A Stillness at Appomattox (70 page)

In
effect,
the
army
was
fighting
blindfolded
and
most
of the
generals
knew
little
more
than
the
men
in
the
ranks knew.
A
IX
Corps
soldier
wrote
that
the
whole
campaign was
confusing:
"Of
the
previous
movements
we
had
been able
to
form
some
conception;
but
the
operations
since crossing
the
Pamunkey,
conducted
rapidly
in
jungles,
swamps and
labyrinths
of
forest;
in
storm
and
darkness;
by
marches and
counter-marches,
advances
and
withdrawals—all
seemed to
us
to
be
conducted
without
consistent
plan
or
purpose." The
generals
could
have
said
the
same
thing.
Indeed,
Meade did
say
it,
complaining
that
in
this
country
he
had
to
fight a
regular
battle
just
to
conduct
an
ordinary
reconnoissance.
¹³

Meade's
temper
was
getting
worse
than
ever.
At
Cold Harbor
on
June
1
he
was
denouncing
Warren
and
Wright —the
one
for
moving
without
orders,
the
other
for
moving too
slowly
with
orders—and
he
was
complaining
angrily
that the
corps
commanders
ought
to
act
for
themselves
and
not lean
constantly
on
army
headquarters.
At
this
untimely
moment,
one
of
Baldy
Smith's
staff
officers
came
in
to
report that
Smith
had
arrived
with
his
troops
but
had
brought little
ammunition
and
no
transportation
and
considered
his position
precarious.

"Then
why
in
hell,"
demanded
Meade,
"did
he
come
at all
?"
¹⁴

The
big
job
on
the
evening
of
June
1
was
to
get
Hancock and
his
II
Corps
around
to
Cold
Harbor
in
time
for
the dawn
attack,
and
the
orders
breathed
unusual
urgency: "You
must
make
every
exertion
to
move
promptly
and
reach Cold
Harbor
as
soon
as
possible.
.
.
.
Every
confidence
is felt
that
your
gallant
corps
of
veterans
will
move
with
vigor and
endure
the
necessary
fatigue."
An
engineer
officer
was sent
to
lead
the
march,
and
just
after
sunset
the
movement began.

The
II
Corps
had
no
better
luck
with
its
guide
here
than at
Spotsylvania.
Since
the
march
would
be
long
the
engineer
officer
undertook
to
lead
the
corps
on
a
short
cut
along an
unmapped
woods
road,
and
this
road
was
not
good. There
was
profound
darkness
under
the
trees,
and
the
dust rose
in
unbelievable
clouds,
and
the
road
grew
narrower and
narrower
until
it
was
no
more
than
a
path
and
the
corps artillery
finally
got
jammed
in
between
the
trees
and
could go
neither
backward
nor
forward.

The
long
column
piled
up,
and
in
the
dusty
darkness regiments
and
brigades
intermingled,
and
the
still
air
was very
hot.
Officers
rode
back
and
forth,
colliding
with
trees and
falling
down
invisible
banks,
and
it
was
too
dark
for anyone
to
identify
them
or
for
them
to
see
the
troops
they were
trying
to
straighten
out,
and
organization
dissolved completely.
Eventually,
most
of
the
troops
had
to
counter
march
by
another
road,
and
what
was
supposed
to
be
a
nine-mile
hike
turned
out
to
be
fifteen
miles.
¹⁵

The
corps
was
to
be
in
position
to
assault
at
daybreak, which
at
that
time
of
year
meant
around
4:30
in
the
morning,
but
by
seven
o'clock
it
was
just
beginning
to
come
up to
Cold
Harbor,
blue
uniforms
all
Rebel
gray
with
dust, stragglers
strewn
all
over
the
line
of
march,
everyone
too blown
to
do
more
than
put
one
heavy
foot
ahead
of
anothero One
of
Meade's
staff
commented
that
a
fifteen-mile
march at
night
was
more
tiring
than
a
twenty-five-mile
march
by daylight,
and
he
added
that
these
soldiers
were
all
worn out
before
the
march
even
began:
"Our
men
no
longer
have the
bodily
strength
they
had
a
month
before;
indeed,
why they
are
alive
I
don't
see."
¹⁶
To
make
an
immediate
attack was
plainly
out
of
the
question,
and
Meade
ordered
the fight
postponed
until
four
in
the
afternoon.

But
in
the
afternoon
things
looked
no
better.
The
battered VI
Corps
was
in
place
along
the
Richmond
road,
ready
to go,
but
General
Smith
on
the
VI
Corps'
right
was
telling headquarters
that
what
with
battle
losses
and
heavy
straggling
he
had
only
9,000
men
in
line
of
the
16,000
soldiers he
had
brought
up
from
Bermuda
Hundred,
and
if
the Rebels
should
attack
him
he
was
not
sure
that
he
could hold
his
position.
"An
attack
by
me,"
he
added,
"would
be simply
preposterous."
Beyond
Smith's
men,
innumerable
adjustments
had
to
be
made
in
the
positions
of
Warren's
and Burnside's
corps,
and
they
were
doing
a
good
deal
of
marching
to
and
fro
to
get
into
new
positions—being
considerably pestered,
the
while,
by
intermittent
Confederate
stabs
and thrusts—and
it
began
to
seem
best
to
have
those
two
corps act
on
the
defensive
and
hold
their
positions
while
the
fight was
made
at
Cold
Harbor.