Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War (24 page)

By the end of 1971 the burgeoning bilateral relationship between Washington and Brasilia, in particular, was already beginning to bear fruit. At the very least, Nixon acknowledged Brazil’s “help” in turning back left-wing advances in Bolivia and Uruguay.
⁸²
In late August 1971 Bolivia’s nationalist military leader since October 1970, Juan José Torres, had been overthrown by a right-wing coup. Only a few months before, the White House had begun paying close attention to his government. Back then, Nachmanoff had warned Kissinger of a “highly unstable and deteriorating situation” in the country.
⁸³
Torres had closed a U.S. satellite tracking station in the country, expelled U.S. labor organizations, and sent the Peace Corps home, while Bolivian students seized U.S. properties, causing $36,000 worth of damage.
⁸⁴
Although these actions were often the result of local factors, American officials perceived them as part of a Cold War zero-sum game.
⁸⁵
Indeed, the U.S. ambassador in La Paz, Ernest Siracusa, warned that, having gone from being “unimportant,” Bolivia was on the verge of becoming a “Soviet satellite.”
⁸⁶
And by June 1971 Kissinger had regarded the Bolivian situation as “urgent.”
⁸⁷

Available evidence suggests more than a coincidental link between this concern and the events that followed. Along with indications that CIA and Pentagon officials were involved in plotting, the U.S. Air Force is reported to have allowed coup leaders to use its communications system on day one of their offensive.
⁸⁸
After the coup took place, Kissinger also personally pushed for improving ties with the coup’s leader, Colonel Hugo Banzer, who had close links to the Pentagon.
⁸⁹
Even so, by getting involved, Washington joined—rather than directed—Brazilian and Argentine interventions. Certainly, Brazil had been plotting against Torres since 1970, when Brazilian intelligence services had furnished Banzer with a plane and weapons to escape Bolivia after a previous failed coup attempt.
⁹⁰

To Cuba’s foreign minister, who was visiting Chile when Torres was overthrown, the Bolivian coup was clearly a continental “American battle” and an “objective lesson for revolutionaries throughout the hemisphere” rather than an isolated incident that concerned only Bolivia.
⁹¹
Only two months earlier, Foreign Minister Raúl Roa had privately described Torres as a positive pillar in a new Latin American configuration of forces. As the Cubans saw it, Torres had secured the support of Bolivia’s peasant masses, and the country had a higher degree of social radicalization than even Chile or Peru.
⁹²
Yet the Cubans’ hopes for Torres now lay in tatters. Moreover, Havana’s leaders interpreted the Bolivian coup as a signal that a “counteroffensive” aimed at putting the “breaks on growing revolutionary processes” in Latin America had begun.
⁹³

If Nixon was grateful for Brazil’s “help” in Bolivia, he also recognized that Brazil had “helped” Washington in Uruguay. There, it had helped forestall the victory of Uruguay’s left-wing coalition, the Frente Amplio (or Broad Front), in elections widely feared as a possible repeat of Chile’s 1970 race. While advocating U.S. operations to “blunt” the Frente Amplio’s chances, the U.S. Embassy in Montevideo had welcomed cooperation between Uruguay’s security forces and Brazil and Argentina.
⁹⁴
Before the election, Brazil had also stationed military units on Uruguay’s border and formulated plans to invade should sabotage fail.
⁹⁵
As it turned out, extensive reports that the Brazilians planned to intervene may well have been exaggerated (the units on the border actually withdrew before the election in the face of widespread condemnation), but Brazil’s shadow had a psychological effect on internal Uruguayan developments. And when Uruguayans went to the polls on 28 November, the ruling Colorado Party and its candidate, Juan María Bordaberry, overwhelmingly defeated the Frente Amplio. In Nixon’s words, Brazil had helped “rig” the elections.
⁹⁶

