A World at Arms (196 page)

69
Ibid., 12, No. 140. This document records a Soviet instruction explaining acquiescence in Germany’s Balkan push as consistent with the Soviet Union’s most important goal: the destruction of the British empire.

70
Note the report on a conversation with the Soviet assistant military attache in Germany
on 11 Apr. 1941, NA, RG 165, Entry 77, Box 1417, File 6900 Germany, weekly reports.

71
Ueberschar,
Hitler und Finnland
, pp. 263–65; Moscow tel. 1280 of 1 June 1941, AA, St.S., “Russland,” Bd. 5, fr. 113467.

72
ADAP
, D, 12, No. 351; KTB, Marineattache Moskau, Mar.-Apr. 1941, BA/MA, Case 20/3, PG 48803.

73
Details in Weinberg,
Gennany and the Soviet Union
, pp. 161–62.

74
Ibid.; see
also
ADAP
, D, 12, Nos. 280,380,521; KTB Skl A 19, 12 Apr. 1941, BA/MA, RM 7/23. The Soviets also offered new economic negotiations to Italy (Moscow tel. 1046 of 30 Apr. 1941, AA, St.S., “Russland,” Bd. 4, fr. 113383).

75
DRuZW
, 4: 290.

76
ADAP
, D, 12, Nos. 333, 468, 505, 628; Schulenburg (Moscow) to Grosskopf, 29 May 1941, AA, Inland IIg, “Volkstumsfragen gRs," fr. H 297725–27.

77
On this famous speech, of which a reliable text may soon be made available, see
ADAP
, D, 12, No. 593; Hinsley,
British Intelligence
, 1: 466; Erickson,
Road to Stalingrad
, p. 82; Ribbentrop to Mackensen, 19 Dec. 1942, AA, Botschaft Rom (Quir.), Geheim 58/1, “Kriegfuhrung Sowjetrusslands," Bd. I, E 260213–35.

78
Note the comment of the Soviet ambassador in Sweden that her government expected until the last moment that there would be an opportunity for negotiations, in Wied (Stockholm) No. 731 of 24 June 1941, AA, St.S., “Russland," Bd. 5, fr. 113602.

79
KTB Halder
23 June 1941, 3: 8–9;
Leeb KTB
, 22 June 1941, pp. 275–77. British Ambassador Cripps had returned to London in disgust over Soviet appeasement of Germany. He explained to the British Cabinet that the Soviet leadership was willing to make major concessions to Germany. He expected the Soviet Union to hold out no more than three or four weeks in a war but thought they might hang on in Siberia if they could extricate some of their troops; WM(41) War Cabinet 60 of 16 June 1941, Confidential Annex, PRO,
CAB
65/22; compare the account in Gorodetsky,
Stafford Cripps
, pp. 170–72

80
Köstring to Matzky, 21 May 1941, BA/MA, N 123. A detailed study, showing Stalin vetoing projects to interfere with the German buildup in the spring of 1941 by a preventive Red Army offensive, in Timothy P. Mulligan, “‘Stalin’s Surprise’ and German Preventive War: Synonymous or Separate?,” paper at the Conference on “Barbarossa" at the University of Waterloo, May 1991.

81
Barton Whaley,
Codeword Barbarossa
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1973). On the American warnings, based on information provided to the U.S. by Dr. Erwin Respondek, see Waldo Heinrichs,
Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War 11
(New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1988), pp. 21–23, n 11 on pp. 224–25, pp. 88–89; John V. Dippel,
Two against Hitler: Stealing the Nazis’ Best-Kept Secrets
(New York: Praeger, 1992), chaps. 4–5.

82
Hewel Diary, 13 and 20 June 1941, Institut für Zeitgeschichte.

83
KTB Skl A 22, 13 June 1941, BA/MA, RM 7/25, f. 135.

84
KTB OKW
, 14 June 1941, 1: 415;
KTB Halder
, 14 June 1941, 2: 455; Tagebuch von Waldau, 14 June 1941, Institut fur Zeitgeschichte.

