A World at Arms (202 page)

54
A good account in Gerald R. Kleinfeld and Lewis A. Tambs,
Hitler’s Spanish Legion: The Blue Division in Russia
(Carbondale, III.: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1979). See also Smyth,
British Policy and Franco’s Spain,
pp. 229–30; Klaus-Jorg Ruhl,
Spanien im Zweiten Weltkrieg: Franco, die Falange und das “Dritte Reich”
(Hamburg: Hoffman & Campe, 1975), pp. 27–3 I. On the anthem incident, see
ADAP
, D, 13, No 70 n 2.

55
The heavy losses incurred by the division, and German inability to provide relief for it, put a real strain on German-Spanish relations in the winter of 1941–42 (
ADAP
, E, I, Nos. 109, 205, 268; 2, No. 62).

56
On the German attempt to obtain Turkish entry into the war with offers of territory at the expense of French Syria, see Önder,
Türkische Aussenpolitik
, pp. 127ff. Greek islands were also dangled in front of Turkish eyes but never in sufficient quantities to move the Ankara government. All the Germans could get was a new non-aggression pact (AA, St.S., “Türkei,” Bd. 3, passim).

57
Waley,
Codeword Barbarossa
; note also the references to Stalin’s rejection of warnings, cited in Chalmers Johnson,
An Instance of Treason: Ozaki Hotsumi and the Sorge Spy Ring,
expanded edition (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1990), p. 290 n 16.

58
Erickson,
Road to Stalingrad,
chaps. 1 and 2; Jacob W. Kipp, “Barbarossa, Soviet Covering Forces and the Initial Period of War: Military History and Airland Battle” (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Soviet Armies Studies Office, 1987); Volkogonov, Stalin, chaps. 41–43.

59
Erickson, chap. 3, esp. pp. 132–35.

60
Ibid., p. 225.

61
A preliminary discussion of the evacuation of people (c. 16.5 million including refugees) and of industrial facilities, in Mark Harrison,
Soviet Planning in Peace and War, 1938–1945
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985), pp. 63–79.

62
Gordon A. Prange,
Target Tokyo: The Story of the Sorge Spy Ring
(New York: McGraw Hill, 1984); Johnson,
Instance of Treason
.

63
Text in James,
Churchill Speeches,
6: 6428–31. See also John Colville,
The Fringes of Power: 10 Downing Street Diaries 1939–1955
(New York: Norton, 1985), 21–22 June 1941, pp. 403–6; Gilbert,
Churchill
, 6: chap. 58.

64
See the account of his talk with Soviet Ambassador Maisky in London on June 19, 1941, N 3099/3/38, PRO, FO 371/29466.

65
War Cabinet 59(41) of 12 June 1941, and related documents, in N 3500/3014/38, PRO,
FO 371/29561; War Cabinet 61(41) of 19 June and 62(41) of 23 June 1941, CAB 65/18. RAF documents on plans beginning on 19 June 1941 are in AIR 8/928 and AIR 20/25’

66
Kettenacker, “Alliance,”
JCH
17 (1982), 436–37. Obviously, though, a Soviet victory would reduce Britain’s role; see Leeper memorandum of 7 July 1941, N 3718/78/38, PRO, FO 371/29486.

67
Note the letter to the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs dated 24 June handed to MacFarlane on 25 June 1941, PRO, WO 216/124.

68
Ibid. See also MacFarlane’s letter of 1 Aug. 1941 in ibid, and Cadogan’s and Eden’s comments on the underestimation by the British military in London, in N 77/30/38, PRO, FO 371/32904’

69
Brooke to Mac Farlane, 27 Oct. 1941, PRO, WO 216/124.

70
Whitney to Donovan No. 5392 of 12 Nov. 1941, FDRL, PSF, COl Donovan File 1–41.

71
Beaumont,
Comrades in Anns
pp. 32–34; Gilbert,
Churchill,
6: chap. 61.

72
See the documents in PRO, AIR 8/564, 840, 937, 939; AIR 20/1398; WO 106/5729.

73
Brian Schofield,
The Russian Convoys
(London: Pan, 1984), first published in 1964, remains an excellent account. See now also Simpson,
Admiral Stark,
pp. 143–45.

74
The best account of the supply route is still T. H. Vail Motter, The
Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia
in the U.S. Army in World War II series (Washington: GPO, 1952). As Beaumont,
Comrades in Arms
pp. 82–85, points out, very little use could be made of the route in the first months of the war in the East. A detailed account of the occupation of Iran is in Stewart,
Sunrise at Abadan,
chaps. 4–10.

75
Gilbert,
Churchill,
6: chaps. 63–64.

76
Murray,
Luftwaffe,
p. 83. On the transfer of Kesselring, see also Schüler,
Logistik im RusslandJeldzug,
p. 475 n 101.

77
Woodward, British Foreign Policy, 2: 5–14.

78
The best account currently available is Terry,
Poland’s Place in Europe,
pp. 56–65. See also Detlef Brandes,
Grossbritannien und seine osteuropäischen Alliierten 1939–1943
(Munich: Oldenbourg, 1988), pp. 155–61.