Less than a week later, the Washington-Brasilia axis was consolidated when Brazil’s president, General Emílio Garrastazu Médici, arrived in the United States. The visit had not been without its procedural difficulties, given that the Brazilian leader had asked for a greater public fanfare upon arrival than he received. However, once in Washington, Médici was privately accorded deference and special treatment. As he told Nixon at the end of his visit, he could not have been “more pleased with the way things had gone.”
⁹⁷
The general not only shared the U.S. president’s view of unsettling and potentially dangerous trends in Latin America but was also able to inform Nixon about Brazil’s initiatives and “assistance” to counter such
developments, particularly when it came to Uruguay and Bolivia. Sitting in the Oval Office during two summit meetings, Médici nevertheless noted “the future of Latin America looked pretty bleak.” As he stated, “it was true that the ‘Broad Front’ had been defeated [in Uruguay] and the traditional parties had led the election, but if one looked at the other side of that coin one would see that the Communists and their friends, who had polled 5% of the votes in the preceding election, had polled 20% this time…. [Meanwhile] Bolivia was in desperate straits…. if the present Bolivian government did not succeed it would be the last moderate government in Bolivia, which would then fall into the arms of the Communists and become another Cuba or Chile.”
⁹⁸

Nixon, who seems to have been more aware of the situation in Uruguay and less up to date on the Bolivian developments, appreciated his guest’s analysis and said he was “very happy to hear about” Brasilia’s efforts to combat these dangerous trends. And in this respect, Médici specifically mentioned his efforts to persuade Paraguay’s dictator, Alfredo Stroessner, to give Bolivia access to power supplies from the hydroelectric dam Brazil was financing on the Paraná River. Médici also raised the problems related to funding Brazil’s armed forces in the light of their new requirements for dealing with developments in neighboring countries. As Médici lamented, the Brazilian armed forces were a third the size of Italy’s, despite Brazil having double Italy’s population. When Nixon then asked if military contacts should continue between U.S. forces and their Latin American counterparts, Médici replied affirmatively, arguing that it was “the only way to ensure the stability that was essential to economic development.” In both meetings, the presidents also agreed unequivocally not to change their policies toward Cuba, which they regarded as representing a threat to the hemisphere. “We should not lose sight of the situation in Latin America which could blow up at any time,” Médici warned.
⁹⁹

While exchanging views on this explosive situation and the general’s opinion of the “desperate” situation in Bolivia, Nixon appears to have been very taken by Médici’s insistence that Brasilia and Washington coordinate their efforts to improve the balance of forces in the region. As the CIA noted afterward, “President Nixon took great interest in this proposal and promised to assist Brazil when and wherever possible.”
¹⁰⁰
General Vernon Walters, who had returned to Washington to serve as an interpreter for these meetings between two presidents he also counted as his personal friends, later wrote up memorandums of their conversations. He recorded
the Brazilian president as saying that “both the U.S. and Brazil should do everything in their power to assist the other countries of South America. [Médici] did not believe that the Soviets or the Chinese were interested in giving any assistance to these countries’ Communist Movements; they felt that Communism would come all by itself because of the misery and poverty in these countries.”

When Nixon asked Médici what he thought of Chile, he must have been thrilled with the reply he received, for the general not only underlined similar concerns about Allende’s government but also stressed the prospects for cooperation. As Walters noted, Médici told his host that Brasilia was
already
intervening in Chilean affairs.

President Médici said that Allende would be overthrown for very much the same reasons that Goulart had been overthrown in Brazil. The President then asked whether President Médici thought that the Chilean Armed Forces were capable of overthrowing Allende. President Médici replied that he felt that they were, adding that Brazil was exchanging many officers with the Chileans, and made clear that Brazil was working towards this end. The President said that it was very important that Brazil and the United States work closely in this field. We could not take direction but if the Brazilians felt that there was something we could do to be helpful in this area, he would like President Médici to let him know. If money were required or other discreet aid, we might be able to make it available. This should be held in the greatest confidence. But we must try and prevent new Allendes and Castros and try where possible to reverse these trends. President Médici said that he was happy to see that the Brazilian and American positions and views were so close.
¹⁰¹

Médici’s acknowledgment of Brazilian intervention in Chile and the prospect of a U.S.-Brazilian partnership against Allende were perfect examples of the Nixon Doctrine’s regional potential. Nixon appears to have been ready to intervene unilaterally in Latin America if need be, but Brazil’s growing role in boosting counterrevolutionary forces in South America perfectly suited U.S. attempts to share its Cold War burden with key regional allies and lessen its own exposure. In a separate meeting with Médici, Kissinger followed up on this idea of cooperation and coordination. He explained that the United States needed the “advice and cooperation of the largest and most important nation in South America. In areas of mutual concern such as the situations in Uruguay and Bolivia, close
cooperation and parallel approaches can be very helpful for our common objectives. He felt it was important for the U.S. and Brazil to coordinate, so that Brazil does some things and we do others for the common good.”
¹⁰²

