A World at Arms (225 page)

29
Forrest C. Pogue,
The European Theater of Operations: The Supreme Command
(Washington: GPO, 1954), p. 199.

30
The best account remains Alan F. Wilt,
The Atlantic Wall: Hitler’s Defenses in the West,
1941–1944 (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State Univ. Press, 1975).

31
According to a report by the Japanese naval attache in Berlin to Tokyo (No. 02014–44 of 6 June 1944), German air reconnaissance photos of 28 Apr. 1944 had revealed new large type pontoons which could be flooded. it was believed in the German navy that these might be floated to cliffs and used for temporary harbors (NA, RG 457, SRNA 1525). Salewski’s study of the German naval high command in World War II shows that no serious conclusions were ever drawn
(Seekriegsleitung,
2: 431). On the Mulberries, see Alfred B. Stanford,
Force Mulberry: The Planning and Installation of the Artificial Harbor off U.S. Normandy Beaches in World War II
(New York: Morrow, 1951). The whole concept and its being pushed forward vigorously was undoubtedly due in large part to Churchill’s personal interest.

32
For a summary account of the three systems devised for supplying gasoline and other petroleum products for Overlord, see Roland G. Ruppenthal,
The European Theater of Operations: Logistical Support of the Armies
(Washington: GPO, 1953), 1: 322–25.

33
See Wilt,
The Atlantic Wall,
pp. 143, 206 n 13. The German belief in a forthcoming
landing in the area between Calais and Le Havre can be followed in the reports of the Japanese naval attache in Berlin which were read by the Americans, see his reports of 7, 10, 14, 22, 24 July 1944, NA, RG 457, SRNA 1873, 1886, 1965, 2009, 2020–21. It is not until his No. 308 of 7 Aug. 1944 (SRNA 2097) that the Germans were reported as thinking a second Channel landing unlikely.

34
Eisenhower,
Eisenhower at War,
p. 220. See Ralph C. Greene and Oliver E. Alen, “What Happened off Devon,”
American Heritage
36, No.2 (1985), 26–35; Edwin P. Hoyt,
The Invasion bef Ore Normandy: The Secret Battle of Slapton Sands
(New York: Stein Day, 1985). Much was made in the I980s of the alleged concealment of this incident; in fact the major details had been published decades earlier in the army and navy official histories (Harrison, p. 270; Morison,
US Naval Operations
, 1I: 66).

35
Note Roosevelt to Marshall, 2 June 1944, FDRL, PSF Box 5 Marshall.

36
Lamb,
Ghosts of Peace,
p. 233; Tuvia Ben-Moshe, “Winston Churchill and the ‘Second Front’: A Reappraisal,”
JMH
62 (1990), 503–38.

37
Of the many accounts, see Eisenhower,
Eisenhower at War,
pp. 231–34; Morison,
US Naval Operations,
11: 69–70. Montgomery’s presentation is in Hamilton,
Monty,
2: 570–78. On British doubts, hesitations, and the waning strength behind those doubts, see Max Hastings,
Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), pp. 22–26.

38
See
Eisenhower Papers,
3: 1894–95; Eisenhower,
Eisenhower at War,
pp. 239–42, 252–53; Morison, 11: 82 n 5. John Keegan’s
Six Armies in Normandy,
chap. 2, is an especially good account of the American 10l St Airborne Division’s drop.

39
Dieter Ose,
Entscheidung im Westen,
1944:
Der Oberbefehlshaber West und die Abwehr der alliierten Invasion
(Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1982), pp. 72–73, gives the figures as 1,873,000 men including 950,0001n the army, Waffen-SS and air force ground units, with about 1370 tanks.

40
On the Indian Legion and Hitler’s later comments on it, see Heiber,
Hitlers Lagebesprechungen,
pp. 939–40.

41
Tokyo to Berlin Nos. 477–78 of 3 July 1944, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 66043–45.

42
The details can be followed in Wilt,
The Atlantic Wall,
and Ose,
Entscheidung im Western.

43
A good map in Ose, p. 58.

44
There are important materials on D-Day in the Ismay files, Liddell Hart Centre, 11/3/278/1, 2a. The British Army Operational Research Group report, “Casualties and Effects of Fire Support on the British Beaches in Normandy,” of 21 Apr. 1945, in PRO, WO 106/4447, reviews the British effort; see WO 106/4468 for the German opposition. The Canadians had the good fortune at Juno beach that the Germans had withdrawn a division to send East and replaced it with a very weak unit (Keegan,
Six Armies in Normandy,
pp. 128–31). The best accounts of D-Day remain the American and British official histories by Pogue, Harrison, Ellis, Morison, and Roskill. Some interesting new material in Hamilton,
Monty,
2; Lamb,
Montgomery;
Ose,
Entsheidung im Westen;
Hastings,
Overlord;
and Eisenhower,
Eisenhower at War.
On the serious impact of bad weather on air support as well as on the landing of supplies, see the historical record of Leigh-Mallory’s headquarters in PRO, AIR 37/1057.

