A Short History of Chinese Philosophy (14 page)

logically speaking, the contrast between ming and shih in ancient Chinese philosophy is something like that between subject and predicate in the West. For instance, when we say: "This is a table, or "Socrates is a man, ' "this" and "Socrates" are shih or actualities, while "table" and "man" are ming or names. This is obvious enough. Let us, however, try to analyze more exactly just what the shih or ming are, and what their relationship is. We are then apt to be led into some rather paradoxical problems, the solution of which brings us to the very heart of philosophy.

The members of the School of Names were known in ancient times as pien che (debaters, disputcrs, arguers). In the chapter of the Chuang-tzu titled "The Autumn Flood," Kung-sun Lung, one of the leaders of the School of Names, is represented as saying: 1 have unified similarity and difference, and separated hardness and whiteness. I have proved the impossible as possible and affirmed what others deny. I have controverted the knowledge of all the philosophers, and refuted all the arguments brought agamsl me. (Chuang-tzu, eh. TJ.) These words are really applicable to the School of Names as a whole.

Its members were known as persons who made paradoxical statements, who were ready to dispute with others, and who purposely affirmed what others denied and denied what others affirmed. Ssu-ma Tan

130

THE SCHOOL OF NAMES

(died 110 B.C.), for example, in his essay, "On the Essential Ideas of the Six Schools," wrote: "The School of Names conducted minute examinations of trifling points in complicated and elaborate statements, which made it impossible for others to refute their ideas." (Historical Records, ch. I2O.) Hsiin Tzu, a Confucianist of the third century B.C., describes Teng Hsi (died 501 B.C.) and Hui Shih as philosophers who "liked to deal with strange theories and indulge in curious propositions."

(Hsiin-tzu, ch. 6.) Likewise, the Lii—shih Ch un—ch IU mentions Teng Hsi and Kung—sun Lung as among those known for their paradoxical arguments. (XVIII, 4 and 5.) And the chapter titled "The World" in the Chuang-tzu, after listing the paradoxical arguments famous at that time, mentions the names of Hui Shih, Huan T uan, and Kung—sun Lung. These men, therefore, would seem to have been the most important leaders of this school.

About Huan T'uan we know nothing further, but about Teng Hsi, we know that he was a famous lawyer of his time; his writings, however, no longer are preserved, and the book today bearing the title of Teng—hsi—tzu is not genuine. The Lii-shih Ch'un-ch'iu says that when Tzu-ch'an, a famous statesman, was minister of the state of Cheng, Teng Hsi, who was a native of that state, was his major opponent. He used to help the people in their lawsuits, for which services he would demand a coat as a fee for a major case, and a pair of trousers for a minor one. So skilful was he that he was patronized by numerous people; as their lawyer, he succeeded in changing right into wrong and wrong into right, until no standards of right and wrong remained, so that what was regarded as possible and impossible fluctuated from day to day. (XVIII, 4.)

Another story in the same work describes how, during a flood of the Wei River, a certain rich man of the state of Cheng was drowned. His body was picked up by a boatman, but when the family of the rich man went to ask for the body, the man who had found it demanded a huge reward. Thereupon the members of the family went to Teng Hsi for advice. He told them: "Merely wait. There is nobody else besides yourselves who wants the body." The family took his advice and waited, until the man who had found the body became much troubled and also went to Teng Hsi. To him Teng Hsi said: "Merely wait.

There is nobody else but you from whom they can get the body." (Ibid.) We are not told what was the final end of this episode!

It would thus seem that Teng Hsi' s trick was to interpret the formal letter of the law in such a way as to give varying interpretations in different cases at will. This was how he was able to "conduct minute examinations of trifling points in complicated and elaborate statements, which made it impossible for others to refute his ideas." He thus devoted himself to interpreting and analyzing the letter of the law, while disregarding its spirit and its connection with actuality. In other words, his attention was directed to names," instead of to "actualities." Such was the spirit of the School of Names.

