A World at Arms (226 page)

75
See Eisenhower,
Eisenhower at War,
pp. 416-23, 430–34, 438–52, 477–79. Note Montgomery to Simpson for CIGS of 20 Sep. 1944, Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers, 14/32 (which stresses Montgomery’s troubles with the British officers at SHAEF). it is impossible to document, but nevertheless appears likely, that both Eisenhower and the British officers who agreed with him were influenced by their knowledge of Montgomery’s proclivity for slow and steady advances in prior years; the one time he had tried a fast move, in Sicily, it had both disrupted the Allied plan and failed of its object. On the supply problems, see also van Creveld,
Supplying War,
chap. 7.

76
Lamb,
Montgomery,
pp. 200ff, 257–62; Eisenhower,
Eisenhower at War,
pp. 445–46.

77
Lamb, pp. 212–26.

78
The account in ibid., chap. 8, is especially critical of Montgomery, Brereton (the commander of 1 st Airborne Army), and Browning (the corps commander). The account in
Eisenhower at War,
pp. 441–45, 455–56, 459–77, suggests that at the end neither Montgomery nor Eisenhower really wanted to go forward with the operation. Murray, “Ultra,” p. 55, stresses Montgomery’s disregard of ultra information on the SS Panzer divisions near Arnhem. Hamilton, in
Monty,
3: Part 2, considers the Arnhem operation a mistake that Eisenhower should have prevented.

79
WM(44) War Cabinet 91(44) of 17 July 1944, PRO, CAB 65/43.

80
WM(44) War Cabinet 115(44) of 4 Sep. 1944, ibid.

81
On the Soviet June offensive against Finland, see Ziemke,
Stalingrad to Berlin,
pp. 296–303; Erickson,
Road to Berlin,
pp. 204–5, 328–30; Glantz,
Soviet Military Deception,
pp. 351, 358–60.

82
On the situation in July 1944, see esp. the piece by Ernst Klink in Ernst Klink et a I.,
Operationsgebiet östliche Ostsee und der finnisch–baltische Raum
(Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1961), pp. 43ff. See also “Pressekonferenz der Reichsregierung,” 2 July 1944, BA, ZSg. 115/9, f. 27, 32; Japanese military attache Helsinki to Tokyo No. 273 of 29 July 1944, NA, RG 457, SRA 10859–60.

83
On Finland’s leaving the war, see Ziemke,
Stalingrad to Berlin,
pp. 389–91;
Berry,American Foreign Policy and the Finnish Exception
, pp. 418–2 I; German Minister Stockholm to Berlin Nos. 1339 of 18 Aug. and 1402 of 30 Aug. 1944, AA, Gesandtschaft Helsinki, “Drahtberichte geheim 1944,” fro H063444, H063472; Oshima’s No. 867 of 22 Aug. 1944, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 68699–702; Japanese military attache Helsinki to Tokyo No. 334 of I Sep. 1944, SRA 11307–8; documents in BAlMA, PG 39690; “Pressekonferenz der Reichsregierung,” 12 Sep. 1944, BA, ZSg. 115/10, f. 32; Henrick S. Nissen (ed.),
Scandinavia during the Second World War
(Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1983), pp. 280–84 with helpful maps. Thede Palm,
The Finnish-Soviet Armistice Negotiations of
1944 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1971), is important for the period up to the signing of the armistice; Tuomo Polvinen, “Zur Vorgeschichte des finnisch–sowjetischen Vertrages tiber Freundschaft, Zusammenarbeit und gegenseitigen Beistand wahrend der Jahre 1944–1945,”
Jahrbucherfür Geschichte Osteuropas
30, No.2 (1982), 227–29, is useful for the subsequent negotiations. The Soviets agreed to pay the British-controlled International Nickel Co. compensation for its mines in the Petsamo area (Foreign Office note of 30 Sep. 1944, N 5768/132/56, PRO, Fa 371/43175).

