A World at Arms (198 page)

200
Churchill’s regular minutes to the First Sea Lord, pushing the naval war in all details, from 1941 to 45, are in PRO, ADM 205/10, 13, 14, 27, 35, 43.

201
Hinsley,
British Intelligence
2: 165ff; Jürgen Rohwer, “‘Special Intelligence’ und die
Geleitzugsteuerung im Herbst 1941,”
Marine-Rundschau
75, No. 11 (Nov. 1978), 711–19. The German navy was invariably confident on reexamination that its coding system was so wonderful that no one could break into it, or that if there were breaks these were so minimal as to be insignificant. See diary of the Seekriegsleitung, 19 Mar. 1941, BA/MA, RM 7/22, f. 263; 20 Sep. 1941, RM 7/28, f. 323; 21 Oct. 1941, RM 7/29, f. 354; 30 Oct. 1941, RM 7/29, f. 517; 10 Nov. 1941, RM 7/30, f. 191; 18 Nov. 1941, RM 7/30, f. 330–31.

202
Medlicott,
Economic Blockade,
1: 648–59, 669–71; Halifax to FDR, 11 Feb. 1941, FDR to Halifax, 19 Feb. 1941, FDRL, PSF Box 52, Great Britain, Halifax; FDR to Hull, 3 Mar. 1941,
FDR Letters,
2: 1130–31.

203
Stafford,
Britain and European Resistance,
pp. 59–69. The British thought until quite late that the German buildup in the East was to pressure the Soviet Union rather than to invade (Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
1: 470–71).

204
See the documents in PRO, PREM 261/1, and Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers, 14/58.

205
One of the intermediaries involved in the contacts between the British and the German opposition to Hitler in the winter of 1939–40, Lonsdale Bryans, now turned out to be, in Under Secretary of State Alexander Cadogan’s phrase of I I Feb. 1941, “an idiot and something of a crook” (C 1143/14/62, PRO, FO 371/26419; see also C 1072/324/18, FO 371/26542).

206
C 610, 1426, 1705/324/18, PRO, FO 371/26542. See also C 1301/18/18, FO 371/26508; C 2505, 5695, 6735/324/18, FO 371/26542. The references back to the December 1939 soundings show the impact of the failure of the German opposition to act at that time.

207
Ribbentrop to Stockholm No. 84 of 2I Feb. 1941, AA, St.S., “England," Bd. 4, fr. 108666; Werner Dankwort, “Infernalische Reise," f. 76, Dankwort Papers.

208
The text is in C 7642/324/18, PRO, FO 371/26543. Churchill brought this to the Cabinet’s attention and approval on 7 July, WM(4I) War Cabinet 66(41),
CAB
65/19. Cf. C 7759/324/18, FO 371/26543.

209
C 9472, 10855/324/18, PRO, FO 371/26543.

210
M 8881 in ibid. Lothar Kettenacker claims in “Die alliierte Kontrolle Deutschlands als Exempel britischer Herrschaftsaustibung," in Ludolf Herbst (ed.),
Westdeutschland
1945–1955:
Unterwerfung, Kontrolle, Integration
(Munich: Oldenbourg, 1986), p. 55 n 16, that Churchill may have been open to dealing with a government installed by a military coup that displaced Hitler in November 1941. The major point, of course, always was whether someone in Germany would actually do something other than always carry out Hitler’s orders; the opponents had had their chance in the winter of 1939–40. See also Kettenacker, “The Anglo-Soviet Alliance and the Problem of Germany, 1941–1945,"
JCH
17 (1982) 444.

211
On the Hess affair, see my
Gennany and the Soviet Union
, pp. 122–24, where the then available evidence was first analyzed. See also Gilbert,
Churchill
, 6: 1087–88; Bauer,
Hitler’s Pilot
, pp. 124–26; Fröhlich,
Goebbels Tagebucher
, 4: 638–47, 653–64; additional documents in
ADAP
, D, I I and 12; PRO, PREM 3/219. 1–7; C 12104/18/18, FO 371/26513; PRO, AIR 19/564; 22 June 1941 memorandum in FDRL, PSF Box 96, State, Welles, June-Dec. 1941.

Speculation about the Hess mission continues in view of the still partially closed British records. Professor Richard Breitman has found a document from the fall of 194I asserting that Hess did mention the forthcoming German invasion of the Soviet Union; it remains to be seen whether this was in fact the case. On this, see Costello,
Ten Days
, chap. 17.

212
Note Lothian to Halifax, 29 Aug. 1940, PRO, FO 800/324, f. 290.

213
Weizsäcker to Ribbentrop, “St.S. No. 250," 12 Apr. 1941, AA, St.S., “Aufzeichnungen über interne Ange1egenheiten,” Bd. 2. The navy’s view was due not only to its interest
in sinking ships but also to a recognition that the American deliveries would increase to substantial proportions (KTB Skl A 27, 13 Aug. 1941, BA/MA, RM 7/27, f. 210).

214
“Was sind schon die USA,” Plesman statement, Institut für Zeitgeschichte, ZS 115, p. 4. See also Boog,
LuftwaffenjUhrung
, pp. 118–21.

