A World at Arms (79 page)

If the attack on shipping was one way of striking at the economy of the Axis, the blockade imposed by the Allies was another. Having gone to war with all her neighbors except the Soviet Union, Japan was not in a position to draw any benefit from trade with neutral powers; the South American countries which had remained out of the war were too far away for Japan to engage in any substantial trade with them.
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Germany, on the other hand, bordered on and traded with several neutral countries even after her attack on the Soviet Union:
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Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Vichy France and Turkey. In these cases, there was an opportunity for Germany to draw directly on their resources and also to try to obtain goods from other neutrals, especially in South America, across them. On the other hand, the Allies were interested both in preventing goods from being sent to Germany across these neutrals and also to keep the neutrals themselves from supplying Germany. It was in opposition to such practices that the Allied blockade operated during the war.
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To prevent transshipment of goods, the Allies, with the British generally taking the lead, tried to ration the neutrals so that the Germans could not import goods which were nominally consigned to neutral
neighbors. A complicated system of controls, operated primarily by the British, served this purpose and worked reasonably well. There was some slippage through the neutrals, but very little, and there was some smuggling of items by individual seamen on neutral ships trying to make substantial profits for themselves.
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Some materials which the Allies had allowed into Spain and into Vichy France did end up being re–shipped to German-occupied Europe, but the volume was never substantial.
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The main concern was always the direct shipment of goods from the neutrals to Germany, especially as in some cases the items involved were of great military significance.

As discussed in
Chapter 2
, the trade between Germany and Sweden was a major focus of concern throughout the war. Germany drew from Sweden a substantial volume of high-grade iron ore and a high proportion of her steel ball bearings. The Germans were continually pressuring the Swedes to deliver more while the Allies were trying to restrict the flow. Three factors influenced the long and tedious struggle over Swedish exports to Germany. The first was the ability and willingness of Germany to pay for what she bought. The Swedes did not wish to allow her to run up debts, in effect borrowing from Sweden to pay for the imports. In 1941, when Germany still seemed to be winning the war and was in a strong position to threaten military action, the Swedes did extend her considerable credits; but, as the tide of war turned, the Germans found it more and more difficult to extort credit. On the contrary’ in 1943–44, when they could least afford it, they had to export at last some coal and some war materials to pay for a portion of the imports.
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The payments issue already points to the second factor in the picture: the military situation. As long as Germany could effectively threaten Sweden, the latter was more inclined to make concessions to Berlin; as it became more and more obvious that Germany could not afford to take the initiative in beginning hostilities against Sweden and that the Allies were going to win the war-and in the not too distant future-Stockholm was more likely to yield to Allied pressure.
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As one follows the difficult negotiations of both sides with Sweden, however, a third facet can be recognized, and that is the general inclination of the Swedish government to assist Germany as much as possible in spite of Allied pressure. In spite of the fact that most of the post-war literature attempts to present Swedish policy in the best possible light, the evidence–even that offered in the most eloquent apologias–shows a consistent and determined effort to slip as much iron ore and steel ball bearings to Germany as possible.
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Although a series of agreements between Sweden and Germany
seemed to be more and more restrictive each year, the Swedes did what they could to assist Germany in spite of the appearance of greater restrictions in 1943.
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The last and most restrictive German-Swedish agreement was signed on January 10, 1944, but even during that winter the Swedes, feeling confident that the Allies–unlike the Germans earlier–would not punish them by invasion, did what they could to circumvent their promises to the Allies by shipping ball–bearings to Germany.
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In April 1944 they rejected an Allied demand for an end of ball bearing exports at a time when both the Allies and the Germans thought that these were essential for the German war economy.
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As Allied bombing of German Baltic ports and political pressure on Stockholm increased, the Swedes in August 1944 began to insist that the Germans provide their own ships, refusing to provide Swedish ships any more for war supplies.
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Later that year, they were still circumventing their own promise to the Allies to cease delivering ball bearings,
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and only at the end of 1944-when it clearly made very little difference any more were the Swedes prevailed upon to stop.
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The Swedish government was interested in getting and retaining German permission for a minimal level of Swedish seaborne trade with the outside world, but this was as much in German as in Swedish interest. The most plausible explanation for the policy of accommodating Germany in her need for critical materials is to be found in the sympathy of some circles for her in the early part of the war and worry about the advance of the Soviet Union in the latter years of the conflict. Sweden made some important humanitarian gestures during the war, but it insured that it would be one of the very few countries on earth to profit handsomely from it.
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Spain was important to Germany as a source of wolfram, needed for the steel–hardening alloy tungsten, iron ore, and mercury and zinc ore. Here also the issue of German payment played an important role. Spain was simply too poor, and its government too nationalistic, to be able or to want to extend credits to Germany. Time and again the Spaniards held up exports to ensure German payment in arms, machines, and other forms of compensation.
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The Allies, on the other hand, used their economic leverage on Spain with increasing effectiveness to inhibit Spanish exports to Germany, especially wolfram, and also bought as much as they could themselves in a program of preclusive buying.
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The Spaniards took advantage of the situation to extort maximum payments from both sides, eventually yielding to Allied pressure in early 1944-after quickly selling as much as possible to the Germans and then letting them smuggle out some more until the Allied advance closed the border in August 1944.
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The government in Madrid was even more
pro-German in its orientation than that in Stockholm. Certainly, if it had not been for Allied pressure, the Germans would have been able to draw more heavily on the Spanish economy; but as it was, they obtained substantial quantities of important goods.
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The most critical material for her war effort that Germany needed from Portugal was wolfram, and in this country also pressure from both sides and competitive buying were significant. As in the case of Spain, the Germans obtained a considerable amount but not all they wanted. There were, however, several differences. The Portuguese government, headed by Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, was more sympathetic to the Allies than the Franco regime in Spain. It was, in addition, affected by the decision of Brazil, with which Portugal had special ties dating back to colonial times, to join the United Nations in the war against Germany after a German campaign against Brazilian shipping. On the other hand, Salazar was a man who did not appreciate being pushed around, an issue on which the Americans were generally less inclined to be patient than the British. In this case also the final cutting off came in 1944, ironically a day before the invasion of June 6 made the whole issue theoretical.
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The pressures of both sides on Switzerland led to especially complicated negotiations during the war. As explained in
Chapter 3
, the Germans intended to occupy and partition the country with Italy in the late summer of 1940 but then postponed the disappearance of what they considered an undesirable entity until after victory in the war. Later it would be easy to dispose of Switzerland when its main defense assets, the railway communications through the Gotthard and Simplon tunnels, were no longer of such great importance to Axis military operations. In the meantime, the Germans would provide some coal to keep Swiss industry working–primarily for the Axis. This pattern was shielded against Allied pressure by the economic interest of much of Swiss industry in German orders, and the generally pro-German preferences of the Federal Councillor in charge of foreign affairs, Marcel Edouard Pilet-Golaz. In spite of Allied rationing of imports and repeated pressure attempts, Switzerland’s industry worked hard for Germany, substantially increasing its exports, which included arms and ammunition, during 1943 as the bombing of Germany increased her incentive to turn to the safer factories of Switzerland for products.

