A World at Arms (201 page)

7
Jochmann,
Hitler Monologe,
5/6 July 1941, p. 39, 27 July, p. 48;
DRuZW,
4: 990-9l, 994–95; Streit,
Keine Kameraden
, chaps. 6 and 7.

8
ADAP
, D, 13, No. 114;
DRuZW
, 4: 856, 1007.

9
See
ADAP
, D, 13, Nos. 3–6, 18,37,39,223; AA, St.S. “Litauen,” fro 1933369--94, 96–401.

10
Czeslaw Madajczyk (ed.), “Generalplan Ost,” in
Polish Western Affairs
3, No.2 (1962), 391–442, contains many bibliographic references.

11
ADAP
, D, 13, No. 149. Not only Germans but others, for example Dutch, were to be settled.

12
ADAP
, D, 13, Appendix III. One page of the record of the Hitler-Kvaternik meeting of July 22, 1941, appears to be lost because of an error made by the German wartime microfilm operator; perhaps it will yet turn up if another copy of the record survived.

13
The text was first published in
IMT
, 26: 266–67. For a careful review of the basic source, see Ronald Headland,
Messages of Murder: A Study of the Reports of the Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police and the Security Service
, 1941–1943. (Rutherford, N. J.: Fairleigh Dickinson Univ. Press, 1991).

14
Mathias Beer, “Die EntwickIung der Gaswagen beim Mord an denJuden,”
VjZ
35 (1987), 403–17. The initiative came from an inspection of the mass shootings by Himmler; the new device derived its techniques and personnel largely from the Euthanasia program. Rosenberg informed a large audience (the Reichsarbeitskammer) on Nov. 18, 1942, that the killing of all Jews was to be applied to all of Europe (BA, ZSg Nadler, 115/4, f. 99).

15
Wilhelm Deist (ed.),
The German Military in the Age of Total War
(Dover, N.H.: Berg, 1985), p. 297; Seekriegsleitung, “1385/41 Gkdos Chefs. Absichten für die Weiterfuhrung des Krieges nach Beendigung des Ostfeldzuges,” 8 Aug. 1941, BA/MA, RM 7/234, f. 106–9;
DRuZW
, 5/1: 567–69.

16
Boog,
Luftwaffenführung
, pp. I 12–14.

17
KTB Ski A 23, 17 July 1941, BA/MA, RM 7/26, f. 255; Canaris/Lahousen file, 20 July 1941, Imperial War Museum, AL 1933, item 11; Skl, “Lagebeurteilung 29.7.41,” BA/MA, III M 502/4, f. 9–22;
KTB Halder
, 11 Aug. 1941, 3: 170.

18
Warlimont’s memorandum of 6 Aug., sent to the navy on 15 Aug., “441339/41 g.K.Ch. Kurzer strategischer Überblick über die Fortführung des Krieges nach dem Ostfeldzug,” is a key document (BA/MA, RM 7/258, f. 4–15); see also OKW L, “441465/41 g.K.Ch. Die strategische Lage im Spätsommer 1941 als Grundlage für die weiteren politischen und militarischen Absichten,” 27 Aug. 1941 (ibid., f. 19–26). The change also meant that the German navy had to postpone any thought of using the northern seaway around north Russia to the Pacific and Japan (KTB Skl A 24, 18 Aug. 1941, RM 7/27, f. 290).

19
The author has covered the partisan movement in this area in a study, much of it reprinted in John A. Armstrong (ed.),
Soviet Partisans in World War II
(Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1964), pp. 389–457. There is a good account of the fighting around Yelnya in Timothy A. Wray,
Standing Fast: German Defensive Doctrine on the Russian Front during World War II, Pre-War to March 1943
(Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 1986), pp. 39–47. See also the interesting discussion in Andreas Hillgruber,
Die Zerstijrung Europas: Reitrage zur Weltkriegsepoche 1914 bis 1945
(Frankfurt/M: Propylaén, 1988), pp. 296–312, and Samuel J. Lewis,
Forgotten Legions: German Army Infantry Policy, 1918–1945
(New York: Praeger, 1985), pp. 136–44. Very important, Klaus A. F. Schuler’s study discussed in the next note, pp. 351–53, 358–62, 380–81; Walther Lammers (ed.),
Fahrtberichte aus der Zeit des deutsch-sowjetischen Krieges
1941 (Boppard: Boldt, 1988), pp. 11–12, 24–25.