From this we may see that the pien che were originally lawyers, among 132.. THE SCHOOL OK NAMES

whom Teng Hsi was evidently one of the first. He was, however, only a beginner in the analysis of names, and made no real contribution to philosophy as such. Hence the real founders of the School of Names were the later Hui Shih and Kung—sun Lung.

Concerning these two men the Lu-shih Ch'un-ch iu tells us: "Hui Tzu [Hui Shih] prepared the law for King Hui of Wei (370-319). When it was completed and was made known to the people, the people considered it to be good. (XVIII, 5-) And again: The states of Chao and Ch in entered into an agreement which said: 'From this time onward, in whatever C h i n desires to do, she is to be assisted by Chao, and in whatever Chao desires to do, she is to be assisted by Ch in. But soon afterward Ch in attacked the state of Wei, and Chao made ready to go to Wei's assistance. The King of Ch in protested to Chao that this was an infringement of the pact, and the King of Chao reported this to the Lord of P ing—yuan, who again told it to Kung—sun Lung. Kung-sun Lung said: 'We too can send an envoy to protest to the King of Ch'in, saying: "According to the pact, each side guarantees to help the other in whatever either desires to do. Now it is our desire to save Wei, and if you do not help us to do so, we shall charge you with infringement of the pact."'" (Ibid.)

Again we are told in the Han—fei—tzu: When discussions on hardness and whiteness and having no thickness' appear, the governmental laws lose their effect." (Ch. 41-) We shall see below that the doctrine of "hardness and whiteness" is one of Kung-sun Lung, while that of "having no thickness" is one of Hui Shih.

From these stories we may see that Hui Shih and Kung-sun Lung were, to some extent, connected with the legal activities of their time. Indeed, Kung— sun Lung s interpretation of the pact between Chao and Ch in is truly in the spirit of Teng Hsi. Han Fei Tzu considered the effect of the "speeches" of these two gentlemen on law to be as bad as that of the practice of Teng Hsi. It may seem strange that Han Fei Tzu, himself a Legalist, should oppose, as destructive to law, the discussions of a school which had originated with lawyers. But, as we shall see in chapter 14, Han Fei Tzu and the other Legalists were really politicians, not jurists.

Hui Shih and Kung—sun Lung represented two tendencies in the School of Names, the one emphasizing the relativity of actual things, and the other the absoluteness of names. This distinction becomes evident when one comes to analyze names in their relationship to actualities. Let us take the simple statement, "This is a table." Here the word "this refers to the concrete actuality, which is impermanent and may come and go. The word table, however, refers to an abstract category or name which is unchanging and always remains as it is. The "name" is absolute, but the "actuality ' is relative.

Thus "beauty" is the name of what is absolutely beautiful, but "a beautiful thing" can only be relatively so. Hui Shih emphasized the fact that actual things are changeable and relative, while Kung-sun Lung emphasized the

134 THE SCHOOL OF NAMES

fact that names are permanent and absolute. Hui Shih's Theory of Relativity

Hui Shih (fl. 350-260) was a native of the state of Sung, in the present province of Honan. We know that he once became premier of King Hui of Wei (370-319)? and that he was known for his greal learning.

His writings, unfortunately, are lost, and what we know of his ideas may be deduced only from a series of "ten points" preserved in the chapter titled "The World" in the Chuang—tzu.

The first of these points is: "The greatest has nothing beyond itself, and is called the Great One. The smallest has nothing within itself, and is called the Small One." These two statements constitute what are called analytical propositions. They make no assertions in regard to the actual, for they say nothing about what, in the actual world, is the greatest thing and the smallest thing. They only touch upon the abstract concepts or names: "greatest" and smallest. In order to understand these two propositions fully, we should compare them with a story in the chapter titled "The Autumn Flood in the Chuang-tzu. From this it will become apparent that in one respect Hui Shih and Chuang Tzu had very much in common.

