A World at Arms (190 page)

24
The German record is in
ADAP
, 0, 9, No.1; the Italian in Ciano, Diplomatic Papers, pp. 361–65. See also Ciano,
Diary
, 8 Feb. 1940;
KTB Halder
, 12 Feb. 1940.

25
See his comments to Goebbels on March 20 in the latter’s diary.

26
Weinberg,
Gennany and the Soviet Union
, pp. 91–95 (related documents have since been published in
ADAP
, D, 8 and 9).

27
See
ADAP
, 0, 9, Nos. 40, 92, 138, 164.

28
Mackensen to the Foreign Ministry, 30 Apr. 1940, AA, Botschaft Rom (Quir.) Geheim 43/2, fr. E 086906–8.

29
In addition to the numerous documents on these appeals published in the various
document collections, see Loraine to Halifax, 7 June 1940, C 7179/5/18, PRO, FO 371/24383. After the Germans seized the Italian archives in 1943, they checked carefully for any signs of disloyalty by Mussolini but found none, see Hencke’s report for von Ribbentrop, “Pol XI 9677g,” 20 Nov. 1943, AA, S1.S., “Italien,” Bd. 18, fr. 71169–73.

30
Mac Gregor Knox, “The Sources of Italy’s Defeat in 1940: Bluff or Institutional Incompetence,” in Carole Fink
et al.
(eds.),
Gennan Nationalism and the European Response, 1890–1945
(Norman, Okl.: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1985), pp. 247–66.

31
Note the report of the Japanese embassy in Rome No. 455 to Tokyo of 29 May 1940 on a May 15 speech by Mussolini, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 4565;
ADAP
, D, 9, Nos. 350,356, 357,360,371,387,408. Interesting are the comments of the representative of the German navy to the Italian navy, Admiral Weichold, in BA/MA, N 316/1, f. 5, 20, 28–29,3940. Weichold points out that the Italians had prepared in Libya to fight the French, not the British, and that prestige attacks by Italian planes sent to Belgium to fly against England could not affect the situation in the Mediterranean. See also Weichold’s comments in his 23 Dec 1953 letter to Btirkner in the Btirkner Papers, N 565/11.

32
Roosevelt’s speech of June 10, 1940 is in
The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt
, Samuel I. Rosenman (ed.), Vol. 3 (New York: Macmillan, 1941), pp. 259–64. On the refusal of King Victor Emanuel III to block the declaration of war, see Denis Mack Smith,
Italy and its Monarchy
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1989), pp. 287–92.

33
ADAP
, D, 9, No. 129.

34
See AA, Deutsche Botschaft Madrid, “Seekrieg und seine Auswirkungen auf Spanien,” 2 vols.;
ADAP
, D, 9, Nos. 169, 330; Reichsfinanzministerium, “Sparpeseten in Spanien,” BA, R 2/24–26.

35
Léon Papeloux,
L’Amiral Canaris entre Franco et Hitler
(Tornai: Castermann, 1977), pp. 82–84;
ADAP
, D, 9, No. 380.

36
Detwiler, Hitler, Franco, pp. 18–19.

37
These promises were made during a trip to Germany by Spanish Air Minister General Juan Vigon Suerodiaz; see the summary in ibid., pp. 22–25. The view that Franco was very much in earnest about wanting to join the war on Germany’s side if only his major conditions could be met is shared by Denis Smyth,
Diplomacy and Strategy of Suroival: British Policy and Franco’s Spain
, 1940–1941 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1986), pp. 31–36; and is very strongly supported by the new evidence in Norman Goda, “Germany and Northwest Africa in the Second World War: Politics and Strategy of Global Hegemony,” Ph diss., Univ. of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1991.

38
In June and July of 1940 the defenses of Gibraltar were (like those of Singapore) all on the sea side; there were no modern land defenses at all, and the fortress would have fallen in days. See Imperial War Museum, Mason Macfarlane Papers, MM 30.

39
See Hoare’s letters to Halifax of 3, 7, and 11 June 1940, PRO, FO 800/323, f. 89–90, 95–97, 101–4.

40
ADAP
, 0, 9, Nos. 32, 70, 75, 85, 109, 175,229,238,300,332. See also
DRuZW
, 4: 110–11; Reichswirtschaftsministerium, “Niederschrift tiber die Sitzung des Interministeriellen Ausschusses flir die deutsch–sowjetischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen vom 7. Juni 1940,” BA, R 2/17315’ The Soviet government was willing to cooperate with the Germans in some wild schemes in Afghanistan (
ADAP
, 0,8, Nos. 369, 445, 449, 468, 470), but was not as yet ready to have Stalin or Molotov visit Berlin (ibid., 9, Nos. 20, 28).

41
Ueberschar,
Hitler und Finnland
, pp. 155–59; KTB Ski A, 10, 10 June 1940, BA/MA, RM 7/13, f. 104.

42
ADAP
, D, 9, Nos. 73, 94

43
Ibid., No. 226.

44
See the June 22, 1940, summary of a cable of June 14, 1940, from the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to the Soviet ambassadors in Japan and China prepared
by the Japanese Consulate-General in Harbin which had obtained access to the document there, in Morley,
Fateful Choice,
pp. 310–11 n 65.

