage in the weeks prior to the arrest, including the
Chicago Tribune
's demand for an impeachment investigation, had created a major embarrassment for the Democrats. Now, with the arrest, it became clear: Blagojevich had to leave office.

The house Republicans recognized a political advantage and immediately reacted to the Blagojevich arrest. House Republican leader Tom Cross was playing golf with a group of lobbyists at the exclusive Isleworth Country Club, near Orlando, Florida, when he was informed of the arrest. “We were getting ready to tee off when everyone's phone began to go off,” one lobbyist recalled. The Republicans wasted no time and filed a resolution that same day calling for the formation of a special investigative committee to determine if there was cause to impeach the governor. The resolution was modeled after the impeachment resolution used to hold hearings on Supreme Court justice James D. Heiple in 1997. It was filed with the clerk of the house and became House Resolution (HR) 1644, with Tom Cross listed as the chief sponsor. HR 1644, a political statement by the house Republicans, called for equal representation of both parties and proposed
a committee of ten members, five Democrats and five Republicans. The Speaker and the minority leader would each appoint one member to serve as co-chairperson, and both parties would have equal control of the committee proceedings. But the house was firmly under the control of Michael Madigan, and few, if any, expected the Democratic Speaker to give equal control of impeaching a Democratic governor to the Republicans.

On December 15, six days after the governor's arrest, Madigan filed his own resolution calling for the formation of a special investigative committee, HR 1650. This Democratic version proposed a twenty-one-member committee made up of twelve Democrats and nine Republicans to investigate allegations of “misfeasance, malfeasance, nonfeasance and other misconduct of Governor Rod Blagojevich.” The resolution stated that the purpose of the investigation was “to determine the existence of cause for impeachment.” The Speaker would appoint one individual as chairperson. The Republicans would appoint one person to serve as minority spokesman. Accepting the inevitable, as Democrats outnumbered Republicans in the House, Minority Leader Cross joined as a co-sponsor of HR 1650.

Both resolutions were sent to the Rules Committee on December 15. The Rules Committee, by majority vote, can assign a legislative initiative to a substantive committee for review or can advance the initiative directly to the full house. On that same day the Rules Committee quickly passed and sent HR 1650 to the full house. The vote was four in favor and zero against. HR 1644, the Republican version, never was presented for a vote and remained in the Rules Committee.
3

The full house met on December 15, and after some obligatory political jousting, Republican efforts to have HR 1644 discharged from the Rules Committee and considered by the full house failed. The house took up the Democrats' HR 1650 and approved it by a vote of 113 to 0.
4
Soon after HR 1650 was passed, Madigan held a press conference announcing the formation of an investigative committee. The Speaker appointed a trusted ally, Barbara Currie, the house majority leader, as committee chairperson. Though not an attorney, Currie was skilled at running a committee, and she was unflappable. She also had chaired the impeachment committee investigating Heiple in 1997. Most important, Currie would not deviate from the Speaker's script. James Durkin, the former prosecuting attorney from Cook County, was named Republican spokesman.

December 15 was also the day that the delegates elected to the Electoral College in November met in Springfield to cast their votes for either Barack
Obama or John McCain for president. Barbara Currie was one of these delegates. After she cast her vote, she attended the Illinois Speaker's press conference. Currie had served in the Illinois house since 1979. Her district included the University of Chicago, and early in her legislative career, she was considered by some to be a “Hyde Park liberal.” Her skills soon became apparent, and among legislators, staff, and lobbyists, she was respected for her intelligence, fortitude, and refined comportment. A slight woman, Currie was a trusted and capable legislative manager and a confidant of the Speaker. She was fiercely loyal to Madigan, and it was safe to assume that when she spoke, Speaker Madigan was in agreement.

To Currie, it seemed strange attending the press conference just moments after standing in Illinois' Old State Capitol building to cast her vote for Barack Obama as president of the United States. Now she was attending an event a few blocks away in the capitol's Blue Room to announce the beginning of an investigation of Rod Blagojevich for possible impeachment. The incongruity of events aroused conflicting emotions. She had felt pride voting for Barack Obama, a friend who had been the state senator from her legislative district, a US senator from Illinois, and the first black man to attain the highest elected office in the United States, and then experienced utter dejection and revulsion at the press conference to begin the impeachment of the governor of Illinois.
5

During the previous six days, Ellis had begun to prepare the case for impeachment. He considered using the criminal complaint filed by the federal government as part of the cause for impeachment, but the governor had not yet been found guilty of anything or indicted on any of the allegations pertaining to the arrest, and if he was indicted, a criminal trial would be months, perhaps years, away. In developing the evidence to justify the existence of cause, Ellis had to include conduct that constituted a pattern of maladministration and malfeasance. He had to show that the governor had used his office in an illegal manner, had used his position at times contrary to the law, and had failed to perform his official duties.
6
But Ellis had only six days, not enough time to investigate and assemble new evidence. He had to rely on existing data developed by the legislature and state agencies in past administrative investigations. Fortunately, he had plenty of material to choose from.