To facilitate such coordination, Nixon offered Médici a direct channel of communication to the White House, “outside the normal diplomatic channels.”
¹⁰³
As it turns out, Kissinger had actually raised the idea of a “special consultation arrangement” with Brazil six months earlier when he and the president had been discussing their fears that congressional investigations on torture in Brazil and misguided liberals in the State Department might undermine the United States’ relationship with Brasilia.
¹⁰⁴
But the success of the Brazilian president’s visit—or, as Nixon put it, because he and Médici had “gotten along so well”—added impetus to the idea. Subsequently, when Nixon named Kissinger as the U.S. contact for this channel, Médici happily reciprocated, nominating his foreign minister, Gibson Barbosa, as his respective interlocutor (he explained that he already handled selected private matters outside the Brazilian Foreign Ministry with Gibson Barbosa). For “extremely private matters,” Médici also recommended that the White House could contact the Brazilian colonel Manso Netto. Having agreed on who would be involved in this special channel, the next step was to decide what it would accomplish. Médici, for one, suggested it could be used as a way of discussing how Brazil and the United States might help the “million” Cuban exiles throughout the Americas to overthrow Castro. Nixon agreed to look into this. On a more general note, he then again conveyed his hopes for the special channel and the new U.S.-Brazilian axis, particularly as “there were many things that Brazil as a South American country could do that the U.S. could not.”
¹⁰⁵

It is hard to imagine a more successful summit or a more gratifying follow-up to Nixon’s orders to build up relations with Brazil in the immediate aftermath of Allende’s election . During his meeting with the general, Kissinger had underscored the “paramount importance” Washington attached to relations with Brasilia and had listened as his interlocutor referred to the two countries as “lovers.”
¹⁰⁶
Even more so than Kissinger, Nixon was eager to ensure that Médici enjoyed his visit, and Kissinger later assured the president that Médici had been “really very impressed” by Nixon.
¹⁰⁷
And to crown this mutual affection at the end of the visit, Nixon publicly toasted Médici by saying “where Brazil goes, Latin America will follow.”

Although the State Department regarded this as highly embarrassing given domestic sensitivities to the Brazilian regime and Latin American suspicions about Brasilia’s hegemonic pretensions, Nixon’s public faux pas
revealed a private reality.
¹⁰⁸
Certainly, after his own meetings with Médici, Nixon privately told Rogers that he wished the general was “running the whole continent,” and the secretary concurred.
¹⁰⁹
By the end of 1971, Brazil was experiencing its third year of 9 percent economic growth. And despite its unequal distribution (Brazil’s poorest 80 percent received 27.5 percent of its GNP), Nixon held this growth up as proof that private investment and political authoritarianism paid off.
¹¹⁰
Beyond the State Department’s reaction to Nixon’s speech, the impact of the White House’s decisive pro-Brazil policy, initiated as a direct consequence of Allende’s election, was becoming all the more obvious to outsiders. As the
Washington Post
observed shortly after Médici’s visit, “after years” of what appeared to be no U.S. policy toward Latin America, one seemed to be evolving.
¹¹¹
Observantly, Castro also acknowledged that “partial imperialist victories” in Bolivia and Uruguay demonstrated a mobilized and strengthened “imperialist intention” to “restrain” new revolutionary trends in Latin America.
¹¹²

Nowhere was this more so than in Chile. Throughout late 1971, the 40 Committee had kept up its financing of Allende’s opposition parties and their media outlets while the CIA launched black operations to discredit La Vía Chilena and divide the Chilean Left. “Where possible,” the CIA station in Santiago had informed Langley, it was playing up Allende’s links to the far Left party, the MIR, implying that it was the president’s “covert action arm” and very useful “when he has to step outside the constitution to accomplish his objectives.”
¹¹³
Meanwhile, U.S. officials in Santiago kept a close eye on the military. In conversation with ex-president Eduardo Frei, Ambassador Korry had voiced his concerns that the Chilean armed forces were “a rather hermaphroditic body which Allende massaged seductively.”
¹¹⁴
Frei then implored the U.S. assistant secretary of state for Latin American affairs, Charles Meyer, to maintain “the closest possible relationship” with them, noting that “the Chilean people and their neighbors would understand this even if all other relationships were to be cut off.”
¹¹⁵
And in this context State Department officials agreed.
¹¹⁶