A Peace to End all Peace (9 page)

Free passage through the Dardanelles had been assured by treaty; once again the Ottoman authorities were violating their obligations under international law, and once again they appeared to have been provoked to do so by the actions of Winston Churchill.

Yet the Ottoman Empire made no move to declare war. Its position of passive hostility left Churchill baffled and frustrated.
¹²

III

Though Churchill did not know it, from the point of view of the German government, too, the situation was baffling and frustrating; German military officers attempting to bring Turkey into the war found themselves driven to anger and despair.

Berlin was bitterly disappointed that the continuing presence of the
Goeben
and
Breslau
did not provoke Britain into declaring war; and the German and Austrian ambassadors received repeated demands from their home governments to push the Turks into taking action. Both ambassadors recognized, however, that whatever the Young Turks’ ultimate intentions might be, the Grand Vizier and his colleagues had valid reasons for not moving toward intervention in the European conflict immediately. Mobilization of the armed forces was not yet completed; and it was not clear, once mobilization had been completed, how the fragile Ottoman exchequer could continue to support it. Moreover, Turkish negotiations with neighboring Balkan countries, and particularly with Bulgaria, had not yet come to fruition.

From the beginning, the Porte had made clear its view that Turkey could intervene in the war only in partnership with Bulgaria. Indeed, the campaign plan that had been worked out on 1 August by Enver, Wangenheim, and Liman von Sanders presupposed that Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire would combine forces. Bulgaria sat astride Turkey’s principal land route to the rest of Europe and—of more immediate importance—was a neighbor who coveted additional territory. Were Bulgaria to invade Turkey while the Ottoman armies were away fighting the Russians, the empire would be helpless. “Surely,” the Grand Vizier remarked to the German ambassador, “Germany would not want Turkey to commit suicide.”
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The Bulgarians, however, were reluctant to commit themselves, and while Talaat succeeded in negotiating a defensive treaty with Bulgaria, signed on 19 August, which provided for mutual assistance in certain circumstances in case either country was attacked by a third party, the terms of the treaty were inapplicable to the situation that would arise if Turkey should join Germany in the war against Russia. Bulgaria was not prepared to intervene in the Russo-German conflict; and, as the Germans in Constantinople had been made to understand, this meant that the Ottoman Empire, too, would continue to maintain its neutrality.

Berlin and London both viewed Constantinople with despondency. Churchill, it will be recalled, no longer believed in Turkish neutrality and had proposed to the Cabinet that a flotilla be sent up to the Dardanelles to sink the
Goeben
and
Breslau
. But in Constantinople only two days later, General Liman von Sanders—from the opposite point of view—despaired of bringing Turkey into the war and sent a request to the Kaiser that he and his military mission be allowed to return home. Like Churchill, he raged against the Young Turks; he spoke of challenging Enver and Djemal to duels.
¹⁴
In his request to the Kaiser, Liman pointed out that Enver’s recent statements and military dispositions indicated that the C.U.P. intended to keep Turkey on the sidelines until the war was over, or at least until it became clear beyond a doubt that Germany was going to win it. He also pointed out that the Ottoman armies might collapse even before entering the war, for lack of money and food, if the Porte continued to keep them in a state of mobilization.
¹⁵
At roughly the same time that Admiral Limpus was reporting to Winston Churchill that Constantinople was almost completely in German hands, General Liman von Sanders was reporting to the Kaiser that the whole atmosphere of Constantinople made it almost unbearable for German officers to continue their service there.
¹⁶

The Kaiser, however, refused Liman’s request that he should be allowed to return to Germany. Germany’s plan to win the war quickly by a rapid victory in western Europe had collapsed at the first Battle of the Marne in early September; and thereafter Berlin stepped up the pressure to bring Turkey into the war. The German ambassador, von Wangenheim, was unable to explain to his home government how unrealistic, at least for the time being, that project appeared to be in Constantinople. Even Enver, whom the ambassador had once described as standing “like a rock for Germany,”
¹⁷
believed that the time for action had not yet come: Turkey was not ready militarily and, in any event, Enver’s colleagues were still opposed to intervention.

