A World at Arms (223 page)

153
An excellent source on these squabbles is Mountbatten’s correspondence in PRO, CAB 127/24,25. In commenting on the feuds between Mountbatten and Admiral Somerville, the commander of the British fleet in the area, Marder
(Old Friends, New Enemies,
2: 321)

154
See Lebra,
Japanese-Trained Armies,
pp. 23, 31. An excellent account of the background of this offensive in Allen, chap. 3.

155
Lebra, pp. 28ff; Leonard A. Gordon,
Brothers against the Raj,
pp. 467ff, 49Sff. None of those who have written on Bose’s Indian national army has investigated whether, while they were trained by the Japanese army, they were permitted to share in the “comfort” provided by the thousands of kidnapped Korean young women held as sex slaves by the Imperial Japanese army at its camps. This might have provided them with some insight into the nature of Japanese, as opposed to British, colonial rule, as well as what might be in store for their sisters and daughters.

156
The complicated transport plane arrangements can be followed in Ehrman,
Grand Strategy,
5: 408-15. What the author does not point out is that the prior American reluctance and the 1944 American willingness to assist can be understood in terms of justified suspicions earlier that the British were not going to do any serious fighting in the theater anyway, and a swift change in U.S. attitude when it became obvious that the British had changed: they were clearly fighting it out this time around. Mountbatten and Slim had done for the British-Indian 14th Army in 1943–44 what Alexander and Montgomery had done for the British 8th Army in 1942. The Imphal-Kohima battle itself is well described in Allen,
Burma,
chap. 4. See also Raymond Callahan,
Burma,
1942–1945 (London:
A Battle on Lofty Heights
(London: Macmillan, 1964).

157
Brooke Diary, Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers. The entry continues with scathing comments about Mountbatten, General Pownall (his Chief of Staff), and General Giffard, the 11 th Army Group commander.

158
Japanese Army General Staff Tokyo to military attache Berlin No. 949 of IS July 1944,

159
On the Myitkyina campaign and Merrill’s Marauders, see the still useful book, Charles

160
Note Roosevelt to the Prime Minister of New Zealand in
FDR Letters,
2: 1428.

161
Elmer B. Potter, Bull Halsey (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1985), p. 221.

162
Kreis, Air Base Defense, pp. 234–36.

163
The Japanese discussion of strategy is reviewed in Morton, Strategy, pp. 543–50, 655–
60; Louis Morton, “Japanese Policy and Strategy in Mid-War,”
U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings
85, No.2 (Feb. 1959), 52–64. The statistics on aircraft production are from Coox, “The Rise and Fall,” p. 81.

164
On the Bougainville campaign, see Costello,
Pacific War,
pp. 422–27; James,
The Years of
Mac Arthur,
pp. 339–41; a full account of the invasion and fighting in Harry A. Gailey,
Bougainville,
1943–1945:
The Forgotten Campaign
(Lexington, Ky.: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1991), chaps. 4–9.

165
See James, pp. 332–35.

166
Ibid., pp. 341–46.

167
Costello,
Pacific War,
pp. 446–47.

168
Morton,
Strategy,
pp. 460–72.

169
An early study, Jeter A. Iseley and Philip A. Crowl,
The U.S. Marines and Amphibious
War: Its Theory and its Praaice in the Pacific
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press 1951)

170
Morton,
Strategy,
pp. 57 1, 575.

171
Ibid., pp. 444–47. In the subsequent operation against the Marshall Islands the Americans captured secret Japanese charts which proved enormously helpful.

172
The report of a British naval observer on the carrier
Essex
during “Galvanic” stresses how essential the huge number of fleet and escort carriers (over 20) turned out to be (PRO, WO 106/3402).

173
An excellent account in Iseley and Crowl,
The U.S. Marines,
chap. 6. Captain James R. Stockman, USMC,
The Battle of Tarawa
(Washington: GPO, 1947), remains useful. See also Costello, chap. 25; the “official” account by Henry I. Shaw, Jr.
et al.
History of
u.s.
Marine Corps Operations in World War II,
Vol. 3: Central Pacific Drive (Washington: GPO, 1966), Part 2. Morison,
US Naval Operations,
7: Part 2, covers the whole operation in detail.

174
The British ambassador to the U.S., Lord Halifax, repeatedly suggested that the island be given to the U.S. as a war memorial, but objections from the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand prevented the offer from being made (File AN 3551, in PRO, FO 37 1/44623).

175
Morton,
Strategy,
pp. 590–91.

176
Good accounts in Iseley and Crowl, chap. 7; Costello, pp. 448–52; Shaw et a I.,
US Marine
Corps,
part 3; Morison,
US Naval Operations,
7: part 3.

