A Stillness at Appomattox (49 page)

So
Hancock's
corps
was
to
take
position
three
quarters
of
a mile
north
of
the
tip
of
the
salient,
and
at
the
first
light
of
day it
was
to
go
into
action.
On
Hancock's
left
Burnside's
corps was
in
line,
and
Wright's
corps
was
lined
up
on
Hancock's right,
and
they
were
to
come
in
the
moment
Hancock's
men needed
help.
On
the
extreme
right
of
the
army
was
Warren's corps,
and
it
was
to
be
on
the
alert
also,
ready
to
smash
the Confederate
left
down
below
the
salient.
Thus
virtually
all
of the
troops
would
be
thrown
into
the
offensive,
which
was
a new
note:
never
before
had
the
army
tried
to
put
its
entire weight
into
one
co-ordinated
smash.

There
have
been
worse
battle
plans,
and
although
neither Grant
nor
Meade
realized
it
they
were
helped
by
a
thumping piece
of
good
luck.
During
that
rainy
afternoon
of
May
11, Rebel
scouts
had
seen
Federal
trains
moving
off
toward
the northeast,
and
it
seemed
to
Lee
that
Grant
was
beginning
to shift
around
the
Confederate
right.
It
would
be
necessary
to move
fast
to
meet
the
shift,
and
during
the
evening
Lee
ordered
that
all
artillery
which
was
posted
where
it
could
not move
quickly
should
be
pulled
out
of
the
line
and
held
in readiness
for
a
quick
start.
This
applied
principally
to
the twenty-two
guns
in
the
nose
of
the
salient,
and
sometime
before
midnight
all
of
these
guns
were
limbered
up
and
taken back
to
the
rear.
General
Ewell,
who
commanded
the
Confederates
who
held
the
salient,
was
left
without
his
ace
of trumps.
⁹

A
good
plan,
then,
and
unexpected
good
luck
to
go
with
it; and
yet,
as
that
black
wet
night
unrolls
its
story,
one
gets
the impression
of
a
queer,
uncertain
fumbling,
as
if
there
mysteriously
existed
in
the
army
a
gap
between
conception
and execution
which
could
never
quite
be
bridged.
Meade's
chief of
staff
was
General
Andrew
A.
Humphreys,
and
Humphreys was
very
capable;
the
column
of
attack
belonged
to
Hancock,
who
was
by
all
odds
the
army's
best
corps
commander; but
with
good
men
to
plan
and
lead,
and
ample
staffs
to
aid them,
what
finally
came
out
of
it
all
was
a
blundering
lunge which
hit
the
right
spot
largely
by
accident
and
which
missed turning
into
an
incredible
disaster
only
because
those
twenty-two
guns
had
been
taken
away.

Never
before
had
the
soldiers
and
their
leaders
gone
into action
so
completely
ignorant
about
where
they
were
supposed
to
go
and
what
they
were
going
to
find
when
they
got there.
Hancock
wrote
that
he
had
sent
a
couple
of
staff
officers
out
the
afternoon
before,
with
an
officer
from
Grant's staff,
to
look
the
ground
over,
"but
owing
to
the
uncertainty as
to
the
exact
point
to
be
attacked
no
very
definite
information
was
obtained."
¹⁰
He
tried
to
use
Mott's
dejected
soldiers to
drive
in
the
Rebel
picket
line
so
that
he
could
get
a
better view
of
things,
but
the
attempt
was
a
flat
failure
and
when
it came
time
to
move
the
corps
up
to
the
jump-off
point
the
best corps
headquarters
could
do
was
to
lay
a
map
on
a
farmhouse table
and
study
it.
Here
where
the
troops
were
forming
there was
a
house,
clearly
shown
on
the
map;
off
to
the
south
the map
showed
another
house,
which
seemed
to
be
approximately
in
the
middle
of
the
Rebel
salient;
draw
a
line,
then, from
house
to
house
on
the
map,
see
what
compass
point
the line
hits,
and
give
that
to
the
division
commanders
for
a guide.

It
was
done
so,
by
lamplight,
while
the
rain
came
down
in sheets
outside,
and
the
division
commanders
got
their
instructions,
which
were
vague—the
attack
was
supposed
to
hit
the Rebel
flank,
it
was
a
move
of
more
than
ordinary
importance, and
if
it
succeeded
the
country
would
owe
a
great
debt
to
the officers
responsible;
that
was
about
it,
as
men
who
were
present
recalled
it.
No
one
knew
anything
about
the
strength
of the
enemy
or
even
about
the
enemy's
position,
except
that
it was
off
to
the
south.
When
it
was
time
to
move,
staff
and
engineer
officers
would
be
on
hand
to
take
the
men
to
the
spot where
they
were
to
begin
their
charge.
¹¹