This story describes how in autumn, when the Yellow River was in flood, the Spirit of the River, who was very proud of his greatness, moved down the river to the sea. There he met the Spirit of the Sea, and realized for the first time that his river, great as it was, was small indeed in comparison with the sea. Yet when, full of admiration, he talked with the Spirit of the Sea, the latter replied that he himself, in his relationship to Heaven and Earth, was nothing more than a single grain lying within a great warehouse.

Hence he could only be said to be small, but not to be great. At this the River Spirit asked the Sea Spirit: "Are we right then in saying that Heaven and Earth are supremely great and the tip of a hair is supremely small? The Sea Spirit answered: What men know is less than what they do not know. The time when they are alive is less than the time when they are not alive....How can we know that the tip of a hair is the extreme of smallness, and Heaven and Earth are the extreme of greatness? And he then went on to define the smallest as that which has no form, and the greatest as that which cannot be enclosed (by anything else). This definition of the supremely great and supremely small is similar to that given by Hui Shih. {Chuang-tzu, eh. 17.)

To say that Heaven and Earth are the greatest of things and that the tip of a hair is the smallest is to make assertions about the actual, the shih. It makes no analysis of the names of the actualities, the ming.

These two proposi tions are what are called synthetic propositions and both may be false. They have their basis in experience; therefore their truth is only contingent, but not necessary. In experience, things that are great and things that are small are all relatively so. To quote the Chuang-tzu again: "If we 136 THE SCHOOL OF NAMES

call a thing great, because it is greater than something else, then there is nothing in the world that is not great. If we call a thing small because it is smaller than something else, then there is nothing in the world that is not small.

We cannot through actual experience decide what is the greatest and what is the smallest of actual things. But we can say independently of experience that that which has nothing beyond itself is the greatest, and that which has n o t h i n g w i t h i n i t s el f i s t h e s mal l es t . G r e at es t an d " s m al l es t , d ef i n e d i n this way, ar e absolute and unchanging con cepts. Thus by analyzing th e n a m e s , " G r e a t O n e " a n d " S ma l l O n e , " H u i S h i h r e a c h e d t h e c o n c e p t o f what is absolute and unchanging. From the point of view of this concept, he realized that the qualities and differences of actual concrete things are all relative and liable to change.

Once we understand this position of Hui Shih, we can see that his series of "points," as reported by the Chuang-tzu, though usually regarded as paradoxes, are really not paradoxical at all. With the exception of the first, they are all illustrations of the relativity of things, and expressions of whal may be called a theory of relativity. Let us study them one by one.

"That which has no thickness cannot be increased [ i n thickness], yet it is so great that it may cover one thousand miles. This states that the great and the small are so only relatively. It is impossible for that which has no thickness to be thick. In this sense it may be called small. Nevertheless, the ideal plane of geometry, though without thickness, may at the same time be very long and wide. In this sense it may be called great.

"The heavens are as low as the earth; mountains are on the same level as marshes." This, too, states that the high and the low are so only relatively. The sun at noon is the sun declining; the creature born is the creature dying. This states that everything in the actual world is changeable and changing.

"Great similarity differs from little similarity. This is called little-similarity—and—difference. All things are in one way all similar, in another way all different. This is called great-similarity-and-difference." When we say that all men are animals, we thereby recognize that all human beings are similar in the fact that they are human beings, and are also similar in the fact that they are animals. Their similarity in being human beings, however, is greater than that in being animals, because being a human being implies being an animal, but being an animal does not necessarily imply being a human being. For there are other kinds of animals as well, which are different from human beings. It is this kind of similarity and difference, therefore, that Hui Shih calls little-similarity-and-difference. However, if we take "beings'as a universal class, we thereby recognize that all things are similar in the fact that they are beings. But if we take each thing as an individual, we thereby recognize that each individual has its own individuality and so is different from other things.

This kind of similarity and difference is what Hui Shih

138 THE SCHOOL OF NAMES

calls great—similarity—and—difference. Thus since we can say that all things are similar to each other, and yet can also say that all things are different from each other, this shows that their similarity and difference are both relative. This argument of the School of Names was a famous one in ancient China, and was known as the argument for the unity of similarity and difference."