A World at Arms (187 page)

158
A good summary in Dallek,
.Roosevelt and Foreign Policy,
pp. 172ff.

159
A comprehensive study of the work of the British and French purchasing missions in the United States would be most helpful.

160
Summary in Dallek, pp. 205–6.

161
The personal feuds within the leadership of the State Department have sometimes obscured the extent to which the best–known rivalry, that between Hull and Welles, masked common perceptions on many policy issues.

162
A brief summary of the pre-war situation in Weinberg,
Foreign Policy,
1937–39, pp. 255–60. It should be noted that one of the most spectacular pieces of evidence on German interference in Latin America, the so-called Patagonia Document–demonstrating German territorial interest in the southern part of Argentina–which was denounced as a forgery after its publication by an Argentine parliamentary investigating committee, now turns out to have been authentic
(ADAP,
C, 6, No. 137). For an earlier account, see Alton Frye,
Nazi Germany and the American Hemisphere
1933–1941 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1967), pp. 122–23. Reiner Pommerin,
Das Dritte Reich und Lateinamerika,
1939–1942 (Dusseldorf: Droste, 1977), pp. 65–67, accepted the allegation that the document was a fabrication.

163
This whole subject has been studied in great detail, and emphasized far beyond its real significance, by Hans-Jurgen Schröder. A summary of his views may be found in his piece in Manfred Funke (ed.),
Hitler, Deutschland und die Mächte
(Dusseldorf: Droste, 1977), pp. 339–64.

164
FRUS,
1939, 1: 424;
FDR Letters,
2:938–39;
Wiener Library Bulletin
18 (1964),32.

165
On William R. Davis, see Dallek,
Roosevelt and Foreign Policy,
p. 207; Beatrice Bishop Berle and Travis B. Jacobs (eds.),
Navigating the Rapids
1918–1971:
From the Papers of Adolf A. Berle
(New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973), p. 265;
ADAP,
DP, 8, No. 242 n 13; Moffat to Leland Harrison (Bern), 14 Nov. 1939, Harvard, Houghton Library, Moffat Papers, Vol. 15. It was in this connection that Roosevelt tried to think of ways to get a mission to the Vatican
(FDR Letters,
2: 930–32), which was eventually entrusted to Myron Taylor in December 1939.

166
See C 17219, 17220/13005/18 of 24 Oct. 1939 in PRO, FO 371/23099. On James D. Mooney, see also C 17285, C 17419 in ibid.; War Cabinet 61(39) of 26 Oct. 1939, PRO, CAB 65/3, f. 154–55; Kirk to Moffat, 19 Apr. 1940, Moffat Papers, Vol. 18; Dallek,
Roosevelt and Foreign Policy,
p. 216;
ADAP,
0, 8, No. 656; FDR to Mooney, 25 Mar. 1940, FDRL, PSF Safe File, Cont. 4, Germany, and FDR to Mooney, 2 Apr. 1940, FDRL, PSF Cont. 79, Navy Dept. Jan.-Apr. 1940.

167
Presidential Diary, 3 Oct. 1939, FDRL, Morgenthau Papers, Diary, Vol. 2, p. 317; cf.
ADAP,
D, 8, No. 291. For some British minutes on Kennedy’s defeatist and anti-British views, see A 605, 1317, 1384, 1723, 1848, and 1945/605/45, 18 Jan.-22 Aug. 1940, in PRO, FO 371/14251. For a balanced and fairly sympathetic account of Kennedy’s term as ambassador, see Jane K. Veith’s chapter in Jones,
US Diplomats,
pp. 165–82.