The difference between the ultimate objectives of the two governments became vividly evident on 8 September 1914, when the Porte suddenly announced its unilateral abrogation of the Capitulations privileges of all foreign powers—including Germany. The German ambassador flew into a rage upon receiving the news, and threatened that he and the military mission would pack up and leave for home immediately. In the event, however, neither he nor the mission left. That they stayed illustrated the improvement in the Turkish bargaining position since late July.

In an extraordinary maneuver, the German and Austrian ambassadors joined with their enemies in the war, the British, French, and Russian ambassadors, in presenting a joint European protest to the Porte, whereupon it became evident how skillful the Turkish leaders had been in flirting without committing themselves. For the German and Austrian ambassadors privately intimated to the Porte that they would not press the issue for the time being, while the Allied ambassadors, in turn, intimated that they would accept the Turkish decision if Turkey continued to remain neutral.

The Porte went ahead to put its decision into effect. In early October all foreign post offices in the empire were closed; foreigners were made subject to Turkish laws and courts; and customs duties on foreign imports not only were taken over, but were also raised.

IV

Considering the tangible benefits that had begun to flow from the policy of non-intervention, it seems astonishing that at about this time Enver Pasha began to plot against that policy and against its leading proponent, the Grand Vizier. The substantial German military presence in Constantinople, supported by the
Goeben
and
Breslau
, may have played a role in his calculations; but what Enver had in mind is more likely to have been the course of the Russo-German war. In July and August his policy had been motivated by fear of Russian seizures of Turkish territory; but in September, in the wake of the Russian collapse, he seems to have turned to thoughts of Turkey seizing Russian territory. He switched from a defensive to an aggressive policy. His switch was a turning point in Ottoman and Middle Eastern affairs.

It may be surmised that the spectacular German military triumphs over the Russians at the battle of Tannenberg at the end of August, and in the ongoing battle of the Masurian Lakes that began in September, persuaded Enver that, if Turkey wanted to win a share of Russian territory, she would have to intervene soon, before Germany had won an unaided victory. Hundreds of thousands of Russian troops had been killed or captured by the Germans, and even a less impetuous observer than Enver might have concluded that Russia was about to lose the war. The German victory train was leaving the station, and the opportunistic Enver seems to have been jolted into believing that it was his last chance to jump aboard. On 26 September Enver personally ordered the closing of the Dardanelles to all foreign ships (in effect, to Allied shipping) without consulting his colleagues. A week later he told von Wangenheim that the Grand Vizier was no longer in control of the situation.

A bid for power was taking place in Constantinople behind closed doors. The British Foreign Office, which knew next to nothing about the internal politics of the C.U.P., took a simplistic view of the affair. Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, later remembered remarking that “nothing but the assassination of Enver would keep Turkey from joining Germany,” and adding “that, in times of crisis and violence in Turkey, there were apt to be two classes of person—assassins and assassinated, and that the Grand Vizier was more likely than his opponent to belong to the latter class.”
¹⁸

Would it have been possible for a well-informed British ambassador to have exerted some influence on the evolution of events in Constantinople? Historians continue to debate the question, and of course there is now no way to put the matter to the test.
¹⁹

Obscure though the details remain, what was going on in the autumn of 1914 was a process in which rival factions and personalities maneuvered for support within the C.U.P. Central Committee. Enver’s growing influence came from winning over Talaat Bey to his point of view, for Talaat headed the principal faction in the party.

Other C.U.P. leaders, while sharing Enver’s belief that Germany would probably win the war, until now had seen no reason to hazard their empire’s future on the accuracy of that prediction. They were politicians, while Enver was a warrior, younger and more impetuous than Churchill but filled with much the same passion for glory. As War Minister and Germany’s best friend, he stood to benefit personally from the many opportunities to increase his fame and position that war at Germany’s side would offer. A dashing figure who had enjoyed almost unlimited luck but had demonstrated only limited ability, he failed to see that bets can be lost as well as won. In putting his chips on Germany, he thought he was making an investment—when he was doing no more than placing a wager.