215
ADAP
, D, 11, No. 633. A German correspondent who heard a briefing on Jan. 19, 1941, in which American aid to Britain was belittled commented that this sounded very much like what had been said in 1917 and early 1918 (BA, Brammer, ZSg. 101/38, f. 91–93).

216
ADAP
, D, 11, Nos. 307, 313, 12, No. 608;
KTB OKW
, 1: 253–58; Salewski,
Seekriegsleitung
, 1: 406–15; Hewel Diary, 22 May 1941, Institut für Zeitgeschichte; von Waldau Diary, 9 Jan. 1941, Institut für Zeitgeschichte.

217
KTB Skl A 19,22 Mar. 1941, BA/MA, RM 7/22, f. 309; now cited in
DRuZW
, 6: 283 n 34.

218
Skl IlIa “17233/gKdos,” 31 July 1941, BA/MA, RM 6/83, f. 49–50.

219
Salewski,
Seekriegsleitung
, 2: 514.

220
FDR Letters
, 2: 1057.

221
Ibid., pp. 1093–95 (FDR to F.B. Sayre, 31 Dec. 1940).

222
Robert J.C. Butow, “The FDR Tapes,”
American Heritage
33 (Feb.-Mar. 1982), 16–17.

223
FRUS
, 1942, 2: 833–42; cf. ibid, 1: 916.

224
Peter Herde, “Pearl Harbur aus unbekannter revisionistischer Sicht: Neue Materialien über den nachrichtendienstlichen Hintergrund des Japanischen Angriffs vom 7. Dezember 1941,”
Historisches Jahrbuch der Görres Gesellschaft
104/1 (1984), pp. 83–85; James Bamford,
The Puzzle Palace: A Report on America’s Most Secret Agency
(New York: Penguin Books, 1983), pp. 394–97.

225
William F. Friedman, “SRH 125,” NA, RG 457, pp. 35–37; Kahn,
Seizing Enigma
, pp. 235–36.

226
Abraham Sinkov and Leo Rosen, “Report of Technical Mission to England,” 11 Apr. 1941, in NA, RG 457, SRH 145, pp. 2–4.

227
Jürgen Rohwer, “Die USA und die Schlacht im Atlantik,” in Rohwer and Jäckel (eds.),
Kriegswende
, pp. 97, 99, 101.

228
This interpretation differs somewhat from that in ibid., pp. 89–101. See also Waldo Heinrichs,
Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II
(New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1988), pp. 166–68.

229
As late as Sep. 17, 1940, Lindbergh was trying to persuade American officers that Britain would be beaten in a few weeks (see Thomsen [Washington] No. 1987 of 18 Sep. 1940, AA, St.S., “England,” Bd. 3, fr. B 002749–50).

230
Butow, “FDR Tapes," p. 12.

231
Reynolds,
Lord Lothian
pp. 39ff; British Cabinet Minutes for 20 Feb. 1941, WM(41) War Cabinet 19(41), PRO, CAB 65/17.

232
A good summary in Kimball,
Most Unsordid
Act.

233
The idea of shipping gold from South Africa to the U.S. on the cruiser USS
Louisville
, which so annoyed Churchill, had originally been suggested by the British representative in the negotiations. See ibid., p. 149; Alan P. Dobson,
US. Wartime Aid to Britain
(New York, St. Martin’s, 1986), pp. 26–28.

234
The British records are filled with negative comments about Kennedy. Roosevelt, who believed he needed his political support, replaced him after the Nov. 1940 election. Note Douglas Fairbanks to FOR, 19 Nov. 1940, FDRL, PSF Box 53, Great Britain, Kennedy. Useful for background are Michael R. Beschloss,
Kennedy and Roosevelt
(New York: Norton, 1980), and Ralph F. de Bedts,
AmbassadorJoseph Kennedy 1938–1940
(New York: Peter Lang, 1985).

235
See Murray to FDR, 25 Dec. 1940, FDRL, PSF Box 53, Great Britain, Arthur Murray 1940–44; Earl of Birkenhead,
Halifax: The Life ofLord Halifax
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), pp. 467ff. A full study remains to be written.

236
Gilbert,
Churchill
chap. 51 is the most recent account.

237
Theodore A. Wilson,
The First Summit: Roosevelt and Churchill at Placentia Bay 1941
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969); Pogue,
Marshall
, 2: 142–45. This was when Marshall and Dill first met, becoming friends right away.

238
Kirk to Welles, 15 Dec. 1940, and Phillips to FDR, 21 Jan. 1941, FDRL, PSF Box 57, Italy 1941; Welles to FDR, PSF Box 96, State, Welles, Jan.-May 1941; NA, RG 457, SRH 281, pp. 83, 84, 86–130; KTB SkI A 20, 4 Apr. 1941, BA/MA, RM 7/23, f. 43.

239
Although the German embassy in Washington generally denied the allegations, sometimes in good faith, the fact is that many consular officials were working for one or another of the rival German intelligence organizations. Note Thomsen tel. 2226 of IS Oct. 1940, AA, St.S., “USA," Bd. 3, fr. 22994–95.