79
See Terry,
Poland’s Place in Europe,
p. 61 n 40, p. 64 n 47.

80
Ciechanowski to Donovan, 27 Sep. 1941, FDRL, PSF Box 141, Coordinator of Information. See also Richard C. Lucas, The
Strange Allies: The United States and Poland
, 19411945 (Knoxville: Univ. of Tennessee Press, 1978), pp. 7–14.

81
A basic account remains Raymond Dawson,
The Decision to Aid Russia, 1941: Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics
(Chapel Hill, N.C.: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1959). More recent accounts are John L. Gaddis,
The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947
(New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1972), pp. 34–41; Herring,
Aid to Russia,
chap. I. On Roosevelt’s belief from the beginning that the Russians would hold out, see Owen Lattimore and Fujiko Isono,
China Memoirs: Chiang Kai-shek and the War against Japan
(Tokyo: Univ. of Tokyo Press, 1990), pp. 82–83.

82
Memorandum of Hopkins, 25 Nov. 1941, FDRL, PSF Safe File, Cont. 7, Russia. Similar comments by Roosevelt can be found on a 17 Feb. 1942 U.S. Maritime Commission document in PSF Safe File, Cont. I, ABCD Folder; a 21 Feb. 1942 letter to the Maritime Commission in Lend-Lease PSF Safe File, Cont. 5, Marshall; and Roosevelt’s comments to Morgenthau on 11 Mar. 1942 in Morgenthau Presidential Diary, 5: 1075.

83
ADAP
,
D, 13, Nos. 225, 239, E, I, No. 12; Japanese military attaché Washington to the Vice Chief of the Japanese General Staff in Tokyo No. 179 of 4 Sep. 1941, NA, RG 457, SRA 15810–11.

84
The President’s worry about a Japanese attack on the Soviet Union is documented in Roosevelt to Admiral Stark and General Marshall, 4 Mar. 1942, FDRL, PSF Safe File, Box 5, Marshall. On China’s retention of Sinkiang, see Garver,
Chinese-Soviet Relations,
chap. 6; Garver also argues (chap. 8) that it was the German-Soviet War which enabled Mao Tse-tung to emancipate the Chinese Communist Party from Moscow.

85
On
the Hopkins trip, see George Mc Jimsey,
Harry Hopkins: Ally of the Poor and Defender of Democracy
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1987), chap. 12; Erickson,
Road to Stalingrad,
p. 181; John D. Langer, “The Harriman-Beaverbrook Mission and the Debate over Unconditional Aid,” in Walter Laqueur (ed.)
The Second World War
(London: Sage, 1982), pp. 300–19.

86
See esp. Beaumont,
Comrades in Arms,
pp. 45–46, 52–66; McJimsey,
Harry Hopkins,
pp. 189–92; Herring,
Aid to Russia,
chap. 2; Hans Knoll,
Jugoslawien in Strategie und Politik der Alliierten
1940–1943
(Munich: Oldenbourg, 1986), pp. 477–88. The article by Langer cited in n 85, above, also stresses the hope of Churchill and Roosevelt for better post-war relations; it is the best summary of the issue on the basis of solid research.

87
Note
ADAP
,
E, I, NO.4.

88
See, e.g., Oshima’s reports 377 and 378 on his meeting with Ribbentrop on 17 Mar. 1942, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 20696–98.

89
Ingeborg Fleischhauer,
Die Chance des Sonderfriedens: Deutsch-sowjetische Geheimgespräche 1941–1945
(Berlin: Siedler, 1986). This book is especially useful for its examination of Swedish, American and German records.

90
Beaumont,
Comrades in Arms,
pp. 50–52; Woodward,
British Foreign Policy,
2: chap. 20; Gilbert,
Churchill,
6: chap. 62.

91
Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
2: 58ff; Gilbert, 6: 1209.

92
It would appear that some of the British intelligence gathered from decrypts was passed to the Russians through a special mission in Moscow while some was fed into an espionage network in Switzerland that was nominally working for the Soviet Union.

93
Beaumont,
Comrades in Arms,
pp. 69–7 I; Heinrichs,
Threshold,
pp. 105–8; Kettenacker, “Alliance,” pp. 439–42; Woodward, 2: chaps. 20, 26; Erickson, pp. 293–96; Axel Gietz,
Die neue Alte Welt: Roosevelt, Churchill und die europäische Nachkriegsordnung
(Munich: Fink, 1986), pp. 184–88; Ross,
Foreign Office and Kremlin,
chap. 3.