45
Mario Toscano,
Designs in Diplomacy
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), pp. 124ff.
ADAP,
D, 9, Nos. 286, 303, 308, 332, 353, 382, 388, 392, 454.

46
Marguerat,
Pétrole Roumain,
chap. 5.

47
See Hillgruber,
Hitler, König Carol
, pp. 63–69.

48
See the report of 14 Dec. 1939, PRO, FO 800/322, f. 134; Halifax to Reginald Hoare, 19 Jan. 1940, ibid., f. 135–44.

49
ADAP
, D, 8, No. 514;
KTB Halder
, 3 July 1940.

50
Hillgruber,
Hitler, König Carol
, pp. 70ff. Fabricius report G 164 of 14 Sept. 1940 enclosing a copy of the report of the Romanian Minister in Moscow to the Romanian Foreign Minister of 9 Sept. 1940, AA, U.St.S., “Sudosten,” Bd. 3, fr. 177007–14. The Germans in Bessarabia and the Bukovina were also evacuated.

51
Hoppe, Bulgarien, chap. 9. For current problems in German-Bulgarian economic relations, see “
RK
2904B,” 9 Feb. 1940, BA, R 4311/1428b, f. 20–22.

52
Hoppe, chaps. 4, 10, I I, is useful though somewhat exaggerating the caution.

53
ADAP
, D, 9, No. 478. It is too often forgotten that into the fall of 1940 Germany held to Hitler’s earlier view of Italy’s having a predominant role in the area south of Austria and did not change this position until the Italian disaster in Greece. For the understanding of this point, and the changing picture after the Italian defeats in Greece and Africa, by the Japanese ambassador in Berlin, see Kurusu’s tel. 119 of 14 Feb. 1941, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 98201.

54
The views of Molotov, presumably reflecting Stalin’s, are clearest in the reports of the Italian ambassador Augusto Rosso, translated in Toscano,
Designs in Diplomacy
, pp. 15162. See also
ADAP
, D, 10, Nos. 21, 130, 165, 286.

55
The Germans had first tried to worsen Soviet-Turkish relations by publishing documents seized in France and showing Turkish knowledge of the preliminary planning for Allied attacks on Soviet oil fields; and also to compromise the Turkish Foreign Minister. They succeeded in scaring the Turks from honoring their treaty with the Allies and into signing an economic agreement, but could not get further with Ankara at the time. See Krecker,
Deutschland und die Türkei
, pp. 85–95; Frank G. Weber,
The Evasive Neutral: Germany, Britain and the Quest for a Turkish Alliance in the Second World War
(Columbia, MO : Univ. of Missouri Press, 1979), pp. 50–6 I; Selim Deringil,
Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War
(Cambridge: Cambridge Vniv. Press, 1989), p. 95; Günter Kahle, “Die Publikation des deutschen Weissbuches Nr. 6: Zur Reaktion in London, Moskau, Ankara und Teheran,” in
Vom Staat des ancien rçgime zum modernen Parteienstaat: Festschrift für Theodor Schieder zu seinem 70. Geburtstag
(Munich: Oldenbourg, 1978), pp. 451–66.

56
Veberschar,
Hitler und Finnland
, pp. 188–91.

57
Ibid., pp. 188, 197–99; Krosby,
Petsamo Dispute
, chap. 2.

58
Ueberschär, pp. 191–92.

59
A useful summary in Bell,
Britain and the Fall of France
, pp. 55–58.

60
Compare Hastings,
Bomber Command
, pp. 101–2, and
ADAP
, D, 9, No. 421.

61
The Germans were quite accurately informed about the situation inside the French government; relevant documents in
ADAP
, D, 9.

62
Most useful on the Vichy regime are Ferro,
Petain
; Eberhard Jackel,
Frankreich in Hitlers Europa
(Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1966); Robert O. Paxton,
Vichy France
(New York: Columbia Vniv. Press, 1972, 1982).

63
See Bedarida,
Strategie Secrete
, pp. 42–49; Lçon Noël, “Le project d’union franco–britanniquede juin 1940,”
Revue d’histoire de la deuxieme guerre mondiale
21 Gan. 1956), 22–37; Gilbert, 6: 558–61; C 5162, 5614, 5818, 6307/9/17, PRO, FO 371/24299, C 6566, 6942/9/17, FO 371/24300.

64
See War Cabinet 169
⁴⁰
of 16 June 1940, PRO, CAB 65/7; Noël, p. 52.

65
DRuZW,
2: 28.

66
See Boelcke,
Kriegspropaganda
, p. 399.

67
See esp.
ADAP
, D, 9, No. 479, with its emphasis on the British need for destroyers.

68
Ibid., No. 525.

69
On the armistice, see Jäckel,
Frankreich
, chap. I; Hermann Böhme,
Der deutsch-französische Waffenstillstand im Zweiten Weltkrieg
(Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1966); Marine Attache Rom, “Tätigkeitsbericht Nr. 26 der Italienischen Waffenstillstandskommission,” 17 Feb. 1942, BA/MA, Case 580, PG 33654.