20
This point is made absolutely clear by a very fine study of the problems of logistics which rendered any further German major offensive on the central portion of the front impossible and in other ways doomed the German armies to delay and frustration; see Klaus A.F. Schuler,
Logistik im RusslandJeldzug: Die Rolle der Eisenbahn bei Planung,
Vorbereitung und DurchfUhrung des deutschen Angriffs auf die Sowjetunuion bis zur Krise vor Moskau im Winter
1941/42 (Frankfurt/M: Lang, 1987). See also Martin van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1977), chap. 5.

21
A useful summary in Alan F. Wilt, “Hitler’s Late Summer Pause in 1941,”
Military Affairs
45 (1981 ), 187–91. The documents on Hitler’s views are published in
KTB OKW
, 1: 1061–81. See also
DRuZW
, 4: 118; von Bock Diary, 13 July 1941, BA/MA, N 22/9, f. 23–24. In the papers of Field Marshal von Weichs in BA/MA there are interesting letters by von Sodenstern of Feb. 9 and Apr. 15, 195 I which point out how very much wiser the Kiev operation was than any attack toward Moscow, which could not be reached in 1941 anyway, and stating that von Rundstedt had been of the same opinion (N 19/13, f. 131–34).
DRuZW
, 4: 651comes to essentially the same conclusion. Schuler’s book, cited in n 20, shows that any operation on the Central front could not have been launched before late Sept., early Oct. in any case.

22
DRuZW
, 4: 710.

23
The order was repeated on Oct. 7 when the possibility of Leningrad or Moscow actually falling seemed imminent (
ADAP
, D, 13, No. 388). The intention of making the two cities disappear from the earth had been communicated to the German press as early as Aug. 20, 1941; see Kausch, “Vertrauliche Bestellungen,” 20 Aug. 1941, BA, Brammer, ZSg. 101/21, f. 162, cf. ibid., f. 232. The earliest reference of Hitler to the concept appears to be the one mentioned in
KTB Halder
on July 8, 1941.

24
Note
DRuZW
, 4: 1013; Schüler,
Logistik in Russlandfeldzug
, pp. 328–31. A useful sidelight in Sergei Varshasky and Boris Rest,
The Ordeal of the Hermitage: The Siege of Leningrad, 1941–1944
(St. Petersburg: Aurora Art, 1985).

25
See
ADAP
, D, 13, Nos. 248, 262.

26
On the British and American pressure on Finland at Soviet request, and on German contrary pressure, see Prime Minister personal minutes 704/1 of 5 July 1941, 725/1 of 10 July, and 731/1 of 16 July to Eden, PRO, PREM 3/170/4; Eden to Cripps No 227 (N 5096/78/G) of 4 Sep. 1941, PREM 3/170/1; Churchill to Mannerheim, 28 Nov. 1941, PREM 3/170/ 1;
ADAP
, D, 13,85, 160,264,301,331,353,436,461,477,533, 540; Woermann note, “U.S1.S. Pol Nr. 741,” 4 Aug. 1941, AA, St.S., “England,” Bd. 4, fro 108867;
DRuZW
, 4: 819–20, 850, 854–55;
FDR Letters
, 2: 1207–8; FRUS, 1941, 1: 81–108; Heydrich to Ribbentrop, 27 Oct. 1941, forwarding intercepted information on the conversations of the Finnish Minister in Washington, AA, Inland IIg, “Berichte über Amerika,” Bd. 4, fro E 024612–17; U.S. military attache Berlin, “Conversation with the Finnish Military Attache,” 10 Sep. 1941, in NA, RG 165, Entry 77, Box 1417, File 6900, Report 18,629 of 15 Sep. 1941, pp. 1–3.