85
Hillgruber,
Hitlers Strategie
, pp. 504–8.

86
Hewel Diary, 18–19 June 1941, Institut für Zeitgeschichte;
ADAP
, D, 12, Nos. 654, 655, 662.

87
See
KTB OKW
, 7 Dec. 1940, 1: 227.

88
See Hitler-Hewe1 meeting of June 8, 1941, Hewel Diary, Institut für Zeitgeschichte; draft of directive 32,
ADAP
, D, 12, No. 617, also Walther Hubatsch (ed.),
Hitlers Weisungen für die Kriegführung 1939–1945
(Frankfurt/M: Bernard & Graefe, 1962), pp. 129–35; Karl Klee, “Der Entwurfzur Führer-Weisung Nr. 32 vom 1I. Juni 1941,"
Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau
3 (1956), 127–41 (with silly assertions in the introduction but some important
technical details); “Lagebesprechung beim Chef der Seekriegsleitung,” 23 June 1941, KTB Skl A 22, BA/MA, RM 7/25, f. 283–84.

89
DRuZW
, 4: 182.

90
The best account remains Jäckel,
Frankreich in Hitlers Europa,
chaps. 3–9.

91
See above, pp. 133–34.

92
Halifax to Hoare, 30 July 1940, PRO, Fa 800/323, f. 134–40; Hoare memorandum of 23 Sep. 1940, ibid., f. 183–87; Halifax to Hoare, 29 Sep. 1940, ibid., f. 201–2.

93
ADAP
, D, 10, Nos. 346, 369, 373.

94
Good accounts in Detwiler,
Hitler, Franco
, and Goda, “Germany and Northwest Africa.” See also Weizsacker’s memorandum No. 644 of 9 Aug. 1940, in AA, Botschaft Rom (Quir.), geheim, Bd. 43/5; Huene memorandum of I Oct. 1940, Gesandtschaft Lissabon, “Deutsch-polnischer Krieg,” Bd. 5.

95
Ciano,
Diary
, 1 Oct. 1940, p. 297; Smyth,
British Policy and Franco’s Spain
, pp. 84–93, 98; Hoare No. 816 of3 Oct. 1940, C 10595/113/41, PRO, FO 371/24517; Mr. Garran’s minute of Z 11696/11696/41, FO 371/49663.

96
Hoare memorandum of 18 Oct. 1940, PRO, Fa 800/323, f. 217–19; Hoare No. 506 (Saving) of 22 Oct. 1940, C 11369/113/41, FO 371/24517.

97
See David W. Pike, “Franco and the Axis Stigma,” JCH 17 (1982), 377–39; Smyth,
Diplomacy and Strategy of Survival
, pp. 93–94, 99–105.

98
Charles B. Burdick,
Germany’s Military Strategy and Spain in World War 11
(Syracuse: Syracuse Univ. Press, 1968), chaps. 1–4.

99
Hinsley,
British Intelligence
, 1: 256; Smyth,
British Policy and Franco’s Spain
, pp. 160–63, 169; Hoare No. 816 of 3 Oct. 1940, C 10595/113/41, PRO, Fa 371/24517; Hoare No. 383 (Saving) of 15 Oct. 1940, C 11145/113/41, ibid. The Japanese also learned of Franco’s refusal when Serrano Suñer returned from his Berlin visit; Takata (Madrid) to Tokyo, No. 185 of 3 Oct. 1940, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 7082.

100
ADAP
, D, 11, No. 268, 13, Nos. 122, 391, 403. Documents on support for German warships and the repatriation of crews from German ships by Spain are in AA, Botschaft Madrid, “Seekrieg,” Bd. 1.

101
Detwiler,
Hitler, Franco
, chaps. 4–7; Hillgruber,
Hitlers Strategie
, pp. 178ff, 316ff; Papeleux,
L’Amiral Canaris
, pp. 150–59.

102
The report of Sir Samuel Hoare of 22 Oct. 1940 on a conversation with Franco may be taken as accurately reflecting the latter’s views; C 11492/113/41, PRO, Fa 371/24517.