The occupation of Vichy France in November 1942 gave the Germans an additional means of pressure since their troops now surrounded the country on all sides. By this time, however, the Allies were fed up with Swiss maneuvers and threatened to use, and began to use, their most important weapon. By blacklisting or threatening to blacklist Swiss firms,
thereby presenting major segments of the Swiss industrial economy–and their owners and directors–with the prospect of a post-war future in which they were not likely to participate, the Allies waved a stick that the wartime profiteers could understand. By this time, it was obvious to them that the Allies would win the war, and that the exclusion of Swiss firms from a world dominated by the United Nations was certain to end the country’s prosperity permanently. Here was a form of pressure that left Switzerland politically independent but imperilled its economic future. The policy of the government now changed, and the new trade agreement of December 19, 1943 met most of the Allied demands. On October 1, 1944, Switzerland embargoed all exports of war materials.
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The last of the European neutrals which needs to be discussed is Turkey. Although other products, especially copper, mohair, and skins were a significant element in trade discussions, the most important focus of attention was always chrome. Not only did German war industry need Turkish chrome, the United States also was short of chrome so that Allied purchases were as much for their own use as to preempt the Germans. The Turks had originally stalled off the Germans by allowing the British to purchase chrome in 1942, in effect promising the bulk of 1943 and 1944 production to the Germans. Though formally allied to Great Britain, Turkey was primarily interested in making territorial gains at the expense of Greece and/or Syria if that were possible, and building up her own military power in exchange for whatever she exported to either side.
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In the background in Ankara was always the fear that either Germany or Russia would win the titanic battle on the Eastern Front and that the winner might then try to dominate Turkey.

Three other factors operated in this situation. One was the great difficulty Germany had in actually delivering the armaments which the Turks insisted on as payment for chrome. If in the end the Germans received substantial quantities of chrome, perhaps some 70,000 tons (compared to over 100,000 in 1939) and not even more, it was due to short–falls in German deliveries rather than to Turkish reluctance or Allied pressure.
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Secondly, the Allies were always hoping, especially in 1942 and 1943, that Turkey would come into the war on their side, and they were therefore reluctant to press the Turkish authorities too hard. Churchill’s meeting with their President, Prime Minister, and Foreign Minister at Adana at the end of January 1943 appears to have convinced him that they were serious about entering the war, and he remained fooled by the Turks, who had no such intention, for a year.
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A military mission was sent as well as substantial military equipment to strengthen the Turkish army.

The third factor which assuredly did not assist the Allies was the fact that from October or November 1943 to February 1944 the valet of the British ambassador in Ankara was regularly providing the Germans with copies of secret messages from the ambassador’s safe. A serious scholarly examination of the “Cicero” case remains to be written, and the implications for British code security have not as yet been fully investigated at least in material available to the public. Whatever else mayor may not have been compromised, the leak certainly did not make the task of Allied diplomacy in Turkey any easier.
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In early 1944, the Allies were tired of Turkish stalling and their continued deliveries of chrome to the Germans. In January they withdrew the military mission and began imposing economic restrictions on Turkey. Patience as well as gullibility had run out in London and Washington. The effects were quick and dramatic. On April 20, 1944, the Turks announced the halting of all chrome deliveries to Germany-and on Hitler’s birthday at that–and on August 1 broke diplomatic and economic relations with Berlin. It had become obvious to the authorities in Ankara that the Allies would soon win the war, that the Germans were in no position to do anything to them in the meantime, and that it behoved Turkey to be in the good graces of Britain and the United States when the war was over.
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With minimal variations depending on circumstances and conditions, the neutrals tended to follow essentially similar policies in the face of pressures from both sides. They recognized that by their nature the two sides had differing choices, and the neutrals did their best–or worst–to profit from this situation. It was obvious on the basis of their prior record that the Axis powers would as soon crush the neutrals as respect them and that there would be no place for any independent states in a German-dominated Europe. On the other hand, the Allies were clearly inclined to respect the neutrals’ right to exist, certainly if they won the war, and probably during the fighting. The one advantage the Allies had, even before their victory appeared certain, was their ability to follow the line being taken by most of the neutrals in negotiations with the Axis by reading the reports of the Japanese diplomats and service attaches stationed there. But this did not greatly help them cope with the basic inclinations of the neutral governments.