A World at Arms (224 page)

213
In Eisenhower’s case as in others, Brooke had a vehemently negative opinion at the time
which Bryant for the most part suppressed in the published version. Compare, e.g., the entry for 24 Jan. 19441n Bryant with that in the original diary, Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers.

214
Liddell Hart Centre, Ismay Papers IV
ICon!
2/4’ The Somme and Passchendaele references involve bitter battles of 1916 and 1917 on the Western Front; Nivelle’s offensive was a much heralded French operation in 1917 whose failure led to the great mutinies in the French army.

215
See de Guingand,
Operation Victory,
pp. 332–34.

216
A fair account in Martin Blumenson,
Bloody River: The Real Tragedy of the Rapido
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970).

217
On Anzio, see the comments by Harold Deutsch in Rohwer and Jäckel,
Funkaujklärung,
pp. 313–14; Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
3/1:
184–87, 19C>-91, 196–97. A balanced account in William L. Allen, Anzio: Edge ofDisaster (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1978). An extraordinarily vivid account of the fighting is in William Woodruff, Vessel of Sadness (London: Chatto & Windus, 1970).

218
Chadwick,
Britain and the Vatican,
pp. 278–84.

219
Onder,
Turkische Aussenpolitik,
pp. 223–24.

220
See Arthur L. Funk, “Churchill, Eisenhower, and the French Resistance,”
Military Affairs
45, No. 1 (1981 ), 29–33.

221
Brooke to Wilson tel. 74890 of 6 Mar. 1944, Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers,
14/44.
Related documents, including Wilson’s answer of 8 Mar., are in the same file.

222
See the extensive documentation for the period May 1944 - July 19451n PRO, WO
106/3973.

223
Roger Beaumont, “Bomber Offensive,” p. 15.

224
Murray,
Luftwaffe,
pp. 216–22.

225
On the P-51, see Robert W. Gruenhagen,
Mustang: The Story of the P-51 Fighter,
revd.ed. (New York: Arco, 1980), esp. pp. 87ff; Jeffrey Ethell,
Mustang: A Documentary History
of the P-51
(London: Jane’s, 1981 ).

226
See Boog,
Luftwaffenföhrung,
pp. 28–31.

227
Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
3/1: 317–22.

228
An account which focuses on the German and American aspects, largely omitting the British, in Murray,
Luftwaffe,
pp. 223–32.

229
Saward,
“Bomber” Harris,
pp. 246–48.

230
Ibid., pp. 248–52. A detailed discussion of the decision in Walt W. Rostow,
Pre-Invasion
Bombing Strategy: General Eisenhower’s Decision of March
25, 1944 (Austin: Univ. Press of Texas, 1981). On the debate in the British Cabinet, see WM(44) War Cabinet 61(44) Conclusions, Confidential Annex, 2 May 1944, PRO, CAB
65/46.

231
Note Hinsley,
3/1: 41–42.

232
Williamson Murray, “Ultra: Some Thoughts on its Impact on the Second World War,”
Air University Review
35, NO.5 (1984), 59.

233
Arnold to Roosevelt, 27 Jan. 1944, and enclosure, FDRL, Map Room Box 164, Naval Aide’s File, Axis War Potential.

234
Boog,
Luftwaffenföhrung,
pp. 130–33.

235
“Punkte aus der Besprechung beim Fuhrer am 5. Marz 1944” (Milch, Bodenschatz,

236
Murray,
Luftwaffe,
pp. 240–41.

237
Ibid., pp. 232–33; Boog,
Luftwaffenföhrung,
pp. 200–2.

238
On this operation, see Murray,
Luftwaffe,
pp. 237–38; Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
3/1:
chap. 38; Gerald Kirwin, “Waiting for Retaliation - A Study of Nazi Propaganda Behaviour and Civilian Morale,”
JGH
16 (1981), 575–77; War Department G-2, “The
G.A.F. and the London Raids,” 9 Mar. 1944, NA, RG 165, Entry 77, Box 1482, File

239
Japanese military representative in German-controlled Italy to the Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff, No. 33 of 18 Dec. 1943, NA, RG 457, SRA 06577–81.

240
Oshima’s Berlin to Tokyo Nos. 81–82 of 24 Jan. 1944, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 49910–20, 49886–93 (German record in
ADAP,
E, 7, No. 179); F.C. Jones,
Japan’s New Order,

241
For Japanese urgings, see the preceding note. The Japanese ambassador in Moscow, it should be noted, anticipated that the Allies would succeed in getting ashore and saw no signs of a German-Soviet peace; see Sato’s No. 995 of 20 May 1944, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 59053–55. On Laval, see the reports of Mitani, the Japanese representative in Vichy, Nos. 45 of 16 Feb., 207 of 19 June, and 208 of 19 June 1944, SRDJ 51113–16, 62400, 62237. That such supposedly anti-Communist collaborators with the Germans as the Hungarian Szálasi and the French Laval favored peace with the Soviet Union so that Germany could concentrate her strength on fighting the Western Powers is an aspect of World War II which awaits its historian. Goebbels, who had urged peace with the Soviet Union on Hitler in 1943, did so again in the spring of 1944 (Rudolf Semmler,
Goebbels The Man Next to Hitler
[London: Westhouse, 1947], pp. 119–22, 127–28).

