A World at Arms (192 page)

120
Halifax,
Fulness of Days
, p. 229, gives his own view of the .circumstances of the speech.

121
Text in Domarus,
Hitler
, 2: 1540–59.

122
On July 23 Churchill explained to a Member of Parliament that there was no need to go into detail in the government’s answer to Hitler since the government had formulated and publicly announced its policy in October 1939 (Churchill to R.R. Stokes, PRO, PREM 4/100/2). He replied similarly to the King of Sweden on August 3 (PREM 4/100/3). See also
ADAP
, D, 10, Nos. 65, 220, 236; Record of interview with Dr. Albert Plesman, Institut fur Zeitgeschichte, ZS 115; Hewel to Max von Hohenlohe, 30 June 1940, AA, Handakten Hewel, “Deutschland E-H,” fr. 371067–70.

123
WM(40) War Cabinet 181(40) of 25 June 1940, PRO, CAB 65/7’ Churchill’s first message to Roosevelt as Prime Minister called attention to the forthcoming exhaustion of Britain’s ability to pay.

124
ADAP
, D, 8, Nos. 655, 659; Hugh Wilson to FDR, 7 Mar. 1940, FDR to Wilson, 15 Mar. 1940, FDRL, PSF Box 90, State, Jan.-Mar. 1940.

125
ADAP
, 0, 9, Nos. 141, 163; Weinberg,
World in the Balance
, pp. 53–74.

126
Compare
ADAP
, 0, 9, No. 127, p. 153, with Bureau of Demobilization, Civilian Production Administration,
Industrial Mobilization for War: History of the War Production Board and Predecessor Agencies
, Vol. 1 (Washington: GPO, 1947), 1: 542. Similarly, see the reaction to Siebel to Udet of 7 Oct. 1940, DRuZW, 5: 527–28, 573–74.

127
See Morgenthau Presidential Diary, 24 Jan. 1940, FDRL, Morgenthau Papers, 2: 420, 28 June 1940, 3: 598–99; cf. Cole,
Roosevelt and Isolationists
, pp. 388–89; Lothian to Halifax, 28 Dec. 1939, A 384/39/45, PRO, FO 371/24233.

128
FDR Letters
, 2: 1045–48; Samuel Rosenman, (who prepared a draft of a speech for
FDR declining the nomination), FDRL, Oral History Transcript, pp. 150–51; Rosenman,
Working with Roosevelt
(New York: Harper, 1952).

129
Thomas F. Troy,
Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agenry
(Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, 198 I), pp. 29–3 I; Donald R. Mc Coy,
Landon of Kansas
(Lincoln, Neb.: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1966), pp. 215–19, 431–38; Forrest C. Pogue,
George C. Marshall
, 3 vols. (New York: Viking Press, 1963–73), 2: 39–42. .See also the Japanese report, in Washington to Tokyo No. 934 of 22 June 1940, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 4876–79. The retiring Secretary of the Navy (who was about to run for Governor of New Jersey) urged Roosevelt to appoint Rear Admiral Ernest J. King as Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. fleet in order to shake the navy out of its peacetime psychology (Edison to Roosevelt, 24 June 1940, FDRL, PSF Box 82, Navy, Charles Edison).

130
On German spies in the United States, see David Kahn,
Hitler’s Spies
(New York: Macmillan, 1978).

131
Some documents on these efforts have been published in
ADAP
, D, 8–1 I, note esp. 10, No. 112. See also Boelcke,
Kriegspropaganda
, p. 307; Schoenfeld to Moffat, 20 and 24 Jan. 1940, Moffat Papers, Vol. 18; “Besondere Bestellung fur die Redaktion,” 29 Mar. 1940, BA, Brammer, ZSg. 101/15, f. 158; KTB Skl A, 10, 3 June 1940, BA/MA, RM
7/13
, f. 19–20. Cf. Muto (San Francisco) to Tokyo No. 109 of 28 June 1941, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 34172–74.

132
For a perceptive analysis of the domestic American repercussions of the fall of France, see J. Henriette Louis, “Reactions americaines a la defaite franc;aise de 1940,”
Revue d’histoire de fa deuxième guerre mondiale
, No. 119 (July 1980), 1–16.

133
There is an excellent examination of this in Michaela Honicke, “Franklin D. Roosevelt’s View of Germany before 1933: Formative Experiences of a Future President,” MA thesis, Univ. of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1989.

134
On this concern, see Dallek,
Roosevelt and Foreign Poliry
, pp. 233–35.

135
FDR Letters
, 2: 1016; Stanley E. Hilton,
Hitler’s Secret War in South America, 1939–1945: German Military Espionage and Allied Counterespionage in Brazil
(Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1981), p. 190; Conn and Fairchild,
Framework
, passim, esp. pp. 32–34, 47–48. On contingency planning against the possibility of the surrender of the British fleet, see the 22 May 1940 memorandum from the files of the Chief of Naval Operations in NA, RG 38, Box 245, Records of the CNO, Headquarters Cominch 1942-Secret (I am indebted to Prof. Michael Gannon for reference to this document).

