A World at Arms (199 page)

260
Ibid., p. 79.

261
Jones,
Manhattan
, pp. 30–32. Soon after, the President got the navy to convert light cruisers under construction into carriers, another project that worked out in practice (
FDR Letters
, 2: 1226).

262
Dallek,
Roosevelt and Foreign Policy
, p. 270; Schaller,
U.S. Crusade in China
, pp. 36–38.

263
Schaller, pp. 47–51.

264
FDR Letters
, 2: 1233–34.

265
Borg and Okamoto,
Pearl Harbor
, p. 46.

266
FDR Letters
, 2: 1077.

267
Borg and Okamoto, pp. 450–51.

268
An excellent account in Robert J.C. Butow,
The John Doe Associates: Backdoor Diplomacy for Peace, 1941
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1974). It would seem that State Department official Stanley Hornbeck saw through Drought’s action (p. 140), but the project still went forward. See also Barnhart,
Japan Prepares
, pp. 204–7, 219–24.

269
Borg and Okamoto, pp. 149–64; Hilary Conroy, in Richard D. Burns and Edward M. Bennett (eds.),
Diplomats in Crisis: United States-Chinese-Japanese Relations, 1919–1941
(Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-Clio, 1974), pp. 307–9, argues that Nomura deliberately withheld information to help the negotiations along.

270
Note Pogue,
Marshall
, 2: 186ff.

271
FDR to Welles, 19 Feb. 1941, FDRL, PSF Box 96, Welles State Jan.-May 1941. Cf.
FDR Letters
, 2: 1126; Butow,
John Doe Associates
, p. 391.

272
Butow,
John Doe Associates
, chap. 4.

273
Washington to Tokyo No. 98 of 7 May 1941, NA, RG 457, SRA 18359–60 (translated in Aug. 1945).

274
Morley,
Fateful Choice
, pp. 255–62; Barnhart, chaps. 1–2.

275
See Horinouchi No. 1347 of 22 Aug. 1940, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 6935, The conclusion of the conference in Washington was that joining Germany and Italy meant war with Britain and the United States and that thereby Japan would be “drawn into a useless war of exhaustion and this will in the end prove disadvantageous to us.”

276
The relevant documents in F 3782, 3992, 4009, 4071, 4489/43/10 in PRO, FO 371/24668–70, make it clear that this was a British decision made without American encouragement or promises because Britain’s situation in Europe looked better and because the concession which had been made to Japan had strengthened the extremists rather than the moderates in Tokyo. The argument in Frederick W. Marks, III, “The
Origins of FDR’s Promise to Support Britain Militarily in the Far East - A New Look,”
Pacific Historical Review
53 (1984), 447–62, does not stand up.

277
Nigel J. Brailey,
Thailand and the Fall of Singapore: A Frustrated Asian Revolution
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), pp. 91–94; Morley,
Fateful Choice,
pp. 209–34, 283–85. As Matsuoka explained to the Germans, Tokyo wanted “Thai’s lost territory restored ... so that we could better get at British territory” (No. 865 to Berlin, 5 Dec. 1940, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 58329).

278
Berger,
Parties out of Power
, pp. 290–318; Butow,
Tojo
, pp. 158–59.

279
See Konoe’s note on Preliminary Liaison Conference on Tripartite Pact, 14 Sept. 1940, in Morley,
Deterrent Diplomacy
pp. 238–39. See also Morley,
Fateful Choice
, p. 276; Butow,
Tojo
, pp. 161–68.

280
Johanna M. Meskill,
Hitler and Japan: The Hollow Alliance
(New York: Atherton, 1966), pp. 17–22;
ADAP
, D, 11, Nos. 119–21. On earlier German interest in these former colonial territories, see Weizsacker memorandum, “St.S. Nr. 952," 6 Dec. 1939, and Bielfeld memorandum of 15 Dec. 1939, AA, St.S., “Japan," Bd. I; Marinekommandoamt, “2330/39 gKdos.” of 14 Oct. 1939, BA/MA, Case 561, PG 33624.