103
See Hoare’s report No. 1234 of 13 Dec. 1940 on recent Spanish Army Council meetings, C 13404/113/41, ibid.

104
ADAP
, D, 11, Nos. 490, 506, 428, 434; KTB Skl A 15, 21 Nov. 1940, BA/MA, RM 7/18, f. 376.

105
Burdick,
Germany’s Military Strategy and Spain
, chap. 5; KTB SkI A 21, 5 May 1941, BA/MA, RM 7/24, f. 53.

106
A summary of the Italian preparations and the German veto in Knox,
Mussolini Unleashed
, pp. 165–77. See also KTB Skl A 12,28 Aug. 1940, BA/MA, RM 7/15, f. 328; German naval attache Rome to Admiral Bürkner, 24 Aug. 1940, BA/MA, Case 17/3, PG 45171, f. 82–85.

107
Ciano, Diary, 8 Oct. 1940, p. 299. Von Ribbentrop had at least hinted at this ten days earlier, but the Germans had then deliberately kept their actual movements quiet (Knox,
Mussolini Unleashed
, pp. 190, 205–7).

108
Mussolini as quoted in Ciano, Diary, 12 Oct. 1940, p. 300. The concept of equilibrium in Southeast Europe was very important to Mussolini; the prior example was his action in Albania in April 1939 after the German occupation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia in March. The refutation by Knox (
Mussolini Unleashed
, p. 346 n 84) of the doubts expressed by Hillgruber and van Creveld (see Bibliography, p. 930) about this quotation appears to me to be sound. On the other hand, I cannot agree with the view of Knox (p.
209) that the Italian attack on Greece was certain to come at some point. Maybe so–but hardly after the Italian disasters in Africa later in 1940. There is a fascinating translation of the minutes of a meeting on Oct. 15, 1940, in Mussolini’s office in Appendix A of ZM 3420/1176/82, PRO, FO 371/49933’ It shows general enthusiasm for the invasion.

109
A summary of the September negotiations in Knox, pp. ISS-56.

110
Ibid., pp. 191–93. Knox also argues (pp. 196–98) that Ciano wanted to move on Greece in order to have something in hand if the war ended in a compromise peace, but note the report of the Japanese ambassador in Rome on a conversation with Ciano on Sept. 24, in which Amau concludes that Ciano expected a long war (NA, RG 457, SRDJ 691718).

111
Knox, pp. 209–30. Ciano also told the Japanese of the attack on the evening of the 27th (Amau [Rome] to Tokyo No. 1120 of 27 Oct. 1940, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 7479).

112
Clemm von Hohenberg, “Kurzer Uberblick tiber den italienisch-griechischen Krieg 1940/1941 und seiner Vorgeschichte,” BA/MA, N 449/4, f. 2.

113
Ibid., passim (a survey by the former German military attache in Athens); other accounts in Knox, pp. 231–60;
DRuZW
, 3: 394–414.

114
Reconnaissance planes supplied by the U.S. and flown from Malta had helped scout the harbor (Gilbert,
Churchill
, 6: 901). There is some evidence that this attack contributed to Japanese Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku’s fixation on a carrier-launched torpedo attack as the way to strike at the U.S. fleet in Pearl Harbor. It led the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, to warn Hawaii to put in torpedo nets, but the U.S. fleet commander, Admiral Richardson (subsequently replaced by Kimmel), turned the idea down (Prange,
At Dawn
pp. 40, 43, 45–46).

115
The Italians were also always worried about possible German concessions to the French which might allow the latter to build up their military strength in Tunisia on Libya’s western border (Marineattache Rom Bericht “3101/40 Gkds.,” 15 Sept. 1940, BA/MA, Case 17/3, PG 45171).

116
I.S.O. Playfair,
The Mediterranean and Middle East
(London: HMSO, 1954), 1: 190–204, 241–56.

117
Knox,
Musso/ini Unleashed
, pp. 253–56; Playfair, chaps. 14, 15, 19; Gavin Long,
Six Years War
, pp. 54–58;
DRuZW
, 3: 591–98. There is a very interesting file of Italian lOth Army documents of the period May-Dec. 1940 captured by the British at Bardia, in PRO, WO 106/2129.