168
On the mission of Welles, see Stanley E. Hilton, “The Welles Mission to Europe, February-March 1940: Illusion or Realism?”
Journal of American History
58 (1971), 93–120; Dallek,
Roosevelt and Foreign Policy,
pp. 216–18. The whole peace question is covered here and elsewhere in this book in detail and on the basis of archival research because the main monograph on the subject, Bernd Martin,
Friedensinitiativen und Machtpolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg
(Düusseldorf: Droste, 1974), is not reliable (see, e.g., J. W. Brugel,
“Dahlems als Zwischentrager nach Kriegsausbruch,”
Historische Zeitschrift
228 [1979], 70–79; D. Albrecht, “Zur Friedensdiplomatie des Vatikans 1939–41: Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Bernd Martin,” in
Politik und Konfssion: Festschrifi fir Konrad Repgen
[Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 19831, pp. 447–64). Unfortunately one of the best recent accounts, that in
chap. 6
of Marion Thielenhaus,
Zwischen Anpassung und Widerstand: Deutsche Diplomaten 1938–1941
(Paderborn: Schöningh, 1984), depends on Martin at many points.

169
ADAP,
D, 8, pp. 177–80.

170
On the Göring-Dahlerus soundings, see ibid., No. 138; Brügel, “Dahlerus”, pp. 70–97; Helmut Krausnick and Harold C. Deutsch (eds.),
Helmuth Groscurth: Tagebücher eines Abwehroffziers
1938–1940 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1970), p. 385. (Henceforth cited as
Grosnrrth Tagebuch
.) British documents in C 13916/15/18, PRO, FO 371/22983; C 18882–83/15/18, FO 371/22986; C 15620/13005/18, FO 371/23097, C 15875 and 16448/13005/18, FO 371/23098; C 16662, 16731, 16840 and 17015/13005/18, FO 371/23099; C 20525/13005/18, FO 371/230100; FO 800/317, f. 60–62, 70, 75, 77–78, 121–24, 141; Cabinet meetings of 2, 6, 10, 12, 15, and 16 Oct. 1939, in PRO, CAB 65/3, f. 88–91, 102–3, 114, 119, 133–34, 138–39. On Göring’s soundings via Max von Hohenlohe, see
ADAP
, D, 8, No. 645; C 17016/13005/18, PRO, FO 371/23099. On a sounding via the Swedish Baron Borde, see C 1187/89/18, FO 371/24405. On Baldwin Raper, see C 3537/89/18, FO 371/24406, C 4917 and 5506/89/18, FO 371/24407.

171
Hans-Adolf Jacobsen,
Fall Gelb: Der Kampf um den deutschen Operationsplan zur Westensive 1940
(Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1956); Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (ed.),
Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des West[eldzuges 1939–1940
(Gottingen: Musterschmidt, 1956).

172
There were also probes launched by other Germans such as the one of Franz von Papen, then German ambassador in Turkey, who put forward ideas characteristically too silly to be taken seriously; see Papen tel. 367 of 3 Oct. 1939, AA, St.S., “Friedensbemühungen,” fr. 471603; C 15221, 15356, 15435, 15442/13005/18, PRO, FO 371/23097; C 15944–45, 15972/13005/18, FO 371/23098; C 16892/13005/18, FO 371/23099; War Cabinet 34
³⁹
of 2 Oct. 1939, CAB 55/3, f. 77–81, 83–84; FO 800/317, f. 238–41; Mackensen to Weizsäcker, 18 Jan. 1940, AA, Nachlass Mackensen, Bd. 4, fr. 64913–22.

173
A preliminary account in Weinberg,
Germany and the Soviet Union,
pp. 64–65; see also Johann W. Brügel (ed.),
Stalin und Hitler: Pakt gegen Europa
(Vienna: Europaverlag, 1973), Nos. 136ff. A scholarly account of the whole campaign remains to be written. The Germans reprinted Molotov’s October 31 speech on the subject and dropped it over France, see Luther notes of 9 and 10 Nov. 1939, in AA, St.S., “Der Krieg 1939,” Bd. 6.

174
Knox,
Mussolini Unleashed,
pp. 49–52; Thielenhaus,
Zwischen Anpassung und Widerstand,
pp. 196-202;
ADAP,
D, 8, Nos. 73,97, 127, 180; Lorraine No. 1000, secret, of 4 Oct. 1939, C 15721/15/18, PRO, FO 371/22984’ The Italian effort was pushed with special determination by Bernardo Attolico, the Italian ambassador in Berlin, whom the Germans soon after had recalled.