The other side to this peculiar relationship is that one day after the signing of the Tripartite Pact Lammers had great difficulty getting Hitler’s permission for a German to marry a person of mixed German-Japanese parentage; something permitted in this instance only because it had been allowed before and a change would cause problems. But there would be no repetitions. See Lammers’s memorandum “zu Rk.J.Rot 5.10/B,” 21 Sep. 1940, BA, R 4311/722, f. 58–59.

281
Morley,
Deterrent Diplomacy
, pp. 242, 245–49; Morley,
Fateful Choice
, pp. 49–50, 276; Butow,
Tojo
, pp. 168–77; Borg and Okamoto,
Pearl Harbor
, p. 618 n 38; conference text in Nobutaka Ike (ed.),
Japan’s Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1967), pp. 4–13.

282
Morley,
Fateful Choice
, pp. 275–76; Butow,
Tojo
, pp. 177–83.

283
Netherlands Foreign Office to Sir Nevile Bland, 27 Sep. 1940, F 4368/2739/61, PRO, FO 371/24717. On the mission of Kobayashi Ichizu, see Morley,
Fateful Choice
, pp. 14346; Isigawa (Batavia) to Tokyo No. 1131 of 11 Dec. 1940, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 841214. See also Batavia No. 68 of 12 Oct. 1940, SRDJ 7217–19, No. 84 of 19 Oct. 1940, SRDJ 7308–9, and Batavia No. 272 of 7 Apr. 1941, SRDJ 10969–71. A subsequent mission to the Netherlands East Indies under Yoshizawa Kenkichi had no more success (Morley,
Fateful Choice
, pp. 146–53; Ike,
Japan’s Decision for War
, pp. 36–39, 43–45, 49).

284
Morley,
Fateful Choice
, pp. 188–200, 203–8; Butow,
Tojo
, pp. 192–93.

285
ADAP
, D, 11, Nos. 257, 299, 311, 315; Boyle,
China and Japan
, pp. 301–4. Relevant Japanese diplomatic messages intercepted by the Americans are in NA, RG 457, SRDJ 7738–39, 7888–89, 7893–94, 8054, 8127–28, 8198–99, 8298–300 (also in SRH 018), 8328, 8374, 8566–67.

286
Morley,
Fateful Choice
, pp. 272–73, 285–86.

287
Ibid., pp. 45–70; Butow,
Tojo
, pp. 205–6; Japanese intercepts in NA, RG 457, SRDJ 7693–96, 8003, 8021, 8132–36, 8251, 8252, 8260, 8782–86. The Japanese, of course, kept a wary eye on the Soviet Union; when they learned of the murder of the Soviet defector Walter Krivitsky in Washington, they wanted to learn whether he had been killed by the same person who had killed Leon Trotsky (Matsuoka to New York No. 17 of 12 Feb. 1941, SRDJ 9878).

288
Morley,
Fateful Choice
, pp. 75–81; Dallek,
Roosevelt and Foreign Policy
, pp. 273ff; Butow,
Tojo
, p. 207. Matsuoka did not take the full record of his talks with Stalin and Molotov back to Tokyo with him, so the Japanese government had to ask its embassy in Moscow for that record in 1945! See Tokyo to Moscow No. 281 of 17 Feb. 1945, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 91558.

289
Tatekawa No. 1530 of6 Dec. 1940, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 8345–46. At that time Matsuoka
had not wanted to hurry, see his No. 871 to Berlin of I I Dec. 1940, SRDJ 8415–16. Simultaneously the Soviets were sending more supplies to Chiang in hopes of keeping the Japanese busy in China (Garver,
Chinese-Soviet Relations,
pp. 107–8).