70
F.-A. Babtiste, “Le regime de Vichy á la Martinique (juin 1940 a juin 1943),”
Revue d’histoire de la deuxième guenrre mondiale
, No. 111 Ouly 1978), 1–14; Pierre Pluchon,
Histoire des Antilles et de la Guyane
(Toulouse: Edouard Privat, 1982), pp. 431–33. Vichy instructed Admiral Robert to fight the British, Americans, or Free French if they invaded, to send the ships there to West Africa or to scuttle them, destroy the American planes on the aircraft carrier Béarn and send the gold out as well. See the intercepted Vichy order of 25 Oct. 1940 in OKM, Skl, 3. Abt. “B-Bericht 43/40,” 1 Nov. 1940, Anlage 10, NA, RG 457, SRS 548/5.

71
Eleanor M. Gates,
End of the Affair: The Collapse of the Anglo-French Alliance
, 1939–1940 (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1981), p. 567 n 5; Thomas J. Knight, “Belgium Leaves the War, 1940,” JMH, 41 (1969), 62–63; Boelcke,
Kriegspropaganda
, pp. 405–6;
ADAP
, D, 10, No. 222 n 5; Koecher (Bern) NO.516 of 24 June 1940 and the note on it by von Weizsacker of 25 June 1940, AA, U.St.S., “Krieg Westen,” Bd. 2; Memoirs of General von Falkenhausen covering June-July 1940, BA/MA, N 246/46, f. 188; KTB Ski A, 11, 3 July 1940, BA/MA, RM 7/14, f. 145. On British knowledge of secret Belgiansoundings, see War Cabinet 171(40) of 18 June 1940, PRO, CAB 65/7.

72
ADAP
, D, 10, No. 138; other relevant documents are in AA, Gesandtschaft Lissabon, “Deutsch-polnischer Krieg,” Bd. 5.

73
Some details in Broszat,
Polenpolitik
, pp. 17–18; Boelcke,
Kriegspropaganda
, pp. 283, 284; Fröhlich,
Goebbels Tagebücher
, 9, 13, 21, 23 Feb. 1940;
Frank Diary
, pp. 170, 450–51; Weizsacker to Major von Harbou, 25 Jan. 1940, AA, St.S., “Schriftwechsel von A-K,” Bd. 4, fr. 470584–92.

74
Relevant documents are in AA, Gesandtschaft Lissabon, “Deutsch-polnischer Krieg,” Bd. 5, 7. See also Sarah M. Terry,
Poland’s Place in Europe: General Sikorski and the Origin of the Oder-Neisse Line, 1939–1943
(Princeton, N.).: Princeton Univ. Press, 1983), p. 50 n 9; R 7493/3700/22, PRO, FO 371/38240.

75
It is worth noting how far reticence about the Duke of Windsor still goes; there is no reference to him in Bell,
Britain and the Fall of France
. On the British effort to suppress German documents pertaining to the Duke, see Paul R. Sweet, “Der Versuch amtlicher Einflussnahme auf die Edition der ‘Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1933–1941’, Ein Fall aus den ftinfziger Jahren,”
VjZ
, 39 (1991), 265–303.

76
The text of WP(40) No. 168, also COS(40) No. 390, is in PRO, CAB 65/7. See also the book by Bell, which derives its title from this document, esp. chap. 3; Gilbert,
Churchill
, 6: 357.

77
A table of the daily landings in England is printed in Winston S. Churchill,
The Second World War
, 6 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948–53), 2: 102. Key documents are the Confidential Annex of WM(40) I39th Conclusion, 28 May 1940, Minute I, in PRO, CAB 65/13, WM(40) 140th Conclusions, 26 May 1940, ibid., Cabinet Paper W.P.(40) 170 of 26 May 1940, R 6309/58/22, FO 371/24946; Chamberlain diary, 26 May 1940, quoted in Dilks, p. 82; WM(40) 142 War Cabinet Conclusion Confidential Annex, 27 May 1940, CAB 65/13, and 145th Conclusion Confidential Annex, 28 May 1940 in ibid; Halifax to Sergent, 12 Oct. 1942, R 7017/3700/22, FO 371133240. See also Lord Halifax,
Fulness of Days
(New York: Dodd, Mead, 1957), pp. 226–27; Hill, Cabinet Decisions, chap. 6. There is a rather confusing discussion of the Cabinet meetings in
Jonathan Knight, “Churchill and the Approach to Mussolini and Hitler in May 1940: A Note,”
British Journal of International Studies
3 (1977), 92-96. Gilbert,
Churchill,
6: 418–41821, adds some detail but is not, in my judgement, entirely accurate. Bell,
Britain and the Fall of France
, pp. 38–48, summarizes the discussion and correctly relates it to the proposed approach to Mussolini. His conclusion on p. 48 is, however, contradicted on p. 50. Bell’s chap. 6 summarizes popular support for the policy adopted. See also Kettenacker,
Krieg zur Friedenssicherung
, pp. 68–77.