84
On operation “Tanne” to seize Suursaari (Hogland), see Ursula von Gersdorffs piece in
Operationsgebiet östliche Ostsee,
pp. 143–82; the essay by Admiral Otto Schulz of Oct. 1945, in C
8254/8254/18,
PRO, Fa 371/47019; and the most recent analysis in the PhD dissertation by Davis Grier, “Hitler’s Baltic Strategy,” University of North Carolina, 1991.

85
On the Soviet offensive in the north and the German withdrawal, see Ziemke,
Stalingrad to Berlin,
pp. 387–403; Ziemke,
Northern Theater,
chap. 14; Major James F. Gebhardt,
The Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation: Soviet Breakthrough and Pursuit, October
1944 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute, 1990). On Rendulic’s pre-1938 Nazi background, see the documents in NA, T - 120, Cont. 2695, Serial 5705, fr. E 414436, 414650; Historische Kommission des Reichsftihrere SS,
Die Erhebung der österreichischen Nationalsozialisten im Juli
1934 (Vienna: Europa-Verlag, 1965), pp. 227–28. In Oct. 1943 the German general in Croatia quoted Rendulic as saying: “Oh, if I had 20 divisions, I would murder everyone in this country if possible!” (“Ach, wenn ich 20 Divisionen hätte, dann würde ich in diesem Lande alles morden, so gut es ginget” Broucek,
Ein General im Zwielicht,
3: 291). it will be obvious to the reader why Rendulic had such a fabulous career in Hitler’s army.

86
Wilhelm, “Die Prognosen der Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost 1942-1945,” pp. 59–63, summarizes the evidence on the German side; Glantz,
Soviet Military Deception,
pp. 36079, brings together Soviet deception schemes and the evidence of the Germans falling for them.

87
Accounts in Ziemke,
Stalingrad to Berlin,
chap. 15; Erickson,
Road to Berlin,
chap. 5; still useful, Hermann Gackenholz, “Der Zusammenbruch der Heeresgruppe Mitte im Sommer 1944,”
VjZ
3 (1955), 317–33. Recent studies include Rolf Hinze,
Der Zusammenbruch der Heeresgruppe Mitte im Osten 1944 (Stuttgart: Motorbuch, 1980); Gerd Niepold, Mittlere Ostfront Juni 1944: Darstellung, Beurteilung, Lehren
(Herford: Mittler, 1985).

88
Sato No. 1444 of 17 July 1944, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 64921. There is a picture in Ziemke,
Stalingrad to Berlin,
p. 330; another in Jacobsen and Dollinger,
Zweite Weltkrieg,
3: 4445. For the origins of the idea, see Volkogonov,
Stalin,
pp. 476–77.

89
See Ziemke,
Stalingrad to Berlin,
p. 327; transcript of Jod I Diary, 16 Sep. 1944, Imperial War Museum; very detailed account in Grier.

90
On the northern sector of the front, see Ziemke,
Stalingrad to Berlin,
pp. 327–29, 333–36, 338–43; Erickson,
Road to Berlin,
pp. 307–26.

91
On German army Chief of Staff Guderian’s trip to Budapest on 31 Aug. 1944 to discuss the defense of Hungary, see Hennyey,
Ungarns Schicksal zwischen Ost und West,
p. 64. On Soviet deception operations before the operations toward Lwow and Lublin, see Glantz,
Soviet Military Deception,
pp. 379–409.

92
Two books on the Majdanek trial are useful: Heiner Lichtenstein,
Majdanek: Reportage eines Prozesses
(Frankfürtl M: Europaische Verlagsanstalt, 1979); Karl Sauer,
KZ Majdanek: Report uber das Vernichtungslager und uber den Majdanekprozess,
3d ed. (FrankfürtlM: Roderberg-Verlag, 1979). A short account in English in Konnilyn G. Feig,
Hitler’s Death Camps: The Sanity of Madness
(New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979), pp. 313–32.