242
The text and commentary on it in Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm (ed.), “Hitlers Ansprache vor Generalen und Offiziere am 26. Mai 1944,”
MGM
20 (1976), 123–70, esp. pp. 134–35.

243
Backe to Rosenberg M 2130/44 of 8 May 1944, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Container 834. On Nov. 17, 1943, Rosenberg had been told by Hitler not to let the best of the occupation administration officials be drafted so that they would be available for redeployment (Albrecht memorandum, BA, R 4311/684, f. 4).

244
See Heinz Magenheimer, “Das Gesetz des Schwergewichts: Zur strategischen Lage Deutschlands im Fröhjahr 1944,”
Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau
3I (1981), 18–25.

245
Earlier Hitler had been sure that the invasion would come in Normandy, ibid., p. 24. On Hitler’s views in May, see the German record
in ADAP,
E, 7, No. 41; the Japanese record

12: THE ASSAULT ON GERMANY FROM ALL SIDES

1
Text in Hubatsch,
Hitler’s Weisungen,
pp. 233–38.

2
“Im Osten lässt die Grosse des Raumes aussersten Falles einen Bodenverlust auch grosseren Ausmasses zu, ohne den deutschen Lebensnerv todlich zu treffen."

3
For an interesting report on the Eastern Front by a group of American officers, led by the commanding general of the Persian Gulf Command, who were permitted a tour on 3–16 Jan. 1944, see U.S. military attache Moscow, “Trip to Kiev Front, 3–16 Jan. 1944,” 24 Jan. 1944, NA, RG 165, Entry 77, Box 1431, File 691o-Germany (Russia) Jan. 1944. For a joint British-U.S. estimate of Red Army casualties as of February 1944, see Annex I to the U.S. Army ETO Intelligence Committee Minutes of 14 Mar. 1944, in ibid., Box 1417, File 690o-Germany-General.

4
Ziemke,
Stalingrad to Berlin,
pp. 218–38; Erickson,
Road to Berlin,
pp. 163–67, 176–79; Trevor N. Dupuy,
Great Battles on the Eastern Front: The Soviet-German War, 1941–1945
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1982), pp. 129–38; Glantz,
Soviet Military Deception,
pp. 306–22. It was at this battle that the National Committee for a Free Germany made its major - but unsuccessful–effort to induce a surrender (see refs. in Friedrich Freiherr
Hiller von Gaertringen [ed.],
Die Hassell-Tagebucher: Ulrich von Hassell, Aufzeichnungen
vom Andern Deutschland
[Berlin: Siedler, 1988], p. 608 n 13). The stabilization of the northern sector of German Army Group South’s front after the Soviet liberation of Rovno is covered by Ziemke, pp. 244–47; Glantz, pp. 322–26.

5
Erickson,
Road to Berlin,
pp. 165–67, 179–80.

6
Notes of General Hansen in Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Zg. 1130, f. 18ff; Ziemke,
Stalingrad to Berlin
, p. 244.

7
Hillgruber,
Hitler, Kijnig Carol,
pp. 180–81;
ADAP,
E, 7, Nos. 236–38.

8
Ziemke,
Stalingrad to Berlin,
pp. 291–95; Erickson,
Road to Berlin,
pp. 193-g5; Gosztony,
Hitlers Fremde Heere
, pp. 282–84; Dupuy,
Great Battles
, pp. 139–49. The role of the German navy is covered by Salewski,
Seekriegsleitung
, 2: 383–400, in a manner very critical of Donitz’s encouraging the policy of holding on to the peninsula.

9
Ziemke,
Stalingrad to Berlin,
pp. 272–85; Erickson,
Road to Berlin,
pp. 180–87; Glantz,
Soviet Military Deception,
pp. 326–48.

10
See the report on the Hitler-Kvatemik conversation of 22 July 19411n
ADAP,
D, 13, Appendix III.

11
On this episode, see Ziemke,
Stalingrad to Berlin,
pp. 287–88; Carlile A. Macartney,
Oaober Fifteenth: A History of Modern Hungary
1920–1945, 2 vols. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press, 1956), 2: 221ff; Mario D. Fenyo,
Hitler, Horthy, and Hungary: German Hungarian Relations
, 1941–1944 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1972), chap. 9; Gyorgy Ranki,
Unternehmen Margarethe: Die deutsche Besetzung Ungarns
, trans. by E. and M.
Pogany (Vienna: Böhlau, 1984); Gustav Hennyey, Ungarns Schicksal zwischen Ost und West: Lebenserinnerungen
(Mainz: Hase & Koehler, 1976), pp. 55–65, 161, 166–67;
KTB OKW
, 19441/45, 1: 179–246; extensive material in BAlMA, Nachlass Weichs, Nlg/3; JodI Diary transcript, 28 Mar. 1944, Imperial War Museum; numerous documents in AA, St.S., “Ungarn,” Bd. 11. The original German candidate for heading the new government had been Bela Imredy. It should be noted that initially the Germans planned a similar operation code-named “Margarethe II” for Romania.