45
An account of the movement of the 2nd SS Panzer Division “Das Reich,” infamous for the Oradour massacre, from southern France to Normandy, 450 miles in more than two weeks, is in Max Hastings,
Das Reich: The March of the 2nd
SS
Panzer Division Through France
(New York: Jove, 1983). The combat narrative of this book is dependable; its broader analysis of the SS flawed by Hastings’s unfamiliarity with its structure and personnel policies (see p. 13).

46
On the German shock at what they considered the early fall of Cherbourg, see “Streng vertraulicher Informationsbericht,” 28 June 1944, BA, ZSg. 115/8, f. 95; Heiber,
Hitlers
Lagebesprechungen,
p. 600; Dönitz’s comments on 24–25 Aug. 1945, Salewski,
Seekriegsleitung
, 2: 645.

47
A summary in Gordon A. Harrison,
Cross-Channel Attack
(Washington: GPO, 1951), pp. 441–42.

48
Very instructive is Montgomery’s letter to Brooke, M 501 of 13 June 1944, in Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers, 14/26/6. The postscript Montgomery added on the morning of the 14th shows the first signs of change as more German armored divisions move toward the British front. This letter clearly shows that Montgomery originally hoped to break through but then adapted to the new situation–pretendingafterwards that he had planned this all along. A good map in Hamilton,
Monty,
2: 651.

49
See Montgomery’s M 5021, in Liddell Hart Centre, quoted in ibid., pp. 663–64.

50
Montgomery to Brooke, M 511 of 14 July 1944, Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers, 14/28. The accompanying map shows the 7th Armored Division taking Falaise.

51
Charles J. Dick, “The Goodwood Concept - Situating the Appreciation,”
Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies
127 (March 1982), 22–28; Keegan,
Six Annies in Nonnandy,
chap. 5; Hastings,
Overlord,
pp. 230–43; Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
3/2: Appendix 18.

52
For example, on June 11, 1944, Hitler ordered II SS Panzer Corps from the Eastern Front back to the West. Its movement took until June 28 (Keegan, p. 179).

53
In the period June 6 - July 23 both sides had suffered something over 110,000 casualties, but the Germans had received only 10,000 replacements (Pogue,
Supreme Command,
p. 194).

54
See Scheidt Papers, Institut für Zeitgeschichte, B 2, f. 299–300; Frau Junge (Traudl Humps) material, Institut fur Zeitgeschichte, f. 86.

55
On Churchill’s advocacy of using poison gas and the arguments over this issue, see Bernstein, “Churchill”; Harris and Paxman,
A Higher Fonn of Killing,
pp. 126–35; Gellermann,
Der Krieg,
pp. 168–72, 249–51. On July 13 Churchill asked Stalin for access to the German firing test range at Blizna, which the Red Army had overrun, but the Russians waited for two months before allowing British observers there (Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
3/1: 446n). It should be noted that the Germans were also considering the use of gas at this time to attack the Allied beachhead but decided against it for fear of retaliation. See Muller, “Gaskriegsvorbereitungen,” pp. 45–46; Oshima to Tokyo No. 822 of 12 Aug. 1944, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 67480.

56
For Hitler’s views and speeches at this time, see Wilhelm, “Hitlers Ansprache,” pp. 134, 162 n 24;
Rommel Papers,
pp. 475–78; “Streng vertraulicher Informationsbericht,” 28 June 1944, BA, ZSg. 115/8, f. 93–95; Reichspropagandaamt Berlin, “Sondertagesparole des Reichspressechefs,” 3 July 1944, BA, ZSg. 115/18, f. 40–42. Quite revealing, frank, and detailed are Oshima’s reports to Tokyo Nos. 621 of 23 June and 626 of 24 June 1944, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 62519–20, 62688–94.

57
John J. Sullivan, “The Botched Air Support of Operation Cobra,”
Parameters-U.S. Army War College Quarterly
18, No. 1 (1988), 97–110, is the best account available.

58
General Heinrich Eberbach replaced Geyr von Schweppenburg as commander of Panzer Group West.

59
A key figure in the tactical air support operations was U.S. Air Force General Elwood R. (Pete) Quesada. There is a useful sketch of his career and role in John L. Frisbee (ed.),
Makers of the United States Air Force
(Washington: GPO, 1987), pp. 177–204. The Germans kept using up what fighter reinforcements they could bring forward in vain efforts to cope with the rapidly changing situation in the West, and therefore could never build up an adequate reserve for defense against the bomber fleets assailing Germany (Boog,
Luftwaffenj Uhrung,
p. 136).