175
Hung. Docs.,
4, Nos. 380, 386; Budapest tel. 326 of 15 Sept. and Ribbentrop’s answer No. 364 of 18 Sept. 1939, AA, St.S., “Der Krieg 1939,” Bd. 4, fr. 223955–56.

176
Thielenhaus,
Zwischen Anpassung und Widerstand,
pp. 191–96.

177
Ibid., pp. 185–91; C 20492/13669/62, PRO, FO 371/22947 (Halifax-Berggrav meeting of 15 Dec. 1939); PRO, FO 800/322, f. 214–21 (Halifax–Berggrav meeting of 27 Jan. 1940 with Chamberlain’s comment: “This doesn’t get us any further”);
ADAP
, D, 8, No. 550; Frederick A. Sterling (US. Minister Stockholm) to Moffat, 16 Jan. 1940 (with a report on Berggrav’s Dec. trip to England), Moffat Papers, Vol. 18 (Houghton Library, Harvard); Weizsäcker note, St.S. No. 249, 21 Mar. 1940, AA, St.S., “Aufzeichnungen btr. nicht-Diplomatenbesuche,” Bd. 2, fr. 36560–62.

178
See
ADAP,
D, 8, Nos. 25, 87;
Hung, Docs.,
4, No. 386; PRO, FO 800/317, f. 179–82.

179
War Cabinet 9(39) of 9 Sept. 1939, PRO, CAB 65/1, f. 59. After the soundings were to all intents and purposes over, Neville Chamberlain on February 2, 1940, wrote to Lord Brocket, a long-time advocate of concessions to Germany, that he would not accept peace at any price. “I did not want this war and did my best to keep out of it. Having been forced into it, I am not prepared undefeated to accept terms which would give away just what we are fighting to preserve.” He wrote that he had no desire to cut up Germany into little bits but they must “get rid of the gangsters.” PRO, PREM 1/443, f. 3–5.

180
Weinberg,
Foreign Policy,
1937–39, pp. 618–19.

181
In addition to the other British documents cited in this section, see Sargent Memorandum of 11 Sept. 1939 (C 15050/13005/18, PRO, FO 371/23097); Halifax to Earl of Lytton, 11 Nov. 1939 (FO 800/317, f. 196–99); and Halifax to Lord Lothian, 21 Nov. 1939 (FO 800/311, f. 374–81). The last two documents summarize the situation as seen from London particularly effectively and also reflect British concern that any French insistence on the dismemberment of Germany would harden German resistance. There is a review of the Cabinet discussions in Christopher Hill,
Cabinet Discussions on Foreign Policy: The British Experience, October 1938-June
1941 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1991), chap. 5. See also Lothar Kettenacker,
Krieg zur Friedenssicherung: Die Deutschlandplanung der Britischen Regierung während des Zweiten Weltkrieges
(Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1989), pp. 40–51.

182
Memorandum by Kirkpatrick, 1 Oct. 1939, C 15649/13005/18, PRO, FO 371/23098. A 31 October memorandum by Strang, which particularly impressed Cadogan, noted that Poland had regained its independence when
both
Germany and Russia collapsed but that the Soviet Union now would be strong when Germany was defeated. He asserted that this would be less dangerous for Western Europe than for Germany to maintain herself, and that whatever happened in Eastern Europe after Germany’s defeat would probably not be within the control of the Western Powers (C 17105/13669/62, FO 371/22946).

183
See esp. Bullitt to Roosevelt, 16 Sept. 1939, Bullitt,
For the President,
pp. 374–75.

184
See the documents about the Dahlerus soundings cited in n 170, above.

185
On this point, see Halifax to Osborne, 17 Feb. 1940, PRO, FO 800/318.

186
See Foreign Office comments of May 7, 1939 in C 6612/7/62, PRO, FO 371/24362.

187
Note Christie to Vansittart, circulated with Halifax’s approval, 15 Sept. 1939, C 14293/15/18, PRO, FO 371/22983; Halifax minute of 4 Dec. 1939, C 19589/13005/18, Fa 371/23100.