94
Woodward, 2: 220–21.

95
Note Halifax to Churchill, 11 Jan. 1942, warning that in view of the possibility of a good offer from Hitler to Stalin, Britain could not simply say “No” (PRO, PREM 4/29/9). See also Graham Ross, “Foreign Office Attitudes to the Soviet Union 1941–1945,”
JCH
16 (1981), 523. The key documents are Eden’s memorandum “Policy toward Russia,” of 8 Feb. 1942, WP4269 in PRO, CAB 66/21, and his memorandum of 24 Feb. 1942, WP
⁴²
96, CAB 66/22.

96
Mason-MacFarlane to Brooke, 22 Dec. 1941 and 8 Jan. 1942, PRO, WO 216/24; Ross,
Foreign Office and Kremlin,
p. 524; Beaumont,
Comrades in Arms,
pp. looff; Kettenacker, “Alliance”, pp. 442–44; N 7471/3/38, PRO, FO 371/29655. According to a paper by Gabriel Gorodetsky given at the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies in 1991, the Soviet Union attached great importance to the project for a landing at Petsamo.

At one point in the difficult talks, Churchill evidently thought of going to Moscow himself; see Brooke diary, 5 Mar. 1942, Liddell Hart Centre.

Hugh Phillips in “Mission to America: Maksim Litvinov in the United States, 1941–1943,”
Diplomatic History
12 (1988), 261–75, claims on the basis of published Soviet documents that at a meeting on Mar. 12, 1942, Roosevelt agreed to the Soviet 1941 border. The assertion is contradicted, not supported, by other evidence and subsequent events.

97
Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
2: 116–17.

98
Note that of the German air force losses from June 22, 1941 to the end of the year, three-quarters were in the East (
DRuZW
, 4: 699–700). On land the ratio was even higher; only at sea were German losses greater in the West than in the East.

99
See esp. Churchill’s growling message to Cripps of Oct. 28, 1941, in Gilbert,
Churchill,
6: 1227–28) which includes the portions changed in the final text in Woodward)
British
Foreign Policy)
2: 44–45.

100
Louis Morton)
The War in the Pacific, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years
(Washington: GPO) 1962) pp. 156–57; Beaumont, (
Comrades in Arms
) chap. 4.

101
The U.S. War Department G-2 appreciation of the situation of 5 Dec. 1941 noted that the Germans appeared to be in considerable trouble in the East but attributed no offensive capability to the Soviet Union (Sherman Miles Memorandum for the Chief of Staff) NA) RG 165, Entry 77, Box 1419).

102
Erickson,
Road to Stalingrad,
pp. 267ff.; Klaus Reinhardt,
Die Wende vor Moskau: Das Scheitern der Strategie Hitlers im Winter 1941/42
(Stuttgart: Deutsche VerlagsAnstalt, 1972 (an excellent study showing that the Germans had been effectively defeated before the winter battles); Schüler,
Logistik im RusslandJeldzug,
pp. 401ff; Ziemke,
Moscow to Stalingrad,
chaps. 4–5. For Soviet perspectives, see Alexander M. Samsonov,
Pages from the History of the AntiFascist War
(Moscow: U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, 1978), pp. 6–55; Michael Parrish (ed.)
Battle for Moscow: The 1942 Soviet General Staff Study
(Washington: Pergamon-Brassey, 1987).

103
DRuZW
, 4: 620–21; Bücheler,
Hoepner
, pp. 167–72; Walter Chales de Beaulieu,
Generaloberst Erich Hoepner: Militärisches Portrait eines Panzerführers
(Neckargemund: Vowinckel 1969) pp. 246–53. On the appalled reaction of another general to the use of scarce trains to ship Jews to be murdered rather than supplies and reinforcements to the front, see Hans Rothfels (ed.), “Ausgewählte Briefe von Generalmajor Helmuth Stieff,”
VjZ
2 (1954) 302–3 (letter of 19 Nov. 1941); cf. Schüler,
Logistik im RusslandJeldzug,
pp. 472–73.

104
The text of Hitler)s speech at this last meeting of the Reichstag is in Domarus,
Hitler
2: 1865–77. The relevant documents on the end of any rule of law in Germany are in BA) R 4311/958) f. 38–129. For the place of the Hoepner incident in a broader context. see Gerhard L. Weinberg, “The Nazi Revolution: A War against Human Rights,” in Moses Rischin and Raphael Asher (eds.)
The Jewish Legacy and the German Conscience
(Berkeley, Calif.: Judah L. Magnes Museum, 1991) pp. 287–96. An interesting British reaction is in the Cabinet Memorandum “Hitler’s Speech of April 28, 1942," 30 Apr. 1942, WP(42) 182, PRO, CAB 66/24.

105
The original plan appears to have been to replace Halder by Jodi and the latter by Manstein when the last named had completed the conquest of the Crimea, see the diary of the Chef des Stabes AHA, 19 Dec. 1941, Imperial War Museum) M 114/981/2) f. 2.

106
"Meldungen aus dem Reich (Nr. 248) vom 5. Januar 1942,” in Heinz Boberach (ed.)
Meldungen aus dem Reich
(Herrsching: Pawlak, 1984) 9: 3120–22.