A helpful account in R. Michael Berry,
American Foreign Policy and the Finnish Exception
(Helsinki: Societas Historica Finlandiae, 1987), pp. 121–46, 192–206.

27
Note Helsinki to Tokyo No. 388 of 18 Dec. 1941, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 17978.

28
Schüler,
Logistik in Russlandjeldzug
, pp. 410–13; Boog,
Luftwa.ffenfuhrung
, p. 116;
ADAP
, D, 13, Nos. 424, 433; “Bestellungen aus der Pressekonferenz vom 9. Oktober 1941,” BA, Brammer, ZSg. 101/22, f. 27; “Vertrauliche Informationen Nr. 264/41–266/41,” 8–10 Oct. 1941, BA, Oberheitmann, ZSg 109/26, f. 26–37 (for more realistic assessments by 25 Oct., see ZSg 101/22, f. 76, ZSg 109/26, f. 85).

At this time the Germans who assumed that Moscow would be taken passed out the new jobs. Thus Siegfried Kasche, the Minister to the puppet state of Croatia, was to head the Moscow area (AA, Gesandtschaft Sofia, “Personliche Aufzeichnungen des Gesandten Beckerle,” 4 Oct. 1941, Bd. 1, f. 69); while one of the city officials of Hamburg, Senator von Allworden, was happily looking forward to running the economy of the Moscow area all the way across the Urals (Hamburg Forschungsstelle, Krogmann Diary, 1941, Ilk 9, 27 Nov. and 4 Dec. 1941).

29
Erickson,
Road to Stalingrad,
p. 29. On the plans for evacuating the different commissariats, see John A. Armstrong, “The Relocation of the Soviet Commissariats in World War II,” in Karl-Heinz Manegold (ed.),
Wissenschaji, Wirtschaji und Technik: Studien zur

30
See
ADAP
, D, 13, No. 265;,
DRuZW
, 4: 585.

31
See
DRuZW
, 4: 585–92; Earl Ziemke, “Franz Halder at Orsha: The German General Staff Seeks a Consensus,” MilitaryAffairs 39 (1975) 173–76; Schüler,
Logistik in Russlandfeldzug
, pp. 468–75; Heinrich Bücheler,
Hoepner: Ein deutsches Soldatenschicksal des 20. Jahrhunderts
(Herford: Mittler, 1980), pp. 156–57.

32
Two analyses of German army intelligence blunders illustrate the point with numerous examples: Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, “Die Prognosen der Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost 1942–1945,” in
Zwei Legenden aus dem Dritten Reich
(Stuttgart: Deutsche VerlagsAnstalt, 1974), pp. 7–75; David Thomas, “Foreign Armies East and German Military Intelligence in Russia, 1941–45,”
JCH
22 (1987), 261–301.

33
The German strength assessment of the Red Army as of Dec. I, 1941 asserted that it had no substantial reserve units left (
KTB OKW
, 1: 1075–76); on Dec. 4, 1941, German army intelligence concluded that the Red Army was for the time being incapable of launching a major offensive (
DRuZW
, 4: 600).

34
The whole issue of Germany’s allies on the Eastern Front has been little studied. A comprehensive work is Peter Gosztony,
Hitlers Fremde Heere: Das Schicksal der nichtdeutschenArmeen im Ostjeldzug
(Düsseldorf: Econ, 1976). Concentrating on the later period of the war and excluding Finland is Jürgen Förster,
Risse im Bundnis
(Freiburg: Rombach, 1975). Both books list literature on the individual armies in their bibliographies.

