A World at Arms (222 page)

96
On Finland at the Moscow Conference, see Bernd Martin, “Deutsch-sowjetische Sondierungen tiber einen separaten Friedensschluss im Zweiten We Itkrieg,” in Inge

97
Sainsbury,
Turning Point,
pp. 33, 66.

98
Stoler, p. 134, speculates that perhaps the great Red Army successes that fall may have led Stalin to think that a push in the Mediterranean at that time might bring on a German collapse in 1943.

99
See Eden’s memorandum, WP(43) 438, “Western Frontier of the U.S.S.R.,” 5 Oct. 1943, PRO, CAB 66/41.

100
Morton,
Strategy,
pp. 528–29; U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Correspondence between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the Presidents of the U.SA. and
the Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War,
2 vols. (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957), 2: Nos. 64ff.

101
This view, and the steps taken to implement it, are described in the title of Divine’s very fine book:
Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America During World War II.
See pp. 149–55 for Hull’s role in connection with this issue at the Moscow Conference and the unprecedented invitation to him to report to the U.S. Senate on his return.

102
Sainsbury,
Turning Point,
p. 136; cf. ibid., pp. 125–26. In a personal minute of 6 Nov. 1943 Churchill had raised the question whether it would be possible to increase the number of British divisions for Overlord so that the British could carry greater weight in the discussion “and might well enable us to secure any necessary retardation of ‘D’ Day” (PRO, WO 259/77).

103
See WM(43) War Cabinet 147th Conclusions, Confidential Annex, 27 Oct. 1943, and Churchill’s tele. No. 142 to Eden [in Moscow] of 26 Oct. 1943, PRO, CAB 65/40.

104
Matloff,
Strategic Planning
1943–44, p. 268. The 1st Infantry Division was officially assigned to the ETO on Nov. I, and to 1st Army’s VII Corps on Nov. 6; it actually arrived in England on Nov 8. See Society of the First Division [U.S.Army],
Danger Forward: The Story of the First Division in World War II
(Washington, 1947; reprint Nashville: Battery Press, 1980), pp. 419, 421.

105
Brooke’s diary entry for 1 Nov. 1943 (Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers) is more vehement than that in Bryant,
Triumph in the West,
pp. 2: 37–38.

We are to discuss plans for another Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting, and the stink of the last one is not yet out of my nostrils! My God! how I hate those meetings and how weary I am of them! I now unfortunately know the limitations of Marshall’s brain and the impossibility of ever making him realize any strategical situation or its requirements.

In strategy I doubt if he can ever even see the end of his nose. When I look at the Mediterranean I realize only too well how far I have failed in my task during the last 2 years! If only I had had sufficient force of character to swing those American Chiefs of Staff and make them see daylight, how different the war might be.

We should have been in a position to force the Dardanelles by the capture of Crete and Rhodes, we should have the whole Balkans ablaze by now, and the war might have been finished in 1943!!

Instead, to satisfy American short sightedness we have been led into agreeing to the withdrawal of forces from the Mediterranean for a nebulous 2nd front, and have emasculated our offensivestrategy!! it is heartbreaking.

In his post-war comments, Brooke connects this outburst with a bad cold, not having recovered from the strain of the Quebec Conference, and being not far from having a nervous breakdown. That may all be true, but I would be inclined to note the coincidence in timing with the American transfer of troops and the use of the term “nebulous” for Overlord, then scheduled for a date six months later.

106
Roosevelt’s map is reproduced in Matloff,
Strategic Planning
1943–44, facing p. 341; see also Earl F. Ziemke,
The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany
1944–1946 (Washington: GPO, 1975), pp. 120–21.

107
Roosevelt’s letter to Mountbatten of 8 Nov. 1943
(FDR Letters,
2: 1468) is especially important as it gives a good picture of Roosevelt’s views on China and Southeast Asia as he explained them to a person he thought of as a friend and whom he was happy to see in the SEAC position.

108
Dallek,
Roosevelt and Foreign Policy,
pp. 426-29.

109
On the first Cairo Conference, see Sainsbury,
Turning Point,
chap. 7; Stoler,
Politics of the Second Front,
pp. 135–43; Matloff,
Strategic Planning
1943–44, pp. 334–56.

110
Recent accounts of the Teheran meeting in Sainsbury, chap. 8; Stoler, chap. 10; Keith Eubank,
Summit at Teheran
(New York: Morrow, 1985). On this, as on so much else, there is unfortunately little new in Eden’s authorized biography, Robert Rhodes James,
Anthony Eden
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1986), pp. 279–80.

111
By Dec. 9, 1943, the Germans and Japanese knew that Turkey had refused to enter the war and that the Turks believed Stalin had promised Roosevelt to enter the Pacific War after the end of the European War (Kurihara [Ankara] to Tokyo No. 453 of 9 Dec. 1943, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 46871–72).