93
On the uprising, see the still useful account by its commander, Tadeusz Bor-Komorowski,
The Secret Army
(New York: Macmillan, 1951); also Lukas,
Forgotten Holocaust,
chap. 7; Joanna K.M. Hanson,
The Civilian Population and the Warsaw Uprising of
1944 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1982); Janusz K. Zawodny,
Nothing but Honor: The Story of the Warsaw Uprising
, 1944 (London: Macmillan, 1978). For the German operations to crush the uprising, see Hans von Krannhals,
Der Warschauer Aufstand
1944 (Frankfürtl M: Bernard & Graefe, 1962).

94
Note that in early October the Polish Communist Party’s line was changed with Stalin’s approval or at his urging to one of fighting the AK rather than establishing a national front with it Gaime Reynolds, “‘Lublin’ versus ‘London’ - The Party and the Underground Movement in Poland, 1944–1945,”
JCH
16 [1981], 628–34).

95
On the British effort, see the material in PRO, FO 371/39492, 39494–96, AIR 8/1156, 1169; Slessor No. 581 to RAF HQ 20 Sep. 1944, AIR 8/1170. On the U.S. effort, see Lukas,
Eagles East
, pp. 202–7; Roosevelt to Leahy, 29 Sep. 1944, and Leahy to Roosevelt, 30 Sep. 1944, FDRL, PSF Box 66, Poland Sept.-Dec. 1944; Diane T. Putney,
Ultra and the Army Air Forces in World War II: An Interview with Associate Justice of the U.S.
Supreme Court Lewis F. Powell Jr.
(Washington: GPO, 1987), pp. 44–45; Neil D. Orpen,
Airlift to Warsaw: The Rising of
1944 (Norman, Okla.: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1984).

96
See C 11440/1077/55, PRO, FO 371/39494.

97
See Harriman to Roosevelt, Nos. 3021, 3028 of 17 Aug. 1944, and Hull to Roosevelt 19 Aug. 1944, FRDL, PSF Box 66, Poland, Aug. 1944; Michael Burleigh,
Germany Turns Eastwards: A Study of “Ostforschung” in the Third Reich
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989), p. 235.

98
In 1983 a distinguished Soviet historian privately confirmed that the halt before Warsaw was political, not military, in origin.

99
Note the documents cited in n. 97, above, and Beaumont,
Comrades in Arms,
pp. 182–83

100
An account by Anna Josko, “The Slovak Resistance Movement,” in Victor S. Mamatey and Radomjr Luza (eds.),
A History of the Czechoslovak Republic,
1918–1948 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1973), chap. 13. Still useful, Peter A. Toma, “Soviet Strategy in the Slovak Uprising of 1944,”
Journal of Central European Affairs
19 (1959), 290–98. The closer coordination between the uprising and the Soviets–and the availability and use of Red air force planes–didnot make for a different outcome. See Erickson,
Road to Berlin,
pp. 290–307. A journalistic account, important for its interview material, is Wolfgang Venohr,
Aufstand für die Tschechoslowakei
(Hamburg: Christian Wegner, 1969).

101
Stafford,
Britain and European Resistance,
pp. 185–87; documents in PRO, Fa 371/38941–44.

102
Ziemke,
Stalingrad to Berlin,
chap. 16; Erickson,
Road to Berlin,
pp. 346–69; Glantz,
Soviet Military Deception,
pp. 409–27. An account extensively using Romanian materials, Hie Ceausescu, Florin Constantiniu and Michael E. Ionescu,
A Turning Point in World War II:
23
August
1944
in Romania
(New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1985). The head of the German military mission in Romania, General Erik Hansen, has some interesting comments in Institut für Zeitgeschichte, ZS 1130. There is a helpful summary in Peter Gosztony, “Rumanien im August 1944,”
Osterreichische Militärische Zeitschriji
18, No. 1 (1980), 48–54. The account in Hillgruber,
Hitler, König Carol
, pp. 209ff, can still be consulted.

103
Arnold to Roosevelt, 22 Sep. 1944, FDRL, PSF Box 105, War Dept., Arnold 1942–45.

104
Oshima to Tokyo No. 946 of 6 Sep. 1944, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 70124–28; “Pressekonferenz der Reichsregierung,” 31 Aug. 1944, BA, ZSg. 115/9, f. 161.