118
The campaign may be followed in Playfair, chaps. 21–23. The last Italian forces surrendered on May 16, 1941.

119
Ibid., pp. 326–32.

120
On Ciano’s role, see the memorandum of the German embassy Rome, 4 Dec. 1940, AA, Botschaft Rom (Quir.) Geheim 44/3, fr. 481754–63.

121
Knox,
Mussolini Unleashed
, pp. 269–70;
ADAP
, D, 11, No. 731.

122
Full text in James,
Churchill Speeches
, 6: 6322–25.

123
Knox, pp. 260–72, surveys the internal situation in the critical winter months. See also Horikiri (Rome) to Tokyo No. 1221 of 14 Dec. 1940, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 8480. There appears to have been some consideration of defection in the Italian navy beginning in November, 1940, but the evidence is fragmentary; see Denham,
Inside the Nazi Ring
, pp. 133–38; Alberto Santoni,
Ultra siegt im Mittelmeer
(Koblenz: Bernard & Graefe, 1985), pp. 74–77; docs. in R 8939/60/ 22, PRO, FO 371/ 24952; R 530, 1004, 1314, 2070, 2489, 3017, 7013/218/22, FO 371/29940, and PREM 242/1 lA, f. 463–64.

124
See the observation of the Japanese ambassador in Berlin in his tel. No. 119 of 14 Feb. 1941, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 9820.

125
KTB SkI A 13, 9 Sep. 1940, BA/MA, RM 7/16, f. 255–56.

126
Note von Bock Diary, 11 Nov. 1940, BA/MA, N 22/7,
f.I;
ADAP
, D, 11, No. 353. The Germans were also sensitive about Greece as a result of memories of the collapse of
Bulgaria when Allied troops pushed up from the Salonika front in World War I.

127
Wagner, Lagevorträge, pp. 301–4; KTB Skl A 26, 28 Oct. 1941, BA/MA, RM 7/29, f. 474–80.

128
Knox,
Mussolini Unleashed
, p. 272.

129
Playfair,
Mediterranean
, 1: 315–28;
DRuZW
, 3: 599, 606–7; Murray,
Luftwaffe
, p. 76. Fliegerkorps X had more experience in attacks on shipping than most German air force units. See also von Waldau Diary, 3 Dec. 1940, Institut fur Zeitgeschichte.

130
Farnie,
East and West of Suez
, pp. 623ff.

131
Knox, pp. 279–81.

132
Ibid., pp. 279–82; Playfair, 1: 366–68;
DRuZW
, 3: 599–605.

133
ADAP
, D, 11, Nos. 320, 324, 334, 417. The Yugoslav leaders of the time never grasped that once almost completely surrounded by German-controlled territory their own independence would be over.

134
An excellent account in Breccia,
Jugoslavia,
1939–1941, pp. 331–569.

135
On Greek reluctance to allow any British measure likely to be read as menacing Germany, see Robin Higham,
Diary of a Disaster: British Aid to Greece
1940–1941 (Lexington, Ky.: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1986), p. 51; John L. Hondros,
Occupation and Resistance: The Greek Agony,
1941–44 (New York: Pella, 1983), pp. 48–5 I. My interpretation of the peace soundings and their rejection by Hitler differs from that of Knox primarily on the basis of the material in the papers of Clemm von Hohenberg, BA/MA, N 449/4, f. 16–21. See also Ehrengard Schramm-von Thadden,
Griechenland und die Grossmächte im Zweiten Weltkrieg
(Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1955), pp. 217–21; FRUS, 1940, 3: 572;
ADAP
,
D, 11, No. 584,12, Nos. 143, 155, 170, 179, 180, 189. Of interest is the summary of a conference in the high command of the German navy on March 19, 1941: “The Fuhrer has confirmed that even if there is a peaceful solution of the Greek question the whole country is to be occupied” (KTB Skl A 19, BA/MA, RM 7/22, f. 265). The Germans, who were able to read some relevant Greek telegrams, knew that their official pretext for action, namely that there were British troops in Greece, was false (Greek Foreign Ministry to Greek Legation Berlin, 14 Mar. 1941, AA, Botschafter Ritter, “Verschiedenes, Aufzeichnungen, Telegramme,” fr. E 220961–62).