A World at Arms (197 page)

136
Note the 5 June 1940 memorandum in R 6476/58/22, PRO, FO 371/24948.

137
An excellent account in Higham,
Diary of a Disaster,
pp. 26–27, 34.

138
Sir Francis de Guingand,
Operation Victory
(London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1947), pp. 85–86.

139
Higham, pp. 74–75.

140
Ibid., pp. 88–89; Playfair,
Mediterranean,
I: chap. 20;
DRuZW,
3: 433–35; Sir John Kennedy,
The Business of War
(London: Hutchinson, 1957), pp.81–87; David Carlton,
Anthony Eden
(London: Allen Lane, 1981), pp. 170–79; Ismay notes in Liddell Hart Centre, Ismay Papers, 11/3/57/2.

141
Knox,
Mussolini Unleashed,
p. 283; Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
1: 404–6; Higham,
Diary ofa Disaster,
p. 193;
DRuZW,
3: 608–11.

142
Hoppe,
Bulgarien,
chap. 12; Marshall Lee Miller,
Bulgaria during the Second World War
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1975), pp. 41–51. See also Hans Bauer,
Hitler’s Pilot
(London: Muller, 1958), p. 119.

143
Thomas F. Troy,
Donovan and the CIA
(Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, 1981), p. 39;
FRUS,
1941, 1:
282;
ADAP
,
D, 11, Nos. 685, 713; British records in PRO, AIR 8/368.

144
On the futile British efforts, see Carlton,
Eden,
pp. 179–80; Woodward,
British Foreign Policy
, 1, chap. 16.

145
Numerous documents on this are in AA, St.S., “Türkei,” Bd. 2–3; also
ADAP
,
D, 12, No. 303; E, I, No. 250. The map in
DRuZW,
3, facing p. 492, shows the piece of
Greece adjacent to Turkey as all under German control without reference to the special concession to Turkey.

146
Note Roosevelt to Hull, 20 Feb. 1941,
FDR Letters,
2: 1126–27.

147
The Germans had learned by Feb. 13 that the Soviet Union would not support Turkey or work with Great Britain but rather watch Germany’s moves into the Balkans from the sidelines (Weizsäcker to embassies in Moscow and Ankara, 13 Feb. 1941, AA, St.S., “Türkei,” Bd. 2, fr. 172597–99).

148
Hitler refused the suggestion of the German Minister in Belgrade that the secret protocols to Yugoslavia’s adhesion to the Tripartite Pact be shown to the leaders of that country’s opposition (Interrogation of Kurt von Kamphoevner by OronJ. Hale, 14 Aug. 1945, U.S. Army Center for Military History).

149
DRuZW
, 3: 449–54.

150
The German shift from support of Yladko Macek’s autonomist movement to the Ustasha can be followed in a report by Walter Malletke of Apr. 1941 in BA, R 4311/1458, f. 11–17.

151
DRuZW
, 3: 454–84, covers the fighting in both Yugoslavia and Greece.

152
ADAP
, D, 12, Nos. 224, 226.

153
Ibid., No. 215.

154
Relevant documents have been published by the Hungarians in
Hung. Docs
., Vol. 4. The Hungarians imagined that they would get an outlet to the Adriatic but soon learned otherwise
ADAP
, 0, 12, No. 282). Before committing suicide, Teleki wrote a last letter to Gabor Apor, a prominent Hungarian diplomat then serving as Minister to the Vatican, recounting the crisis and his views. A copy of the text is in Donovan to Roosevelt, 30 Mar. 1945, FDRL, PSF 171, OSS March 16–31, 1945.

155
ADAP
, D, 12, No. 216.

156
See the summary of Hitler’s views, prepared c. 2 Apr. 1941, in AA, Handakten Ritter, “Verschiedenes geheim 1 & 11,” fr. 280709.

157
ADAP
, D, 12, Nos. 465, 478.

158
An early sample may be found in a report of 7 May 1941, Item 8 of the CanarislLahousen file, Imperial War Museum, AL 1933.

159
Higham’s book,
Diary of a Disaster
, is one of the few which stress this aspect. See Farnie,
East and West of Suez
, pp. 624–25; Playfair,
Mediterranean
, 1: 326–28. For continued German mining of the canal in July, Aug. and Sep. 1941, see the reports in PRO, CAB 160/864.

160
ADAP
, D, 12, Nos. 350, 427, 446, 13, No. 49.

161
See Brooke Diary, 23 Oct. 1941,31 Mar. 1942 (both omitted from the published version), Liddell Hart Centre. An additional problem for the British was the relationship with the Australian government which did not appreciate – and with a one-vote margin in its Parliament could not abide – the repeated failures of British military leadership, at least in
Australian
eyes; see John Robertson,
Australia at War
(Melbourne: Heinemann, 1981), pp. 47–48.