290
ADAP,
D, 12, No. 361.

291
Ibid., 11, No. 341, 12, No. 190; numerous documents in AA, St.S., “Japan,” Bd. 2; Shanghai to Tokyo NO.512 of 2 Apr. 1941 and Tokyo to Shanghai No. 263 of 5 Apr. 1941, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 10808 and 10956; KTB Ski A 21, 23 May 1941, BA/MA, RM 7/24, f. 339–40. The Japanese had helped a little in the outfitting of German raiders, see the file W 39 in PRO, FO 371/28814’

292
Butow,
Tojo
,
pp. 205–6; Morley,
Fateful Choice,
pp. 72–74; Wagner,
Lagevorträge,
p. 184;
ADAP,
D, 12, Nos. 78,81, 100,218,222,230,233; German naval attache Tokyo, “Nr. 174/41, Japans Beteiligung am europaischen Krieg,” 13 Mar. 1941, and Ski to Ritter, “25142/4Ig.Kdos,” 19 Nov. 1941, BA/MA, RM 7/253; KTB Ski A 19, 17 Apr. 1941, RM 7/23, f. 236–37; KTB Ski A 21, 13 May 1941, RM 7/24, f. 170–71 and 31 May, f. 458–59; KTB Ski A 22, 25 Oct. 1941, RM 7/29, f. 426–27; Oshima to Tokyo No. 308 of 26 Mar. 1941, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 10684–85; John W.M. Chapman, “Forty Years On - The Imperial Japanese Navy, The European War and the Tripartite Pact,”
Proceedings of the British Association for Japanese Studies
5, Part 1 (1980), p. 219 n 46. It must be noted that for Matsuoka’s talks in Berlin there are only German reports. M. decided to report in person and apparently did so orally; see message cited in U.S. Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section, “The Problem of the Prolongation of the Soviet-Japanese Pact,” 12 Feb. 1945, NA, RG 457, SRH 069, p. 2. The only report of Matsuoka from Berlin is his one paragraph No. 369 of 5 Apr. 1941, SRDJ 10828.

293
See Chapman,
Price of Admiralty,
2: 336–37, on this action of 12 Dec. 1940. The document in question had been seized by a German auxiliary cruiser from the
Automedon
(ibid., pp. 582–83);
DRuZW,
6: 148–49. Earlier the British naval attache in Tokyo in a private letter of 10 Oct. 1940 to the director of naval intelligence had suggested that in case of war Britain should send an aircraft carrier with planes carrying incendiaries to burn down Japanese cities (F 5308/193/61, PRO, FO 371/24711).

294
KTB Skl A 19, 10 Apr. 1941, BA/MA, RM 7/23, f. 127–28, 22 Apr. 1941, f. 317; “Unterredung mit Admiral Nomura am 6.8.1941,” RM 7/94, f. 407–12; Skl “26519/41 gKdos,” 20 Nov. 1941, RM 7/206, f.440–47.

295
Krebs,
Japan’s Deutschlandpolitik,
1: 284. Ribbentrop was speaking on 16 June 1939 to Shiratori in the presence of Attolico and Ciano.

296
Wenneker to Schniewind, 22 Nov. 1940, Chapman,
Price of Admiralty,
pp. 511–13; cf. ibid., pp. 514–21; KTB Skl A 19, 3 Mar. 1941, BA/MA, RM 7/22, f. 38–39; German naval attache Tokyo, “75/41 gKdos. Der Eintritt Japans in den europäischen Krieg, Möglichkeiten und Auswirkungen,” 3 Feb. 1941, RM 7/253, f. 25–35; Meskill,
Hitler and Japan,
pp. 26–29.

297
ADAP,
D, 12, No. 266.

298
Oshima to Tokyo, 14 Aug. 1941, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 14100. Oshima reports a German back from Hitler’s field headquarters as quoting Hitler that if there were a clash between Japan and the U.S. Germany would “at once open war against the United States.” Similarly, the report on the RibbentropOshima conversation of 28 Nov. 1941,
Pearl Harbor Attack,
12: 202 (a British intercept and translation of the same document in Part 35, p. 677). See also the comments of Friedrich Gauss, head of the legal division of the German Foreign Ministry, on Dec. I, 1941 which obviously reflect the general understanding of German policy at the Ministry in Berlin (U.S. Department of Defense,
The “Magic” Background of Pearl Harbor,
5 vols. [Washington: GPO, 1977], 4, No. 83 I).