12
The first directive on this general concept, Föhrer Order No. 11 of 8 Mar. 1944, is in Hubatsch,
Hitlers Weisungen,
pp. 243–49; a brief discussion in Ziemke,
Stalingrad to Berlin,
p. 277. The discussion of Hitler’s concept of the
Wellenbrecher,
the “wave breaker,” in
KTB OKW
1944/45, 1: 53–54, confuses the holding of isolated points with the holding of ports in the West which had entirely different purposes and is discussed in this and the following chapters.

13
Ziemke,
Stalingrad to Berlin,
p. 286.

14
The inter-relationbetween the defeats at the front and the name and personnel changes is shown clearly in the entry for 31 Mar. 19441n Dermot Bradley and Richard Schulze-Kossens (eds.),
Tätigkeitsbericht des Chefi des Heerespersonalamtes General der
Infanterie Rudolf Schmundt, 1.10.1942
-
29.10.1944
(Osnabrück: Biblio, 1984).

15
On Soviet anticipation of a possible German pull-back, see Erickson,
Road to Berlin,
p. 169.

16
Ibid., pp. 167–76; Ziemke,
Stalingrad to Berlin,
pp. 248–66; Glantz,
Soviet Military Deception,
pp. 297–306, 308-g.

17
On Soviet planning and deception operations, see Glantz, pp. 348–79; Erickson,
Road to
Berlin,
pp. 189–204,207–15; Ziemke,
Stalingrad to Berlin,
pp. 313–19; Magenheimer, “Das Gesetz des Schwergewichts,” pp. 22–23. Charles G. Fitz Gerald, “Operation Bagration,”
Military Review
44, NO.5 (1964), 59–72, summarizes the then available literature.

18
JIC
⁴⁴
81 (0) Final, “No. 30 Mission [to the Soviet Union]: Report by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee," 8 Mar. 1944, PRO, CAB 119/128, and other documents in this file. On Soviet cooperation in the deception operation, see Hinsley,
British Intelligence
, 5: 111–12.

19
Note the title of William L. Allen,
Anzio: Edge of Disaster.

20
On Mar. 24, 1944, Wilson wrote Brooke that he would soon replace Clark with Patch as commander of the 5th Army (Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers, 14/10/1). On
Patch, whose record on the whole appears superior to Clark’s, see William K. Wyant,
Sandy Patch: A Biography of Lt. Gen. Alexander M. Patch
(New York: Praeger, 1991). He was to command the 7th Army.

21
Note the report by the Japanese military attache Rome, No. 134 of 29 May 1944, NA, RG 457, SRA 11356–62.

22
See Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
3/1: 206–7 note*.

23
Much too slowly for Brooke; see his comments on the diary entry for 7June 19441n Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers, 3/B/XII, f. 957. The Pope’s request was forwarded to London on 26 Jan. 1944; it is quoted in Chadwick,
Britain and the Vatican,
p. 290.

24
See Brooke’s comment on the diary entry of 21 Sep. 19431n Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers, 3/All 0, f. 790.

25
In his memoirs,
Intelligence at the Top
(New York: Doubleday, 1964), pp. 164–65, Eisenhower’s chief of intelligence, Sir Kenneth Strong, expresses the view that it was the closeness of the Salerno landing to disaster which led Eisenhower to insist on control of the heavy bombers.

26
One of the great virtues of David Eisenhower,
Eisenhower at War,
is its emphasis on the key role of the Red Army.

27
Note Schörner’s letter to his friend Himmler of June 18, 1944, urging big transfers to the West and not worrying about landings elsewhere in France, in Imperial War Museum, General Edouard Schörner Papers, Box E 117, AL 2831/2; Magenheimer, “Das Gesetz des Schwergewichts,” pp. 18–25.

28
These deception operations have become the subject of a vast literature, much of it belonging in the category of fiction. Reliable and serious are the pieces by Thomas L. Cubbage in Michael I. Handel (ed.),
Strategic and Operational Deception in the Second World War
(London: Franklin Cass, 1987), pp. 114–74 and 327–46. The piece by Klaus-Jurgen Muller in ibid., pp. 301–26, explains, among other things, the failure of “Fortitude North.” The memoirs of “Garbo,” a central figure in “Fortitude South,” Juan Pujol with Nigel West,
Operation Garbo
(New York: Pocket Books, 1985), are very much worth reading. Ronald Lewin argues that “Fortitude North”
was
partially successful and also believes that the notional British 9th and lOth Armies in the Middle East helped tie down German forces in the Balkans (Rohwer and Jäckel,
Funkaujklärong
, pp. 209, 225–26). There are important additional details in Hinsley,
British Intelligence
, 4: 237–44, 112–17 and other places on “Garbo,” and chap. 14 on security in general; 5: 18ff, 51–52, 75ff, chap. 6, 185ff.