162
On this issue, see Chadwick,
Britain and the Vatican
, chap. 10.

163
Hewel Diary, 19 May 194I, Institut fur Zeitgeschichte.

164
Ibid., 29 May 1941.

165
Daniel Silverfarb,
Britain’s Informal Empire in the Middle East: A Case Study of Iraq
, 1929–1941 (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1986), pp. 123–40; Richard A. Stewart,
Sunrise at Abadan: The British and Soviet Invasion ofIran,
1941 (New York: Praeger, 1988), chap. 3;
DRuZW
, 3: 448–555; an earlier account in Lukasz Hirszowicz,
The Third Reich and the Arab East
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966), chaps. 7–8.

166
See Önder,
Türkische Aussenpolitik
, pp. 110–17, for German pressure on Turkey. The bait offered was now Bulgarian territory.

167
Burkhart Mueller-Hillebrand et al., “Germany and Her Allies in World War II,"
USAREUR (United States Army, Europe), Historical Division, P-108, pp. 260ff (copies in National Archives and reprinted in Donald S. Detwiler
et al.
[eds.],
World War II German Military Studies,
vol. 20, New York: Garland, 1979); Stewart
Sunrise at Abadan,
pp. 40–41; Great Britain, Air Historical Branch, “The Middle East Campaign, Vol. IX: The Campaign in Syria June 1941,” Royal Air Force Narrative (First Draft), pp. 7–9; A.B. Gaunson,
The Anglo-French Collision in Lebanon and Syria 1940–45
(London: Macmillan, 1986), pp. 33–34.

168
Jäckel,
Frankreich
, pp. 162ff; Elmar Krautkrämer, “General Giraud und Admiral Darlan in der Vorgeschichte der alliierten Landung in Nordafrika,”
VjZ
30 (1982), 212–13; Coutau-Begarie and Huan,
Darlan
, chap. 14; Werner-Otto von Hentig,
Mein Leben: Eine Dienstreise
(Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962), pp. 342–45; Fridolin von Senger und Etterlin, “Report on his Activity as German Representative at the Italian Armistice Commission,” 1942, BA/MA, N 64/9, f. 26–30; Hewel Diary, 18 May 1941, Institut für Zeitgeschichte.

169
ADAP
, D, 10, No. 370; 12, No. 12.

170
Some of the communications from Rashid Ali to Berlin were handled by the Japanese legation in Baghdad (Ettel [Teheran] tel. 357 of 9 May 1941, AA, Botschafter Ritter, “Verschiedenes geheim I & II,” fr. 280845–48).

171
ADAP
, D, 12, No. 590, 13, Nos. 180, 183, and docs. in E, 1.

172
Various German government, Nazi Party, and military agencies were involved in plots and controversies in and about Afghanistan. The main effect was to provide draft deferments for German bureaucrats engaged in these endless disputes and subventions for some Afghan exiles. See
DRuZW
, 3: 145–48; Inge Kircheisen and Johannes Glasneck,
Türkei und Afghanistan – Brennpunkte der Orientpolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg
(Berlin-East: Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1968); Pilger (Kabul) to Weizsacker No. 121 of 7 Apr. 1941, AA, St.S., “Italien,” Bd. 4, fr. B 001686.

173
Walter Ansel, Hitler and the Middle Sea
(Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ. Press, 1972), chaps. 11–13, 15–23;
DRuZW
, 3: 485–511.

174
DRuZW
, 3: 612.

175
The bridge was blown up, but the landing had shown once again the possibilities of airborne forces.

176
The author first demonstrated this point in some detail in
Gennany and the Soviet Union
, pp. 163, 180–82.

177
An unconvincing summary in
DRuZW
, 3: 508.

178
R. T. Thomas,
Britain and Vichy
(New York: St. Martin’s, 1979), pp. 106–7. It was in May 194I that the British made plans to evacuate Palestine if necessary. The troops and the non-Jewish British civilians were to be evacuated; Jews as well as Arabs were to be left to the Germans (Ronald W. Zweig, “British Plans for the Evacuation of Palestine in 1941–1942,”
Studies in Zionism
8 [Autumn 1983], 291–96).

179
On the campaign in Syria, see
DRuZW
, 3: 561–67; Long, pp. 87–97; Hirszowicz,
The Third Reich
, chap. 9. The report on the fighting of the 1st Australian Corps in Syria observed: “The Vichy French, in this campaign, displayed fighting qualities in defence that make it difficult to understand the ease with which they were defeated in their own country.” John Robertson and John McCarthy (eds.),
Australian War Strategy, 1939–1945: A Documentary History
(St. Lucia: Univ. of Queensland Press), doc. 93, p. 120.