Ellis found one instance that had occurred halfway into Blagojevich's first term particularly intriguing. In October 2004 the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) announced that half of the US flu vaccine supply
for the 2004–5 flu season was unsafe. Illinois, like many other states and municipalities, began searching for replacement vaccines. The Blagojevich administration immediately began negotiating the purchase of flu vaccines from Ecosse Hospital Products, a European company based in the United Kingdom, and on October 22, 2004, the state of Illinois' special advocate for prescription drugs, Scott McKibbin, agreed to purchase thirty thousand doses of the vaccine from Ecosse. Aware that it was a violation of federal law to import drugs from a foreign country, the governor's office announced that the agreement was subject to FDA approval.
7
Deputy Governor Bradley Tusk increased the order the following day by two hundred thousand doses and again on November 1 by an additional thirty thousand doses.
8
The Blagojevich administration had developed a plan to obtain vaccines not only for Illinois but also for other states and out-of-state municipal governments. The total cost for the vaccines ordered from Ecosse was $8.2 million.
9
FDA approval was never granted. Although the flu vaccine program was promoted by the governor's office with much fanfare, by the end of 2004 the state of Illinois and Ecosse still had not entered into a contract specifying the terms of purchase or delivery. And the US Centers for Disease Control (CDC) announced that it had located sufficient vaccines to serve Illinois' priority population: people over age sixty-five, pregnant women, and other vulnerable citizens. In January 2005 the CDC announced that an additional two hundred thousand doses were available for Illinois. By late December 2004 McKibbin was already aware that the vaccines from Ecosse would not be allowed to legally enter the United States and that an adequate supply of vaccines was available. He sent an e-mail alerting administration staff, “We probably will never take delivery of these doses so we will need to find a way to pay [Ecosse] for the service they performed.”
10
Saying “service” instead of “product” or “drugs” obfuscated just what the state had been planning to purchase. On January 11, 2005, Ecosse submitted a bill for $2.6 million. Even though Illinois did not need the vaccines, importing drugs from a foreign country was a violation of federal law, and the administration was aware that the drugs would never be delivered, two days after receiving the Ecosse bill, Deputy Chief of Staff for Social Services Louanner Peters signed a contract for the vaccines.
11
The drugs were never shipped, and at the time of the governor's arrest, Ecosse was still seeking payment of $2.6 million through the Illinois Court of Claims.

Another incident involving the importation of drugs from foreign countries also took place in October 2004. The governor announced the I-SaveRx
program, which would enable state employees and state retirees to obtain prescriptions from foreign pharmacies—another violation of federal law.
12
The governor knew that it was illegal to import drugs from a foreign country—the FDA had written a letter warning Blagojevich that the program, “if implemented, would be in direct conflict with federal and state law.” The governor appealed to the FDA to allow Illinois to establish this pilot program, but the FDA denied the request. Nevertheless, Blagojevich launched the I-SaveRx program with another high-profile media campaign.
13
He continued promoting the program and encouraged state employees and state retirees to illegally purchase drugs from foreign countries.

The Blagojevich administration's mismanagement of the flu vaccine purchase, the Ecosse claim for $2.6 million, and the I-SaveRx program did not go unnoticed by the legislature. In the spring session of 2005 Representative Jack Franks, chairman of the house State Government Administration Committee, was aware of the flu vaccine fiasco and the governor's flagrant disregard of the FDA warning. Franks's committee was responsible for administrative oversight and held hearings in March 2005 concerning both the flu vaccine and I-SaveRx drug procurement. The committee found several instances where both federal and Illinois law and state procurement procedures were not followed. Franks summoned the director of the Illinois Department of Central Management Services to appear before the committee. Instead, a department lawyer appeared. Franks was outraged. “I went ballistic,” he later said. Franks told the lawyer that the director should appear the next day and that he would be sworn in and would testify under oath. The director resigned that night, rather than appear and testify under oath before Franks's committee. “I knew we were on to something,” Franks said.
14

After the hearings, Franks filed and the house passed identical House Resolution 394 and House Joint Resolution 040, instructing the state auditor general to audit and determine what roles the governor's office and the special advocate for prescription drugs played in the flu vaccine procurement, what agencies were responsible for the I-SaveRx program, and whether the “entities involved in these programs followed all applicable laws, regulations, policies, and procedures.”
15
Senate President Emil Jones was an ally of the governor, and the senate never considered the house joint resolution. But HR 394 was sufficient for the auditor general to take action.

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