136
Pogue,
Marshall
, 2: 18.

137
Dallek,
Roosevelt and Foreign Poliry
, pp. 221–22.

138
Pogue,
Marshall
, 2: 28–32. See also Richard G. Davis, “Carl A. Spaatz and the Development of the Royal Air Force – U.S. Army Air Corps Relationship, 1939–1940,”
Journal of Military History
54 (1990), 453–72.

139
Borg and Okamoto,
Pearl Harbor
, p. 218.

140
Ibid., p. 43;
FDR Letters
, 2: 969; Dallek, pp. 236–37;
ADAP
, D, 8, No. 573.

141
Cole,
Roosevelt and Isolationists
, p. 354; Robert J.C. Butow,
Tojo and the Coming of the war
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1961), p. 191; Herbert Feis,
The Road to Pearl Harbor
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1950), pp. 88–94; Michael A. Barnhart,
Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security
, 1919–1941 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1987), pp. 184ff; Jonathan G. Utley, “Upstairs, Downstairs at Foggy Bottom: Oil Exports and Japan, 1940–41,"
Prologue
8, No. 1(1976), 17–28.

142
Note the comment of the American naval commander in East Asia to the Chief of Naval Operations on holding down expenditures in the Philippines: “Anno 1946 is not far away.” Hart to Stark, 12 Apr. 1940, FDRL, PSF Box 79, Navy Dept. Jan.-Aug. 1940. On Hart’s appointment, see James Leutze, A
Different Kind of Victory: A Biography of Admiral Thomas C. Hart
(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1981), chap. 6.

143
War Cabinet 38
³⁹
of 6 Oct. 1939, PRO, CAB 65/3 ,f. 92ff; Halifax to Churchill, 19 Jan. 1940, A 434/434/45, PRO, FO 371/24248. A large selection of the Roosevelt-Churchill correspondence was first published by Francis L. Loewenheim
et al.
(eds.),
Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence
(New York: E.P. Dutton, 1975); a fuller one has been edited in 3 vols. by Warren F. Kimball,
Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence
(Princeton N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984).

144
The collection of these reports is in FDRL, PSF Great Britain, Boxes 50–52, 47, 48. After Mar. 3, 1942, they were sent to the Secretariat of the Combined Chiefs of Staff rather than to the White House. A few of the reports from July and Dec. 1941 were published in
Pearl Harbor Attack: Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack,
39 parts (Washington: GPO, 1946), 20: 4545–48.

145
The Tyler Kent Papers are at Yale University as HM-120; the trial transcript included in these papers makes it clear that the Germans received information obtained through him, though other evidence indicates that the spy ring was an Italian one which appears to have been penetrated by the Soviets. See on these issues E.H. Cookridge (pseud. of Edward Spiro),
The Third Man
(New York: G.P. Putnam’s, 1968), pp. 94–98; Reynolds,
Lord Lothian,
p. 17; Gilbert,
Churchill,
6:485–86; Kahn,
Hitler’s Spies,
p. 96 and notes p. 564; David Kahn,
The Codebreakers,
(New York: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 494–95;
Pearl
the Churchill-Roosevelt Correspondence: September 1939-May 1940,”
JCH
10 (1975), 465–91;
ADAP
, D, 9, No. 305; Costello,
Ten Days,
chaps. 5–6, Appendix 5; WM(40) 133 War Cabinet Conclusions, Minute 9, Confidential Annex, PRO, CAB 65/13; Wiley to Moore, 9 Nov. 1934, FDRL, Bullitt Papers; Thomsen (Washington) tel. 4003 of 17 Nov. 1941, AA, St.S., “U.S.A.,” Bd. 10, fr. 44616–18; Schulenburg report “A 509/41,” of 12 Feb. 1941 and note by Luther for Ribbentrop of 26 Feb. 1941, AA, Inland IIg, “Berichte tiber Amerika,” Bd. 2, fr. K 204628–30. Cole
(Roosevelt and Isolationists)
never mentions the Kent episode and thus fails to see its influence on Roosevelt (see p. 460).

146
The article by David G. Haglund, “George C. Marshall and the Question of Military Aid to England, May-June 1940,”
JCH
15 (1980), 745–60, rather overemphasizes the reluctance in Washington but is a useful corrective to earlier accounts.

147
Pogue,
Marshall,
2: 50–52; Gilbert,
Churchill,
6: 427,462,513–15,676.

148
See the note by Eden, then Secretary of State for War, to Churchill of 13 July 1940 stating that American rifles being unloaded from a convoy were issued directly to troops (PRO, PREM 3/54/11).