299
Ike,
Japan’s Decision for War,
pp. 17–19, 20–24, 26, 28–36; Butow,
John Doe Associates,
pp. 172–73, 178, 182–84;
Kido Diary,
19 Apr. 1941, p. 272;
ADAP,
D, 12, Nos. 45456, 480, 483–84, 487–89, 496, 507, 517–18, 537; Hewel Diary, 8 and 10 May 1941,
Institut für Zeitgeschichte; Rintelen to Mackensen No. 1058 of 9 May 1941 and Mackensens’s reply No. 10862 of 10 May, AA, Botschaft Rom (Quir.), Geheim 46/2, fr. 482072 and 482074–77.

300
KTB OKW
, 1: 328–29; ADAP, D, 12, Nos. 125,418; KTB SkI A 18, 11 and 22 Feb. 1941, BA/MA, RM 7/21, f. 133–34,295–96; A 19, 10 Mar. 1940, RM 7/22, f. 138; A 20, 17 Apr. 1941, RM 7/23, f. 236–37; German naval attaché Rome, “Pro-Memoria,” 3 Jan. 1941, Case 19/1, PG 45197.

301
Morley,
Fateful Choice
, pp. 89–94;
Kido Diary
, 18 Apr. 1941, pp. 271–72, 6 and 20 June 1941, pp. 279, 283; Hinsley,
British Intelligence
, 1: 478.

302
Summarized in Hillgruber, “Japan und der Fall Barbarossa," in
Deutsche Grossmacht und Weltpolitik
, pp. 225–28.

303
Ibid., pp. 230–33, and appended documents; Morley,
Fateful Choice
, pp. 98–101;
ADAP
, D, 13, No. 241 and Appendices 2 and 4; KTB Skl A 22, 13 June 1941, BA/MA, RM 7/25, f. 133–34; KTB Skl A 26, 28 Oct. 1941, RM 7/29, f. 477–78.

304
See, e.g., Sato (Hanoi) to Tokyo, 21 and 23 Nov. 1940, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 7998–8001 and 8090–91.

305
Butow,
Tojo
, pp. 196–97. Cf. Butow,
John Doe Associates,
pp. 124–25.

306
Text in Ike,
Japan’s Decision for War
, pp. 34–43. A speech Matsuoka gave in public a few ays later was so strange that the Home Minister banned the distribution of copies. See Burns and Bennett,
Diplomats in Crisis
, p. 291; Butow,
John Doe Associates,
pp. 399–400; Krebs,
Japans Deutschlandpolitik
, pp. 442–51.

307
Ike, pp. 5I-56; Butow,
Tojo
, pp. 210–11; Morley,
Fateful Choice
, pp. 234–35; Heinrichs,
Threshold
, pp. 118–27; cf.
ADAP
, D, 12, No. 611.

308
Morley,
Fateful Choice
, pp. 82,94–104,236; Butow,
Tojo
, pp. 212–21, 228–33;
Kido Diary
, 22–23 June 1941, pp. 284–86; Ike,
Japan’s Decision for War
, pp. 55–90;
ADAP
, D, 13, Nos. 14, 33, 35–36, 53, 63–65, 72, 88–89, 105, 117.

This decision may be in the background of Japan’s finally and rather reluctantly giving in to German pressure to end diplomatic relations with the Polish government-in-exile in the fall of 194 I. See Weizsäcker to Lammers, “Volkerrechtliche Bedeutung des Zerfalls des Polnischen Staates," 15 May 1940, NA, RG 238, PS-646; Ott reports to Berlin of 6 and 16 Aug. 1941, IMTFE, IPS 4064 and 4053; Privy Council Meeting of I Oct. 1941, IPS 1196; Robert Craigie,
Behind the Japanese Mask
(London: Hutchinson, 1946), p. 126; Heydrich to Ribbentrop, 7 Aug. 1941, AA, Inland IIg, “Berichte und Meldungen zur Lage in und tüber Japan 1940–1944,” fr. 280088–100.