177
Butow,
Tojo,
pp. 427–28.

178
Note the report from the German embassy in Tokyo of Mar. 1944 with a clear understanding of the implications for Japan of the loss of the Marshalls (once a German colony) and of the failure of the Japanese to realize the extent to which their earlier victories derived from Germany’s having drawn Allied forces into fighting elsewhere. The report recognized Japan’s need for good relations with the Soviet Union and shows comprehension of the nature of the American double thrust strategy (Hencke to OKW and others, 31 Mar. 1944, AA, Handakten Etzdorf, “Ferner Osten,” fr. 313280–83).

179
Morton,
Strategy,
pp. 517–20.

180
Ibid., pp. 592–601.

181
Ibid., pp. 668–74.

182
Ibid., pp. 602–5; see also Falk, “General Kenney,” p. 153.

183
Yasushi Hidagi, “Attack against the U.S. Heartland,”
Aerospace Historian
27, No.2 Oune 1981),87–93; NA, RG 457, SRMA-6; Douglas,
Creation of a National Air Force,
pp. 425-26; quite detailed, Bert Webber,
Silent Siege: Japanese Attacks against North America in World War II
(Fairfield, Wash.: Ye Galleon Press, 1983).

184
Ohmae, “Strategischen Konzeptionen,” pp. 200–1;
Ugaki Diary,
25 May - 14June 1944, pp. 376–99.

185
Included among the battleships were three of those “sunk” at Pearl Harbor. By a curious
coincidence, the man who had been in charge of the Pearl Harbor raid, Admiral Nagumo Chuichi, had in the meantime been relegated to the tiny naval command of Saipan (and committed suicide at the end of the Saipan fighting).

186
Harry A. Gailey,
Howlin’ Mad Versus the Army: Conflict in Command, Saipan
1944 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1986).

187
On the Marianas, see Iseley and Crowl,
The U.S. Marines,
chap. 8; Morison,
US Naval
Operations,
8: part 3; Costello,
Pacific War,
pp. 475–86; Dull,
Imperial Japanese Navy,
pp. 302–11; Shaw et a I.,
US Marine Corps,
3: parts 4–6;
Ugaki Diary,
14 June - 24 June 1944, pp. 398–425. Useful studies of the way in which increasing size went hand-in-hand with decreasing effectiveness in the Japanese naval air force as well as the Japanese army air force are in the “Magic Far Eastern Summary” No. 112 of 10 July 1944 (NA, RG 457, SRS 112). For German navy perceptions, see KTB Skl A 58, 20June 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/61, f. 610–11. Comment on Japanese concern that the Allies had been able to mount the Saipan operation at the same time as the invasion of Normandy is in ibid., A 59, 9 July 1944, RM 7/62, f. 220–21.

188
On the Biak operation, Robert Ross Smith,
The Approach to the Philippines
(Washington: GPO, 1953), chaps. 12–16, in the U.S. Army official history remains a fine account. Smith estimates American casualties from battle and disease at just under 10,000 (p. 392). See now also Drea,
Mac Arthur’s Ultra,
pp. 135–41.

189
James,
The Years of MacArthur,
chap. 10. When James wrote, the information of MacArthur’s enormous gratuity from President Quezon had not become public. One wonders what a leak would have done to his candidacy had he been nominated. Those who speculate on MacArthur’s relationship with President Roosevelt have not as yet engaged the implications of Roosevelt’s and Interior Secretary Harold L. Ickes’s knowledge of this transaction (and the fact that MacArthur, of course, knew that they had been asked for their approval).

190
Butow,
Tojo,
pp. 432–33; Shillony,
Wartime Japan,
pp. 60–64;
Kido Diary,
13 July 1944ff, pp. 387ff; Marder,
Old Fn’ends, New Enemies,
2: 388–98.

191
Robert J.C. Butow,
Japan’s Decision to Surrender
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1954), pp. 30–37.

192
Morley,
Fateful Choice,
pp. 140–41.

193
See Butow,
Japan’s Decision,
p. 37.

194
Ohmae, “Strategischen Konzeptionen,” p. 201; Shillony,
Wartime Japan,
pp. 69–70.

195
Shigemitsu (Tokyo) to Sato (Moscow) No. 352 of 2 Apr. 1944, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 54704–5.

196
See Sato’s telegrams No. 747 of 8 Apr., 754 of 10 Apr., and 773–74 of 12 Apr. 1944, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 55688–97, 55622–29, 55630–31.