112
Martin, “Deutsch-sowjetische Sondierungen,” pp. 314–18; Berry,
American Foreign Policy,
pp. 360–63.

113
Note Eden’s report to the British Cabinet on 13 Dec. 1943, PRO, CAB 65/36, 40.

114
Sainsbury,
Turning Point,
chap. 9; Matloff,
Strategic Planning
1943–44, pp. 369–87. See also Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
3/1: 16–17, for the original British ideas for Mediterranean operations.

115
Note Seekriegsleitung, “Niederschrift tiber die Besprechung mit V.Adm. Nomura beim Chef des Stabes der Seekriegsleitung am 18.2.1943,” BAIMA, RM 7/254, f. 48–53; KTB Ski A 42, 21 Feb. 1943, RM 7/45, f. 359–60.

116
Costello,
Pacific War,
pp. 390–91; Kenney,
General Kenney Reports,
chap. 7; Drea,

117
Note Japanese military attache Rome to Tokyo No. 095 of 3 Apr. 1943, NA, RG 457, SRA 01107–8; German naval attache Tokyo to Berlin No. 14, Chefsache, of 14 May 1943, BA/MA, RM 7/254, f. 124–26. Although deception attempts were made to induce the Japanese to believe that an attack might come from the north (see Chapter 10), no such projects were ever developed beyond initial planning; for a recent look at this, see Galen R. Perras, “Eyes on the Northern Route to Japan: Plans for Canadian Participation in an Invasion of the Kurile Islands-A Study in Coalition Warfare and Civil-Military Relationships,”
War
(5
Society
8, No. 1 (May 1990), 100–17.

118
Morton,
Strategy,
pp. 413–15. Important additional details in
Ugaki Diary,
18–25 Apr. 1943, 18 Apr. 1944, pp. 330–31, 350–60 (Ugaki was Yamamoto’s Chief of Staff and survived the shooting down of the plane in which he was being ferried). The latest details from the American side in Richard H. Kohn, “A Note on the Yamamoto Aerial Victory Credit Controversy,”
Air Power History
39, No. 2 (Spring 1992), 42–52. it is indicative

119
16,000 out of 46,000 prisoners of war and 60,000 out of 150,000 Asian forced laborers died (Butow,
Tojo,
p. 5I I). A good recent account in Peter N. Davies,
The Man Behind
the Bridge: Colonel Toosey and the River Kwai
(London: Athlone, 1991).

120
Tokyo (Shigemitsu) to Kuibyshev (Sato) Nos. 420,446, 421 (sic) of 16, 22, 25 May 1943, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 36162, 36555, 37167–68; Kuibyshev to Tokyo Nos. 556, 558, 587, 593 of 17, 21, 21, 23 May 1943, SRDJ 36685–87, 36987–70 (sic), 36971, 36961–62; Tokyo Circular No. 418 of 24 May 1943, SRDJ 37368. In April 19..4 the Japanese were had landed near Vladivostok in the Soviet Far East, and was now flying from England on air raids against Germany. See Shigemitsu to Sato No. 418 of 24 Apr. 1944, and Sato to Shigemitsu No. 846 of 26 Apr. 1944, SRDJ 56581, 56665 (note that both of these 593 of 17, 21, 21, 23 May 1943, SRDJ 36685–87, 36987–70 (sic), 36971, 36961–62; Tokyo Circular No. 418 of 24 May 1943, SRDJ 37368. In April 19..4 the Japanese were alarmed to hear of an American flyer who had been in the Doolittle raid of April 1942, had landed near Vladivostok in the Soviet Far East, and was now flying from England on air raids against Germany. See Shigemitsu to Sato No. 418 of 24 Apr. 1944, and Sato to Shigemitsu No. 846 of 26 Apr. 1944, SRDJ 56581, 56665 (note that both of these documents were decyphered immediately).

121
Tokyo Circular No. 535 of 26 June 1943, NA, RG 457, SRDj 39661–62; Japanese
No. 280 of 28 July 1943, SRA 03127–29; Berlin to Tokyo No. 897 of 4 Aug. 1943, SRDJ 41346–68;
Kido Diary,
26 July 1943, p. 363.

122
Tokyo to Kuibyshev No. 460 of 26 May and No. 547 of 28 Jun 1943, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 37387–88, 39597; Tokyo to Moscow No. 21 of 1 July 1943, SRDJ 40067.

123
Moscow to Tokyo No. 46 of 4 July 1943, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 40170–73; Tokyo to Moscow No. 704 of 12 Aug. 1943, SRDJ 42226.

124
Moscow to Tokyo No. 961 of 24 Aug. 1943, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 42339,47656.

125
Molotov and Sato reassured each other after the Moscow Conference; see Sato’s No. 1375 of 11 Nov. 1943, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 46829–32.