240
FDR Letters
, 2: 1079–80;
ADAP
, D, 11, No. 394.

241
Ray, “The Takoradi Route,” pp. 342, 347–56.

242
FRUS
, 1941, 2: 35–72;
ADAP
, D, 12, Nos. 308, 309, 314, 315, 318, 327, 329;
FDR Letters
, 2: 1142–43. See also the section omitted from FOR to Hull, 20 Feb. 1941, ibid., p. 1127, in FDRL, PSF Box 93, Cordell Hull, 1941–42.

243
A good account in James Leutze,
Bargainingfor Supremary: Anglo-American Naval Relations, 1937–1941
(Chapel Hill, N.C.: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1977). On the key role of Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Harold Stark in this, see B. Mitchell Simpson,
Admiral Harold R. Stark: Architect of Victory, 1939–1945
(Columbia, S.C.: Univ. of South Carolina Press., 1989), chaps. 3–4.

244
Borg and Okamoto,
Pearl Harbor
, pp. 220–22.

245
See Admiral Ingersoll memorandum for Captain Callaghan, 21 Feb. 1941, in FDRL, PSF Box 82, Navy, Daniel J. Callaghan;
FDR Letters
, 2: 1137. The Germans were incensed by this practice which mirrored their own use of Swedish ship-building facilities (Wittmann,
Schwedens WirtschaJtsbeziehungen
, pp. 252–57).

246
Prange,
At Dawn
, pp. 122–24, 130–34, 139–40; Danckwerts for the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Halifax (Washington) No. 1883, 29 Apr. 1941, A 3153/384/45, PRO, FO 371/26220.

247
Pogue,
Marshall
, 2: 130–31.

248
Bittner,
Britain and Iceland
, pp. 124–34; Heinrichs,
Threshold
, pp. 85–88, 110–11. It may well be that the cruise of the
Bismarck
and the fate of Crete influenced the President. The marine brigade first sent to Iceland had been scheduled for the Azores if Germany invaded Portugal.

249
Note Stimson to FOR, 8 July 1941, FDRL, PSF Box 9, Safe File War Department.

250
Sherman Miles memorandum for the Chief of Staff, “Battle of the Atlantic," 5 May 1941, NA, RG 165, entry 77, Box 1419, A6: British Estimate of German Intentions towards NE Africa and Spain winter 1941–1942.

251
Sherman Miles memorandum for the Chief of Staff, “Estimate of the Russo-German Situation," 19 June 1941, ibid. When the Russians had kept insisting that the Germans show them their tanks bigger than the Mark IV and had refused to believe that there were none, the Germans had failed to draw the obvious conclusion, namely that the Red Army had larger ones itself. They would find out about the T -34 and KV tanks of the Red Army on meeting them in battle (see also Earl Ziemke,
Moscow to Stalingrad
[Washington: GPO, 1987], p. 11).

252
John D. Langer, “The ‘Red General’: Philip R. Faymonville and the Soviet Union, 1917–52,”
Prologue
8 (1976), 214–19; James S. Herndon and Joseph D. Baylen, “Col. Philip R. Faymonville and the Red Army, 1939–43,”
Slavic Review
34 (1975), 483–505; Thomas A. Julian, “Philip Ries Faymonville and the Soviet Union,” paper read at the SHAFR Conference, 9–11 June 1988. When F. was recalled in 1943 over differences with the American embassy staff, he was replaced by General Sidney Spalding who had recommended F. in the first place (Langer, p. 220).

253
Cole,
Roosevelt and Isolationists
, p. 433;
FDR Letters
, 2: 1204–5; George C. Herring,
Aid to Russia 1941–1946
(New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1973), chap. 1; FDR memorandum for Myron C. Taylor, 1 Sept. 1941, FDRL, PSF Italy.

254
On the worries, see
FDR Letters
, 2: 1179; on the lack of contact, note that Roosevelt saw the Soviet ambassador on July 10, 1941, for the first time since the summer of 1939 (Dallek,
Roosevelt and Foreign Poliry
, p. 279).

255
Joan Beaumont,
Comrades in Anns: British Aid to Russia
, 1941–1945 (London: DavisPoynter, 1980), pp. 36–42.

256
Morgenthau Presidential Diary, 4 Aug. 1941, Vol. 4, pp. 951–53, FDRL; FDR to Wayne Coy, 2 Aug. 1941, PSF Box 68, Russia 1941.

257
Heinrichs,
Threshold
, pp. 104–5, 136–41. The famous map FDR spoke of in October 194I showing German plans for the Western Hemisphere now turns out to have been put out by Nazis in Argentina, obtained by the British, doctored up by them in Canada and then passed on by them to the Americans. See John F. Bratzel and Leslie B. Rout, Jr., “FDR and the ‘Secret Map’,”
Wilson Quarterly
9 (1985), 167–73; Donovan to Roosevelt, No. 350, 26 Mar. 1942, FDRL, PSF Box 165, OSS Donovan Reports # 8.

258
Note Beaumont,
Comrades in Arms
, pp. 46–49.

259
Pogue,
Marshall
, 2: 145–54.