180
Note
ADAP
, D, 12, Nos. 83, 103. The Turks had asked the Germans to be allowed to take northern Syria in the last stages of the fighting there (Önder,
Turkische Aussenpolitik
, pp. 120–21).

181
Joseph Schechtman,
The Mufti and the Fuhrer: The Rise and Fall ofHaj Amin el-Husseini
(New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1965); Klaus Gensicke,
Der Mufti von Jerusalem, Amin el-Husseini, und die Nationalsozialisten
(FrankfurtlM: Lang, 1988).

182
At this time, however, the Japanese had a low opinion of Bose, see Konoe to Berlin to Matsuoka, No. 267 of 27 Mar. 1941, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 10708.

183
On “Crusader,” see DRuZW, 3: 658–81; James J. Sadkovich, “Of Myths and Men: Rommel and the Italians in North Africa, 1940–1942,”
International History Review 13
(1991), pp. 298–301; John Gordon IV, “Operation Crusader: Preview of the Non-linear Battlefield,”
Military Review
71 (1991), 48–61.

184
These were “Stuart” tanks. The superiority of the British in armor had to await the arrival of “Sherman" tanks in large quantities in the late summer of 1942.

185
On the superiority of German armor and anti-tank guns note Hinsley,
British Intelligence
, 2: 297–99, 304ff.

186
Ibid., Appendix 14.

187
Hitler Directive 38 of 2 Dec. 1941, in
ADAP
, 0, 13, No. 535, and Hubatsch,
Hitlers Weisungen
, pp. 169–70. See also R. J. Overy,
The Air War 1939–1945
(New York: Stein & Day, 1981), p. 66; Hinsley, British Intelligence, 2: 291, 322–25.

188
The assertion in
DRuZW
, 3: 681, that this diversion practically halted the V-Boat war in the Atlantic is exaggerated, but there was a very substantial effect. See Salewski,
Seekriegsleitung
, 1: 472–85; Hinsley,
British Intelligence
, 2: 326–28.

189
Note KTB Skl A 12, 14 Aug. 1940, BA/MA, RM 7/15, f. 163, and A 13,7 Sept. 1940, RM 7/16, f. 80. The British were confident that there would be no invasion in 1940 by Oct. 3 I (Gilbert,
Churchill
6: 879–81).

190
Hastings,
Bomber Command
, p. 110; Webster and Frankland,
Strategic Air Offensive
, 1: 163

191
Note the Churchill minute of 20 Oct. 1940 in Churchill,
Second World War
2: 603–4, and Hastings, pp. 125, 126, 136–37, 140–42.

192
Webster and Frankland, 1: 155–66; Hastings, pp. 116–17.

193
On British concentration on the air force and navy as the implements of victory, see Kennedy,
Business of War
, pp. 96–97. On the shift to the bombing of cities as it became clear in the summer of 194I that specific targets could not be hit, see Dudley Saward,
"Bomber" Harris
(Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday, 1985), pp. 108–1 I; Hastings, pp. 12747. There is a helpful discussion of Harris in the review articles, “‘Bomber’ Harris in Perspective,”
Journal of the United Service for Defence Studies
, 130, No.2 (1985), 62–70. On Lord Cherwell’s role, see esp. PRO, PREM 3/119/10.

194
A good survey in Salewski,
Seekriegsleitung
, 1: 425–49. On the combat experience of the “Condor,” see Kenneth Poolman,
Focke-Wulf Condor: Scourge of the Atlantic
(London: Macdonald & Jane’s, 1978).

195
Note, e.g., the acrimonious meeting of Goring and Donitz recorded in “Vnterredung B.d.V. mit Reichsmarschall am 7.2.41," BA/MA, RM 6/74, f. 43–45.

196
There is a massive literature on the
Bismarck
episode. Good accounts in Salewski,
Seekriegsleitung
, 1: 392–98;
DRuZW
, 6: 370–83; Donald F. Steury, “Naval Intelligence, the Atlantic Campaign and the Sinking of the Bismarck: A Study in the Integration of Intelligence and the Conduct of Naval Warfare,"
JCH
22 (1987), 209–34. The
Prinz Eugen
escaped but had to return to port on account of engine trouble.

197
Hinsley,
British Intelligence
, 2: 165.

198
Salewski, 1: 449–70; Hinsley,
British Intelligence
, 2: 179–88;
DRuZW
, 6: 384–88. To make sure that the Germans could not resume such operations, the British on March 17, 1942, staged a special raid against the drydock at St. Nazaire on the French coast, the only one large enough to repair the
Tirpitz
, Germany’s newest battleship (Hinsley, 2: 192).

199
This meant that the British limited shipments to Ireland; they were reluctant to risk more lives and ships than necessary to assist the Free State which refused to assist them.