188
S. Payne Best,
The Venlo Incident
(London: Hutchinson, 1950). Thielenhaus (
Zwischen Anpassung und Widerstand,
p. 167) imagines that the kidnapping took place in Germany. On the British background, see Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
1: 56–57n; Christopher M. Andrew,
Her Majesty’s Secret Seroice
(New York: Viking, 1986), pp. 433–39; Chapman Pincher,
Too Secret Too Long
(New York: St. Martin’s, 1984), chap. 45; Nigel West,
The SIC/NT Secrets
(New York: Morrow, 1988), pp. 142–43.

189
PRO, Fa 800/317, f. 27.

190
War Cabinet 40(1939) and 42(39), PRO, CAB 65/1, f. 222, 230.

191
For the drafting of the speech, see PRO, PREM 1/395; for Churchill’s reference, see his letter to R.R. Stokes, M.P. of 23 July 1940, PREM 4/100/2.

192
See the formal statement of British war aims of Dec. 15, 1939, in C 20438/13669/62, PRO, FO 371/22947. In view of this position, it should not be surprising that the London government did not welcome the Welles mission, tried to dissuade Roosevelt from sending him, and correctly suspected that it reflected the President’s doubts about the strength
1940,” Canadian Journal of History
16, NO.1 (1981), 50. The basic British objection to the British made it clear that not only did Poland and Czechoslovakia–and if they so voted, the Austrians - have to be freed, but that the German government itself had to be shown to its own people to be a failure; see Cabinet 67(40) of 13 Mar. 1940, C 3949/89/18, FO 371/24046, and the Halifax memorandum of the same date in FO 800/326, f. 73-78. To avoid antagonizing Roosevelt, Halifax sent him a message through Arthur Murray to tell him how much he and Chamberlain liked Welles personally and had tried to be perfectly frank with him (Murray to FDR, 5 Apr. 1940, FDRL, PSF Box 53, Great Britain). Documents on the mission that were not printed as well as sections omitted from the published ones in FRUS, 1940, Vol. 1, are in FDRL, PSF Safe File, Box 9, Welles Reports 1940.

193
On Hitler’s views, see his comments of Sept. 26 in
ADAP,
D, 8, No. 138; his comments to the pro-German Swedish explorer Sven Hedin on Oct. 16 in ibid., No. 263, and in Hedin,
Ohne Auftrag,
pp. 51–56; Fröhlich,
Goebbels Tagebücher,
24 Oct. 1939.

194
Fröhlich,
Goebbels Tagebücher,
14 Oct. 1939. Goebbels directed that the word “peace” was absolutely not to appear in the German press; Willi A. Boelcke (ed.),
Kriegspropaganda
1939–1941 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1966), p. 300. See also the entries in Goebbels’s diary for 24 Oct., 7 and 9 Nov., 12 and 19 Dec. 1939.

195
Harold C. Deutsch,
The Conspiracy against Hitler in the Twilight War
(Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1958).

196
On the contacts of the military, see, in addition to the books of Thielenhaus and Deutsch, Owen Chadwick,
Britain and the Vatican during the Second World War
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1986), pp. 86–99; Peter Hoffmann, “Peace through Coup d’Ètat: The Foreign Contacts of the German Resistance," CEH, 19 (Mar. 1986), 18-21; Kettenacker, Krieg zur Friedenssicherung, pp. 51-67; Weizsäcker to Mackensen, 14 June and 18 Oct. 1940, Mackensen to Weizsacker 28 July 1940, AA, Nachlass Mackensen, Handakten Bd. 4, fr. 65571-72, 65586; documents in the PRO, FO 800/317-18, 321; C 19745/3005/18, FO 371/23100; C 770, 1137, 2522, 3044/89/18, FO 371/24405; C 2339/6/18, FO 371/24387; C 4743/5/18, FO 371/24380; War Cabinet 12(39) of it Sept. 1939 and 16(40) of 17 Jan. 1940, CAB 65/1, f. 71-72, 65/5, f. 67 and 65/It, f. 158-59.