35
An especially useful source on this issue is in the frank comments of former German General Erik Hansen, “Antworten in erweiterter Berichtform auf eine Anfrage des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte-München,” 21 Jan. 1956, IfZ, ZS 1130, f. 13–18.

36
See Erickson,
Road to Stalingrad
, pp. 210-I I.

37
The area was formally turned over to Romania on Aug. 19, 194 I. Although published in 1957, Alexander Dallin’s “Odessa 1941–1944: A Case Study of Soviet Territory under Foreign Rule,” Rand Memorandum 1875, U.S. Air Force Project Rand Research Memorandum, Astia Document No. AD 123552, is still the most comprehensive work on the subject. There is a survey of the Holocaust in this area in Julius S. Fisher,
Transnistria: The Forgotten Cemetery
(Cranbury, N.J.: Thomas Yoseleff, 1969).

38
Killinger to Ribbentrop, No. 2882 of 9 Sep. 1941, AA, St.S., “Türkei,” Bd. 4, fro 173230–32 .

39
ADAP
, D, 13, No. 58.

40
Gosztony,
Hitlers Fremde Heere
, pp. 84–85.

41
Ibid., pp. 86–87.

42
For balanced accounts, see ibid., pp. 116–23; Nandor F. Dreisziger, “The Hungarian General Staff and Diplomacy, 1939–1941,”
Canadian-American Review of Hungarian Studies
7 (1980), 16–21; Juhász,
Hungarian Foreign Policy
pp. 188–90; and the articles by Dreizsiger and Thomas Sakmyster in the special volume on “Hungary and the Second World War,”
Hungarian Studies Review,
10 (1983).

43
Gosztony, pp. 153–62.

44
Canaris/Lahousen file, 2 Sep. 1941, Imperial War Museum, AL 1933, item 15; Juhasz,
Hungarian Foreign Policy
, pp. 199–200.

45
Dreisziger, “Hungarian General Staff”, p. 23 (see n. 42).

46
Weizsäcker memorandum “St.S. No. 816,” 12 Dec. 1941, AA, St.S., “Aufzeichnungen über nicht-Diplomatenbesuche,” Bd. 2, fro 36806–7; Juhasz, p. 201;
ADAP
, D, 13: 38182, E, 2, No. 291.

47
Gosztony,
Hitlers Fremde Heere
, pp. 94–95, 127–30, 173–77.

48
See
Ciano Diary,
21 and 22 June 1941, pp. 368–69;
ADAP
,
D, 13, No. 62. A general review in J. Calvitt Clarke III, “Italy and Barbarossa, June 22 1941,” paper given at the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Nov. 1991.

49
The account in
Ciano Diary
, 5 July 1941, p. 373, should be supplemented by that in Plessen to AA, “Betr.: Ausserungen des Duce über die Lage,” 11 July 1941, AA, Botschaft Rom (Quir.), “Geheim Bd. 45/1a,” fro 481923–24. At the same meeting Mussolini expressed the hope that following the Russian collapse, it would be possible to attack into Egypt via Turkey and Syria. He assumed that the U.S. would enter the war which he expected to be a long one. He did not explain why in view of this expectation he was so eager to send troops to the Eastern Front.

50
Gosztony,
Hitlers Fremde Heere,
pp. 124–27, 162–73.

51
Note the coincidence in time of the beginning of Croatia’s involvement on the Eastern Front and the massive terror and expulsion measures of the summer of 1941 within Croatia; Ladislaus Hory and Martin Broszat,
Der kroatische Ustascha-Staat,
1941–1945
(Stuttgart: Deutsche VerlagsAnstalt, 1964), p. 99.

52
ADAP
, D, 13, No. 46; Gosztony, pp. 131–35, 177–80.

53
Gosztony, pp. 135–37; cf.
ADAP
,
D, 13, Nos. 45, 78. An account of the French military collaborators is in Bertram M. Gordon,
Collaborationism in France during the Second World War
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1980), chap. 9.