60
On the German attack at Mortain, see Pogue,
Supreme Command,
pp. 206–9; Ose,
Einscheidung im Westen,
pp. 222–32. For the use of ultra in coping with the attack, see
Ronald Lewin,
Ultra Goes to War
(New York: Mc Graw-Hill, 1978), pp. 337–40; Adolph G. Rosengarten, Jr., “With Ultra from Omaha Beach to Weimar, Germany - A Personal View,”
Military Affairs
42, NO.3 (1978), p. 129.

61
On the Falaise pocket, see Pogue,
Supreme Command,
pp. 208–17; Ose,
Einscheidung im Westen,
pp. 232–59; Hastings,
Overlord,
pp. 293–319; Lamb,
Montgomery,
pp. 167–78; Hamilton, 2: 756–84; Russell F. Weigley,
Eisenhower’s Lieutenants: The Campaigns of France and Germany,
1944–1945 (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana Univ. Press, 1981), pp. 201-(};
mit dem Henker
(Dusseldorf: Droste, 1978), pp. 353–54, von Kluge did not commit suicide but was shot by Jürgen Stroop.

62
This action is the origin of the famous picture of American infantry in battle dress marching through the city - a picture used on the American postage stamp honoring the army. See also Eisenhower,
Eisenhower at War
, pp. 414–16, 424–27.

63
Keegan,
Six Armies in Normandy,
pp. 283–98.

64
The best account is Alan F. Wilt,
The French Riviera Campaign of August
1944 (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1981). See also Arthur L. Funk,
Hidden Ally: The French Resistance, Special Operations, and the Landings in Southern France,
1944 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1992).

65
To keep operations moving in Italy, Alexander was willing to accept Red Army units there (Alexander to Brooke, 18 July 1944, Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers, 14/10/6)

66
The exchanges are printed in Kimball,
Churchill and Roosevelt,
3. See esp. R-577 on p. 232 (Loewenheim No. 401). See Eisenhower,
Eisenhower at War,
pp. 387–90, on the Brittany project.

67
Relevant documents in AA, Nachlass Renthe-Fink, Paket 5; Mitani (Vichy) to Tokyo Nos. 249 of 19 July and 265 of 6 Aug. 1944, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 65150–52, 66834–35; Tokyo Circular 5699 of 21 Sep. 1944, SRDJ 72609–10; Japanese military attache Berlin to Tokyo No. 416 of 17 Oct. 1944 on the situation in Sigmaringen, SRA 12970–75. See also Bertram B. Gordon,
Collaborationism in France during the Second World War
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1980), chap. 11. Needless to say, when the Germans used “force” to remove the Vichy regime first to Belfort and then to Sigmaringen, there was no resistance. On a supposed effort by Pétain to contact the Allies, see Z 6331/6331/17, PRO, FO 371/42096 (this is the message referred to in Thomas,
Britain and Vichy,
p. 177).

68
See the reports of the Japanese military attache in Vichy of 10 and 17 July 1944, NA, RG 457, SRA 1009CHJ 1, 12445–46.

69
The text is published in Heiber,
Hillers Lagebesprechungen,
pp. 584–609. It is from a collection different from that on which Felix Gilbert,
Hitler Directs His War
(New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1950), is based and therefore not to be found there. A summary is in Pogue,
Supreme Command,
pp. 201–3.

70
See Ose,
Entscheidung im Westen,
p. 252; Heiber,
Hillers Lagebesprechungen,
p. 686 n 5. On the Channel Islands being held until May 1945, see Cruikshank,
The German Occupation of the Channel Islands,
chap. 12.

71
Salewski,
Seekriegsleitung,
2: 432, 448, 484–89.

72
Hans-Georg von Studnitz,
Als Berlin brannte: Diarium der Jahre
1943–1945 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1963), 28 Sep. 1944.

73
Montgomery to Brooke, M/92 of 14 Aug. 1944, Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers, 14/30; L. F. Ellis,
Victory in the West,
Vol I:
The Battle of Normandy
(London: HMSO, 1962), 1: 453.

74
This summary of the argument is supported by Lamb,
Montgomery,
p. 4I I, but not by Hamilton,
Monty,
2. On the promotion, the text of Brooke’s diary for 30 Aug. 19441n Bryant, 2: 197, is rather different from that in the original at the Liddell Hart Centre. On Montgomery’s effort to fire General Henry Crerar, the commander of Canadian 1st
Army, see Lamb,
Montgomery,
pp. 252–57; on his relations with the Poles, see, e.g., ibid., pp. 73–74.