149
See his handwritten addition to the secret daily military report for 3 June 1940: “You will notice the steady loss of destroyers. The damaged ones are also piling up in our repair yards.” FDRL, PSF Great Britain, Box 50.

150
See his letters of 9 Jan. and 1 June 1940,
FDR Letters,
2: 986, 1036.

151
Very good on this is Reynolds,
Lord Lothian,
pp. 25–29. British pressure could be counter-productive: warnings about the possibility of a successor government in London yielding the British fleet to the Germans endangered the destroyer deal, while emphasis on the Atlantic risked creating pressure to move the American fleet from the Pacific (ibid., pp. 21–22).

152
Bittner,
Britain and Iceland,
p. 119; Fred E. Pollock, “Roosevelt, the Ogdensburg Agreement, and the British Fleet: All Done with Mirrors,”
Diplomatic History
5 (1981), 203–19.

153
Reynolds,
Lord Lothian,
pp. 24–25; Conn and Fairchild,
Framework,
pp. 51–61;
FDR Letters,
2: 1050–51; Dallek, pp. 243–47. A popular account in Philip Goodhart,
Fifty Ships that Saved the World: The Foundation of the Anglo-American Alliance
(Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday, 1965).

154
Note the 17 june 1940 memorandum of Alexander Kirk in FDRL, PSF Germany, 1940–41.

155
See Deborah W. Ray, “The Takoradi Route: Roosevelt’s Prewar Venture beyond the Western Hemisphere,”
Journal of American History,
62, No.2 (1975), 340–58, which concentrates on 1941 but shows the connection to earlier developments. See also the documents in PRO, WO 106/2878, which show the early development of the route, the need to build up defenses on it against a possible attack by Vichy France and the problems associated with the use of German JU-52 transports bought by the Belgians before the war.

156
Vincent C. Jones,
Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb
(Washington: GPO, 1985), pp. 13–15, 21–25,65.

157
See Fritz T. Epstein, “National Socialism and French Colonialism,”
Journal of Central European Affairs
3 (1943),52–64; Bell,
Britain and the Fall of France
pp. 199–201; Charles de Gaulle,
The War Memoirs,
vol. 1 (in 2 parts) (New York: Viking, 1955), 1: 112, 11618. The large island of New Caledonia in the Southwest Pacific turned to de Gaulle in September 1940 under British and Australian pressure: Gavin Long,
The Six Years War: A Concise History of Australia in the 1939–1945 War
(Canberra: Australian War Memorial and Australian Government Publishing Service, 1973), p. 38.

158
Bell, pp. 225–27. Arthur Marder,
Operation “Menace:” The Dakar Expedition and the Dudley North Affair
(London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1976), is the most comprehensive account. Elmar Krautkramer,
Frankreichs Kriegswende
(Bern: Peter Lang, 1989), provides an account (pp. 44–47) but is so biased against de Gaulle (usually referred to as “the rebel’) as to be misleading.

159
See esp.
ADAP
,
D, I I, No. 33. There is to the best of my knowledge no comprehensive study of the various projects to reclaim the area for petain.

160
Churchill’s broadcast of 1 Oct. 1939 is in James,
Churchill Speeches,
6: 6161. Note that early in July 1940 the British preferred Soviet to German control of the Petsamo nickel mines, Gunter Kahle, “Die Publikation des deutschen Weissbuches Nr. 6: Zur Reaktion in London, Moskau, Ankara und Teheran,” p. 456 n 17.

161
The account of the Cripps mission by Gorodetsky is not adequate. There is a useful survey in H. Hanak, “Sir Stafford Cripps as British Ambassador in Moscow, May 1940 to June 1941,”
English Historical Review
94, No. 370 Oan. 1979),48–70. Very helpful is Steven M. Miner,
Between Churchill and Stalin: The Soviet Union, Great Britain and the Origins of the Grand Alliance
(Chapel Hill, N.C.: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1988). 1 have used the reports in the PRO: Cripps’s tels. 399–404, 408, 409 of 1 and 2 July 1940, in N 5937/30/38, FO 371/24844; Kahle, “Die Publikation des deutschen Weissbuches Nr. 6,” pp. 453–54; Cripps’s report of 16 July 1940, N 6526/30/38, FO 371/24845; WP
⁴⁰
254, “Comment on the Recent Conversation between His Majesty’s Ambassador at Moscow and M. Stalin,” PRO, CAB 66/9; the Italian intercept of a report of July 6 by the Greek Minister in Moscow on a conversation with Cripps as passed to the Germans, Mackensen (Rome) tel. 1354 of 15 July 1940, AA, St.S., “Russland,” Bd. 3, fr. 112315–16, and the full text of the decoded Greek telegram forwarded with Mackensen’s report 361 of 16 July in Botschaft Rom (Quir.), Bd. 43/4, fr. 481432–36.

162
DRuZW,
4: 58.