105
See Wilson to Brooke, 24 Sep. 1944, Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers, 14/45.

106
Note the comment of Field Marshal von Weichs of Oct. 1944(?) that the Bulgarians seemed to fight better under Russian direction (BAlMA, N 19/3, F 3111944).

107
Hoppe,
Bulgarien,
p. 183 and n 68; “Pressekonferenz der Reichsregierung,” 10 Sep. 1944, BA, ZSg. 115/10, f. 24.

108
Hennyey,
Ungarns Schicksal zwischen Ost und West,
pp. 166–67; see also Donovan to Roosevelt, 16 Oct. 1944, FDRL, PSF Box 169, OSS Oct. 1944.

109
A detailed account in Macartney,
October Fifteenth,
2: chap. 18. See also his “Ungarns Weg aus den Zweiten Weltkrieg,”
Vi Z
14 (1966), 79–103.

110
See Szollosi-Janze,
Die Pfeilkreuzlerbewegung in Ungarn.

111
Ziemke,
Stalingrad to Berlin,
p. 364.

112
See Kurihara (Ankara) to Tokyo, 7 Aug. 1944, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 67235–36.

113
Notes by von Weichs on the evening conference of 23 Aug. 1944 at Hitler’s headquarters, BA/MA, N 19/3, f. 207–1944.

114
Ziemke,
Stalingrad to Berlin,
pp. 365–78; Hondros,
OCtupation and Resistance,
pp. 195ff.

115
The Germans held Memel until Jan. 22, 1945. On the successful Soviet deception of the Germans before this offensive, see Glantz,
Soviet Military Deception,
pp. 433–42.

116
See Grier, “Hitler’s Baltic Strategy,” passim.

117
For such a report, see Japanese naval attache Berlin to Tokyo No. 339 of 17 Aug. 1944,
NA, RG 457, SRNA 219

118
The account in Fleischhauer,
Sonderfrieden,
pp. 228–64, stresses the contacts of the German opposition and the impact of the July 20 coup attempt. But see Ziemke,
Stalingrad to Berlin,
pp. 404–5. Most important are the Japanese diplomatic documents: Shigemitsu (Tokyo) to Oshima (Berlin), Nos. 594 of 24 Aug., 615 and 616 of 29 Aug., 662 of 31 Aug. 1944, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 68635, 69162–64, 69165–66, 62698; Oshima to Tokyo Nos. 881 of 25 Aug., 944 of 5 Sep., 961 of 7 Sep. 1944, SRDJ 68848–49, 70101–13, 70336; Shigemitsu to Sato (Moscow) Nos. 116o, 1161 of 30 Aug. 1944, SRDJ 695056,69451–52; Sato to Shigemitsu No. 1788 of 2 Sep. 1944, SRDJ 69721–24. Cf. Stahmer to Ribbentrop No. 2323 of 25 Aug. 1944, AA, Handakten Ritter, Bd. 4–5, fr. 363343-
44;
ADAP,
E, 8, No. 223 (this is a report on Oshima’s conversations with Hitler and Ribbentrop on 4 Sep. 1944 and is the answer to the preceding document listed in this note; there is a serious transcription error on p. 429 where “unmoglich” [impossible] has been misread as “moglich” [PossibleD; Shigemitsu to Oshima No. 670 of 14 Sep. 1944, SRDJ 71205–8; Oshima to Shigemitsu No. 1054 of 26 Sep. 1944, SRDJ 72699–701; Oshima’s No. 1266 of 10 Nov. 1944 on a conversation with Goebbels the night before, SRDJ 78178–79; Shigemitsu to Sato No. 1694 of 24 Nov. 1944, SRDJ 79853–55; Oshima to Shigemitsu No. 1367 of 2 Dec. 1944, SRDJ 81008–13. See also the U.S. Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section, “Japanese Estimates of Germany’s Ability to Continue the Struggle,” 22 Jan. 1945, NA, RG 457, SRH-066, f. 7–8. In the discussions, the Japanese were especially generous on the concessions to be made by the Germans.