197
For further details on these negotiations, see the intercepted Japanese telegrams of 5 Apr. - 4 Aug. 1944, in NA, RG 457, SRDJ 56013–14, 59589–90, 61093–103, 62953-54, 63331-36, 63495-503, 64338-39, 66199-203, 66907, and the analysis in SRH-069. On the possibly related trip of Soviet ambassador to Tokyo, to Moscow, see Shigemitsu to Sato No. 699 of 17 June 1944, SRDJ 62144–48; Stoller (Shanghai) to Berlin No. 524 of 22 June 1944, AA, Handakten Ritter, “Japan,” Bd. 4–5, fr. 363345–46; Donovan to Roosevelt, 6 July 1944, FDRL, PSF Box 168, OSS Reports Apr. - July 1944.

198
Note the analysis of this Japanese strategy in the Allied Pacific Order of Battle Conference of 3-19July 19441n NA, RG 457, SRH-097. The one point missed by those in attendance was that the utilization of the Marianas for the bombing of Japan was something that the Japanese did not fully understand at this stage of the war. There is no evidence that they considered simply giving up on defending the home islands as too vulnerable and fighting on with their army in mainland China in hopes of a compromise peace as suggested in a G-2 appreciation of 13 May 1944 (NA, RG 165, Entry 77, Box 2265, File 6000 Army-General). The possibility of such extended fighting on the mainland and by other garrisons
after
a successful Allied campaign had conquered the home islands, however, played an important role in Allied thinking until the final Japanese surrender.

199
A useful summary in Fraser,
Alanbrooke,
pp. 410–21; the relevant papers of Field Marshal Brooke are now available in the Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers, 14/20–23, See also
Old Friends, New Enemies,
Marder, 2: chap. 12, part 1.

200
A major substantive argument against British naval participation had been the different pattern in British and U.S. naval operations in the war. The British had always relied on fixed bases. The American fleet in the Pacific was to a large extent based on a fleet-train, a floating group of tankers, supply ships, hospital ships,
etc.
In this context, a British contingent might simply reduce the number of American warships that could be maintained.

201
Summary in Morton,
Strategy,
pp. 592–605; details in Grace P. Hayes,
The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staffin World War II: The Waragainst Japan
(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1982), chaps. 21–25.

202
Hayes, pp. 610–11; James,
The Years of MacArthur,
pp. 526–36; Costello,
Pacific War,
492-93; M. Hamlin Cannon, Leyte: The Return to the Philippines (Washington: GPO, 1954), pp. 5-6. See also the report on the Lumsden–MacArthur meeting of i Aug. 1944 in Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers, 19/54.

203
Hayes, p. 623; James, pp. 533, 536–37.

204
James, pp. 486–89.

205
Ibid., pp. 491–92; Costello,
Pacific War,
pp. 493–98. An excellent account in Harry A. Gailey,
Peleliu
, 1944 (Annapolis, Md.: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Co., 1983); the fighting man’s perspective is impressively presented in Eugene B. Sledge,
With The Old Breed at Peleliu and Okinawa
(New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1990 [1981]), chaps. 3–6. A good case can be made for the view that the 1st Marine Division was not a large enough force for Peleliu, that the 81st Division should not have been committed to the Angaur operation until Peleliu had been secured, and that the marines were simply too stubbornly proud to ask for army help when they needed it.

206
Glantz,
Soviet Military Deception,
p. 251.

207
On this incident, see Eden’s memorandum, WP
⁴⁴
150, “Information from the Soviet

208
PRO, CAB 119/128.

209
N 2996/302/38, quoted in Beaumont,
Comrades in Arms,
p. 179. Sargent was referring to the standard British practice in prior wars.

210
Ibid., pp. 170, 173–75.

211
Lukas,
Eagles East,
Kreis, pp. 204–12;
Air Base Defense,
pp. 192–201; Stockholm to Tokyo No. 326 of 10 June 1944, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 61959–60. - –

212
Erickson,
Road to Berlin,
p. 205; Ziemke,
Northern Theater,
pp. 273–75; Berry,
American
Foreign Poli’J!,
pp. 386–98. For reports of Japanese diplomats in Berlin, Stockholm, and Helsinki, intercepted by the Americans, see military attache Helsinki to Tokyo Nos. 40 of 16 Feb., 42 of 18 Feb., 58 of 28 Feb., 60 of I Mar., 65 of 3 Mar., 76 of 13 Mar. 1944, NA, RG 457, SRA 7582-83, 7015–18, 7335–37, 7759, 7437, 7633–36; military attache Stockholm to Tokyo Nos. 521 of 19 Feb., 526 of 23 Feb., 562 of 21 Mar. 1944, SRA 7321–27,7639–42, 7969–71; embassy Berlin to Tokyo Nos. 185 of 28 Feb., 414 of 3 May 1944, SRDJ 51823, 57740–42; Legation Stockholm to Tokyo No. 153 of 10 Mar. 1944, SRDJ 53930; Legation Helsinki to Tokyo No. 46 of 11 Mar. 1944, SRDJ 53930. German documents have been published in ADAP, E, 7 and 8.