On 9 October, Enver informed von Wangenheim that he had won the support of Talaat and of Halil Bey, President of the Chamber of Deputies. The next move, he said, would be to try to gain the support of Djemal Pasha, Minister of the Marine. Failing that, he said, he planned to provoke a Cabinet crisis; he claimed, on the basis of his following in the Central Committee—which, in reality, was Talaat’s following—that he could install a new pro-interventionist government. Overstating his political strength, Enver assured the Germans that he could bring Turkey into the war by mid-October. All he needed, he told them, was German gold to support the army.
²⁰
The Germans, of course, were already aware that the Ottoman forces would need money; Liman had reported to the Kaiser that they would be in imminent danger of collapse without it.

On 10 October, Djemal joined the conspiracy. On 11 October, Enver, Talaat, Halil, and Djemal conferred, and informed the Germans that their faction was now committed to war and would authorize Admiral Souchon to attack Russia as soon as Germany deposited two million Turkish pounds in gold in Constantinople to support the armed forces. The Germans responded by sending a million pounds on 12 October and a further million on 17 October, shipping the gold by rail through neutral Rumania. The second shipment arrived in Constantinople on 21 October.

Talaat and Halil then changed their minds: they proposed to keep the gold but, nonetheless, to remain neutral in the war. Enver reported this to the Germans on 23 October, but claimed that it did not matter as long as he could still count on the other military service minister, Djemal. Though he later announced that Talaat had swung back again to the pro-interventionist cause, Enver gave up attempting to persuade his party and his government to intervene in the war. He could not get Turkey to declare war on the Allies so he pinned his hopes on a plan to provoke the Allied governments to declare war on Turkey.

Enver and Djemal issued secret orders allowing Admiral Souchon to lead the
Goeben
and
Breslau
into the Black Sea to attack Russian vessels. Enver’s plan was to claim that the warships had been attacked by the Russians and had been forced to defend themselves. Admiral Souchon, however, disobeyed Enver’s orders and openly started the fighting by bombarding the Russian coast. Once again the German admiral gave history a push. His purpose, he stated later, was “to force the Turks, even against their will, to spread the war.”
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As a result of his actions, it was all too clear that the
Goeben
and
Breslau
had struck a premeditated blow; there was now no lie behind which Enver could conceal what he had allowed to happen.

The incident led to an open showdown in Constantinople. The Grand Vizier and the Cabinet forced Enver to cable an order to Admiral Souchon to cease fire. A political crisis ensued that lasted for nearly two days, the details of which were veiled even from the normally well-informed Germans and Austrians. There were meetings of the Ottoman Cabinet and of the C.U.P. Central Committee. Debate was joined, threats were issued, coalitions were formed, resignations were tendered, and resignations were withdrawn. Apparently the consensus approximated the thinking of Asquith in Britain just before the outbreak of war: that the first priority was to maintain party unity. Even though a majority in the Central Committee supported the newly formed triumvirate of Talaat, Enver, and Djemal in the view that the Ottoman Empire now ought to enter the war, it deferred to the views of the minority, led by the Grand Vizier and the Minister of Finance, rather than allow a party split to occur.

On 31 October Enver reported to the Germans that his colleagues in the Cabinet insisted on dispatching a note of apology to the Russians. From the German point of view this was a dangerous proposal, but Enver said that, having “duped” his colleagues about the attack on Russia, he now found himself isolated in the Cabinet; his hands, he said, were tied.
²²

Though Enver and his German co-conspirators did not yet know it, there was no need for alarm: in London the British Cabinet had already risen to the bait. The British were unaware of the deep split in Young Turk ranks and believed the Porte to have been in collusion with Germany all along. Responding to Souchon’s attack even before the Porte drafted its apology, the Cabinet authorized the sending of an ultimatum requiring the Turks immediately to expel the German military mission and to remove the German officers and men from the
Goeben
and
Breslau
. When the Turks did not comply, Churchill did not bother to refer the matter back to the Cabinet; on his own initiative he dispatched an order to his forces in the Mediterranean on the afternoon of 31 October to “Commence hostilities at once against Turkey.”
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