126
The account Lensen,
The Strange Neutrality
chap. 4, can now be supplemented by the intercepted Japanese diplomatic documents of Jan.-Mar. 1944, in NA, RG 457, SRDJ 49897–98, 49566–90, 49616–17, 49726–38, 50128–35,> 49809–13, 50693–94, 50229–30, 52070–71,51808,51815–16,51851–52,52074–77, 54708–9, 56402–3. The text of the concession liquidation treaty is in Lensen, pp. 279–81; an American analysis is in the Weekly G-2 Estimate of 3 Apr. 1944, NA, RG 165, Entry 77, Box 2364, File 6000-Japan, Wkly G-2 Estimates - 1944.

127
Lensen, chap. 5; text of the fisheries agreement in ibid., pp. 281–87. See also Kolb’s “Aufzeichnung tiber das Verhaltnis Japan-Sowjetunion,” 9 Sep. 1943, AA, St.S., “Japan,” Bd. 13, fr. E 541912–17; Sato to Tokyo Nos. 689 and 696 of 1 Apr. 1944, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 55031–34, 56975–76.

128
ADAP,
E, 6, Nos. 15, 36, 41, 68, 364; 7, Nos. 44, 65, 104; Tokyo to Berlin Nos. 841 and 842 of 21 Oct. 1943, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 44625–26, 44623–24. The Japanese were always alert for any signs of a German separate peace with the West, see Tokyo Circular No. 752 of to Nov. 1943, SRA 05836. German propaganda continued to praise all Japanese victories, including the imaginary ones, see, e.g., "Tagesparolen des Reichspressechefs," 6 Nov. 1943, BA, Nadler, ZSg. 115/9.

129
Edward J. Drea, “Missing Intentions: Japanese Intelligence and the Soviet Invasion of Manchuria, 1945,”
Military Affairs
48, NO.2 (1984), p. 67.

130
Note Brooke’s Diary for 30 Sep. 1942, Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers.

131
The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum of 22 Jan. 1943 on “Conduct of the War in the Pacific Theater in 1943” is printed in Morton,
Strategy,
pp. 627–29.

132
See Roosevelt to King and Marshall, 24 Aug. 1942, FDRL, PSF Box 5, King.

133
See Stanley L. Falk, “General Kenney, the Indirect Approach, and the B-29S,”
Aerospace
Historian
28, NO.3 (Sep. 1981), pp. 147–55. The history of the B-291s summarized in Craven and Cate,
Army Air Force,
6: 208–10. See also Steve Birdsall,
Saga of the
Superj Ortress: The Dramatic Story of the
B-29
and the Twentieth Air Force
(Garden City,

134
A good account of the Pacific strategy conference in Morton,
Strategy,
pp. 394–97.

135
Ibid., pp. 447ff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Combined Chiefs of Staff plan for the defeat of Japan of May 19, 1943, is in ibid., pp. 644-48.

136
Ibid., p. 136.

137
Boyle,
China and Japan,
pp. 310–11.

138
A summary in Ch’i,
Nationalist China,
pp. 63–67.

139
Ibid., pp. 98-106.

140
Ibid., pp. 72–74.

141
Note Stimson to Roosevelt, 3 May 1943, FDRL, PSF Box 14, CF War Jan 43-Aug 43.

142
Field Marshal Brooke belonged to the circle of Stilwell’s critics; see his diary for 14 May 1943, Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers. A good general account in Tuchman,
Stilwell.

143
See Mountbatten to Brooke, “SC
4/198C,”
3 Feb. 1944, Liddell Hart Centre,
Alanbrooke Papers, 14/49; Dill’s file of correspondence “30/1 SA” on a great ruckus of Feb.-Mar. 1944 in PRO, CAB 106/329.

144
See Chennault to Roosevelt, 26 Jan. 1944, FDRL, PSF Box I, Army Air Force. On Chennault’s career and views, see Mattha Byrd, Chennault: Giving Wings to the Tiger
(Tuscaloosa, Ala.: Univ. of Alabama Press, 1987).

145
Ch’i,
Nationalist China,
pp. 80–81; Tuchman, pp. 466ff.

146
The best account remains William H. Tunner,
Over the Hump
(New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1964; Washington: GPO, 1985). See also Bliss K. Thome,
The Hump: The Great
Military Airlift of World War II
(Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1965).

147
Note the memorandum by the chief of the Far Eastern Division of War Department G-2 of 13 Feb. 1944, “Japanese Reaction to V[ery]L[ong]R[ange] Operations from Chengtu of 13 Feb. 1944, “Japanese Reaction to V[ery]L[ong]R[ange] Operations from Chengtu Area," in NA, RG 165, Entry 77, Box 2366, F.file 6010–20–Japan.

148
Ch’i,
Nationalist China,
pp. 74–77.

149
Ibid., p. 80.

150
Ibid., pp. 238–39; Boyle,
China and Japan,
chaps. 14–16.

151
Ch’i, pp. 106–11.

152
Letter in Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers, 14/49.